Was the collector's attention fairly directed to paragraph 420? Of course the number of the paragraph to which he was referred was 415. He was advised, as evidently the entries in the case had advised him, that the merchandise was claimed to be in every case but one, cardboard or a manufacture of cardboard; that in three of the protests it was claimed to be dutiable as a manufacture of cardboard and in the other four as a manufacture of paper n. s. p. f. The exhibits in the case which are before us show that the background or the basic material is a relatively thick piece of cardboard upon which are raised letters said to be. of metal. As to the composition of these letters no question is made. Paragraph 415 contains no express provision for manufactures of cardboard nor manufactures of paper by that name, but does contain, as already pointed out, a provision for cardboard and various forms of boards and paper with four separate provisions for duty at the rate of 35 per cent ad valorem, which is the identical rate claimed in the protests.

We think under the terms of the protests the attention of the collector was not directed to paragraph 420 just as we think that the provisions of paragraph 420 were not in the minds of the importers when the protests were made.

This view is somewhat confirmed by the fact that paragraph 420 refers to manufactures of paper or manufactures of which paper is the component material of chief value. The protests do not claim the merchandise to be manufactures of which paper is the component material of chief value, but simply as manufactures of paper, while the merchandise itself shows, the evidence is, and the report of the appraiser in each case was, that the merchandise was a manufacture of paper and something else.

We think is was error to hold these protests sufficient, and the judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is reversed.

UNITED STATES v. TROY LAUNDRY MACHINERY Co. (No. 1418).1 PROTEST WHEN INSUFFICIENT.

The protest here not only expressly refers the collector to a paragraph but avers the merchandise to be of a kind that is provided for in that paragraph alone, and claim is made thereunder. The protestant is bound by this specific allegation and his protest could not avail to give him the benefit of yet another and different paragraph of the law.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 18, 1914. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7565 (T. D. 34457). [Reversed.]

Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence, special attorney, on the brief), for the United States.

Submitted on record by appellee.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges.

1 Reported in T. D. 34947 (27 Treas. Dec., 550).

DE VRIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal may be determined by ruling as to the sufficiency of the protest. The material allegation of the protest it as follows:

We claim and insist that this merchandise is caustic potash, as specifically provided for at 1 cent per pound in paragraph 61 of the tariff act of August, 1909.

Paragraph 61 reads:

61. Caustic potash, or hydrate of, refined, in sticks or rolls, one cent per pound; chlorate of, two cents per pound.

The Board of General Appraisers held merchandise such as this entitled to free entry under paragraph 655 of the act, which reads:

655. Potash, crude, or "black salts"; carbonate of potash, crude or refined; hydrate of, or caustic potash, not including refined in sticks or rolls; nitrate of potash or saltpeter, crude; sulphate of potash, crude or refined, and muriate of potash.

The board upheld the sufficiency of the protest. The Government appeals. Much stress is laid by the board in its opinion upon the fact that the protest eo nomine counts upon "caustic potash."

If "caustic potash" were provided for eo nomine in but one of these paragraphs there might be much force in that position. Smith et al. v. Schell et al. (27 Fed., 648), Cummins et al. v. Robertson (27 Fed., 654), In re Austin et al. (47 Fed., 873). Being so provided for, however, in both paragraphs, at least the name being used in both as related to different kinds of the merchandise, the reason of the rule fails and it has here no application. Furthermore, the protest not only makes claim as to caustic potash but expressly directs the collector's attention to that "caustic potash, as specifically provided for * ** in paragraph 61 of the tariff act of August, 1909." The protest, therefore, not only cites the wrong paragraph but expressly refers the collector to a kind of merchandise provided for in that paragraph alone, and not provided for in paragraph 655. Of such a protest this court in Bliven v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 205-208; T. D. 31239), said:

The cardinal principle underlying the sufficiency of protests being that the protestant must direct the mind of the collector to the appropriate provision of law. It ca not by any stretch of imagination be said that this requirement is satisfied when the protestant directs the mind of the collector to some other provision of law assessing a different rate of duty. Such is a more violent contravention of the requirement because it not only does not leave the mind of the collector free to determine for himself the appropriate provision, but carries his mind away from the applicable clause to an inapplicable one, and thus confuses the situation.

Oelrichs & Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 232; T. D. 32541).

The ruling rests upon the fundamental principle of pleading and practice, applicable also to customs protests, that where an importer states with specificness his objections he is limited thereby. He is bound by the allegations of his protest. Benjamin Iron & Steel Co.

v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 159; T. D. 31667), United States v. Danker & Marston (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 462; T. D. 32208), Bowling Green Storage & Van Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 309; T. D. 32588), United States v. Park & Tilford (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 350; T. D. 32907), United States v. Chattanooga Brewing Co. (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 375; T. D. 32965), Strakosh v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 360; T. D. 31453), In re Solvay Process Co. (134 Fed., 678), Herrman v. Robertson (152 U. S., 521), Presson v. Russell (152 U. S., 577), United States v. Curley et al. (66 Fed., 720), United States v. George Knowles & Son (126 Fed., 737), United States v. H. Bayersdorfer & Co. (126 Fed., 732), United States v. Fleitmann et al. (137 Fed., 476), Davies v. Arthur (96 U. S., 148). Reversed.

UNITED STATES v. VAN INGEN & Co. et al. (No. 1327).1

SHRINKAGE AS A CHARGE OR EXPENSE-SUBSECTION 18 OF SECTION 28, TARIFF ACT OF 1909.

The importer of these woolens incurred certain costs for their inspection and damping in London and the collector added these costs to the entered value. In this he exceeded his authority. These costs so incurred are not charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition packed ready for shipment to the United States, as provided for in subsection 18 of section 28, tariff act of 1909.— United States v. Spingarn (5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 2; T. D. 34002), distinguished.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, November 27, 1914. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 34066 (T. D. 33872. [Affirmed.]

Bert Hanson, Assistant Attorney General (Thomas J. Doherty, special attorney, of counsel; Samuel Isenschmid, assistant attorney, on the brief), for the United States. Allan R. Brown and Gerry & Wakefield for appellees.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BArber, De Vries, and MARTIN, Judges. MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The importers are engaged in the business of importing English and Scotch woolens for men's clothes. They maintain a warehouse in London. Their course of business is to purchase goods at various points in Great Britain. Those in question in this case were purchased at Huddersfield. The goods are shipped to the London office of the importers in bales. The practice prevails by the present importers to send these bales of goods out of their office to concerns called dampers and examiners. These dampers or examiners send their own vans for the goods, and after treatment return them to the warehouse of the importer in the same form in which they were received, except as defects, if any, in the goods are shown, as herein

1 Reported in T. D. 34970 (27 Treas. Dec., 574).

after stated. The process pursued by these dampers or inspectors is to unroll the goods, place them over perches, and make a thorough examination to ascertain if there are any defects in the cloth in width, color, or general appearance. If any such are found, the defect is marked on the edge of the selvage with a string. The unrolling and suspending of these goods over perches having resulted in giving them a rough appearance, they are then dampened and pressed into the form in which they came originally from the manufacturer, and returned to the importer's office. The expense of this treatment amounts to about a penny a yard.

The goods in question were imported and invoiced at the price paid by the importer, and a notation was made of the expense of inspection and damping, which item was deducted from the total by the importer. The local appraiser made an addition to cover the cost of shrinkage, inspection, and damping, and from this decision an appeal to reappraisement was taken, and the general appraiser made an order "entered value sustained." The collector, however, assessed duty, not only upon the value as entered, to wit, the original cost to the importer, but added the item paid for shrinkage, so called, as a cost charge and expense under subsection 18 of section 28 of the tariff act of 1909. The importer filed his protest to this action of the collector, and on hearing the protest was sustained. The Government has brought this appeal, and the question presented is whether the item for treatment of the cloth, as above stated, is subject to assessment by the collector as an item of cost, charge, or expense under subsection 18.

Subsection 18 provides:

*

The duty shall be assessed upon the actual market value or wholesale price thereof, at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of the country from whence exported; that such actual market value shall be held to be the price at which such merchandise is freely offered for sale to all purchasers in said markets, in the usual wholesale quantities, and the price which the manufacturer or owner would have received, and was willing to receive, for such merchandise when sold in the ordinary course of trade in the usual wholesale quantities, including the value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks, casks, barrels, hogsheads, bottles, jars, demijohns, carboys, and other containers or coverings, whether holding liquids or solids, and all other costs, charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States,

*

The question presented naturally divides itself. It is, first, a question whether the item for the service in question is dutiable at all, or whether it is to be treated as a charge kindred to that of a commission paid by the importer for ascertaining the condition and character of the goods as preliminary to the final acceptance of the same; and, secondly, whether if it be dutiable at all it be not a part of the value of the goods at the time of exportation. The section above quoted provides that the value at the time of exportation to the

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United States in the principal markets of the country from whence exported is to be the controlling value.

The Board of General Appraisers in deciding the case rested its decision upon an opinion previously filed in T. D. 33882, in which it was held that the charge in question was not a charge to be ascertained by the collector, but if a charge dutiable at all, it was an item which should have been added to the per se value of the goods.

The case of United States v. Spingarn (5 Ct. Cust. Appls., 2; T. D. 34002) is relied upon by the Government as sustaining the power of the collector to proceed by ascertainment to determine the amount of these charges and to impose duty thereon. But we agree with the Board of General Appraisers in the case cited that under subsection 18 it is the duty of the collector to assess duty upon the actual market value or wholesale price at the time of exportation to the United States. The expense in question having been incurred prior to the date at which the market value is to be found by the appraiser, the item, if dutiable, must be deemed to have entered into the cost of the merchandise to the importer, and it is to be presumed that it entered into consideration of the general appraiser in determining its market value. London is shown by the evidence to be the market for such merchandise, and it is further shown that merchandise which has been shrunk and inspected is the subject of sale in the London market. The expression "other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States," must be construed in connection with what precedes it, which relates to the value of cartons, cases, boxes, etc., and it must be held that the charges and expenses spoken of generally were the charges and expenses of the same general kind and character as those specifically enumerated. Those here in question were not of this character. They related to the inspection of the goods, which might have preceded the receipt of them into the warehouse of the importers, and in the case of some importers did precede such receipt. But the charges had nothing whatever to do with the exportation from London to the United States or with putting the merchandise in condition for shipment. They were not charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition packed ready for shipment to the United States. The same treatment would have been necessary had the importer seen fit to sell these goods in the local market or for exportation to other countries than the United States.

The case is of course clearly distinguishable from that of United States v. Spingarn, in that there the cost in question was one, strictly speaking, for the purpose of placing the goods in condition ready for shipment.

Reaching the conclusion, as we do, that the Board of General Appraisers was right in holding that in no view was this charge or