filing of the bill, and his interest therein had not been determined by forfeiture, surrender, or other lawful means. He was required to swear to these facts in his bill, and according to the practice before Lord Bacon's time, to give a bond to the amount of £10 as a security that the information so given was true.12 Such injunctions were formerly very common; but have now fallen into disuse. The last reported instance of one was in Lord Hardwicke's time.13 § 210. Injunctions to prevent Irreparable Injury for which the Remedy at Law is inadequate; in general. The most ordinary ground upon which an injunction issues, and one, indeed, which includes all but the first of those previously mentioned, is that, otherwise, the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury, for which damages at law would be no adequate remedy. It would be impossible specifically to mention here all the different instances in which an injunction issues for this reason; but the following is an enumeration of those of more frequent occurrence which have not been previously described. An injunction will issue on account of the inadequacy of the remedy at common law; to stay proceedings in other courts, either of law, equity, or admiralty;1 to restrain the indorsement or negotiation of notes and bills of exchange, the sale of land, the sailing of a ship, the transfer of stock, or the alienation of a specific chattel; 2 to restrain the commission of every species of waste or act in the nature of waste; to suppress the continuance of a public or private nuisance; to prevent a threatened destructive trespass; 5 to prevent the infringement of patents; to prevent the violation of copyright, whether by printed publications, or theatrical representation, or otherwise; to prevent the unauthorized use of trademarks, and the opening of private letters;9 to compel the performance or prevent the breach of contracts other than those for the payment of money only; 10 and, under very extraordinary circumstances, to compel the delivery of personal property wrongfully withheld."1 8 § 211. Injunctions to stay Proceedings in other Courts. Injunctions to stay proceedings in other courts are of much less frequent occurrence now that discovery and the inspection of documents can be obtained at common law without the aid of equity than they were formerly; but they are still occasionally issued, especially in bankruptcy.1 Such injunctions must not be confounded with writs of prohibition, which are addressed to the judges of a court, whereas injunctions are directed to the parties to the proceedings which it is desired to restrain.2 Ordinarily, when two courts have a concurrent jurisdiction over the same thing, whichever court was first possessed of the cause has a right to proceed with the same, and proceedings in it will not be prohibited or restrained in another. The Revised Statutes of the United States expressly provide that "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Accordingly a Federal court has refused to enjoin a railway company from taking possession of land upon the termination of condemnation proceedings in a State court. A State court has no power to stay by injunction a proceeding in a court of the United States. It has been held, however, that a Federal court has power to issue an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court which interfere. with the enforcement of one of its own judgments, and to stay proceedings which have been instituted or continued after the beginning or the removal of the suit in the Federal jurisdiction.7 § 211. McLean v. Lafayette Bank, 3 McLean, 185. In re Schwarz, 14 Fed. R. 787. 2 See Eden on Injunctions, ch. ii.; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 624; Dillon v. Kansas City S. B. Ry. Co., 43 Fed. R. 109, 111. 8 Nicholas v. Nicholas, Prec. in Ch. 546; Daniel's Ch. Pr. (2d Am. ed.) 1845; supra §§ 9, 10. But see the Erie Ry. Co. v. Ramsey, 45 N. Y. 637. 4 U. S. R. S. 720. See the Slaughter House Cases, 10 Wall. 273; Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Rensselaer & S. R. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. R. Co., 18 Fed. R. 617; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 13 Fed. R. 793; s. c. 4 Woods, 386; Hamilton v. Walsh, 23 Fed. R. 420; Tifft v. Iron Clad Manuf. Co., 16 Blatchf. 48; Yick Wo v. Crowley, 26 5 Dillon v. Kansas City S. B. Ry. Co., 43 Fed. R. 109. 6 McKim ". Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301-306; City Bank of New York v. Skelton, 2 Blatchf. 14. 7 French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494; Fisk v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 10 Blatchf. 518; Sharon v. Terry, 36 Fed. R. 337; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Ford, 35 Fed. R. 170. Jesup v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 44 Fed. R. 663, 664-667, per Ricks, J. : "The plaintiff, in his petition in said court of common pleas, bases his right to recover against the defendant, as the reorganized railroad company and pur Such an injunction will rarely be issued. But proceedings in a State court cannot be enjoined upon the sole ground that they are taken under a State statute which is repugnant to the chaser of the property foreclosed, as above stated, upon the ground that the circuit courts of the United States, in foreclosing said property, made a decree or order providing that the said receiver, John McNulty, should turn over to the purchasers of said railroad property all the assets, books, vouchers, accounts and property in his custody as such receiver, and be discharged from all further liability as such receiver, upon the following conditions, which I quote from the order of the court: "The court orders the delivery of such receivership assets, papers, and property to the Wabash Railroad Company, on the express condition that the last named corporation agrees to pay, satisfy, and finally discharge all the debts and liabilities of such receivership of every kind now remaining unpaid, and that it may further defend in the name of such receiver all litigated claims or demands against such receivership now pending in this or other courts, and will fully abide by and pay any and all judgments and recoveries, together with costs, which may be rendered in any of such actions or litigations, and always protect and save harmless the said receiver from such claims or any of them.' "This order was made by this court after the confirmation of the sale there tofore made, and the conditions therein required to be performed by the purchaser were substantially and in fact a part of the consideration exacted from such purchasers for said railroad property. This court authorized the receiver to deliver to the said purchaser all of the assets and property in his hands, upon the condition that said purchaser would save harmless the said receiver from all claims of every kind that might be preferred against him. It is therefore clearly the duty of this court to see that such purchaser is not required to pay or satisfy any claim or judgment of any kind that would not be a proper and just liability of said re ceiver. If this court had not discharged said receiver upon the conditions recited in the order, releasing him from further responsibility in connection with this property, it would have retained the assets, books, and vouchers in his hands, and adjusted all the liabilities incurred by him as receiver, by and through the proceedings customary in such cases. It is clearly the duty of this court to protect the purchaser of this property to the same extent, and in the same manner, that it would have protected the receiver if he had been retained for the purpose of settling all these outstanding claims. When the purchaser bought this property it purchased it upon the conditions named in the decree and order of sale. The purchase price so obtained became a fund in the hands of this court for distribution to the beneficiaries under its decree. The court would certainly protect this fund from being diverted. It would take every precaution to see that no party received any portion of it unless justly entitled thereto. But this agreement to pay such just claims as might be allowed against the receiver, as before stated, is, in fact, a part of the price paid by the said purchaser for the road, and it is the duty of the court to protect it against any unjust claims, by the same diligence and care that it would protect the fund if actually in the registry of the court for distribution. The distribution of this fund, and the allowance of claims against the receiver, which is in fact a part of the purchase price, is exclusively within the control of this court. As the court would not allow any other tribunal to distribute any part of the purchase price, so it cannot properly or safely allow any other tribunal to say what are proper claims against the receiver to be paid out of this fund, or by the purchaser as a part of its purchase price, for the property. In order to so fully protect the purchaser and fairly retain control of all claims against the receiver which such purchaser 8 Frishman v. Insurance Co., 41Fed. R. 449. Federal Constitution.9 A judge of a Circuit or District Court has no power to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment in a State court after an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States should be required to pay, this court must retain jurisdiction of all cases which involve the liability of its receiver. It must retain or acquire such jurisdic tion in order that such liability may be adjusted and determined according to the equitable principles controlling this court in such proceedings. The plaintiff in this case had the right, under the act of August, 1888, to sue this receiver in the Court of Common Pleas of Defiance County for the torts committed by him as such receiver. He had the right to bring such action without the leave of this court. Any judgment that he might have obtained in such court would have been subject to the equitable scrutiny of this court before it would have been allowed as a valid claim against the receiver; but the plaintiff's right to sue the receiver was fixed and indisputable. He chose not to avail himself of this right while it existed, but after the discharge of the receiver, and, when the purchaser of the foreclosed railroad property assumed the possession and manage ment of it, he institutes this suit against such purchaser, and seeks to hold it liable for torts committed by the receiver during his management of said property under the orders of this court. While he bases his right to recover upon the express stipulation of the purchaser, made in this court, that it would pay all the liabilities of the receiver upon condition that the assets of the receiver and the control of the property purchased were turned over to it, yet the plaintiff elected to bring this suit against the purchaser instead of the receiver, because of some supposed legal advantage he could derive by reason of a suit against the former instead of the latter. But his right of action no longer exists against the receiver, because the receiver has been discharged, and released from all liability by express order of this court. He ought, therefore, to have no greater right against the purchaser than he has against the receiver. Whatever right or claim he has is against the fund in this court arising from the sale of said mortgaged property. "The promise and agreement of the purchaser constituted an additional consideration, and thereby added to said fund, as we have before stated; but in good faith to said purchaser it is the duty of this court to sift, scrutinize, and finally determine what claims shall be paid, and what claims shall be rejected. In order to do this satisfactorily this court should require all parties who assert any claim against such fund, or who claim any right to recover against said purchaser because of the stipulation and covenant made in this court, to establish such claim in this tribunal by proceedings usual in this class of cases. But if the said Potterf were permitted to prosecute his action in the State court, and recover a judgment thereon, he would have a right to satisfy said judgment out of any property subject to levy in the hands of the purchaser, the Wabash Railway Company; whereas, under the covenants and agreements made in this court between the court and the purchaser, placing upon said covenants the legal construction hereinbefore given, any claim he might have against the receiver was to be satisfied out of the fund arising from the sale of this mortgaged property. While counsel in arguing the case assured the court that they expected, in case they recovered a judgment, to come to this court and ask to have it allowed and paid by the purchaser on this covenant, to which reference has been made, yet there is no legal barrier which would prevent the plaintiff from satisfying such judgment by levy and sale of subsequently acquired property in the hands of the purchaser. This places him in a more advantageous legal position than he occupied with a claim against the receiver, which could be satisfied only out of the fund or property in the receiver's control. 9 Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. Co., 18 Fed. R. 617. 13 and a supersedeas. 10 That can only be done, if at all, by a justice of the Supreme Court. It has been held that a Federal court may enjoin proceedings in a State court which would deprive a citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; 12 that a Federal court can prevent by injunction the levy of a State sheriff under State process against a State judgment-debtor upon the property of a stranger to the suit and process; 18 that a Federal court may enjoin the inequitable use of a judgment of a State court when the validity of the judgment is not thereby impaired; 14 that under the act of Congress limiting the liability of the owners of ships, a District Court of the United States may issue a stay-order restraining proceedings previously begun in State courts; 15 and that when a creditor of a corporation has begun proceedings in a Federal court to enforce his claim against the corporation, the defendant corporation may be enjoined "from taking proceedings for its own dissolution, or for the appointment of a receiver of its effects, or for the distribution thereof among its stock "But it is further contended by counsel that the Wabash Railway Company cannot now ask for this stay of proceedings because it entered its appearance in the State court, and thereby conceded its jurisdiction. The appearance entered by the counsel for the said railway company would not have prevented it from asking the State court to remove said case to this court if the citizenship of the parties and the amount involved had been such as to justify such a request, and I do not think it prevents the said railway company from asking the relief it now demands. The jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, so far as the residence of the parties is concerned, is undisputed. It is because of the subjectmatter of said contention that this court acquires jurisdiction. The exact character and nature of the suit were only developed by the motions made by the counsel for the defendant in the State court after the original suit was instituted; and when the pleadings properly revealed the actual basis upon which the plaintiff founded his action, the petitioner at once invoked the jurisdiction of this court to restrain said proceedings because 18 Cropper v. Coburn, 2 Curt. 465. 14 Linton v. Mosgrove, 14 Fed. R. 543. 15 In re Long Island, N. S. P. & F. Transportation Co., 5 Fed. R. 599. See Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Manuf. Co., 109 U. S. 578, 600. |