The 7th article, as reformed, sets forth certain passages extracted from pages 60 and 61, and from pages 77 and 78, of the volume containing Dr. Williams's Essay, and charges that, in the passages so extracted, Dr. Williams has advisedly maintained and affirmed that the Bible or Holy Scripture is an expression of devout reason and the written voice of the congregation -not the Word of God, nor containing any special revelation of His truth or of His dealings with mankind, nor the rule of our faith.

Dr. Williams has nowhere in terms asserted that Holy Scripture is not the Word of God; and the accusation, therefore, must mean that by calling the Bible "an expression of devout reason, and therefore to be read with reason in freedom," and stating that it is "the written voice of the congregation," Dr. Williams must be taken to affirm that it is not the Word of God.

Before we examine the meaning of these expressions, it is right to observe what Dr. Williams has said on the subject of Holy Scripture in the second of the passages included in this charge. Dr. Williams there refers to the teaching of the Church in her Ordination Service, as to the abiding influence of "the Eternal Spirit," and then uses these words, "If such a Spirit did not dwell in the Church, the Bible would not be inspired;" and again, "The sacred writers acknowledge themselves men of like passions with ourselves, and we are promised illumination from the Spirit that dwelt in them."

Dr. Williams may not unreasonably contend that the just result of these passages would be thus given: -"The Bible was inspired by the Holy Spirit that has ever dwelt, and still dwells, in the Church, which dwelt also in the sacred writers of Holy Scripture, and which will aid and illuminate the minds of those who read Holy Scripture, trusting to receive the guidance and assistance of that Spirit."

The words, that the Bible is "an expression of devout reason, and therefore to be read with reason in freedom," are treated in the charge as equivalent to these words :-"The Bible is the composition or work of devout or pious men, and nothing more;" but such a meaning ought not to be ascribed to the words of a writer who, a few lines further on, has plainly affirmed that the Holy Spirit dwelt in the sacred writers of the Bible. This context enables us to say that the words, "an expression of devout reason, and therefore to be read with reason in freedom," ought not to be taken in the sense ascribed to them by the accusation.

In like manner we deem it unnecessary to put any interpretation on the words, "written voice of the congregation," inasmuch as we are satisfied that, what

ever may be the meaning of the passages included in this article, they do not, taken collectively, warrant the charge which has been made, that Dr. Williams has maintained the Bible not to be the Word of God

nor the rule of faith.

We pass on to the remaining charge against Dr.

Williams, which is contained in the 15th article of charge. The words of Dr. Williams, which are included in this charge, are part of a supposed defence of Baron Bunsen, against the accusation of not being a Christian. It would be a severe thing to treat language used by an imaginary advocate as advised speaking or teaching by Dr. Williams. Against such a general charge as that of not being a Christian, topics of defence may be properly urged, although not in conformity with the doctrines of the Church of England. But, even if Dr. Williams be taken to approve of the arguments which he uses for this supposed defence, it would, we think, be unjust to him to take his words as a full statement of his own belief or teaching on the subject of justification.

The 11th Article of Religion, which Dr. Williams is accused of contravening, states, "We are accounted righteous before God only for the merits of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by faith, and not for our own works or deservings." The Article is wholly silent as to the merits of Jesus Christ being transferred to us. It asserts only that we are justified for the merits of Our Saviour by faith, and by faith alone. We cannot say, therefore, that it is penal in a clergyman to speak of merit by transfer as a fiction, however unseemly that word may be when used in connection with such a subject.

It is fair, however, to Dr. Williams to observe that, in the argument at the Bar, he repudiated the interpre tation which had been put on these words, that "the doctrine of merit by transfer is a fiction,” and he explained fiction as intended by him to describe the phantasy in the mind of an individual, that he has received or enjoyed merit by transfer.

Upon the whole, we cannot accept the interpretation charged by the promoter as the true meaning of the passages included in this 15th article of charge, nor can we consider those passages as warranting the specific charge, which, in effect, is that Dr. Williams asserts that justification by faith means only the peace of mind or sense of Divine approval which comes of trust in a righteous God. This is not the assertion of Dr. Williams.

We are therefore of opinion that the judgment against Dr. Williams must be reversed.

We proceed to consider the charges against Mr. Wilson.

These have been reduced to the 8th and 14th articles of charge. The other articles of charge were either rejected by the Court below, or have been abandoned at the hearing before this tribunal.

In the 8th article of charge an extract of some length is made from Mr. Wilson's Essay, and the accusation is, that in the passage extracted Mr. Wilson has declared and affirmed, in effect, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament were not written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and that they were not necessarily at all, and certainly not

in parts, the Word of God; and then reference is made to the 6th and 20th Articles of Religion, to part of the Nicene Creed, and to a passage in the Ordination of Priests in the Book of Common Prayer.

This charge, therefore, involves the proposition, "That it is a contradiction of the doctrine laid down in the 6th and 20th Articles of Religion, in the Nicene Creed, and in the Ordination Service of Priests, to affirm that any part of the canonical Books of the Old or New Testament upon any subject whatever, how ever unconnected with religious faith or moral duty, was not written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit."

The proposition or assertion that every part of the Scriptures was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not to be found either in the Articles or in any of the formularies of the Church. But in the 6th Article it is said that Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, and the books of the Old and New Testament are therein termed canonical. In the 20th Article the Scriptures are referred to as "God's Word written"; in the Ordination Service, when the Bible is given by the Bishop to the priest, it is put into his hands with these words, "Take thou authority to preach the Word of God"; and in the Nicene Creed are the words, "the Holy Ghost who spake by the prophets."

We are confined by the article of charge to the consideration of these materials, and the question is, whether in them the Church has affirmed that every part of every book of Scripture was written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and is the Word of God.

Certainly this doctrine is not involved in the statement of the 6th Article, that Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation. But, inasmuch as it doth so from the revelations of the Holy Spirit, the Bible may well be denominated "Holy," and said to be "the Word of God," "God's Word written," or "Holy Writ"; terms which cannot be affirmed to be clearly predicated of every statement and representation contained in every part of the Old and New Testament.

The framers of the Articles have not used the word "inspiration" as applied to the Holy Scriptures; nor have they laid down anything as to the nature, extent, or limits of that operation of the Holy Spirit.

The caution of the framers of our Articles forbids our treating their language as implying more than is expressed; nor are we warranted in ascribing to them conclusions expressed in new forms of words involving minute and subtle matters of controversy.

After an anxious consideration of the subject, we find ourselves unable to say that the passages extracted from Mr. Wilson's Essay, and which form the subject of this article of charge, are contradicted by or plainly inconsistent with the Articles or formularies to which the charge refers, and which alone we are at liberty to consider.

We proceed to the remaining charge against Mr. Wilson, -namely, that contained in the 14th article. The charge is, that in the portion of his Essay which is set out in this article, Mr. Wilson has advisedly declared and affirmed, in effect, that after this life and at the end of the existing order of things on this earth there will be no judgment of God, awarding to those men whom He shall then approve, everlasting life or eternal happiness, and to those men whom he shall then condemn, everlasting death or eternal misery; and this position is affirmed to be contrary to the Three Creeds, the Absolution, the Catechism, and the Burial and Commination Services.

In the first place, we find nothing in the passages extracted which in any respect questions or denies that at the end of the world there will be a judgment of God, awarding to those men whom He shall approve, everlasting life or eternal happiness; but, with respect to a judgment of eternal misery, a hope is encouraged by Mr. Wilson that this may not be the purpose of God.

We think that it is not competent to a clergyman of the Church of England to teach or suggest that a hope may be entertained of a state of things contrary to what the Church expressly teaches or declares will be the case; but the charge is, that Mr. Wilson advisedly declares that after this life there will be no judgment of God, awarding either eternal happiness or eternal misery,-an accusation which is not warranted by the passage extracted. Mr. Wilson expresses a hope that at the day of judgment those men who are not admitted to happiness may be so dealt with, as that "the perverted may be restored," and all, "both small and great, may ultimately find a refuge in the bosom of the Universal Parent." The hope that the punishment of the wicked may not endure to all eternity, is certainly not at variance with anything that is found in the Apostles' Creed, or the Nicene Creed, or in the Absolution, which forms part of the Morning and Evening Prayer, or in the Burial Service. In the Catechism the child is taught, that in repeating the Lord's Prayer he prays unto God "that He will keep us from all sin and wickedness, and from our ghostly enemy, and from everlasting death"; but this exposition of the Lord's Prayer cannot be taken as necessarily declaring anything touching the eternity of punishment after the resurrection.

There remain the Commination Service and the Athanasian Creed. The material passage in the Commination Service is in these words :-"O terrible voice of most just judgment which shall be pronounced upon them, when it shall be said unto them, Go, ye cursed, into the fire everlasting which is prepared for the devil and his angels." In like manner the Athanasian Creed declares that they that have done evil shall go into everlasting fire. Of the meaning of these words "everlasting fire," no interpretation is given in the formularies which are referred to in the charge. Mr. Wilson has urged in his defence, that the word "everlasting,"

The defendant was convicted by certain Justices upon an information under the Salmon Fishery Act, 1861. The information was laid by a watcher in the employ of an association of landowners formed for the purpose of protecting the fisheries on the river Tees, and enforcing the provisions of the Salmon Fishery Act on that river. Of this association the Justices who convicted the defendant were members, and at a meeting of the association held previous to this conviction, a resolution, seconded by one of the convicting magistrates, was carried, by which, after expressing an opinion that the defendant's acts were clearly illegal, it was resolved to enforce the law against him. The prosecution was conducted by a solicitor who was the honorary secretary and treasurer of the association.

Held, that the Justices who convicted, being in reality the prosecutors, were not competent to adjudicate on the

case.

The defendant having been convicted on the 23rd of February, 1863, a notice was, on the 15th of August following, given to the Justices, intimating that it was the intention of the defendant to apply, on the 22nd of August, for a certiorari to bring up the conviction. This notice was given under the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5, which requires that the application for a certiorari shall be made within six months after the conviction, and that, before applying, six days' notice in writing shall be given to the Justices. On the 21st, the defendant's attorney left with the Judge's clerk the affidavit on which the application was founded. On the 22nd, which was a Saturday, he again went to Judge's Chambers, but being vacation time, the Judge attended only on Tuesdays and Fridays, and it was impossible therefore to obtain a hearing till the following Tuesday, when the Judge refused to make the order, on the ground that the appli

cation was too late.

Held, that the application was in time, and that the Judge ought to have made the order.

This was a rule for a certiorari to bring up a con

viction under the hands and seals of R. H. Allen, J. W. Smith, and J. H. Pease, Esqrs., three Justices of the county of Durham, in order that it might be quashed. The conviction bore date the 23rd of February, 1863, and was founded on an information laid under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 109, by one R. Little, against the defendant, as occupier of certain land on the river Tees, and of a dam called the Dinsdale Dam, charging him with not having, within thirty-six hours of the commencement of the close season, caused to be removed the inscales, becks, tops and rails of all cruives, &c., and all other obstructions to the free passage of fish in or through the cruives, &c., within his fishery. The premises in question, and the nature of the dam, are fully described in the case of Hodgson, appellant, v. Little, respondent (2 N. R. 79; 32 L. J. M. C. 220), which was a similar information laid against the same defendant.

It appeared from the affidavits in support of the rule, that the said R. Little, the informer, was a water-watcher, appointed by the Tees Salmon Fishery Landowners' Association, which was a voluntary association formed in the year 1861, for the purpose of protecting the fisheries on the river Tees, and enforcing the provisions of the Salmon Fishery Act, under which the present information was laid. It appeared, also, that all the magistrates who heard this

case and convicted the defendant were members of the

association, and one of them had himself a right of fishery in a portion of the river. The case for the prosecution was conducted by Mr. Joseph Dodd, who was a member of, and also the honorary secretary and treasurer of the above-mentioned association. It

appeared also that the association had issued circularsstating that it was clear in their opinion that the dam in question was illegal. And a report had been presented to the association after the previous conviction of the defendant referring to it, and expressing the intention of the association to take all necessary steps. to enforce the law with respect to it. A resolution adopting this report was seconded by J. W. Smith, Esq., one of the convicting Justices, and wa carried at the meeting. It did not appear that the members of the association would be legally liable for the costs of the prosecution, but it was conceded on the argument, that in case the prosecution failed, the members of the association would probably make good the expenses incurred by their officers.

On the 15th of August notice was duly given to the Justices that the defendant intended to apply for a writ of certiorari on the 22nd of August following. On Friday, the 21st, the clerk to the defendant's attorney attended at the Judge's Chambers, and left with the Judge's clerk the affidavits in support of the application, and the Judge's clerk told him to call next day for the order. On the following morning the attorney for the Justices attended at Judge's Chambers pursuant to the notice of the 15th of August, but the defendant's attorney did not meet him there. Later

in the day, however, the defendant's attorney's clerk went to the Judge's Chambers, and learned that the papers were still before the Judge. It appeared that during the Long Vacation, at which time this application was made, the Judge only attended at Chambers on Tuesdays and Fridays. On the same day (Saturday) there was a meeting between the attorneys for the prosecution and the defendant's attorney, at which it was agreed to adjourn the application to the Tuesday following. On Tuesday, the 25th, accordingly, the parties appeared before Byles, J., when the objection was taken that the six months within which by the provisions of the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5, the application for a certiorari must be made, had expired on the 22nd August. The learned Judge upheld the objection, and made no order, without prejudice to the defendant's applying to the Court.

The affidavits also showed that the Justices had, on the application of the defendant, stated a case for the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, and that such appeal was then pending before that Court.

Davison showed cause against the rule. 1st. As there is an appeal pending in the present case, there is no right to a certiorari until the appeal is determined,

Paley on Summary Convictions, 361; Rex v. Sparrow, 2 T. R. 198. [COCKBURN, C.J.-Inasmuch as the question of jurisdiction is preliminary, and goes to the root of all the proceedings, that must be determined before the question whether the conviction was right.]

2nd. The application was not in time. The application on the 21st was too soon, as the six days' notice to the Justices had not expired; and on the 22nd the defendant's attorney did not attend at Judge's Chambers at the appointed time, but he arranged with the prosecutor's solicitor to attend on the Tuesday, which was clearly too late.

3rd. The Justices had no such interest as to oust their jurisdiction.

Manisty, Q.C., and H. Matthews, in support of the

rule.

It would lead to monstrous injustice if it were held that these Justices, who had prejudged the case, having expressed a clear opinion that the defendant's acts were illegal, and who were practically the prosecutors, were competent to adjudicate in this case.

The application was not too late, as the defendant had done all that it was possible for him to do within the appointed time, and he ought not to be prejudiced by the fact that the Judge only attended twice a week. They cited,

Rex v. Inhabitants of Abergele, 5 Ad. & E.1795. COCKBURN, C.J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be made absolute. It is impossible to hold consistently with the principles established by the decisions, and which are of the essence of justice, that

these Magistrates who took part in the conviction were competent to exercise magisterial jurisdiction on the occasion. The information against the defendant was for a violation of the Act for the Protection of Salmon Fisheries; and it appears that the prosecutors were an association of gentlemen who had an interest in the protection of the fishery of portions of the river Tees. Of that association there were certain members present acting as Magistrates, and they were, I think, virtually the prosecutors in the case, being members of the association who were prosecuting. And it is impossible to say that those who are parties to criminal proceedings as prosecutors can at the same time act as Justices.

The only difficulty in the case is that raised as to the time when the application was made. The Act of Geo. 2 says that any application for a certiorari must be made within six months, but then I think it was intended to give the parties the whole of that period, and that they are entitled to the last day as much as to any other part of the time, though the application must undoubtedly be made within the six months, and the parties must take care that their machinery is ready. I think, however, they ought not to suffer because the Judge before whom alone such application could be made does not happen to be on that day attending at Chambers in discharge of his duty. It would be enough if the, person applying has all his tackle ready, and intimates the purpose of his application to the person attending at Judge's Chambers. It appears that on the Friday the party attended at Chambers and left the affidavits, and it is positively sworn that he attended the next day to know what the Judge had determined to do. It is not unlikely that he thought it was an ex parte proceeding, which I think it was not, but it was not the less an application to the Judge because he did not bring himself into contact with the opposing party; though I must say that a Judge would exercise a wise discretion in seeing that notice had been given not only to the Justices but to the parties interested, and that if those parties were not before him summonses should be issued to them. But still, though a Judge should insist on this course being pursued, I do not think that the application would be the less made if within the presented time the person conducting the defence had been to the proper quarter, to an application. The question, therefore, is whether and had there taken steps which virtually would amount

that has been done on the part of the defendant in this case, and I think there can be no doubt that the clerk tion on the Friday and again on the Saturday. On to the defendant's attorney did go to make his applica

the whole, therefore, it seems to me that enough has been done to satisfy section 5 of the 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, and that this rule should be made absolute.

BLACKBURN, J.—I am of the same opinion. Upon the merits I entertain no doubt whatever. It appears that at least one of the Justices was one of the parties