subject-matter is not within the province or jurisdiction of the State Legislatures."

Crutcher v. Kentucky (141 U. S. 47) Justice Bradley:

"And the same thing is exactly true with regard to interstate commerce as it is with regard to foreign commerce. No difference is per

ceivable between the two."

"It has been frequently laid down by this court that the power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute as it is over foreign commerce."

Brown v. Houston (114 U. S. 622) Justice Bradley:

"The power to regulate commerce among the several states is granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations."

License Cases (5 How. 599) Justice Catron:

"And here is the limit between the sovereign power of the State and the Federal power. That is to say, that which does not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State; and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States."

Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308) Justice McKenna:

"Congress is given power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states. The power is direct; there is no word of limitation in it, and its broad and universal scope has been so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary."

Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States (220 U. S. 45) Justice McKenna:

"The statute [Pure Food and Drugs Act] rests, of course, upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and, defining that power, we have said that no trade can be carried on between the states to which it does not extend, and have further said that it is complete in itself, subject to no limitations except those found in the Constitution."

Brown v. State of Maryland (12 Wheat., p. 419 U. S.) Chief Justice Marshall:

"All power may be abused, and if the fear of its abuse is to constitute an argument against its existence, it might be urged against the existence of that which is universally acknowledged and which is indispensable to the general safety."

Objection 9. "The Power of Congress to Regulate or Prohibit Interstate Commerce Depends on the Kind of Injury Such Commerce Might Do."

This objection admits that Congress may regulate or prohibit interstate commerce in goods that do injury:

(1) To the morals of the consumer:

As in the Act of February 21, 1905, which prohibits the transportation in interstate commerce of obscene books, although the Constitution expressly guarantees "freedom of speech."

(2) To his safety:

The transportation of goods may involve danger to life, as in the Act of March 3, 1905, which prohibits the transportation of loose hay on passenger steamships. The Act of March 31, 1900, prohibits the transportation of explosive materials in any vessel or vehicle in interstate

commerce.

(3) Or to the producer:

The producer is protected by the Act of July 1, 1902, which prohibits the transportation or sale by another state of dairy or food products which have been falsely labeled or branded.

But it is contended that the products of child labor are not injurious to the consumer and offer no danger in the process of interstate transportation; that their only possible injury lies in the effect upon the children who produce them.

Assuming for the moment that this is true, apparently the types of injury above cited do not exhaust the power of Congress to intervene.

The Act of February 3d, 1903, prohibits the transportation in interstate commerce of cattle without a certificate from the Inspector of the Department of Agriculture. It cannot be shown that all cattle shipped in interstate commerce without this certificate are diseased or worthless. Many may be entirely sound, but they are effectually barred.

It has never been contended that oleomargarine is injurious to the consumer yet its transportation in interstate commerce or its sale in another state than the producing state is prohibited unless it is plainly marked. This provision is clearly for the purpose of protecting the producers of dairy butter.

If the facts of child labor in any part of the country are such as are obnoxious to the moral sense of the country; if children are so employed as to injure their future value as citizens of the nation; if the state in which these abuses exist refuses or delays to abate them, then it is clearly in the province of "the people," represented in Congress, to act. The decision in the White Slave Case under the Mann Act is definite on this point.

Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308) Justice McKenna:

"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, state and nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said; but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral. This is the effect of the decisions; and surely, if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls."

We do not claim that the consumer is injured materially or physically by the purchase or use of goods produced by child labor. But we do claim that the consumer is injured morally; that he is powerless to protect himself by means of humane laws enacted in his own state so long as interstate commerce offers facilities for shipping into his state goods made under conditions obnoxious to his moral sense. And how can he be protected in this except by the only power competent to regulate interstate commerce? Says Justice McKenna in Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308):

"It must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to the states and those conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and moral."

The responsibility for administering this law is placed upon a Board composed of three Cabinet Officers, the Secretary of

Commerce, the Secretary of Labor and the Attorney General. This Board shall draft all rules and regulations necessary to guide Government officials in enforcing the law and shall from time to time amend the rules as experience or changing conditions may require. We are confident that this is a far better plan for administration than to attempt on a priori grounds to construct a detailed plan of enforcement.

These representatives of the general government are at the source of information; they represent a sufficiently wide range of public interest to insure a fair interpretation and administration of the law which no one department, for example the Department of Labor, could guarantee. The Secretary of Labor will presumably represent the interests of labor on the Board, while the Secretary of Commerce will see that rules are not adopted that would be unnecessarily harsh or irritating to commercial interests. The Attorney General as a third member of the Board completes the group and assures the technical wisdom of the Department of Justice in developing an effective system of administration.

2. Enforcement.

In the practical enforcement of the law the Secretary of Labor is given authority to investigate all industrial plants in which violations of the law may occur. He and his deputies are given the same power to investigate these industrial establishments as is now exercised by Departments of Labor in the various states. At the same time State Factory Inspectors, School Attendance Officers, Health Officers, and private citizens are equally competent to report violations. Cases for prosecution are to be brought before the United States District Attorneys and they are required under the law to institute immediate proceedings.

3. Duty of Citizens.

The Bill differs radically from others in respect to the duties of citizens in complying with it. One pending bill provides that every six months every producer using the facilities of interstate. commerce shall file an affidavit that he does not employ children contrary to law and has not done so during the preceding six months. This is an effective way to bring the desired evidence before the

officials.

On the other hand it would cause unnecessary annoyance to a large number of people. Among 100,000 employers, perhaps 90,000 have never employed child labor and do not intend to do so. In our judgment it is unfair to require of these 90,000 the form of affidavit every six months in order to help Government officials detect the violators who may be found among the other 10,000.

4. Seeks to Punish Real Offenders.

We have been asked why the interstate carrier is not made a party as in other bills. The answer is that it is the producer and not the carrier who is guilty of the offense the law seeks to punish. Why then beat around the bush instead of placing the responsibility where it belongs, viz.: on the employer of the child. And why compel every interstate carrier to act as a government agent to bring offenders to justice. This is a public function and we question the wisdom of laying upon private enterprise the disagreeable task of acting as a federal detective service. We believe that rules can be laid down by this Board which will make it practically impossible for an exploiter of the labor of young children to pollute the stream of interstate commerce with his goods.

Undoubtedly, as shown, there would be danger to an innocent wholesaler or merchant handling the goods of an employer of child labor. This, of course, should be avoided and we have relied on the Administrative Board to fix rules of evidence which will insure the punishment of the real offender. If the "dealer" were omitted from the bill he could be used at any time by the producer as a cover. The law must therefore include all parties who handle the goods from the producer to the acceptance of shipment.

How then include the merchant and wholesaler and still not subject them to punishment for an act innocently performed? It has been objected that the Administrative Board cannot determine rules of evidence, but that this is law and must be embodied in the bill itself. The purpose of the framers of the bill has been to divest it of every unnecessary detail, so as to fix public attention on the standard proposed. If the objection here made is valid, however, it can readily be met by adding to section 5, the following, adopted from the Pure Food and Drugs Act: