holders and any other persons, and from making any distribution or transfer of any of its effects." 16 An injunction granted by a State court to stay proceedings in the same or another tribunal of the State remains in force after a removal to a Federal court of the suit in which it was granted, although such an injunction could not be originally issued in the Federal court in a suit removed from a State court.18 Except in an extraordinary case to prevent irreparable injury to property or business interests,19 an injunction will not be issued to stay a criminal proceeding,20 a proceeding in its nature criminal, as for the removal of an officer,21 or an application for a mandamus.22 "This court," said Lord Hardwicke, "has no jurisdiction to stay proceedings on a mandamus; nor to an indictment; nor to an information; nor to a writ of prohibition, that I know of." 23 Judge Billings recently said: "The extent to which such a bill will lie is well defined. It is when the parties sought to be enjoined have, as plaintiffs, submitted themselves to the court by a bill in equity as to the matters affected by or involved in the criminal procedure. In such case the court will by a decree affecting the parties so situated personally enjoin." It has been doubted whether a Federal Circuit Court has the power to enjoin the prosecution of a suit in a Federal court in another circuit.25 Such an injunction has been refused when sought by a defendant to a patent-suit for the purpose of enjoining the prosecution of suits previously brought upon the same patent.25 The subsequent commencement of suits upon the same patent has been enjoined.27 It was at first 16 Fisk v. Railroad Co., 10 Blatchf. 518. But see Kessler v. Continental, C. & I. Co., 42 Fed. R. 258. 17 Smith v. Schwed, 6 Fed. R. 455; Perry v. Sharpe, 8 Fed. R. 15. But see Lawrence v Morgan's R. R. & S. S. Co., 121 U. S. 634. 18 Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179. 19 M. Schandler Bottling Co. v. Welch, 42 Fed. R. 561; Tuchman v. Welch, 42 Fed. R. 548. Same cases reversed, 45 Fed. R. 283; criticised in 24 American Law Review, 661. 20 Lord Montague v. Dudman, 2 Ves. Sen. 396; Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 18 Ves. 211, 220; Saull v. Browne, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 64, Spink v. Francis, 19 Fed. R. 670; s. c. 20 Fed. R. 567; Suess v. Noble, 31 Fed. R. 855; In re Sawyer, 23 Lord Montague v. Dudman, 2 Ves. Sen. 396, 398. 24 Spink v. Francis, 19 Fed. R. 670, 671; s. c. 20 Fed. R. 567, 569. So held in Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 2 Atk. 302. 25 Kelley v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Manuf. Co., 44 Fed. R. 19, 20, per Brown, J. 26 Kelley v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Manuf. Co., 44 Fed. R. 19. 27 Birdsall v. Manuf. Co., 1 Hughes, 64. 29 held that a court had no power to restrain a defendant from suing in a foreign court; 28 but it seems now to be established that it can do so, though such a power is exercised with great caution.30 It has been held that, in a suit by the United States to vacate a patent for an invention, a preliminary injunction will not be granted to restrain the prosecution by the defendant of suits for the infringement of the patent.31 Where a plaintiff is bringing suits upon the same patent against different defendants, who rely upon the same defenses, the court may stay proceedings in all but one till the validity of the patent has been finally determined in the excepted case. But where some of the defendants set up different defenses, it was held that the court "could not restrain in part and permit in part the prosecution of the cases. It would have no right to issue an injunction which should [sic] have the effect to split up the cases, enjoining their prosecution as to some branches of the controversy and permitting it as to the others." 3 An injunction order providing "that all suits and proceedings on the part of" certain persons "against the said bankrupt, to collect the debt set forth, be, and the same are hereby stayed, to await the determination of the Court in bankruptcy on the question of the discharge therein," was held violated by those who, after discontinuing a suit then pending, subsequently instituted another to recover the same claim, with new allegations charging fraud.34 In § 212. Injunctions to restrain the Alienation of Property. junctions may be obtained to prevent the alienation of property where it would work irremediable or gross injustice." An injunction will, therefore, issue to prevent the transfer of notes, bills of exchange, and other documents, whether negotiable or not, whose possession gives their holder a presumptive title to the rights which they evidence,2 when obtained from the plain 29 Love v. Baker, 1 Ch. Cas. 67, decided by Lord Clarendon; but the reporter added, "sed quære, for all the bar was of another opinion." 29 Bunbury v. Bunbury, 1 Beav. 318; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen (Mass.), 545. Engel v. Scheuerman, 40 Ga. 206; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148. 8) Vail v. Knapp, 49 Barb. (N.Y.), 299; Story's Eq. Jur. §§ 899,900. 31 United States v. Colgate, 21 Fed. R. 318. 32 Birdsell v. Hagerstown Ag. Imp. Man. Co., 1 Hughes, 64; Rumford Chemical Works v. Hecker, 5 Off. Gaz. 644; Allis v. Stowell, 16 Fed. R. 783; Nat. Cash Register Co. v. Boston Cash I. & R. Co, 41 Fed. R. 51. 38 Dyer, J., in Allis v. Stowell, 16 Fed. R. 783, 790. 31 In the Matter of Schwarz, 14 Fed. R. 787. § 212. 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 953. 2 Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 tiff by the defendant through duress, fraud, or other iniquity; or when forged; or when, though the holder may have properly obtained them, he threatens or is about to use them in an inequitable manner. An injunction may be granted to prevent a party from making vexatious alienations of land pending a suit concerning the title to the same.5 For it was said that, otherwise, the plaintiff might be put to the expense of making each vendee or grantor a party to the proceedings; and, at all events, his title, if he prevails in the suit, may be embarrassed by the new outstanding claims of title under the threatened transfer. The sale or transfer, or removal beyond the jurisdiction of the court 5 of a chattel, the loss of which could not be compensated in damages, may also be thus restrained; and so has been the sale of other personal property. Injunctions have also been granted at the suit of a part-owner to prevent the sailing of a ship until his share could be ascertained, and a bond given to secure him against loss upon the voyage; 10 to prevent the removal of timber wrongfully cut down; 11 and to prevent the trustees of a dissenting chapel from appointing as a minister a person not duly qualified according to its constitution.12 § 213. Injunctions to prevent Waste. An injunction will issue to prevent waste, whether legal or purely equitable. Waste is a permanent injury to real estate committed by a person in possession with a limited interest in the same. Legal waste consists of such acts as would be considered waste at common law; equitable waste, of such acts as at law would not, under the circumstances of the case, be considered waste, but which are so Wheat. 738, 845; Lloyd v. Gurdon, 2 Esdaile v. La Nauze, 1 Y. & C. 394. 4 Anon., 6 Madd. 10. Daly v. Kelly, 4 Dow, 417; Echliff v. Baldwin, 16 Ves. 267. But see Turner v. Wight, 4 Beav. 40. 6 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1873. 7 Gibson v. Lewis, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 476; Lady Arundell v. Phipps, 10 Ves. 139; Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1872. 8 Green v. Hanberry, 2 Brock. 403; Haly v. Goodson, 2 Mer. 77; Christie v. Craig, 2 Mer. 137. 9 Bateau v. Bernard, 3 Blatchf. 244; Higgins v. Jenks, 3 Ware, 17. 10 Haly v. Goodson, 2 Mer. 77; Christie v. Craig, 2 Mer. 137. But see Wilkinson v. Dobbie, 12 Blatchf. 298. 11 Bradley v. Reed, 2 Pittsb. (Pa.) 519; Anon., 1 Ves. Jr. 93; Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1874. 12 Milligan v. Mitchell, 1 M. & K. 446. § 213. Garth v. Cotton, 1 Dickens, 183; Thruston v. Mustin, 3 Cranch C. C. 335; United States v Gear, 3 How. 120; Fletcher v. New Orleans N. E. R. R. Co., 20 Fed. R. 345; Lanier v. Alison, 31 Fed. R. 100; Bispham's Eq. §§ 429-432. esteemed in the view of a court of equity, from their manifest injury to the inheritance, though not inconsistent with the legal rights of the party committing them.2 Such is wilful and wanton injury to land committed by a tenant without impeachment for waste. The interference of equity in cases of this kind is justified, not only by the fear of irremediable injury, but also because the tenant for life or years is considered to stand in a trust relation toward the remainder-man. So anxious is equity to prevent waste, that it has sustained a bill praying such an injunction filed in behalf of a child in its mother's womb. An injunction will be granted to restrain acts in the nature of waste committed by one in possession of land the title to which is in litigation.5 It has been held that an applicant for the purchase of government land whose claim is disputed in the land office cannot obtain an injunction to prevent acts of waste by county officers. § 214. Injunctions to prevent the Continuance of a Nuisance. The interference of equity to enjoin the continuance of a nuisance is not only due to the fact that the acts complained of produce irreparable injury, but also is allowed to prevent the multiplicity of suits that would be necessary were the plaintiff confined to his remedy at common law. Nuisances are of two kinds those which are injurious to the public at large, and those which are injurious to the rights and interests of private persons.2 The use of this remedy to suppress a public nuisance is of very ancient date. It was applicable in England, both to nuisances strictly so called and to purprestures. "By purpresture is meant, in its present acceptation, an incroachment upon the Crown, either upon part of the demesne lands, or upon the high roads, rivers, ports, or streets; and the difference between purprestures and nuisances consists in this, that where the jus privatum of the Crown is invaded it is a purpresture, but where the jus publicum is violated it is a nuisance. In cases of pur 2 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1854, 1855. 3 Vane v. Lord Barnard, 2 Vern. 738; Garth v. Sir John Hind Cotton, 1 Dickens, 183; s. c. 1 White & Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity (6th ed.), 806; Bispham's Eq. § 434. Musgrave v. Parry, 2 Vern. 710; Lutterel's Case, cited Prec. Ch. 50; Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229. 5 United States v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271; Lanier v. Alison, 31 Fed. R. 100. McBride v. Board of Commissioners of Pierce County 44 Fed. R. 17. $214. 1 Fishmongers' Co. v. East India Co., 1 Dickens, 163; Attorney-General v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 338, 343. 2 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1857. 3 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1857. presture the remedy is either by information for an intrusion at the common law, or by information in equity at the suit of the attorney-general. The consequence of a judgment at common. law being the abatement of the erection or grievance complained of, whether it is or is not a nuisance, whilst upon an information in equity, where the trespass does not produce any public injury, the court may direct an inquiry whether it is most beneficial to the Crown to abate the purpresture, or to suffer the erection to remain and be assessed as a part of the legal revenue." 4 Cases of public nuisance may be enjoined at the suit of the attorneygeneral, who in England sues by information. A public nuisance may also be restrained at the suit of any who have suffered by it special damage distinct from that which it causes to the public at large; but not otherwise. A bill, for example, may be filed by a State to enjoin the erection of a bridge across a navigable stream which will injure her commerce; but not by a city for a similar reason, unless its property, for example, a wharf, is thereby injured.9 The United States may obtain an injunction against a nuisance which threatens injury to works in aid of commerce which are constructed under the authority of the national government.10 A private nuisance is an act, or series of acts, unaccompanied by an act of trespass, which causes a substantial injury to a person's property, health, or comfort. It will always be restrained when it would otherwise cause an irreparable injury or a multiplicity of suits." "It used to be thought, that if a man knew there was a nuisance, and went and lived near it, he could not recover, because, it was said, it is he that goes to the nuisance, and not the nuisance to him. This, however, is not the law 4 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1857. citing Attorney-General v. Richards, 2 Anst. 603; Attorney-General v. Johnson, 2 J. Wil. 87. See also United States v. Gear, 3 How. 120. 6 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (2d Am ed.) 1858. Baines v. Baker, Amb. 158; Mississippi & Missouri R. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485; Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91; Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10; Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean, 337; Works v. Junction R. R., 5 McLean, 425. 8 Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91. 9 St. Louis v. Knapp Co., 104 U. S. 658. 10 United States v. Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co., 3 Fed. R. 548; s. c. 1 McCrary, 601. 11 Osburne v. Barter & Goddins, anno 26 Eliz., Choyce Cases in Chancery (ed. of 1870), p. 176; Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake C. & W. Co., 2 Black, 545; Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 Fed. R. 753; St. Helen's Smelting 7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. C. 642. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518. |