furniture in the hotel, he must rule that that passed to the assignees. The question of reputed ownership was one for a jury, Hickenbotham v. Groves (2 C. & P. 492). But here there could be no doubt. No rent had been paid under the agreement of 1858 on these goods; for nearly six years they had remained in the bankrupt's possession, and as between him and the public had served to increase the appearance of his property, and thereby procure him false credit. It was too late after the bankruptcy to set up as against creditors and the public, any deeds or agreements that had passed between the parties themselves, and he must therefore hold that these last-mentioned goods passed to the assignees. Ex. 11 Nov. 1863. COMMON LAW. BAKER V. THE GUARDIANS OF THE 22 & 23 Vict. c. 49, s. 1-Guardians of the in Bar. Section 1 of the 22 and 23 Vict. c. 49, which enacts that any debt due from the guardians of any union, &c., shall be paid within the half-year in which the same shall have been incurred, or within three months after 2nd. As to the said sum of 357. 10s. payment into Court. 3rd. Except as to the said sum of 35l. 10s., that the matter herein pleaded to was a debt, claim, or demand incurred by the defendants as the guardians of a union after the passing of the Act of the 23rd year of Her Majesty's reign, intituled "An Act to provide for the payment of debts incurred by Boards of Guardians in unions and parishes, and Boards of Management in School Districts," and that the plaintiff did not commence any proceedings for the said debt within the the expiration of such half-year, but not afterwards, half-year in which the same was incurred or became provided that the Poor Law Board by their order may, if they see fit, extend the time for payment for a period such half-year; nor has the Poor Law Board granted due, or within three months after the expiration of not exceeding twelve months after the date of such debt, precludes a creditor of the guardians from recovering in any extension of time for the payment of the said supan action, commenced after the expiration of the half-posed debt or any part thereof; nor was this action commenced within the time limited by the statute in such case made. year and three months, if the time has not been extended by the Poor Law Board, although at the time of the commencement of the action they might have done so. CASE stated for the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff is a surgeon, and one of the medical officers of the Billericay Union. The defendants are the board of guardians of the same union. The claim is for medical fees beyond the salary to which the plaintiff is entitled as such officer. The plaintiff's appointment was with the consent of the Poor Law Board, and on terms of remuneration fixed by Articles 177 and 183 of the General Consolidated Order of the Poor Law Board, dated 24th of July, 1841. (Articles 177 and 183 of the said Consolidated Order were set out in the case.) The parties are to be at liberty to refer to other parts of the said Consolidated Order, a copy of which is annexed to and to be taken as part of this case. The date of the writ was the 9th of June, 1862. For the purposes of this case the pleadings are as follows:: DECLARATION.-Indebitatus count for money payable by the defendants to the plaintiff for goods sold and delivered, goods bargained and sold, work done, and materials provided, money lent, money paid, and on account stated. The second question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the third plea was not bad in substance, and the plaintiff entitled to judgment upon it. At the time the writ issued, the Poor Law Board might, if they thought fit, have extended the time for payment. When the case came on for argument, the time within which the extension could be made had expired. The 22 & 23 Vict. c. 49, s. 1, is as follows: --"With respect to any debt, claim, or demand which may after the passing of this Act be lawfully incurred by, or become due from, the guardian of any union or parish, or the board of management of any school or asylum district, such debt, claim, or demand shall be paid within the half-year in which the same shall have been incurred or become due, or within three months after the expiration of such half-year, but not afterwards, the commencement of such half-year to be reckoned from the time when the last half-year's account shall or ought to have been closed according to the order of the Poor Law Commissioners or Poor Law Board; provided that the Poor Law Board by their order may, if they see fit, extend the time within which such payment shall be made for a period not exceeding twelve months after the date of such debt, claim, or demand." Section 4 is as follows:-"If any person PLEAS.-1st. Except as to 35l. 10s. never indebted. claiming any debt or demand shall have commenced or shall hereafter commence proceedings in any Court of Law or Equity, or before any Justice or other competent authority within the time hereinbefore limited, or within the time to which the Poor Law Board may grant extension, and shall with due diligence prosecute such proceedings to judgment, or other final settlement of the question, such judgment shall be satisfied by the guardians or managers against whom or against whose officer the same may be brought, not withstanding that such judgment may be recovered, or such final settlement arrived at, after the expiration of the period hereinbefore provided; and all proceedings taken by mandamus or otherwise for the enforcing of such judgment without delay, shall be deemed to be within the operation of this section." D. D. Keane appeared for the plaintiff. There is nothing to show that the action cannot be maintained, although perhaps execution might be stayed. In cases analogous to the present, there is a distinct prohibition of the maintenance of the action itself, but section 1 only says that payment shall not be made. He cited, Harrison v. Stickney, 2 H. of L. Ca. 108; defendants. But Mr. Keane says, that at the time the plea was pleaded the time had not gone by, and the answer to that is, that at the time the plea was pleaded the Poor Law Commissioners had not extended the time. At first I had considerable doubt, until my brother Pigott's suggestion, that, though the action could not be maintained at the time, yet if the Poor Law Commissioners had afterwards extended the time, then the action might be maintained. This action, however, now appears to have been brought after the time given by the statute, independent of the power of the Poor Law Commissioners, and primâ facie the action is not maintainable. BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. I should never have had any doubt about the first point in this case if it had not been for the proviso at the end of the first section; because, when the statute says a debt shall not be paid, the obvious meaning is, it shall not be sued for. That is the common sense of the matter. The statute says the debt shall not be paid, and that is a bar to an action brought. The difficulty I had was this-whether, inasmuch as there is a power to the Poor Law Board to extend the time, the statute was a bar The Attorney-General v. Wilkinson, 28 L. J. Ch. until the time, during which there was the power to 393; extend, had gone by? Now I think the probable so Ince v. The Guardians of the City of London lution of that difficulty is to say, that if an action is Union, 24 Just. Peace, 1860. C. Pollock, for the defendants, was not heard. POLLOCK, C.B.-We are all of opinion that judgment should be given for the defendants. This is an action brought to recover from the Poor Law Guardians a certain demand. For reasons, no doubt satisfactory, the Legislature has said this money shall not be paid unless within a certain period, and, after that period has expired, the present action is brought. The question then is, whether the plea setting up that, is a sufficient answer to the action, or whether we are so to deal with the enactments of the Legislature as to say that though the money is not to be paid, yet the action may be brought, and the defendants may go with this clause in the Act of Parliament to a Court of Equity and there stay the proceedings. I am clearly of opinion, that when an Act of Parliament says something shall not be done, then an action will not lie to enforce doing it. The object of this action is to compel it. There may be a contract to do something, which, by the termination of peaceful relations between this country and other nations, ceases to be lawful, and then you cannot bring an action against the person who has promised to do it. Here it is said the money shall not be paid, and the common sense conclusion is, that you cannot sue for it. But nothing turns here on the form of the plea except that which was suggested by my brother Bramwell, and which may be met, and I think is met, in either of two ways: first, that the time has wholly gone by, so that we may reasonably give judgment for the brought after the time, or before the Poor Law Board has extended it, the action must be barred; although, if the Poor Law Board think fit to extend it afterwards, a fresh action may be brought. Now the difficulty of that reasoning is, that where an action is once barred, it is barred for ever. Usually, you cannot make a judgment a bar to an action, unless you say the plaintiff can never maintain an action in respect of his claim. But to that there are exceptions; as in the case put of the attorney's bill, and I do not know of a better illustration. There, if the attorney brings the action upon an unsigned bill he has, in one sense, a cause of action, and the Statute of Limitations runs against him, and he is barred of his action, although when the statute has been complied with he may recover. So it might be here, if the plaintiff could not bring an action in the time during which the Poor Law Board could grant an extension of time, he is barred of his action, though he may afterwards come within the exception. CHANNELL, B.-I am clearly of opinion that the defendants are entitled to the judgment of the Court. Mr. Keane, on the part of the plaintiffs, seeks to recover the entire amount of his client's claims; and whether he is entitled to do so or not depends upon the construction to be placed on the statute 22 & 23 Vict. c. 49. The important question is-What is the operation of this statute? It has been held over and over again that the words in the enacting clause of an Act of Parliament go beyond any words in the preamble. That is a sound rule of construction. But, quite consistently with is clear what the object of the statute was. Under the old administration of the Poor Laws, overseers were in the habit of allowing matters to run in arrear, and then to make rates which were to be applied retrospectively. Those rates were then disputed, and an amount of litigation was incurred, and ultimately it happened that the expenses fell upon the overseers themselves, and they really hardly knew what their duty was. I think that the Act of Parliament had a double object-one to protect the rates, and the other to define the duties of the guardians. If we did not give this Act of Parliament the effect contended for, and which is required to support this plea, I am of opinion we should altogether defeat it. I do not know what is its object, except to say to parties claiming-You must assert your claims within the specified periods; and you, the guardians, can only pay them within those periods. The power of extending the time we give to another body, whose duty it is to control you. It seems to me that everything is made very consistent by holding that the Act is in effect a Statute of Limitations. If we did not hold that, instead of defining and making more clear, and specifying the duties of the guardians, we should repeal the statute and embarrass them to a great extent. I cannot help thinking that this is a good plea, and that our judgment should be for the defendants. that, it is permitted to the Court to look at the words of the preamble, and see what light they throw on the proper construction of the section. The result of the section is, that it is expedient to define and limit the period during which certain payments may be made. Then I think the case will stand very clear upon the first section, taking that alone. It refers to three periods-two definite, and one (the third), in a sense, indefinite. The first is a half year, the second is a period of three months at the expiration of that half year, and there is a third period referred to in the statute extending the time. That is given by the concluding words of the first section. Those words are words in the proviso, and independently of the proviso, the only meaning I can give it is, the current half year and a period of three months from the termination of that half-year. If there were no proviso, that would be the true construction. Then come the words, "Provided that the Poor Law Board, by their order, may, if they see fit, extend the time within which such payment shall be made for a period | not exceeding twelve months after the date of such debt, claim, or demand." It may be that the current half-year, and a period of three months from the termination of that period, might give rise to some argument, and it would be proper to provide an equitable relief in such a case. That is provided for by the power given to the Poor Law Board in their discretion, within the period of twelve months to extend the time. The action was not brought within the current half year, or within the three months from the termination of that time, and the Poor Law Board have made no order for extending the time. I appre-1 & 2 Vict. c. 110-Arrest under Ca. Sa.-Re hend, therefore, that would completely answer the action. But Mr. Keane has ingeniously argued the case in the only way in which it can be put; viz., putting the first and fourth sections together, the maintaining of the action is not prohibited. It does not appear to me, on examining the fourth section, that it produces any great difficulty. It provides, I think clearly, that within the time limited by the first section, an action shall be commenced either in the definite period of the current half year and the three months, or the extended time during which the Poor Law Board may authorise the action. If the action is brought within the time, all that is requisite is, that it shall be prosecuted with due diligence till final judgment. A party might prefer a claim and bring an action, and the progress of it may be prolonged by a variety of causes over which he may have no control, so that a judgment may not be obtained within the time. I am clearly of opinion that the present action is answered. I am inclined to the opinion that a new action may be brought, but the defendants are not liable in this. The plaintiff ought to have clothed himself with an authority from the Poor Law Board to bring the action. Ex. 25 Nov. 1863. Judgment for the defendants. HALLETT v. DYNE. In re ROLLS and Another. Registration of Judgment-Power of Court to order entry to be made in book of Master of Common Pleas. Plaintiff recovered judgment against defendant in the Court of Exchequer, and registered it under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 19, in the Court of Common Pleas, and afterwards arrested the defendant under a writ of ca. sa. who was discharged by order of the Insolvent Debtors' Court. After this arrest and discharge, the plaintiff again registered the judgment. Subsequently the defendant became entitled to leasehold property, which he mortgaged, and upon a sale of part of it by the mortgagees, the purchaser having refused to complete in aforesaid, it was consequence of the said judgment being registered as Held, upon application made to this Court by the vendors for the plaintiff to attend the senior Master of the Common Pleas and consent to an entry upon the register there that the defendant had been taken in execution by the plaintiff, that this Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order. In this case a rule nisi had been obtained calling on the plaintiff to show cause why he should not attend PIGOTT, B.-I am of the same opinion. I think it before the senior Master of the Common Pleas, and consent to an entry on the register there, that the defendant in the above action was taken in execution by the plaintiff on the judgment recovered by him, and there registered. The following were the material facts In 1853 the above action was commenced by the plaintiff in the Court of Exchequer, to recover the sum of 6297. 14s., and in November of the same year judgment was signed for the said debt and costs. Subsequently, a writ of fi. fa. was issued, under which the plaintiff recovered 497. 12s. On the 12th November, 1853, the judgment was registered in the Court of Common Pleas pursuant to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. In January, 1854, the defendant was taken in execution under a ca. sa., at the suit of the plaintiff, but was ultimately discharged on the 4th May, 1855, under the Insolvent Debtors' Act. On the 9th November, 1859, the plaintiff re-registered his judgment in the Court of Common Pleas. In 1861 certain leasehold property was granted to the defendant, which he mortgaged in the same year to one Daniel Rolls, and upon a subsequent sale of part of the land by Rolls' representatives, the purchaser, by reason of the said judgment, having been registered as aforesaid, refused to complete. Application was therefore made by the vendors to the senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas to make an entry in his book, against the entry of the said judgment, that since the date and registration thereof the plaintiff had caused the defendant to be arrested upon a ca. sa. is sued on the said judgment, and the said Master intimated his willingness to make such entry upon the authority of a Judge's order. A summons was then taken out for that purpose, but the learned Judge referred the matter to the full Court. The above rule nisi having been obtained, Although satisfaction of the judgment may not be entered because of section 87 and other sections of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, there is enough to show that the plaintiff should not be allowed to re-register his judg ment. Whatever steps are taken to affect the defendant's after-acquired property, should be such as all the creditors of the defendant may profit by. Lewis v. Dyson (ubi supra) is in principle the same as the present case. POLLOCK, C. B.-I think this rule should be discharged, and on the ground that we have no jurisdic tion to do that which we are asked for. I am not sure that where a plaintiff has not got real satisfaction, he may not, if he think fit so to do, avail himself of any hold which he may have upon his debtor's property. BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion, and think that this rule should be discharged. There is no provision in the 19th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 for the entry in the Master's book of the satisfaction or extinguishment of a judgment; and even if the debtor pays the debt, there is no provision made by the statute for entering that fact on the Register. Why are we to say then, that because of the inconvenience to vendors, an entry such as is here asked for ought to be made? Mr. Keane, however, says that the fact of the judgment having been satisfied cannot be entered on our records. I am inclined, however, to think that the judgment is gone; but if that is not so, at all events, by an entry on our records of the defendant's arrest under ca. sa., and upon reference to the records of the Insolvent Debtors' Court, the whole matter will appear as to the effect of the judgment upon the real estate of the defendant. CHANNELL, B.-I think also that this rule should be discharged. The judgment is the act of this Court, but the registration is made by virtue of the statute, and I think we have no power to do that which is asked for, as it is for the Court of Common Pleas alone to control the act of its officer in re-registering the judgment. Ex. 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23 Nov. 1863. COMMON LAW. REGINA v. SILLIM and THE ALEXANDRA. Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, c. 69— Section 7 of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 69 Geo. 3, c. 69, enacts that "If any person within any part of the United Kingdom or in any part of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, shall, without the leave and licence of his Majesty, first had and obtained, equip, furnish, fit out, or arm, or attempt to equip, &c., or procure to be equipped, &c., or shall knowingly aid, assist, or be concerned in the equipping, &c., of any ship or vessel with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince, state, &c., as a transport or storeship, or with intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any foreign prince, &c., with whom his Majesty shall not then be at war, or shall within the United Kingdom, &c., issue or deliver any commission for any ship or vessel to the intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed as aforesaid, every such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, &c. and every such ship or vessel, with the tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all the materials, arms, ammunition, and stores which may belong to or be on board of any such ship or vessel, shall be forfeited." | POLLOCK, C. B., directed the jury that if they were of opinion that the claimants had endeavoured to equip, &c., the ship in an English port, in such a manner as would prepare her to commit hostilities, with the intent prohibited by the statute, they were to find for the Crown, but that otherwise they were to find for the claimants. The jury found for the claimants:- Held by POLLOCK, C. B., and BRAMWELL, B., that this ruling was correct, and that the equipment, &c., forbidden by the statute, is an equipment for war, and that to constitute the offence created by the Act, the equipment must be intended to be so completed that the vessel when she leaves port shall be in a condition at once to commence hostilities, and that there had been no such equipment of the Alexandra" Held by CHANNELL, B., that the equipment forbidden by the statute is an equipment for war, but that where the equipment, without being intended to enable the vessel at once to commit hostilities, is yet capable of being used for war, evidence showing the existence of the intent required to constitute the offence, might justify the jury in finding that such equipments were equipments for war :— Held, by PIGOTT, B., that any kind of equipment if given to the vessel with the intent required by the Statute, is sufficient to constitute the offence made penal by the Act. This case arose on an information alleging the for. feiture of the vessel "Alexandra" under the 7th Section of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, c. 69. That Statute is entitled "An Act to prevent the Enlisting or Engagement of his Majesty's Subjects to serve in a Foreign Service, and the Fitting out or Equipping in his Majesty's Dominions, vessels for Warlike purposes without his Majesty's Licence." The preamble is as follows: "Whereas the enlistment or engagement of his Majesty's subjects to serve in war in foreign service, without his Majesty's licence, and the fitting out, equipping, and arming vessels by his Majesty's subjects, without his Majesty's licence, for warlike operations in or against the dominion or territory of a foreign prince, State, &c., or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of govern On the trial of an information framed under the above section of the Act, and filed by the AttorneyGeneral against the owners, builders, &c., of the vessel Alexandra," alleging the forfeiture of the ship by reason of her having been built for the service of the Confederate States of America, evidence was given that the vessel was adapted for a gun-boat, and was not suited for mercantile purposes, being much more strongly constructed than a merchant ship would be, and having no room for stowing cargo; that her bulwarks were lower and much stronger than those of a merchant vessel, and such as would admit of being fired over; and that there were preparations for fitting hammock-racks on the bulwarks, which are very unusual in merchantment in any foreign country, province, or part of any ships, but common in men-of-war. There were, however, no preparations for guns on board her at the time she was seized. It was shown that the vessel was constructed by the order of, and under the superintendence of, the agents in this country of the Confederate States. It was admitted that the ship was not suitable for a transport or storeship. VOL. III. province, &c., may be prejudicial to and tend to endanger the peace and welfare of this kingdom; and whereas the laws in force are not sufficiently effectual for preventing the same; be it enacted," &c. Section 7 enacts, "That if any person within any part of the United Kingdom, or in any part of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, shall, without N |