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of the mind, we may be considered as arriving at a principle like that which Dr. Hutcheson, after Lord Shaftesbury, has distinguished by the name of moral sense. The phrase moral sense, however, I consider as very unfortunate. whether the feeling that attends the contemplation of certain actions admit of being more justly classed with our sensations, or perceptions, or emotions; there is still a susceptibility of this feeling, or set of feelings, original in the mind, and as essential to its very nature, as any other principle or function, which we regard as universally belonging to our mental constitution; as truly essential to the mind, indeed, as any of those senses among which Dr. Hutcheson would fix its place."-Brown on the Human Mind. Lec. 82.]

Aristotle presumes that nature intended that barbarians should be slaves; and deduces from this maxim conclusions in favor of the slave-trade, which then prevailed; and the same maxim is doubtless self-evident to those who are now engaged in a similar traffic.

Now in this example it is plain that the laws of custom have been mistaken for the order of nature; and as nothing is so easy as to mistake a maxim, when in unison with the prejudices of the maker; Dr. Paley argues that it is to be feared a system of morality, founded on instinets and impulses, would only find out excuses for established practices rather than reasons for correcting them.

[This is another evidence that Dr. Paley mistook the nature and the intention of the moral faculty. It is not considered as establishing a system of practical morality by passing sentence upon each moral act in detail; but merely enforcing general duties, and leaving our own understandings to decide what particular duties should be inferred from them.-See the following.]

["An action is (as a moral object) not the mere production of good or evil, but the intentional production of good or evil. It has no moral meaning whatever, but as it is significant of the frame of mind of the agent himself, willing

86 What does Dr. Brown says that his speculations lead to? 87 What is his opinion of the phrase moral sense?

88 What example does Dr. Paley bring to show that the laws of custom may be mistaken for the order of nature?

*89 What principle does he deduce from this?

90 Would this be a correct deduction from acknowledging the moral faculty in its true nature?

91 What makes any action moral or immoral ?

and producing a particular result."-Brown on the Human Mind. Lecture 79.]

["The epithets right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, are applied sometimes to external actions, and sometimes to the intentions of the agent. It was to obviate the confusion of ideas that arises from this ambiguity of language, that the distinction between absolute and relative rectitude was introduced into ethics. And as the distinction is equally just and important, it will be proper to explain it particularly; and point out its application to one or two questions which have been perplexed by that vagueness of expression which it is our object at present to correct.

"An action may be said to be absolutely right, when it is in every respect suitable to the circumstances in which the agent is placed. Or, in other words, when it is such as, with perfectly good intentions, under the guidance of an enlightened and well-informed understanding, he would have performed.

"An action may be said to be relatively right, when the intentions of the agent are sincerely good, whether his conduct be suitable to his circumstances or not.

66

According to these definitions, an action may be right in one sense, and wrong in another; an ambiguity in language which, how obvious soever, has not always been attended to by the writers on morals.

"It is the relative rectitude of an action which determines the moral desert of the agent; but it is its absolute rectitude which determines its utility to his worldly interests and to the welfare of society."-Stewart's Active and Moral Powers of Man. Book iv. chap. 5. Also, Outlines of Moral Philosophy. Lecture 5.] Dr. Paley proceeds in his argument, which we will insert, although it appears to be foreign to our subject.

Granting the existence of moral instincts; what is their power? The power, it is said, of conscience, whose remorse the ill-doer feels. But if he does not feel that remorse, or if

92 To what are the terms right and wrong, virtuous and vicious applied?

93 What remedy has been used for this ambiguity of language? 94 When is an action said to be absolutely right?

95 When is an action said to be relatively right?

96 What ambiguity in language do these definitions occasion? 97 What kind of rectitude determines the moral desert ?

98 What kind determines the utility of an action?

he holds it light, when balanced against the pleasure or profit of a wicked act; (on which point, the sinner who feels both the pleasure of the sin and the pain of remorse, is the best judge;) the advocate for a moral instinct has no motive sufficiently high to offer. For should he say that such instincts are indications of God's will, and a presage of a future state; we reply, he resorts to a rule and motive ulterior to instincts, and which the believer in the Scriptures arrives at by a surer road; at least so long as the question remains unsettled whether there is an existence or not of instinctive maxims. This question is, therefore, in our system one of mere curiosity; and left to those who are more inquisitive than ourselves about the natural history of man.

[But Bishop Butler says, "The practical reason of insisting much upon the natural authority of conscience, is, that it seems in a great measure overlooked by many, who are by no means the worse sort of men. It is thought sufficient to abstain from gross wickedness, and to be humane and kind to such as happen to come in their way. Whereas, in reality, the very constitution of our nature requires that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority; and make it the business of our lives, (as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent,) to conform ourselves to it. The observation that man is thus, by his very nature, a law to himself, pursued to its just consequences, is of the utmost importance. Because, from it will follow, that though men should, through stupidity or speculative scepticism, be ignorant of, or disbelieve any authority in the universe to punish a violation of this law; yet, if there should be such authority, they would be as really liable to punishment, as though they had been convinced beforehand, that such punishment would follow. Because it is not foreknowledge of the pu nishment, which renders obnoxious to it; but merely violating a known obligation." Preface to Sermons on Human Nature.]

[The object of Dr. Paley, in his preceding remarks, ap

99 In conclusion, what does Dr. Paley say of this question? 100 Has Bishop Butler the same opinion?

101 What would follow from determining that conscience is a law to man?

102 What is it that renders us liable to punishment?

103 What was the object of Dr. Paley in his remarks on the moral sense?

pears to have been, to show that the moral faculty should not be our guide in regulating our duties. But nearly all modern moralists have come to a different conclusion.]

[Dr. Dewar says, "This is the monitor which God has superadded to reason, which, while it shows us the essential distinction between what is right and wrong in actions, between virtue and vice, reminds us of the high and glorious purposes for which our nature has been formed.". Elements of Christian Ethics. Book iii. chap. 2.]

[Mr. Stewart says, "Every being who is conscious of the distinction between right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is bound to observe." And in support of this proposition, he has quoted passages from many authors. -Philosophy of Active and Moral Powers of Man. Book ii. chap. 6.]

[Mr. Dymond says, "With respect to the authority which properly belongs to conscience as a director of individual conduct, it appears manifest alike from reason and from Scripture, that it is great. When a man believes, upon due deliberation, that a certain action is right, that action is right to him. And this is true, whether the action be or be not required of mankind by the moral law. The fact that in his mind the sense of obligation attaches to the act, and that he has duly deliberated upon the accuracy of his judgment, makes the dictate of his conscience upon that subject an authoritative dictate. The individual is to be held guilty if he violates his conscience,-if he does one thing, while his sense of obligation is directed to its contrary. These principles respecting the authority of conscience are recognised in Scripture. • One believeth that he may eat all things another who is weak eateth herbs. :

One man esteemeth one day above another; another esteemeth every day alike.' Here then are differences, nay, contrarieties of conscientious judgments. And what are the parties directed severally to do? 'Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind; that is, let the full persuasion of his own mind be every man's rule of action. Thus again : Thus again: I know

104 Do other moralists agree with him?
105 What does Dr. Dewar say is shown by conscience?
106 What does Stewart say of our observing its dictates?
107 What does Mr. Dymond say of its authority?
108 What makes an action right in his opinion?
109 What does he think makes a man guilty?

110 What two examples does he bring from scripture?

and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself;' therefore absolutely speaking, it is lawful to eat all things: but to him that esteemeth any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean.' Rom. xiv. The question is not whether his judgment was correct, but what that judgment actually was."-Prin. of Morality. Essay 1. ch. 6.] [Dr. Paley himself says in his sermons, "Conscience, our own conscience, is to be our guide in all things."-" It is through the whisperings of conscience, that the spirit speaks. If men are wilfully deaf to their consciences, they cannot hear the spirit. If hearing, if being compelled to hear the remonstrances of conscience, they nevertheless decide and resolve and determine to go against them; then they grieve, then they defy, then they do despite to, the Spirit of God."]

[But as Dr. Dewar says, "Though conscience is an original and inherent faculty in man, and universal in its operation, it requires, in order to discharge its office fully, to be enlightened by moral and religious truth. Our moral powers, like all our powers, may be influenced by education, by passion, by habit, by association, and by political arrangements. And it is not to be denied that this power of human nature is affected with the corruption of the race; and that this corruption shows itself by moral insensibility. Hence in the Scriptures, persons under the dominion of hardness and impenitency of heart, are likened to the deaf adder that stoppeth her ear, which will not hearken to the voice of the charmer, charm he never so wisely; and they are said to have the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart, and who are past feeling."Elements of Christian Ethics. Book ii. chap. 9.]

[But further, in the words of Mr. Stewart, "A strong sense of duty will induce us to avail ourselves of all the talents we possess, and of all the information within our reach, to act agreeably to the rules of absolute rectitude. And if we fail in doing so, our negligence is criminal. Not111 Did Dr. Paley always hold to the same sentiments that he has advocated here?

112 Can our moral powers be affected by any circumstances? 113 What does Dr. Dewar say is rendered necessary by this?

114 Will not conscience, if it has its perfect work, correct itself in this respect?

115 If we do not fulfil this duty, what is the consequence?

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