that were open. I happen to be in the mortuary business. I buried most of the people who were killed in the City of Detroit in this conflagration.

I went into their homes, and I note that the kind of homes that I went into involving these looters were not the homes of criminals. So I think we ought to put that in proper context and, I think, related to any suggestion that we should go in indiscriminately, using excessive amounts of force, including gunfire, in order to exercise some kind of control over this situation-I repeat, I am not a supporter of this kind of activity.

I am also curious about reference to the tourist trade being down here in the City of Washington, and relating it to the riot situation, because there has been some encouragement of this kind of reaction from some quarters right here on the Hill through newsletters and responses to requests for servicing groups that propose to come here, that they have actually been discouraged, that there are quarters on the Hill who have not stood up for this community, who have painted a situation here in Washington which has discouraged people, and they have made their contribution to the reduction in tourism in the City of Washington; and then, they have turned around and tried to attribute this to the disturbances which have taken place.

I think that we have a community here that we ought to stand up for. We ought to stand up for our Police Department and its policies. Obviously, there are instances in a situation like this where excessive amounts of force may have created a problem.

I think that those situations ought to be handled on an individual basis as these complaints come up.

I am curious-and I am now getting to the question-I am curious, Mr. Commissioner, as to why or if you plan on asking for more police. We passed an authorization for a minimum of 2500 policemen in the District of Columbia in 1956; and in 1961, we increased it to an authorization of no less than 3,000, and it has stood at that minimum figure for seven years.

There have been some very dramatic changes, not in the population necessarily, but there have been changes in protest techniques; there have been changes in the very character of this community and of this nation and of the issues that have been involved.

I am curious as to whether or not you contemplate petitioning the Appropriations Committee for an increase in appropriations so that you can raise the minimum number of police that would be required during these occasions?

I don't think we are going to go back. I think we have reached a new plateau that ought to be considered in this connection.

Collaterally, may I say, my experience in connection with calling out the National Guard and the Federal Troops has been that they have been called too late. I am certainly hopeful that you will take these matters into consideration and also the curfew techniques, that the time limits of imposing a curfew and calling out the National Guard is something that needs improvement, not only here, but across the country.

I know that there are some political implications involved in calling out the National Guard. This was our trouble in Detroit-when we needed troops, where the troops had to be requested by the Governor,

and the request was made by the Governor-and the troops were not sent in immediately because of certain political implications. The same may be true in connection with the National Guard situation here in our own community.

So the timeliness is a matter-the timeliness of calling out these supplemental enforcement agencies is extremely important; and I would like to get some comment from you with respect to some improvement in that decision-making process, and also of the curfew, and also with respect to the authority for more police, not-when I say more police, I don't mean a policeman on every corner, but certainly more than the authorization under which you are presently operating.

POLICE VACANCIES

Mr. MURPHY. Congressman, at the time that Mayor Washington took office and at the time of my appointment to this position, there were approximately 385 vacancies for police officers in the city. Even before my appointment, the Mayor had, through the assistance of the President and the Department of Defense, developed a recruitment program in cooperation with the Military that provided for early discharge of servicemen who would accept the appointment to Police departments.

Between that program and our own recruitment program, which has been intensified, we have been able since December to reduce the number of vacancies from about 385 to 164 at last count. This is a significant recruitment accomplishment, and I think an indication of high morale in the Police Department and the willingness and desire of many young men to become policemen today, even though it is becoming a more difficult job every day.

We are hopeful, Congressman, that we can close that gap completely within the next few months; and although we have not finalized our thinking on requesting additional positions, we are certainly giving much consideration to that. But we see our first step as that of filling existing vacancies before requesting additional positions.

TROOPS

Concerning the time limits of a call for assistance from the National Guard and the Military-all of my experience through our troubled days indicated to me that we were receiving very prompt response to our request, as I described yesterday.

The decision, the tentative decision, which just had to be finalized Friday a.m., was made very early Friday morning to have the National Guard on duty Friday evening. April 5th. In our discussions with the Military, all that I know about it, suggests to me that the gearing up, the turning of the wheels, was begun immediately upon our indication of our concern that we needed help sooner.

I think Mr. McGiffert may have described yesterday, and he may wish to speak to this question, but it is simply a fact that the movement of troops does take some period of time. But I am satisfied that even the well-laid plans that existed before April 4th have been further refined to provide us with an even more rapid response if we should require it again in the future.

The curfew was certainly a very valuable tool to us because the curfew provides the police and the Military, if they are on duty, the provision that is needed to get people off the streets. Of course, in a large city, with many hundreds of thousands of people who live in it and are in it every day working or as visitors, without some kind of control over the movement of people on the streets, it is very difficult, especially at night, to prevent all looting, even with thousands of troops and National Guardsmen supplementing the regular Police force.

Like you, Congressman, I agree that we have to think awfully long and hard about just how far we want to go with increasing our Police force and what kind of additional talent, if any, we might want to give to our Police Department; because in my view, the manner in which the people in our kind of society police themselves and really, that is very much what the system-it is a system of policing by the people themselves, using the Police as their tool, I think to the extent that we accept that system, which I think is a fine system-we do begin to move toward the kind of Government control and even the Police State that has never been a part of our tradition in this nation.

Mr. DIGGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DowDY. I might comment that I have heard very few complaints about the Police. The complaints I have heard have not been about the actions of the Police, but have been of the undue restraints that were put upon the Police in their attempts to enforce the law and preserve order.

Where have we got to?

Mr. Horton.

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Commissioner, yesterday you spoke at length in regard to the several disturbances, and I had the impression that Chief Layton was prepared to make some comments. At this point, at least, I haven't heard any comments from him.

I would like to ask Chief Layton if you have anything you would like to add to the testimony which was given yesterday with regard to the disturbances of early April?

Chief LAYTON. Mr. Horton, as the disturbance developed on the evening of April 4, it first began with some group at around 14th and U Streets. The violence that attended this didn't begin until later in the evening, first, with a window-breaking at one of a couple of places. We had, at the first news of Dr. King's shooting and then his death, had sent out messages by Teletype to the Force to be alert for any developments on the streets. Then the group at around 14th and U was the first indication.

We did, at one of the decisive points that was available, there on the street in No. 13 Precinct-we had a detail of 100 officers who were sent from the location of the detail at the Washington Hilton Hotelwere sent to the area that was concerned after the crowd began building up.

So that we had 100 additional officers who were sent there.

Mr. HORTON. Did you participate in the decisions with regard to the mobilization of the Force, or was this something done by the Commissioner without your knowledge, or with your knowledge-how was it handled?

Chief LAYTON. I participated in the decisions that were made, Mr. Horton. The early decision to send the 100 men there I wasn't imme

diately available at that time. I was at a location nearby and I was reached by telephone when the numbers of people began developing, and so the first decision to move the 100 officers there was not mine, but I would have agreed with it.

Later decisions, I did participate in.

The next decision that was made was to assemble our Civil Disturbance Unit. We have members of the Civil Disturbance Unit assigned to the various units so that they are on duty three tours of duty.

These Civil Disturbance Unit men, then, were drawn from the units in which they are ordinarily assigned and assembled to be deployed in that area that is affected. About the same time, a directive was issued to all the precincts, not to release any of the men working at 4:00 p.m. to midnight tour of duty until further orders were given.

Very shortly thereafter, a directive went out to recall, or have the midnight section, the section working midnight to 8:00 a.m., report in as soon as possible.

In the early stages, there was not the kind of widespread looting that we had on Friday afternoon and evening, but it was a matter of window-breaking and some stealing of merchandise and running, before Police officers could be deployed on the scene.

In any event, the effort was to build up the Force along 14th Street and to bring back into control.

TROOPS

Mr. HORTON. Did there come a time during the evening of April 4 that you made any recommendations to the Commissioner, one way or the other, with regard to the mobilization or the calling in of National Guard or Army Forces?

Chief LAYTON. I would say not, during-my recollection is that we didn't discuss that specifically during the evening, late hours of April 4th, but the early hours of April 5 we had some discussion of it.

Following that discussion, Mr. Murphy went to a meeting at the Pentagon about 3:00 o'clock.

Mr. HORTON. Three a.m.?

Chief LAYTON. Three a.m., yes, sir.

Mr. HORTON. Was that in accordance with your recommendations? Had you agreed with him in regard to calling at that point for Federal Forces?

Chief LAYTON. This wasn't a specific recommendation, Mr. Horton, that National Guard troops be requested at that time. This was—and it wasn't a specific recommendation of mine-this was a matter of discussion, as we had about a number of things, a number of tactics, that it was one that the purpose of Mr. Murphy's going to the Pentagon then was to report the situation as we saw it and to refine the procedures for calling out troops if that was necessary.

Actually, by 3:00 o'clock in the morning, by that time we had called back all of our off-duty personnel. We had better than 2500 men reporting back. So that by 3:00 in the morning, the number of cases that were being reported was declining, and it continued to decline with that large force that we had available at that time-declined until about 7:00 o'clock. It was back to a normal rate of incidents reported to the Police.

It remained at a normal level compared with the same day a month previously, stayed at that level until about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Prior to that, about the late hours of Friday morning, 11:00, 12:00 o'clock, we began getting reports of further window-breaking and other things of the same character, but the frequency did not go above the normal level for a month previous until about 1:00 o'clock.

POLICY IN EFFECT

Mr. HORTON. Now, Chief, it has been alleged that there were orders that the Police should not use any force and instead give it the "light

touch."

Did you have any such orders, or did you have any instructions which were different from the instructions of the Public Safety Director?

You heard his testimony yesterday.

Chief LAYTON. No, sir. There were no instructions given to the Force to fail to arrest looters. Actually, it is our policy, which as other cities have been hit by riots and disturbances, we have attempted to gain experience from discussing this kind of problem with officials in other cities and with seminars and meetings, and various kinds of other police officials in preparation for this.

I, myself, said, in briefing my staff, my top level staff, early last year, that it was our policy to positively arrest looters to the extent that it is humanly possible to do, recognizing that in a situation of this kind where there are large numbers of people involved and serious law violations, that it is more than officers can cope with.

But I had said to our officials that I expected them to arrest looters if we should be unfortunate here in the District-so unfortunate as to have something of this kind happen. I wanted ever officer to make arrests to the fullest extent that it was possible for him to do.

So that our policy is one of positively making arrests in this kind of situation.

Mr. HORTON. Were there any special instructions to any of the officers under your command, either by you or the Public Safety Director, that they should play it with a "light touch", or that they should or should not arrest violators?

Chief LAYTON. There was positively no directive or order, or in any way, to members of the Force not to arrest looters. I have no knowledge of any statement being made as you inquire, "Give it a light touch." There was a period of time during the evening on April 4 where we were assembling forces there to move up 14th Street to disperse the crowds when there were more people there than the men readily available could handle effectively.

But we assembled the officers and vehicles and transported them to that scene. When there was a sufficient number of officers there, they did move forward. The specific orders that were given to those officers were to arrest, to make arrests. This was the assembling of our Civil Disturbance Unit, which the order went out a little after 10:00 o'clock.

As I say, they were placed in the vehicles and went to the scene. They were given specific instructions that they were to follow our instructions of making arrests.

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