north-west side of the said close, four yards wide, to any adjoining lands and premises." In 1842, the devisor of the plaintiffs, being the owner of the plot E, and the defendant, Hannah Gartsed, being the owner of plot F, in order to secure the privacy of the road, and to prevent the same from becoming a thoroughfare, purchased from William Dickinson the absolute customary inheritance of the strip of land marked in the plan as the private road A to B, at the price of twenty shillings, which was accordingly surrendered to them. At this date the field marked K in the plan, belonged to one Bradshaw, and no road or access to it existed from any part of the road A to B; but there was an exit at point L. In 1849, Hannah Gartsed became the owner of the plot G and H, and the field K; and as owner of an undivided moiety of the road A to B, made use of that road for obtaining access to the field K, and a coachhouse and stables which she had built at the corner of that field, at the spot marked м. It was alleged by the plaintiffs, that the defendant was about to erect dwelling-houses on the field K, and to make the private road A to B a common thoroughfare to them; and that the field K was an eligible site for building purposes. The defendant declining to desist from making use of the private road A to B as a thoroughfare to the field K, the plaintiffs filed the present bill for a partition of the road. The Master of the Rolls directed a partition, and, by a decree dated 30 May, 1861, ordered the partition to be made, "subject to all such rights of way over the same, as existed at the date of the said surrender of 1842." And the Chief Clerk by his certificate, dated the 29th June, 1863, found that the moiety of the road marked A to x had been allotted to the plaintiffs, and the moiety marked x to B, to the defendant. 4 Nov. 1863. On this day Dart (Selwyn, Q.C., with him), on behalf of the defendant, moved that the order made by the Master of the Rolls on the 25th of July, 1863, upon motion to His Honour to discharge the certificate of the Chief Clerk (see 2 N. R. 568), be referred back to His Honour's chambers; and that, in resettling the deed of partition, the partition be made subject to the "right of the defendant, her heir and assigns, and all persons authorised by her or them in that behalf, to use the same as a horse, foot, and carriage way, to the extent, and in the manner to, and in which she or they, under or by virtue of the surrender of the 24th day of March, 1842, and the previous surrenders and assurances recited in the said Covenant to surrender, might have used the same in case the partition directed by the said decree and the said covenant to surrender had not been made or execated, and the surrender thereby covenanted to be made had not been made." At the suggestion of their Lordships the case was adjourned that it might be heard, by consent, as a petition of appeal, and not as an interlocutory motion. The plaintiff's agreed thereto, on condition that the defendant should not attempt to disturb the mode of partition which the Chief Clerk had adopted. No point arose as to the minerals, which were vested in the lord of the manor. 12 Nov. 1863. Dart, with assent, now opened the case against the whole decree, and argued, 1st. That the value of the subject matter of the suit is not more than twenty shillings; that the rule which held good in this Court as to personalty is equally valid as to realty, and that, consequently, the Master of the Rolls ought to have dismissed the bill as frivolous and oppressive. 2nd. The right of way which the plaintiffs propose to give the defendant along the entirety of the road is not equivalent to the right of user which she now enjoys; and the effect of the partition, as ordered by the Master of the Rolls, will be to narrow the legal rights of the defendant over the moiety of the road A to x, to those enjoyed by the owners of plots c and D. Southgate, Q.C., and Bagshawe, for the plaintiff, in support of the decree, contended, 1st. It is not the value of the road, but of the legal consequences flowing from the ownership, which are to be considered in and form the real subject matter of this suit. 2nd. The right of way which the defendant enjoyed previous to the purchase of the road was only suspended during her ownership of an undivided moiety of the entirety of the road, and the partition will revive such right of way over the entirety. The right of user which she now enjoys over the entirety, cannot possibly survive the partition. To hold otherwise will be to render the partition practically null and void. The plaintiffs are willing to concede to the defendant a right of way to the coach-house and stables. KNIGHT BRUCE, L.J., said he did not think their Lordships were empowered to dismiss the bill. He was of opinion that a right merely dependent on ownership could not be reserved after partition. Here there was no ground for suggesting that any right was vested in the defendant beyond the enjoyment pertinent to the original closes. It appeared that there was, and always had been, an entry to the field K at the point L, so that it was unnecessary for him to consider the only point on which any question could arise, and on which many learned Judges had differed; viz., that which arose,—where a late owner set up a right to a "way of necessity." TURNER, L.J., concurred. Minute. Vary decree by stating the concession of a right of way to coach-house and stables. Dismiss motion and appeal with 107. costs. Pleading Parties-Multifariousness-Fraud. J and H, managers of a company, combined to conceal the true amount of the property of the company, whereby H was enabled to buy shares at an undervalue: Held (reversing the decision of the Vice-Chancellor), that the representative of I was a proper party to a suit instituted, long after the death of J, to set aside the sale and recover the intermediate profits of the shares, although I had derived no benefit from the transaction. A bill seeking relief in respect of two sales alleged to be the fruits of a single fraudulent system, is not multifarious. This was an appeal from the decision of Wood, V.-C., reported 2 N. R. 312, allowing the demurrer of the personal representative of Joseph Stainton for want of equity, and multifariousness. The allegations and prayer of the bill are sufficiently stated in the former report; also in H. & M. 322. Giffard, Q.C., and Eddis, for the appellant. The two sales, having resulted from one system of fraud pursued by confidential agents, are in fact a single transaction, and the bill is not multifarious, Attorney-General v. Cradock, 3 My. & Cr. 85. and there is a concurrent jurisdiction in Equity, where Sir H. Cairns, Q.C., and J. Pearson, for the respondent. The two sales are distinct transactions; the relief sought against the estate of Joseph Stainton in respect of the forty shares is of the nature of damages, but a Court of Equity gives no damages against a wrongdoer who derives no benefit from the wrong, Bishop of Winchester v. Knight, 1 P. W. 406; It does not appear from the bill that the mortgagees, by whom the sales were made, were deceived as to the value of the shares. between Garbett and the Staintons; that acts of fraud, prejudicial to Garbett, were committed by the Staintons in the course and by means of that relation; and that, so far as the acts of each of them were concerned, the Staintons were so associated together, as to entitle the plaintiff to proceed in Equity against the personal representatives of both. The demurrer must be overruled, but he had no objection to reserve to the demurring defendant the benefit of it at the hearing of the cause. TURNER, L.J., said, that, under the circumstances alleged in the bill, the estate of Joseph Stainton was liable in respect of the profits of the forty shares. A gross case of fraud was alleged; it was not denied that Joseph Stainton would have been liable to an action at law; and he could not assent to the proposition, that when two confidential agents had conspired to get possession of the property of their principals at an undervalue, the estate of the one was not liable in Equity in respect of the property so obtained by the other, if he himself derived no benefit. As to the objection that there was no allegation of fraud upon the mortgagees who sold the shares, it was enough that the bill alleged a fraud by the purchaser which affected the mortgagor, as well as the mortgagee. The two sales being alleged to be the fruits of a single fraudulent system, the bill was not multifarious. Minute.-Demurrer overruled; the costs, both in the Court below and on the appeal, to be dealt with by the Judge by whom the cause should be heard. Note. See further as to demurrers for multifariousness on such grounds, Campbell v. Mackay, 1 M. & Cr. 603; In this case a submission to arbitration had been made a rule of the Court of Equity under section 17 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854. W. Morris now applied for an order, requiring a witness to attend before the arbitrator. The 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 40, gave the Court power to make such an order. In the Common Law Courts this was an order of course; but as there did not appear to be any precedent for such an order in this Court, the Master of the Rolls. 14 Nov. 1863. } MACLEOD v. BUCHANAN. Mortgagee-Stop Order-Priority. A company having purchased certain shares of a fund in Court, obtained a general stop order on the whole fund. They afterwards purchased another share, but did not obtain another stop order : Held, that they must be postponed to a subsequent mortgagee without notice, of the same share, who had obtained a stop order. The effect of a stop order in giving notice and securing priority, is limited to the charges in respect of which it is obtained. Upon the death of Mrs. Jane Macleod, in June, 1862, a sum of 3,402l. 5s. 1d., Consols, in Court in these suits, became divisible equally among seven of her children. Previously to March, 1846, three of these seven shares, viz., those of Mary Ann Macleod, George Macleod, and Thomas Harrison Scott Macleod, were purchased by the General and Reversionary Investment Company, and were assigned to their trustees. On the 12th of March, 1846, the company's trustees obtained an order that no part of the 3,4027. 5s. 1d. Consols should be paid out without notice to them. This order was made upon affidavits proving the assignments of the three shares. This order was made upon affidavits, proving the two French mortgages. in the fund, now came on to be heard. Selwyn, Q.C., and Beavan, for the trustees of the company, contended, that they had a prior title to Henry Robert Macleod's share. Their stop order extended to the whole fund in Court. The subsequent encumbrancers ought to have inquired of them what charges they had upon the fund. There was no analogy between a stop order and notice to trustees. A stop order was originally merely a process to protect a fund. The first case giving priority on account of a prior stop order, Greening v. Beckford, 5 Sim. 195, was subsequent to the cases as to notice to trustees, Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1; Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 30. Baggallay, Q.C., and G. Simpson, for the French encumbrancers, were not called upon. Hobhouse, Q.C., and Whitehead, appeared for the claimants of another share. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS was satisfied that he had already had this point before him, possibly in Chambers, and that he had then entertained a strong opinion that a stop order, however general in its terms, did not affect any one with notice of, or give any priority to, any charge not existing at the date of the stop order. If a person who obtained a stop order upon a fund in respect of a charge of 500l. was able to found upon this charges for any further sums he might advance, the greatest frauds might be perpetrated, and the Court, therefore, required every applicant for a stop order to state in respect of what charges he obtained the order, and the particulars of the charges must be either established by evidence or admitted by the assignor. The Court was in exactly the same position as a trustee of a fund. As a person who contemplated advancing money on the fund would go to the trustee to know of what previous advances he had notice, so when the fund was in Court he would go not to the person who had obtained the general stop order, but to the Court, and On the 5th of September, 1860, Henry Robert would there ascertain in respect of what charges the Macleod executed two instruments in the French lan-stop order had been obtained. Supposing he found that guage, which, according to the view taken of them by the Master of the Rolls, amounted to assignments of his one-seventh share of the 3,4027.,5s. 1d. Consols, (1st) to M. Rousselle to secure 2,499fr. 30c., and (2nd) to Messrs. Rousselle & Stier, to secure 5,209 fr. 95c. Rousselle & Stier had at this time no notice of the assignment to the company's trustees. By an indenture dated the 23rd of April, 1847, Henry Robert Macleod, another child of Mrs Jane Macleod, assigned his one-seventh of the 3, 4021. 5s. 1d. Consols to the company's trustees absolutely, but no new stop order was obtained by the company. On the 11th of July, 1862, the French encumbrancers obtained an order that no part of Robert Henry Macleod's share in the 3,4027. 5s. 1d. Consols should be dealt with without notice to them. the order had been obtained in respect of only threesevenths of a fund, and relying upon the result of his investigation, made an advance to the owner of one of the other sevenths, Henry Robert, and obtained a stop order; supposing further, that the person who had obtained the general stop order made afterwards an advance to Henry Robert; then if Mr. Selwyn's contention were well founded, the person with the general stop order would have the priority, though his advance was subsequent to the other. His Honour was satisfied that the effect of a stop order was confined to Held, that a fourth nephew was not an object of the Winding-up-Director-Qualification-Con- gift. tributory. A person does not make himself liable as a contributory of a company by becoming a director, even though he has express notice that a certain number of shares constituted the qualification of a director. This was an adjourned summons to determine whether Mr. G. L. Saunders was to be placed upon the list of contributories of the Waterloo Life, Education, Casualty, and Self-Relief Assurance, which was being wound up under the Companies' Act, 1862. The 202nd clause of the company's deed of settlement provided that the qualification of a director should be the holding not less than 500 shares in his own right for at least three months thence next preceding. Saunders was elected a director on the 29th of October, 1861, and subsequently accepted the office and acted as such. He was proved to have known that 500 shares were the qualification required for a director. There was also evidence to show that he had executed a transfer accepting 520 shares; but the Master of the Rolls held that this was not established. This was a suit for the administration of the estate of Robert Glanville. The testator by his will, dated in 1862, gave to trustees a sum of Bank Stock in trust for his four nephews and niece, children of his brother Richard, — viz., Robert, Richard, Francis, and Margaret, to be equally divided between them, with a survivorship clause in the event of any of them not attaining twenty-one, and he directed his trustees during the minority of his said nephews and niece, to apply the interest and annual produce of his or her share towards his or her respective maintenance or educationuntil the end of the year 1872, when he directed a general division of the property to take place. The testator's brother Richard had five children living both at the date of the will and at the time of the testator's death; namely, the four named in the will, and Thomas, the youngest. It appeared that the youngest of the four children named in the will would come of age in March, 1871, and that Thomas would come of age in February, 1873. E. Lloyd, for the eldest son, who was of age, offered no objection to Thomas being admitted to take a share under the will. A. Willcock, for the infants Richard, Francis, and Baggallay, Q.C., and Swanston, for the official liquidator, also contended that Saunders' acceptance of the office of director, with distinct knowledge that a director must hold 500 shares, in itself made him Margaret, contended that Thomas was excluded. The liable as a contributory for so many shares. The present case was distinguishable from, The Marquis of Abercorn's Case, 10 W. R. 451, 548, which was reversed by the Court of Appeal only on the ground that no sufficient notice of the provisions of the deed of settlement was brought home to the Marquis. The Court ought not to allow any juggling among the directors to affect the rights of the shareholders or of the creditors, cases of, Tomkins v. Tomkins, 19 Ves. 126 n. (30); Garvey v. Hibbert, 19 Ves. 125; were distinguishable. There the gifts were to a certain B. T. Williams, for Thomas, the youngest son. Re Newcastle Marine Insurance Company, Ex should be read with "nephews." My four nephews parte Brown, 19 Beav. 97. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said, that he had had occasion to consider this question in Cotterell's Case, (5 July, 1862) and had there come to the conclusion that he was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Marquis of Abercorn's Case,-even in cases where the person becoming a director was aware of the provisions of the deed of settlement; and that decision was affirmed by the Lords Justices. and nieces" would have been different. The postponement of the general division of the property showed an intention to include the youngest child, who would be close on 21 years of age at the time appointed for the division. Bevir, for the executor, took no part in the argu but included the niece. He might have held differently if the words had been "for my four nephews and for my niece." He could draw no inference in favour of Thomas from the fact that he would not be twenty-one till February, 1873, and the general division of the property was postponed till the end of 1872. The inference, if any, was the other way. The money would be carried to a general account, and the dividends of such of the children as were minors, under existing circumstances, be paid to the father. Practice-Exceptions to Answer-ScheduleAnswering by Implication. A defendant is bound to answer directly and precisely; and in answer to a specific interrogatory is not at liberty to refer to a schedule which he does not pray may be taken as part of his answer. This suit was for an account of the dealings of the defendant in respect of an Indian mortgage, under which he had been in possession, and in which the plaintiff, as personal representative of the late John Boldero, claimed to be interested jointly with the defendant. J. W. Chitty, for the exception to the fifth interrogatory, urged, that a general denial is not a sufficient answer where there is a specific averment, Earp v. Lloyd, 4 K. & J. 58; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare, 383. And that, the jurat being to the answer, but not to the schedule, the contents of the schedule were not supported by the defendant's oath. He contended further, that the answer to the thirty-sixth interrogatory was evasive. Baily, Q.C., and Langworthy, in support of the answer, argued— 1st. That the defendant, by the references to the schedule, in his answer, must be taken to have incorporated its contents in his answer. 2nd. That the statement, that the defendant had no means of knowledge, necessarily implied that he did not know, and could not set forth the particulars asked for. At all events, the defendant would be unable to afford fuller information, even should the exception be allowed. KINDERSLEY, V.-C., said, that he must allow exception to the answer to the fifth interrogatory. The other exception would also be allowed. It was probably true, that the plaintiff would obtain no fuller information from the defendant by compelling him to answer precisely; but it was the right of a plaintiff to The case came on upon the hearing of exceptions to have a precise and direct answer. To force a plaintiff the defendant's answer. The plaintiff's fifth interrogatory required the defendant to set forth, whether he had not, under certain eircumstances therein mentioned, made a further advance to the mortgagor. The answer denied that the defendant had made any such further advance, except as in that his answer and as in the second schedule thereto might appear. The answer also contained a statement, that this second schedule contained an account of the defendant's dealings with the mortgaged estate, and all the particulars which the defendant was capable of giving, so as to show his dealings with the estate as mortgagee. The answer further stated, that the contents of such second schedule were, to the best of the defendant's information and belief, correct, and that where the said account was deficient, such deficiency arose from the defendant not having procured, or being able to procure, such particulars precisely. But the usual words of incorporation, by which the defendant prays that the schedule may be taken as part of the answer, were omitted. His thirty-sixth interrogatory required the defendant to set forth, whether he had got in certain arrears of rent, and to specify the several amounts of those arrears, and the times when they came to his hands. The defendant answered, that he was not able to state the particulars asked for, as he had no means of knowledge whatsoever, which would enable him to set them forth. to rest satisfied with a statement, which, only by implication contained an answer to the interrogatory, would be to establish a new mode of answering. Note.-See, also, Lafone v. Falkland Islands Company, 3 K. & J. 267; Inglessi v. Spartaei, 29 Beav. 564; Stuart, V.-C. 11 Nov. 1863. } GURNELL v. GARDNER. Equitable Assignment of Chattels―Power of Attorney. A creditor of G applied to him for payment of his debt. G, having certain wool at a wharfinger's, directed the creditor to take the wool, sell it, pay the unpaid balance of the purchase money, and keep the rest himself. G died on the same day; and the creditor subsequently took possession of the wool and sold it :— Held, that this was a valid equitable assignment of the wool, and not a mere power of attorney which determined by the death of G. In July, 1862, Joseph Gledhill bought of one Bradley a quantity of wool, for which he paid part only of the purchase money. By the order of Gledhill the wool was forwarded to the wharf of the defendant Gardner, |