perhaps "for a year or longer." Third, "one or more 100 bed hostels, and a network of halfway houses and social centers would be located in the District of Columbia" to provide a "therapeutically supportive environment for alcoholic outpatients." Fourth, "outpatient therapy" would be coordinated through “the Alcoholism Treatment Center which also handles Phase I emergency care," for a case load that could involve "as many as 4,000-5,000 patients in some stage of outpatient therapy at a given point in time."

Mr. Tatham's memorandum said that, regardless of the outcome of the Easter case, it is hoped that all inebriated law offenders "could be sobered up in a medical facility before being taken to jail," and that treatment "could be used as a substitute for criminal incarceration when possible." He said that "voluntary treatment would be preferred and more common procedure." Finally, Mr. Tatham recommended "that the general program described herein be considered for activation and that detailed planning be undertaken to determine budgetary and other requirements." This memorandum was subsequently revised and updated on March 11, 1966, but was never implemented. H.R. 6143 will now implement it.

On February 2, 1966, a meeting was held of the Director of the Department of Corrections, the Director of Public Health, and the Budget Officer, at the request of the Director of General Administration. to "discuss possible changes which might be required in the criminal handling of chronic drunkenness offenders if the DeWitt Easter case is reversed." The Report of this meeting stated that "a sense of urgency was felt when the Joe B. Driver case, similar in essential elements to the Easter case, was reversed by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 22." At this meeting, a Task Force was formed and requested "to explore the possible impact on D.C. Agencies of a reversal of the Easter case, and to enumerate possible immediate, as well as longer-range programs which could be used as alternative to the criminal process presently used to manage chronic drunkenness offenders." The Task Force included representatives of the Department of Corrections, the Court of General Sessions Probation Department, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Budget Office, the Public Health Department, and the Department of Vocational Rehabilitation. The Chronic Drunkenness Offender Task Force submitted a 46-page Report on "Possible Effects of DeWitt Easter Case on Treatment of Chronic Alcoholics in the District of Columbia" to the Directors of General Administration, Corrections, and Public Health on March 16, 1966. Although it did not explicitly so state, it correctly assumed that the Easter decision would reverse the lower court rulings and hold that a chronic alcoholic may not be convicted for public intoxication.

The Task Force initially pointed out that "the District Commissioners, through their administrative influence over budget and agency policies are in a unique position to effect the changes which should be made," and recommended that "the District Government should assign a priority to the alcoholism problem as quickly as possible." Page 2. The Task Force forthrightly recognized that "a shift from criminal to treatment procedures in the handling of alcoholics will require an immediate increase in expenditures, most of which will have to be provided through District Appropriations," but also noted that the expenditures will be "greatly offset" because "this will bring about a reduction in welfare, police, court and corrections expenses and an increase in tax revenues." Page 3. Finally, the Task Force pointed out that "the District Government need not await the Easter decision to take steps to improve services for alcoholics" since "needed new services" and "additional care for a greater number of patients" could be and should be provided under the authority of the 1947 statute. Page 4.

The Task Force recommended the following initial action. First. a sound organizational structure should be established within the Public Health Department. Second, expansion of community-based treatment services should be expanded. Third, volutary participation in treatment should be relied upon, whenever possible. Fourth, arrest and commitment to a correctional facility should be avoided. Page 4. None of these recommendations were implemented. H.R. 6143 will now implement all of them.

The remainder of the Task Force's Report was essentially an expansion of Mr. Tatham's recommendations in his February 1 memorandum with regard to a four-phase treatment program for alcoholics. As already noted, these recommendations have yet to be implemented, although over a year has passed. H.R. 6143 will now implement them.

On March 31, 1966, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did hand down its decision in the Easter case, reversing the lower courts, as expected. On April 20, 1966, Mr. Tatham wrote a memorandum on "Immediate Implications of the Easter Decision Relative to the D.C. Department of Public Health." He listed the following "Basic Principles." First, "The Department must be prepared to use every possible resource to provide or contract for any legitimate service the Court of General Sessions requests in relation to the handling of chronic alcoholics." This was not done. Second, "The Department of Public Health should continue to systematically expand its facilities in order to provide a greater variety of services for greater numbers of patients, while maintaining the highest possible treatment standards." This also was not done. Third, "The Department should take a stand that all heavily intoxicated persons, handled by the police, should be medically examined and treated routinely before released on bail or held for court in order to detect and possibly correct physiological, psychological, and social problems which may be related to their inebriety." This also was not done.

Perhaps unforunately, this memorandum accurately pointed out that the net effect of the Easter decision in the few weeks after it was handed down "has been practically nil." This may have led District officials mistakenly to conclude that the decision would have no effect in the future.

When Judge George D. Nielson was assigned to the D.C. Branch of the Court of General Sessions during May 1966, however, he immediately instituted a new procedure under which about 20% of the defendants who appeared before him on charges of public intoxication were referred to a Court Psychiatrist for diagnosis." Those found to be chronic alcoholics were acquitted and were committed to the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Division under the 1947 statute. During the first week, 60 alcoholics were referred to the Clinic, filling it to capacity. It soon became obvious that the limited resources of the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic could not help even the small number of alcoholics referred to it by Judge Nielson.

12

On May 20, 1966, Judge Nielson wrote the Board of Commissioners "to respectfully call to your attention the critical situation which is now confronting all of us who are concerned with the problem of chronic alcoholism in the District of Columbia." He said that "I foresee no possibility of carrying out the decision of the Court of Appeals, unless immediate and adequate facilities are provided for the keeping, care, and treatment of these most unfortunate people." He noted that "we have reached an emergency state," and that "the Court must state that in all honesty, it has only scratched the surface in its referrals to the Clinic." Judge Nielson stated that "many of the people coming before the Court are in dire need of inpatient facilities, and there is a crying need for half-way or intermediate facilities to care for these obviously sick people." He warned that, unless "some means can be found to provide proper facilities for the care and treatment of chronic alcoholics, the only other alternative which the Court has is to release these people to return to the street, and to their normal and tragic drinking habits." He concluded that "this problem is urgent and must be met head-on."

Judge Nielson's letter went unheeded. And the Washington D.C. Area Council on Alcoholism and the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union went back to the Court of General Sessions to urge that, since the City's program to care for alcoholics was a "hoax," the Court should not participate in it." On May 26, 1966, Judge Nielson finally agreed, and freed 25 chronic alcoholics without referring them to the Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic on the ground that the Clinic could not care for them.14

On that same day, May 26, 1966, the Board of Commissioners issued Executive Order No. 66-744, which took the following action. First, it rescinded all previous certifications of alcoholism facilities under the 1947 statute. Thus, as of that moment, the Court was powerless to utilize the 1947 statute at all. Second, it designated the entire Department of Public Health as an alcoholic clinic, in order to utilize all of its available facilities for handling alcoholics. Third, it directed the Department of Corrections to make facilities available to the Department of Public Health for chronic alcoholics, with the specific provision that alcoholic patients shall be kept separate from the prison population. Fourth, it

Washington Post, May 3, 1966, p. B1.

12 Washington Post, May 10, 1966, p. A12.

13 Washington Post, May 24. 1966, p. B1.

14 Washington Post, May 27, 1966, p. B1; Editorial, Washington Post, May 30, 1966, p. A16.

directed the Department of Public Health to "prepare, and periodically up-date, a coordinated and comprehensive plan for the treatment and prevention of all phases of alcoholism." The initial plan was to be presented to the Board of Commissioners by November 1, 1966. Fifth, it directed the Directors of the Departments of Public Health, Corrections, Vocational Rehabilitation, and Public Welfare to submit to the Board of Commissioners 5 copies of “a quarterly report setting forth the facilities and services which each had made available for the treatment or rehabilitation of persons apprehended for public intoxication and of other activities of his Department in the field of alcoholism."

Judge Charles W. Halleck was assigned to the D.C. Branch of the Court of General Sessions during June 1966. Judge Halleck immediately wrote to District of Columbia Commissioner Walter N. Tobriner on June 2, 1966, requesting clarification of this Executive Order. He pointed out that "the specific Clinic envisaged by the statute" obviously cannot be the entire Department of Public Health, and that he is not authorized to commit a chronic alcoholic to the entire Department. He asked where the classification and diagnostic center, which is required to be established under the 1947 statute, is located, and "the number of persons which this facility can accommodate at any one time." He also noted that the Executive Order rescinds prior certifications under the 1947 statute, and that it does not "state the extent to which proper and adequate treatment facilities have been provided." He therefore concluded that "I cannot commit chronic alcoholics to the Department of Public Health on the basis of information contained in the May 26 Order." Finally, he questioned any use of facilities provided by the Department of Corrections for holding chronic alcoholic patients. Judge Halleck requested "prompt clarification of this Order" because "I may be required to release persons adjudged to be chronic alcoholics back into the community."

On June 16, 1966, Commissioner Tobriner replied by listing the following available facilities for chronic alcoholics: the outpatient Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic, 62 beds in D.C. General Hospital, and 40-50 beds in Glenn Dale Hospital. Commissioner Tobriner stated that "by the flexible use of the above enumerated facilities, required diagnostic and treatment services can be provided on an interim basis to all chronic alcoholics committed by the Court pursuant to the Act pending the development of more suitable permanent arrangements." He said that he was "advised that there exists no legal impediment to the use of facilities within a penal institution for handling alcoholic patients."

Judge Halleck continued the same procedures initiated by Judge Nielson, except that he refused to simply scratch the surface as Judge Nielson had done. Approximately 90% of the defendants charged with simple public intoxication who appeared before Judge Halleck were referred to the Court Psychiatrist for diagnosis and were adjudged chronic alcoholics. This figure confirmed the earlier estimates of the American Bar Association Subcommittee and the Committee on Prisons, Probation, and Parole to the District of Columbia. Beginning June 2, 1966, Judge Halleck refused to commit any of these alcoholics to the inadequate facilities of the Department of Public Health, and released all of them immediately out into the community.15

16

After receipt of Commissioner Tobriner's June 16, 1966 reply, Judge Halleck committed all of the adjudicated alcoholics who appeared before him on June 17 and 18 to the Department of Public Health, as requested in Commissioner Tobriner's letter. This filled all of the available facilities to overflowing, and required the Health Department to house some of the patients in a dormitory at the Occoquan Workhouse, a penal facility." The Washington D.C. Area Council on Alcoholism and the National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union immediately requested Judge Halleck to rescind the commitment orders. At a hearing held on June 21, 1966, the Directors of the Departments of Public Health and Corrections admitted that the District of Columbia does not have adequate facilities to care for chronic alcoholics, and that the Occoquan Workhouse is an inappropriate place for their treatment. Judge Halleck accordingly ordered the patients held at the Workhouse to be released."

In the meanwhile, an Ad Hoc Committee on Alcoholism was appointed by the Chairman of the Mental Health Committee of the District of Columbia Public Health Advisory Council, on March 18, 1966, to investigate the problems to be

15 Washington Post, June 3, 1966, p. B2; Washington Star, June 10, 1966, p. B5.

10 Washington Post, June 18, 1966, p. A1; Washington Post, June 19, 1966, p. B1.

17 Washington Post, June 21, 1966. pp. A1 and B1.

18 Washington Star, June 21, 1966. p. A1; Washington Post, June 22, 1966, pp. A24 and C1; Washington Star, June 22, 1966, p. C16.

faced when the Easter decision was handed down. Because the Easter decision was handed down shortly thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee-comprised of leading citizens representing wide interests in the community-undertook work on the changes that should be made to meet the requirements of the new decision. On May 2, 1966, the Ad Hoc Committee met, and on May 20 it submitted a report to Commissioner Tobriner containing three recommendations. First, under the Canons of Professional Ethics, a prosecuting attorney has an obligation to inform the trial court whenever he has reason to believe that the defendant may have available to him the exculpatory defense of chronic alcoholism. Second, a trial judge should raise the possibility of the defense of chronic alcoholism sua sponte in every case in which a person appears charged with public intoxication, and should conduct a brief investigation "as to whether he may have available to him the defense of chronic alcoholism." Third, the Department of Public Health "should immediately make public definite short-term and longrange plans for implementing the Easter decision from a public health standpoint." Commissioner Tobriner replied on May 26, 1966, stating that Acting Corporation Counsel Milton Korman would instruct prosecutors to notify the court when they are of the opinion that a defendant is a chronic alcoholic. His reply also noted that the Commissioners had that day approved "a comprehensive plan for the care and treatment of alcoholics" under the new Executive Order.

Because of the crisis that developed in late May and June, however, it became apparent that a deeper study and further recommendations were necessary. The Ad Hoc Committee therefore met again on June 8, 1966, and submitted a 23-page Report on June 24. This Report briefly reviewed "the past inaction" that had led to the crisis, and concluded:

The Ad Hoc Committee is deeply disturbed by this past inaction. The District of Columbia Government had a mandate from Congress 19 years ago and from a committee of eminent public officials 9 years ago, and almost two years advance warning to prepare for the additional and special problems that the Easter decision would create. Yet nothing was done-in apparent disregard for a serious public health problem." Page 5.

The Report then detailed the present confusion resulting from the Easter decision. The Ad Hoc Committee found the alcoholism program available in the District of Columbia "to be deficient in all of the following respects." First, there is no detoxification center, and the 50-bed center that is planned "will alleviate this situation only to a very small extent." The Committee also noted that "the planned use of arrest procedures to bring intoxicated individuals to such a center is, moreover, inherently inconsistent with the 1947 statue and with intelligent and humane public health planning." Page 6.

Second, the Ad Hoc Committee found that there presently exists no adequate diagnostic center, no half-way house or other municipal lodging, only an inadequate outpatient Alcoholic Rehabilitation Clinic, and so few inpatient facilities that they were exhausted by referral of just those alcoholics who appeared before the Court on one morning. The Committee concluded that "no real treatment program exists in any meaningful sense." Pages 6-8.

The Ad Hoc Committee report rejected any suggestion that the judiciary had been over-zealous in enforcing the Easter decision, and found that the Court of General Sessions "would be derelict in performing their judicial responsibilities" if it had failed to find alcoholics not guilty of the crime with which they are charged. Pages 9-12. The report noted that there are at least 5,000 hard-core chronic alcoholic derelicts in the District of Columbia, and urged that "the District of Columbia simply must face up to that fact, and to their responsibility for providing public health facilities for these people under the 1947 statute." Page 9.

The report went on to discuss Executive Order No. 66-744 of May 26, 1966. It pointed out that "this Order is basically a reorganization plan" which fails to provide for any new facilities, and therefore makes "no helpful progress towards the proper handling of alcoholism in the District of Columbia as a public health, rather than a criminal, problem." Page 10. The Committee was "shocked at the suggestion contained in this Order that the correctional facilities located at Occoquan, Virginia, might be used in lieu of proper medical facilities." The lawyer members of the Committee were "unanimously of the opinion that detention of a health patient within any part of a correctional facility is wholly unconstitutional," the physician members of the Committee stated that use of correctional facilities could not be considered adequate for the rehabilitation of chronic alcoholics, and the entire Committee agreed that "it would be unwise,

as a matter of public policy, to use correctional facilities to house public health patients." The Committee agreed that the Occoquan Workhouse might profitably be converted from a correctional facility to a rehabilitation center, but rejected the possibility of simply changing the title without completely refurbishing the facility and equipping and staffing it as a public health facility. Pages 10-12. The Ad Hoc Committee rejected Commissioner Tobriner's statement in his letter to Judge Halleck of June 16 that adequate facilities exist, and pointed out that even the Director of the Department of Public Health testified at a court hearing that this statement is not true. Pages 14-17.

Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee made the following specific recommendations. First, intoxicated persons should be sent to their private homes whenever possible. Second, plans for the detoxification center should be implemented immediately, using civil rather than criminal arrest procedures, and with more than 50 beds. Third, an inpatient diagnostic center should be set up immediately. Fourth, "there is an immediate need for municipal housing for skid row alcoholics." Fifth, prosecuting attorneys should again be instructed to aid the court in its responsibility to acquit chronic alcoholics charged with public intoxication, because it was apparent that the statement in Commissioner Tobriner's letter of May 26 to the Ad Hoc Committee had not been carried out. Sixth, and finally, the Ad Hoc Committee specifically commended the judiciary "for its responsible handling of this matter during the past two months." Pages 17-23.

The Committee's conclusions emphasized that the problem has reached a "crisis state" that "cannot await long-range plans and budgets for the future." Page 23. Yet the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee were not implemented, and as of this date have still not been implemented. H.R. 6143 will implement those recommendations.

After the failure of the initial plan to commit chronic alcoholics en masse to the Occoquan Workhouse, the Department of Public Health took over two of the dormitories at the Workhouse, segregated them from the other facility, refurbished them, staffed them with public health personnel, and requested the Court of General Sessions to use these dormitories as a diagnostic and classification center.10 The court, with the concurrence of the Washington D.C. Area Council on Alcoholism, agreed to commit alcoholics there for diagnosis and classification, which would require only a relatively small period of inpatient commitment, but not for long-term treatment. The Director of the Department of Public Health agreed that rehabilitative treatment for alcoholism would not be available at that facility. When it became apparent that chronic alcoholics were being held at the facility for an inordinate length of time, moreover, the Court of General Sessions imposed a limitation of 7 days upon any commitment to that facility." Once an alcoholic was diagnosed and classified by the Clinic, he was not again committed to the Occoquan facility unless there was some reason to reconsider that diagnosis. On June 24, 1966, at the height of the crisis in the Court, the Board of Directors of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia approved the following resolution:

"That the question of establishing facilities for treatment of alcoholics in the District of Columbia be referred to the appropriate committee for review and recommendation."

This question was then referred to the Committee on Mental Health, which studied the problem and issued its Report to the Board of Directors on September 28, 1966. On October 7, 1966, the Board of Directors approved the Committee Report, and Mr. Sidney S. Sachs, President of the Bar Association, wrote Commissioner Tobriner on that date transmitting a copy of the Report of the Mental Health Committee and conveying the conclusions and recommendations of the Association.

The letter from Mr. Sachs pointed out "several glaring deficiencies in the available medical facilities," including the lack of a diagnostic and classification center, the scant inpatient facilities, and the limited outpatient facilities. It noted that:

"It is contrary to the public will, and borders on the inhumane, to return chronic alcoholics to the community without adequate treatment; and yet the court finds that adequate treatment facilities are simply not available for these unfortunate individuals."

19 Washington Star, June 2S. 1966, n. B1: Washington Post, June 29. 1966, p. C4. 20 District of Columbia v. Walters, D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., August 16, 1966, reprinted in 112 Cong. Rec. 22716 (September 22, 1966) (daily ed.).