the truck, or frame and running gear of the car, and the shipper owns the tank which is placed upon the truck.

It can hardly be controverted that in such a case the tank is as much a package for carrying the oil as the barrels are packages for that purpose, and to charge the latter with freight and not the former would beyond question be unjust discrimination.

This being true, any argument that insists upon a different criterion of right conduct where both truck and tank belong to the shipper (in other words, where the shipper owns the car) is manifestly founded in technical considerations and not on substantial justice.

Turning now to the question of compensation made by the carrier to the shipper for the use of the latter's car, it is plain that if this compensation is more than a fair return on the cost of the car, treating that as an investment made by the shipper, this practically amounts to paying the latter a bonus for his business, a plain and flagrant discrimination against other shippers.

Compensation for the use of shippers' cars is usually made on the same basis as for the use of cars of other carriers, and is commonly at the rate of three-fourths of a cent a mile for every mile run by the car, whether loaded or empty.

As has been previously observed, it is a matter of comparatively little consequence what price is agreed on between carriers for the use of each other's cars, as it is in any case largely a matter of exchange. But not so as respects payments for cars of private shippers. The mode of fixing the compensation, on the basis of mileage, evidently puts it to a large extent into the carrier's power to determine what the aggregate compensation in any particular case shall be. The carrier thus has the power to discriminate, not only between shippers having cars of their own and those who are obliged to use the carrier's cars, but also between shippers who may both be provided with their own

cars.

It should be said that the carriers in agreeing with shippers for the use of private cars over their lines usually provide that the car, after discharging the freight consigned by the shipper, may be used for the transportation of such return freight as the carrier may be able to secure. Delays occurring in waiting for return loads or from other circumstances of course prevent the car from making the full mileage which by rapid movement it would make. Such delays on the one hand, or on the other the constant and rapid movement of the cars, are matters which the carrier evidently has almost entirely under his own control, and by means of which he can easily manage to effect discrimination in ways that may often be difficult of detection.

Where the use of a special kind of car by the carrier is made very profitable to the owner, who is also a shipper, and where such use is in fact designed to operate as a discrimination in that shipper's favor, the effort is sometimes made to screen the real transaction from public scru

tiny by the adoption of various devices of more or less subtilty and ingenuity.

A very instructive illustration was afforded in a case decided by the Commission during the past year.

The case, as bearing on this particular matter, was as follows: Certain large shippers of cattle from Chicago to New York, having their place of business in the last-named city, agreed with one of the lines of railway leading into New York from the West, to ship all their cattle over that line. To get this large business the railway company, from the first inception of its dealings with these shippers, appears to have made to them certain valuable concessions. As these concessions were met by similar concessions made by rival lines to their patrons, it became necessary, as it appears to have been thought, to look about for some other means of preserving the advantage which the shippers in question had generally been enjoying.

A corporation in form was then gotten up by the shippers, called Lackawanna Live Stock Express Company. The formality of issuing stock and allotting shares in this new company was complied with to a limited extent only. The whole concern evidently belonged to-in fact was identical with-the firm of shippers who organized it. The shippers in question, in the name and under the cover of this corporation, then agreed with the railroad company to supply it with a large number of cattle cars of a special make, designed to be used in shipping stock furnished by the Express Company. For the rental of these improved stock cars the railroad company agreed to pay the Express Company of a cent for every mile run by each of them, whether loaded or empty. In point of fact, although it was not provided for specially by contract, such extraordinary facilities and rights of way were given these cars over the line of the railroad as to enable them to make more than twice the average mileage of ordinary stock cars. In this particular case it was shown that the mileage paid on these cars, within two years, was more than enough to reimburse the owners for the original cost of them and all expenses of operating them meantime. The cars too still remained on hand for a continuation of the business. This was held to constitute an unjust discrimination against all other shippers.

The effect which arrangements of this kind may sometimes have upon the revenues of the railroad company-quite the opposite from what was contemplated-finds strong illustration in this case. The contract between the parties was for a term of five years, and the railroad bound itself to carry at the same rates as should from time to time prevail over other roads. The rates on cattle when the contract was made were sufficiently high to make the arrangement reasonably profitable to the carrier, in view of the large volume of traffic secured by it; but rates soon fell and the continuance of the business on the same footing beyond all doubt resulted in heavy loss to the carrier.

Such improvident management as this is not primarily and in itself a matter with which the act to regulate commerce undertakes to deal. So far, however, as this improvidence in contracts for the use of cars of private shippers is connected with undue and exclusive advantages given to certain parties, it is a matter affecting the public interest, and undoubtedly comes within the purview of the law forbidding unjust discriminations and undue preferences.

It is believed that there are other methods by which the use of private cars may be, and has been, made the means of conferring undue advantage on certain shippers.

But it would be tedious to enter into further details on this subject; and the matter treated of is left to the wisdom of Congress, should it see fit to act, without any special suggestion from the Commission.

CONNECTING LINES-THROUGH ROUTES AND RATES.

The question of transportation over connecting lines of railway becomes every year more important, and seems quite inadequately provided for by existing legislation.

The act to regulate commerce, as first enacted, provided that

In cases where passengers and freight pass over continuous lines or routes operated by more than one common carrier, and the several common carriers operating such lines or routes established joint tariffs of rates or fares or charges for such continuous lines or routes, copies of such joint tariffs shall be filed with said Commission.

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And the Commission was empowered to prescribe the measure of publicity which shall be given to such rates, fares, and charges, or to such part of them as it may deem it practicable for such common carriers to publish, and the places in which they shall be published.

The original act, however, failed to provide expressly against charging more or less than the rates specified in the joint schedules, or against making charges in the same without previous notice. This defect in the law has since been remedied; joint rates as published are now required to be adhered to, and changes in the same are forbidden except after ten days' notice to the Commission in case of an advance and three days' notice in case of a reduction. The Commission, under the power given it to prescribe the measure of publicity which common carriers shall give to joint schedules of rates, and to advances or reductions in the same, has directed they shall be published and posted in the same manner as is required by the act itself in respect to the charges of a single carrier.

The duty of connecting carriers having joint traffic arrangements over a continuous route in respect to the publication of their rates, and of changes in the same, is not one which the law itself directly imposes and requires. The measure of publicity to be given them is left to the Commission from time to time to prescribe.

The difference between the requirements in regard to publication of

joint rates and those of a single line, the one being absolute and the other being left to the discretion of the Commission, was doubtless intentionally made in the law. The idea probably was that carriers on the long through routes over which joint rates are made, being frequently competitive with carriers not subject to the provisions of the act to regulate commerce, might be unduly handicapped in the competition if they should be compelled, by publication of their charges, to disclose to their rivals information which would enable the latter to underbid for the business without themselves being under any obligation to make their own charges public.

The Commission in exercising the discretion given to it upon the subject has acted under the conviction that considerations of public interest in the full publicity of traffic charges should outweigh those above suggested, as to competition between carriers subject to the act on the one hand and those not included within its provisions on the other.

And it had by a general order required the same publicity to be given to joint schedules as the law requires to be given to the schedules of a single road. From the fact that no serious complaint has been made by carriers that their business has, by reason of the enforced publication of rates, been taken away by rivals who are not subject to its provisions, it may be inferred that the question of competition as affecting the publication of rates is not so important as was at one time supposed. In fact, the instances are but few where such competition exists, between carriers subject to the act and those not subject to it, as would render the publication of the rates of the former a source of danger to their business from the action of the latter.

The provisions which have been thus briefly discussed relate only to continuous lines or routes "where the several common carriers operating such lines or routes establish joint tariffs."

In other words, it is only where several connecting carriers have voluntarily associated themselves into a through route, and are doing a through business under some common arrangement, that these provisions apply concerning the publication of through rates.

But there is a vast amount of interstate traffic which either must pass, or would most naturally and cheaply pass, over various connecting lines which have no common understanding or business arrangement with each other for through billing or the making of joint through rates.

The carrier over an initial line, on which traffic originates, may at the end of its own line connect with two or more other carriers, over the lines of either of which the traffic may reach its destination.

No carrier can, in the absence of legislation, or of contract entered into by it, be compelled to assume the duties and responsibilities of a carrier beyond its own line. Its duty in the absence of legislation or contract is simply to carry safely to the end of its own line and there

deliver to a connecting carrier on the route to destination. In the absence of any instructions from the shipper as to the connecting carrier to whom delivery shall be made, the initial carrier may usually select the route by which it will forward the goods after they leave its own line, reasonable regard being had to the safety, expeditiousness, and general fitness of the route selected. Indeed, it is very common for the initial carrier, when receipting for goods destined for a point beyond its own lines, to stipulate expressly in the bill of lading that it may forward the goods by such connecting carrier as it may itself select.

Where the first carrier issues a bill of lading agreeing to carry goods through to a place of destination beyond its own line for a specified price for the whole transportation it will usually, though not necessarily, be the case that such first carrier is a party to some through traffic arrangement with another carrier or carriers whose lines reach the place of destination. Such an arrangement is apt to provide for the recognition by each connecting carrier of the bills of lading issued by any other carrier composing the route for the passage of loaded cars between the roads of the different carriers without breaking bulk, and for an entire through rate for transportation over the different roads which is less than the sum of the local rates over each.

But where all or any one of several carriers, whose lines form a route over which traffic must pass, refuse to unite in arrangements of the character above described, there seems to be no relief from the situation to be found in the terms of the "Act to regulate commerce," unless an unjust discrimination between connecting lines be involved.

Leaving the question of discrimination between connecting lines for the present out of view, it may be observed that a proper consideration of public interests and the needs of commerce frequently requires that through routes should be opened and through rates given over connecting lines, the separate owners of which refuse voluntarily to enter into arrangements to accommodate the public in that behalf.

It is sometimes suggested that the establishment of through routes, and the making of through rates over the lines of connecting but independent carriers, are matters for contract between the several carriers and can not properly be provided for by legislation.

The suggestion merits careful consideration. The question of through routes and through rates may be considered, (1) with reference to the compensation of the several carriers for the services rendered by them, respectively, in the through transportation; (2) with regard to the responsibility and duties of the several carriers toward the shipper, and (3) with reference to the responsibility and duties of the different carriers toward each other.

It is evident that where a through rate over several lines is to be established by public authority the same authority will also, in case the