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you risk your lives, where nobody in the United States of America wants to be a policeman any more.
That is all I have. God blesss you. You have a job to do, you are doing it the best you can. It is on top we should be concerned about, not with you people. That is all I have to say.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisk. Mr. Sisk. Just quickly-one of the things, Mr. Murphy, that I think has troubled a great many people here with reference to the recent problems had to do with the criticism that went to what seemed to be a long delay in recognizing a problem existed. I think it is probably rightly so. That is where my criticism lies.
I think that almost anyone should have known Thursday night pretty well what was going to happen, I would like, quickly, if someone can either you or the gentleman here from the Department of the Armyto give me the sequence of events as to exactly when help was requested above and beyond the police.
Now, I recognize that the police—apparently, at a certain time, you called in all your reserve. At what point did that occur, Chief Layton?
Chief LAYTON. We called in-put the order out to call in all reserves after sometime between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock Thursday night. Earlier, Mr. Sisk, we had made a decision that we needed the first call for the tour of duty coming on at midnight to report earlier, and I don't have the time.
Mr. Sisk. Do you have the time on that? Chief LAYTON. That order to bring the midnight tour of duty in early was at 10:10 p.m., on the fourth. Mr. Sisk. That was at 10:10 ? Chief LAYTON. Yes, sir. Mr. Sisk. On Thursday night? Chief LAYTON. Yes, sir. We decided about that same time to hold until further notice all of the men working 4:00 o'clock p.m, to 12:00 midnight. Then it was a little after midnight that the order actually went out to call in all of the off-duty men, the day section included.
Mr. Sisk. All right. Let's say, then, by 1:00 o'clock a.m., on Friday morning, or one hour after midnight' Thursday night, the police had called up all the forces it had.
Whose authority, Mr. Murphy, was it to make a request for additional help, for the National Guard and the Military! Who had the authority under the program you had set up before to make that decision, as to what point at which to request additional aid?
Mr. MURPHY. Well, the arrangement was that our Commissioner Washington would make the request, but Commissioner Washington and Chief Layton and I conferred shortly after midnight and we had been in telephonic communication with some people at the Pentagon, and it was decided that I should go to the Pentagon at 3:00 a.m.
I arrived there about 3:00 o'clock, after the meeting had been set up, and explained the situation we had had, the present condition in the city, our concern about the next evening, and we began at that time ton
Mr. Sisk. At what hour, and minute, was a specific request made for
Mr. MURPHY. At that conference, sir, we requested that the National
Mr. Sisk. Why the delay there? Was it going to take from 3:00 o'clock in the morning until that night to get the Guard on the street ?
Mr. MURPHY. By 3:00 a.m., Friday morning, sir, the situation was under relatively good control.
Mr. Sisk. Did you have anything, though, to lead you to believe it would stay under controll
Mr. MURPHY. We had no good evidence to indicate either way, sir.
Mr. Sisk. You see, I happen to agree, Mr. Murphy, with you to some extent with reference to hesitancy in using the ultimate force of going out and mowing people down with machine guns. Frankly, I know a lot of other people who were very upset because that had not been done. I agree with you that is not the way. But it seems to ine that the only way, then, you can offset that is through a show of force-with what the Secretary called a massive force.
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sisk. So I think to someone there is justifiable criticism, why a decision wasn't immediately made to have on the streets those troops Friday morning. This, to me, is a real criticism. I am trying to get the exact time the request was made for the first troops, Guard or otherwise?
Mr. MURPHY. Well, sir, that request for the Guard, a preliminary request for the Guard, was made at that time to be confirmed Friday a.m. The situation in the city at that particular time had been pretty much limited to one street, a section of 14th Street, and both the looting and the window-breaking and the larceny and the fires were under good control by 3:00 a.m.
As a matter of fact, by between 4:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., activities in the city were close to normal and that schools opened, people came to work. We had many additional police officers on duty. We did not assume—far from it-we did not assume that we were back to a totally normal situation. But we were hopeful that perhaps this outbreak on Thursday night would subside, and as soon as we had sufficient officers in that it might not flare up again.
Mr. Sisk. Actually, then, as I understand what you are saying, really, there was no request made for troops on the street to be available before lato Friday afternoon or Friday night? Well, we all agree, then, a substantial error in judgment was made here?
Mr. MURPHY. From the present position, knowing what did happen-of course, if we had know that—that there would have been another outbreak
Mr. Sisk. This is hindsight, and it is always better than foresight. But, as I say, there was an error in judgment. Of course, this goes to the matter of intelligence. I would assume certainly you do have in so-called trouble spots in Washington some type of intelligence, that is in the way of information.
Mr. MURPIIY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sisk. What I am trying to say is, people who feed information in, and apparently, there was a failure or breakdown, if you did have such a force.
Mr. MURPHY. Well, I might point out, Congressman, that when I went to the Pentagon—I am not familiar with everything that happened, but I know that alert systems were escalating within the Military. I know the difficult situation that existed in the Pentagon dur
ing those hours when there were outbreaks in so many
cities across the nation.
Yet, there was never any hesitation about giving us what we wanted after we saw the need for it. At the first sign of any outbreak again, Chief Layton communicated with me at the Pentagon; we immediately presented the facts, and the wheels began turning quickly.
Mr. Sisk. Just quickly, and I am already overtime I hate to impose on others.
Looking to the future what kind of plans do you suggest in the event that a situation begins to develop again? How long are we going to wait to call in troops? Do you have any definite plans? What protection, in other words, can we assure to the citizens and business people of the District ?
Mr. MURPHY. Well, Congressman, we have refined our alert system, I believe. I have attended many, many conferences with the Department of Defense people and National Guard people and we are in even closer communication with them and are exchanging information with them on a continuous basis so that we are all observing all of the indicators that we can get.
Intelligence is coming in from the city from several sources, a number of police calls per hour, number of arrests per hour, formation of crowds, movement of crowds, the whole attitude that we are able to evaluate in the community, number of fire calls, number of fires—just any number of indicators that we are observing more closely than ever, Congressman, with the Military at our sides, ready to respond.
Mr. Sisk. Are you satisfied with the present intelligence setup that you have to stay on top of such situations and get forewarning?
Mr. MURPHY. We have done some things very recently that I would prefer not to disclose publicly.
Mr. Sisk. I don't want you to disclose them. I am concerned about what seems to me to be a failure in intelligence in the last fiasco. I am not blaming anyone, necessarily, for that. Intelligence can be terribly important in being able to have the forewarning.
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other things, but I will yield.
Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask if we can have in the record a copy of the statute or regulations, or whatever, which determines whether the Commissioner of the District of Columbia has the same right that the Governor of a State has to call out the local National Guard.
The CHAIRMAN. I will have it checked on, and get something into the record.
(Subsequently, the following excerpt from the District of Columbia Code was submitted for the record :)
SUPPRESSION OF RIOTS
(District of Columbia Code, Title 39, Sec. 603) When there is in the District of Columbia a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men acting together by force with attempt to commit a felony or to offer violence to persons or property, or by force or violence to break and resist the laws, or when such tumult, riot, or mob is threatened, it shall be lawful for the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, or for the United States marshal for the District of Columbia, to call on the commander-in-chief to aid
them in suppressing such violence and enforcing the laws; the commander-inchief shall thereupon order out so much and such portion of the militia as he may deem necessary to suppress the same, and no member thereof who shall be thus ordered out by proper authority for any such duty shall be liable to civil or criminal prosecution for any act done in the discharge of his military duty. (Mar. 1, 1889, 25 Stat. 778, ch. 328 $ 45; Feb. 18, 1909, 35 Stat. 634, ch. 146, 8 48.) (See also United States Code, Title 32.)
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harsha.
Mr. Harsha. Mr. Murphy, you seem to take great stock in the fact that 8,000 arrests were made over a 10- or 11-day period. I am not going to debate that issue with you. Some of us think maybe 18,000 arrests should have been made, but I just want to point out that from April 4 through April 12, you made 3,155 arrests, which were for curfew violations, and only 40 arrests for larceny. (See tabulation,
Mr. MURPHY. Might I check that figure, please? What period, sir? Mr. HARSHA. April 4 through April 12.
Mr. MURPHY. Well, larceny arrests—but there were many housebreaking arrests.
Mr. HARSHA. I am getting to that next. And less than 1,000 for housebreaking. But I would hazard a guess that I personally saw 48 instances of larceny on TV, and in newspaper pictures. So I don't think you had such an outstanding record in that particular field.
In this 8,000, how many traffic violations have you brought inparking tickets?
Mr. MURPHY. We are not including traffic violations.
Mr. MURPHY. No. We are not including traffic violations, sir. These are all felonies, misdemeanors, curfew violations.
Mr. Harsha. The great bulk of your arrests were curfew violations? Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.
Mr. Harsha. Now, did you have any indication at all that this riot was going to transpire?
Mr. MURPHY. This riot?
Mr. MURPHY. The death of Dr. King, of course, alerted us to the possibility of a problem. We had no advance notice prior to that time.
Mr. HARSHA. You assured this Committee sometime earlier this year that the city was prepared for any eventuality.
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I hope that I did not create the impression that I was assuring this Committee or anybody that there would be no riot. Sir, I cannot assure you whether you will be protected as you leave
Mr. Harsha. Well, I understand that. But the point is this: you assured this Committee that the City was prepared for any eventuality; ; and I am just wondering if there was a large number in the Police Department off-duty when the rioting commenced-or recommencedon Friday?
Mr. MURPHY. The number of officers on duty Thursday night, as far as I know, Congressman, was the normal number we would have on
duty on that night. We went to an alert after Dr. King's death. As Chief Layton described, by about 1:00 o'clock Friday morning we had 2500—in the very early hours of Friday morning, we had close to 2500 officers on duty, which is the kind of response, Congressman, that presents a very different situation.
It gives us perhaps four or five times as many officers on the street as we would normally have.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE UNIT
Mr. HARSHA. Regarding the Civil Disturbance Unit of 280 men11: why weren't they called to duty before 1:00 o'clock on Friday? Surely,
you had forewarning.
Mr. MURPHY, The Civil Disturbance Unit, the nucleus of the Civil Disturbance Unit, is the Special Operations Division. The Special Operations Division was on duty Thursday evening, sir. If I may explain that, Congressman, the members of the Civil Disturbance Unit are officers assigned to our Special Operations Division, plus officers assigned in precincts all over the city.
In the event of an emergency, these officers who have had the special training are drawn from their precincts to supplement our Special Operations Division under Chief Pyles, and they constitute the Civil Disturbance Unit.
Mr. HARSHA. Why were they not called before 1:00 o'clock Friday morning?
Mr. MURPHY. At 10:12 p.m., April 4th, all Civil Disturbance Unit officers were on duty at 10:00, according to the report I have.
Mr. HARSHA. Well, the report I have here was they were called to duty at 12:55 or 12:50 a.m., Friday, several hours after the rioting began. Maybe I have the wrong information.
Mr. MURPHY. Well, I will be happy to clarify that for you, Congressman. Maybe Chief Wilson or Chief Layton could explain that. But the report I have before me indicates that all CDU
officers were on duty, were assembled, which means that those CDU officers—we would have those officers on duty with all of the various sections of the Department, all those, on duty at precincts throughout the city at that timeat that time, they had been assembled. Mr. HARSHA. Why wasn't everybody in that unit assembled ?
Mr. MURPHY. At the same time, we were calling back platoons, Congressman, and as they would come back, then they would be assembled.
Mr. HARSHA. I got the impression from your colloquy with Mr. Sisk that after you went to the Pentagon at 3:00 a.m., Friday morning, to see about calling out the National Guard, that things were pretty well under control at that time!
Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. The Police Department had control over 14th Street, which was the principal street on which the trouble had occurred.
Mr. HARSHA. Then, what was the point in calling the National
Mr. MURPHY. We were concerned about the next evening. The second