Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

ton mill in Georgia equipped with the best modern machinery, surrounded by cotton fields, located in a territory where rents are not high and the cost of living is not great, surrounded by a labor force that can be employed at low wages and with tide water facilities for bringing its product to the great markets of the world, cannot manufacture cotton under conditions that now exist in New York and Ohio and Massachusetts where labor is costly, rents are high, and cotton fields are remote. It will require some stretch of the imagination to accept this astounding position.

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL CHILD
LABOR LAW.

Assuming now that such standards as we have discussed are desirable for the whole country we next face the question whether such action is within the power of Congress under the constitutional limitations of our Federal Government. The specific objections thus far brought to our attention on constitutional grounds are here considered in order:

Objection 1. "It Violates the Rights of the States."

We answer that it does not undertake to dictate under what conditions children shall be employed in any state, but does undertake to protect sister states, i. e., the National domain, against the folly of any of its parts; just as Congress has not undertaken to forbid prostitution or commercialized vice in any state, but does forbid the spread of the abuse from one state to another. On this power of the Federal Government the court is clear, see Hoke et al. v. United States (227 U. S. 308), argued January 7th and 8th, 1913, decided February 24th, 1913. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court and said in part:

"There is a domain which the states cannot reach and over which Congress alone has power; and if such power be exerted to control what the states cannot, it is an argument for-not against-its legality. Its exertion does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the states. We have examples; others may be adduced. The Pure Food and Drugs Act is a conspicuous instance. In all of the instances a clash of national legislation with the power of the states was urged, and in all rejected."

Cohens vs. Virginia (6 Wheat. 264). Chief Justice Marshall:

"That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects the American people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes, her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire-for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate."

We need not here cite the cases in which the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is maintained. These cases are very numerous. See Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton 1, U. S.), Chief Justice Marshall:

"They denied that the particular law in question was made in pursuance of the Constitution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual embargo was the annihilation, and not the regulation of commerce. In terms they admitted the applicability of the words used in the Constitution to vessels; and that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent of excitement calculated to draw forth every principle on which legitimate resistance could be sustained. No example could more strongly illustrate the universal understanding of the American people on this subject."

In case of Brown v. Houston (114 U. S. 622), Justice Bradley, the Supreme Court used this language:

"The power to regulate commerce among the several states is granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations."

Wherever cases have arisen involving this principle the Supreme Court has been emphatic. This is true even down to the case of Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308) in which Justice McKenna said:

"Congress is given power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.' The power is direct; there is no word of limitation in it, and its broad and universal scope has been so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary. And besides, it has had so much illustration by cases that it would seem as if there could be no instance of its exercise that does not find an admitted example in some one of them. Experience, however, is the other way, and in almost every instance of the exercise of the power differences are asserted from previous exercises of it and made a ground of attack. The present case is an example."

Objection 2. "It Infringes the Right of Free Contract."

The power of a state over making of contracts is defined in the case of Sturges Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp (231 U. S. 320). Justice Hughes said:

"It was competent for the state to prohibit such employment altogether," etc.

This case involved damages against an employer of a child injured while working on a certificate giving a false statement of age. Also in Muller v. Oregon (208 U. S. 412) Justice Brewer:

"We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge. Legislation designed for her (woman's) protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for man and could not be sustained. The limitations which this statute (ten-hour work day) places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all."

The power of Congress over making contracts is defended in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger (226 U. S. 491) Justice Lurton:

"The constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states and with foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts between shipper and carrier of shipments in such commerce in regard to liability for loss or damage to articles carried."

The court even refuses to justify a social wrong by the exercise of personal "rights." See Hoke v. United States (227 U. S. 308) Justice McKenna:

"It is misleading to say that men and women have rights. Their rights cannot fortify or sanction their wrongs; and if they employ interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it may be forbidden to them to the extent of the Act of July 25, 1910."

Objection 3. "Congress Has No Power to Regulate the Hours of Labor."

Such power is not claimed. It is not assumed in this bill. But Congress has power to say whether goods shall be shipped in interstate commerce which have been produced under conditions injurious to public welfare.

See Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Interstate Commerce Commission (221 U. S. 612) Justice Hughes:

"The Act of March 4, 1907

regulating the hours of labor

of railway employees engaged in interstate commerce and requiring
carriers to make reports in regard thereto, is not unconstitutional as be-
yond the power of Congress because it applies to railroads and employees
engaged in intrastate business.
The length of time employed
has a direct relation to efficiency of employees, and the imposition of
reasonable restrictions in regard thereto is not an unconstitutional inter-
ference with the liberty of contract. The power of Congress to make
regulations in regard to agencies for interstate commerce is not defeated
by the fact that the agencies regulated are also connected with intrastate
commerce."

Employers' Liability Cases (207 U. S. 463) Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court:

"We fail to perceive any just reason for holding that Congress is without power to regulate the relation of master and servant, to the extent that regulations adopted by Congress on that subject are solely confined to interstate commerce, and therefore are within the grant to regulate that commerce or within the authority given to use all means appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred."

This principle is clearly set forth by placing side by side the following two utterances of the Supreme Court; the first showing the extent of the power of a state over industry, the second declaring a similar power over interstate commerce by Congress.

Sturges Manufacturing Co. v. Beauchamp (231 U. S. 320). Justice Hughes says:

"As it was competent for the state to prohibit such employment altogether, it could select the means appropriate to make its prohibition effective, and could compel employers at their peril to ascertain whether those they employed were in fact under the age specified. The imposition of absolute requirements of this Act is a familiar exercise of the protective power of the government."

Northern Securities case (193 U. S. 197) Justice Harlan:

"Subject only to such restrictions (those imposed by the Constitution upon the exercise of the powers granted by that instrument), the power of Congress over interstate and international commerce is as complete as the power of any state over its domestic commerce."

Objection 4. "It violates the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution which provides that 'No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'"

1. It does not take life, but seeks to conserve it.

2. It does not deprive of liberty. The only liberty of which it could be charged that the citizen is deprived is the right to make labor contracts with a child. In the case of Sturges Manufacturing Company v. Beauchamp, above cited (231 U. S. 320), Justice Hughes says: "It was competent for the state to prohibit such employment altogether." The liberty to contract for the labor of a child does. not exist except in case of contract for apprenticeship between the guardian of a child and a journeyman. Even such contracts are in disrepute and in the Children's Code, recently adopted in Ohio, have been eliminated on the ground that to permit them was to permit a species of slavery.

3. It does not deprive of property-unless it can be proved that an employer enjoys a property right in the labor of children. The proof of the existence of such a propcrty right would present the strongest possible argument for a law which would at once abolish such property. It would call for emancipation of the children of the country.

In brief, this bill does none of these three things. It does not even attempt to determine under what conditions goods shall be prepared, but only when they can become objects of interstate

commerce.

See McDermott v. Wisconsin (228 U. S. 115) Justice Day:

"That body [Congress] has the right not only to pass laws which shall regulate legitimate commerce among the states and with foreign nations, but has full power to keep the channels of such commerce free from the transportation of illicit or harmful articles, to make such as are injurious to the public health outlaws of such commerce and to bar them

« AnteriorContinuar »