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furniture in the hotel, he must rule that that passed public had served to increase the appearance of his to the assignees. The question of reputed ownership property, and thereby procure him false credit. It was one for a jury, Hickenbotham v. Groves (2 C. & P. was too late after the bankruptcy to set up as against 492). But here there could be no doubt. No rent creditors and the public, any deeds or agreements that had been paid under the agreement of 1858 on these had passed between the parties themselves, and he goods; for nearly six years they had remained in the must therefore hold that these last-mentioned goods bankrupt's possession, and as between him and the passed to the assignees.
Ex. BAKER v. THE GUARDIANS OF THE 2nd. As to the said sum of 351. 10s. payment into 11 Nov. 1863. POOR OF THE BILLERICAY UNION. Court.
3rd. Except as to the said sum of 351. 10s., that the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 49, s. 1-Guardians of the
matter herein pleaded to was a debt, claim, or demand Poor-Limitation of Time for Sueing—Plea incurred by the defendants as the guardians of a union in Bar.
after the passing of the Act of the 23rd year of Her
Majesty's reign, intituled “An Act to provide for the Section 1 of the 22 and 23 Vict. c. 49, which enacts that any debt due from the guardians of any union, &c., payment of debts incurred by Boards of Guardians in
unions and parishes, and Boards of Management in shall be paid within the half-year in which the same
School Districts,” and that the plaintiff did not comshall have been incurred, or within three months after the expiration of such half-year, but not afterwards, half-year in which the same was incurred or became
mence any proceedings for the said debt within the provided that the Poor Law Board by their order may, due, or within three months after the expiration of if they see fit, extend the time for payment for a period such half-year ; nor has the Poor Law Board granted not exceeding twelve months after the date of such debt, precludes a creditor of the guardians from recorering in any extension of time for the payment of the said supan action, commenced after the expiration of the half- commenced within the time limited by the statute in
posed debt or any part thereof; nor was this action year and three months, if the time has not been ex
such case made. tended by the Poor Law Board, although at the time
The second question for the opinion of the Court of the commencement of the action they might have
was, whether the third plea was not bad in substance,
and the plaintiff entitled to judgment upon it. At the CASE stated for the opinion of the Court.
time the writ issued, the Poor Law Board might, if The plaintiff is a surgeon, and one of the medical they thought fit, have extended the time for payment. officers of the Billericay Union. The defendants are When the case came on for argument, the time within the board of guardians of the same union. The claim which the extension could be made had expired. The is for medical fees beyond the salary to which the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 49, s. 1, is as follows : plaintiff is entitled as such officer. The plaintiff's respect to any debt, claim, or demand which may after appointment was with the consent of the Poor Law the passing of this Act be lawfully incurred by, or beBoard, and ou terms of remuneration fixed by Articles come due from, the guardian of any union or parish, 177 and 183 of the General Consolidated Order of the or the board of management of any school or asylum Poor Law Board, dated 24th of July, 1841. (Articles district, such debt, claim, or demand shall be paid 177 and 183 of the said Consolidated Order were set within the half-year in which the same shall have out in the case.) The parties are to be at liberty to been incurred or become due, or within three months refer to other parts of the said Consolidated Order, a after the expiration of such half-year, but not aftercopy of which is annexed to and to be taken as part of wards, the commencement of such half-year to be this case. The date of the writ was the 9th of June, reckoned from the time when the last half-year's ac1862. For the purposes of this case the pleadings are count shall or ought to have been closed according to as follows :
the order of the Poor Law Commissioners or Poor Law DECLARATION.— Indebitatus count for money pay- Board ; provided that the Poor Law Board by their able by the defendants to the plaintiff for goods sold order may, if they see fit, extend the time within which and delivered, goods bargained and sold, work done, such payment shall be made for a period not exceeding and materials provided, money lent, money paid, and twelve months after the date of such debt, claim, or on account stated.
demand.” Section 4 is as follows :-"If any person Pleas. — 1st. Except as to 35l. 10s. never indebted. claiming any debt or demand shall have commenced
or shall hereafter commence proceedings in any Court | defendants. But Mr. Keane says, that at the time the
BRAMWELL, B. -I am of the same opinion. I should within the operation of this section.”
never have had any doubt about the first point in this D. D. Kcane appeared for the plaintiff.
case if it had not been for the proviso at the end of the There is nothing to show that the action cannot be first section ; because, when the statute says a debt maintained, although perhaps execution might be shall not be paid, the obvious meaning is, it shall not stayed. In cases analogous to the present, there is a be sued for. That is the common sense of the matter. distinct prohibition of the maintenance of the action The statute says the debt shall not be paid, and that itself, but section 1 only says that payment shall not is a bar to an action brought. The difficulty I had was be made. He cited,
this-whether, inasmuch as there is a power to the Poor Harrison v. Stickney, 2 H. of L. Ca. 108 ;
Law Board to extend the time, the statute was a bar The Attorney-Gencral v. Wilkinson, 28 L. J. Ch. until the time, during which there was the power to 393;
extend, had gone by? Now I think the probable soInce v. The Guardians of the City of London lution of that difficulty is to say, that if an action is Union, 24 Just. Peace, 1860.
brought after the time, or before the Poor Law Board
has extended it, the action must be barred; although, C. Pollock, for the defendants, was not heard.
if the Poor Law Board think fit to extend it after
wards, a fresh action may be brought. Now the Pollock, C.B. --We are all of opinion that judg. difficulty of that reasoning is, that where an action is ment should be given for the defendants. This is an
once barred, it is barred for ever. Usually, you cannot action brought to recover from the Poor Law Guardians make a judgment a bar to an action, unless you say the a certain demand. For reasons, no doubt satisfactory, plaintiff can never maintain an action in respect of his the Legislature has said this money shall not be paid claim. But to that there are exceptions ; as in the unless within a certain period, and, after that period
case put of the attorney's bill, and I do not know of a has expired, the present action is brought. The better illustration. There, if the attorney brings the question then is, whether the plea setting up that, is action upon an unsigned bill he has, in one sense, a a sufficient answer to the action, or whether we are so
cause of action, and the Statute of Limitations runs to deal with the enactinents of the Legislature as to against him, and he is barred of his action, although say that though the money is not to be paid, yet the when the statute has been complied with he may action may be brought, and the defendants may go with
So it might be here, if the plaintiff could this clause in the Act of Parliament to a Court of not bring an action in the time during which the Poor Equity and there stay the proceedings. I am clearly Law Board could grant an extension of time, he is of opinion, that when an Act of Parliament says some
barred of his action, though he may afterwards come thing shall not be done, then an action will not lie to
within the exception. enforce doing it. The object of this action is to compel it. There may be a contract to do something, CHANNELL, B.-I am clearly of opinion that the which, by the termination of peaceful relations be defendants are entitled to the judgment of the Court. tween this country and other nations, ceases to be Mr. Keane, on the part of the plaintiffs, seeks to lawful, and then you cannot bring an action against recover the entire amount of his client's claims; and the person who has promised to do it. Here it is said whether he is entitled to do so or not depends upon the the money shall not be paid, and the common sense construction to be placed on the statute 22 & 23 Vict. conclusion is, that you cannot sue for it. But c. 49. The important question is-What is the operanothing turns here on the form of the plea except tion of this statute ? that which was suggested by my brother Bramwell, It has been held over and over again that the words and which may be met, and I think is met, in either in the enacting clause of an Act of Parliament go of two ways: first, that the time has wholly gone by, beyond any words in the preamble. That is a sound so that we may reasonably give judgment for the rule of construction. But, quite consistently with
that, it is permitted to the Court to look at the words is clear what the object of the statute was. Under of the preamble, and see what light they throw on the the old administration of the Poor Laws, overseers proper construction of the section. The result of the were in the habit of allowing matters to run in arrear, section is, that it is expedient to define and limit the and then to make rates which were to be applied period during which certain payments may be inade. retrospectively. Those rates were then disputed, and Then I think the case will stand very clear upon the an amount of litigation was incurred, and ultimately first section, taking that alone. It refers to three it happened that the expenses fell upon the overseers periods—two definite, and one (the third), in a sense, themselves, and they really hardly knew what their duty indefinite. The first is a half year, the second is a was. I think that the Act of Parliament had a double period of three months at the expiration of that half object--one to protect the rates, and the other to define year, and there is a third period referred to in the the duties of the gnardians. If we did not give this statute extending the time. That is given by the con Act of Parliament the effect contended for, and which cluding words of the first section. Those words are is required to support this plea, I am of opinion we words in the proviso, and independently of the proviso, should altogether defeat it. I do not know what is the only meaning I can give it is, the current half its object, except to say to parties claiming-You must year and a period of three months from the termina assert your claims within the specified periods; and tion of that half-year. If there were no proviso, you, the guardians, can only pay them within those that would be the true construction. Then come periods. The power of extending the time we give to the words, “Provided that the Poor Law Board, by another body, whose duty it is to control you. It their order, may, if they see fit, extend the time seems to me that everything is made very consistent within which such payment shall be made for a period by holding that the Act is in effect a Statute of Limitanot exceeding twelve months after the date of such tions. If we did not hold that, instead of defining debt, claim, or demand.” It may be that the current and making more clear, and specifying the duties of half-year, and a period of three months from the the guardians, we should repeal the statute and emtermination of that period, might give rise to some barrass them to a great extent. I cannot help thinkargument, and it would be proper to provide an ing that this is a good plea, and that our judgment equitable relief in such a case. That is provided for should be for the defendants. by the power given to the Poor Law Board in their
Judgment for the defendants. discretion, within the period of twelve months to extend the time. The action was not brought within the
Ex. HALLETT v. DYNE. current half year, or within the three months from the
25 Nov. 1863. In re Rolls and Another. termination of that time, and the Poor Law Board have made no order for extending the time. I appre- 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110_ Arrest under Ca. Sa.—Rehend, therefore, that would completely answer the action. But Mr. Keane has ingeniously argued the
Registration of Judgment-Power of Court to case in the only way in which it can be put; viz.,
order entry to be made in book of Master of putting the first and fourth sections together, the
Common Pleas. maintaining of the action is not prohibited. It does
Plaintiff' recovered judgment against defendant in the not appear to me, on examining the fourth section, Court of Exchequer, and registered it under the 1 & 2 that it produces any great difficulty. It provides, I
Vict. c. 110, s. 19, in the Court of Common Pleas, and think clearly, that within the time limited by the first afterwards arrested the defendant under a writ of ca. sa. section, an action shall be commenced either in the who was discharged by order of the Insolvent Debtors' definite period of the current half year and the Court. After this arrest and discharge, the plaintiff three months, or the extended time during which
again registered the judgment. Subsequently the the Poor Law Board may authorise the action. If
defendant became entitled to leasehold property, which the action is brought within the time, all that is he mortgaged, and upon a sale of part of it by the requisite is, that it shall be prosecuted with due dili- mortgagees, the purchaser having refused to complete in gence till final judgment. A party might prefer a claim and bring an action, and the progress of it may aforesaid, it was
consequence of the said judgment being registered as be prolonged by a variety of causes over which he may
Held, upon application made to this Court by the have no control, so that a judgment may not be vendors for the plaintiff to attend the senior Master obtained within the time. I am clearly of opinion of the Common Pleas and consent to an entry upon the that the present action is answered. I am inclined to register there that the defendant had been taken in executhe opinion that a new action may be brought, but tion by the plaintiff, that this Court had no jurisdiction the defendants are not liable in this. The plaintiff
to make such an order. ought to have clothed himself with an authority from the Poor Law Board to bring action.
In this case a rule nisi had been obtained calling on
the plaintiff to show cause why he should not attend Pigotr, B.-I am of the same opinion. I think it before the senior Master of the Common Pleas, and
consent to an entry on the register there, that the Although satisfaction of the judgment may not be defendant in the above action was taken in execution entered because of section 87 and other sections of the by the plaintiff on the judgment recovered by him, 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, there is enough to show that the and there registered.
plaintiff should not be allowed to re-register his judg. The following were the material facts-
ment. Whatever steps are taken to affect the defenIn 1853 the above action was commenced by the dant's after-acquired property, should be such as all plaintiff in the Court of Exchequer, to recover the sum the creditors of the defendant may profit by. Lewis of 6291. 143., and in November of the same year judg. v. Dyson (ubi supra) is in principle the same as the ment was signed for the said debt and costs. Subse- present case. quently, a writ of fi. fa. was issued, under which the plaintiff recovered 491. 12s. On the 12th Novem
POLLOCK, C.B. -I think this rule should be disber, 1853, the judgment was registered in the Court charged, and on the ground that we have no jurisdic
tion to do that which we are asked for. I am not sure of Common Pleas pursuant to the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.
that where a plaintiff has not got real satisfaction, In January, 1854, the defendant was taken in execution under a ca. sa., at the suit of the plaintiff, but was ulti- he may not, if he think fit so to do, avail himself
of mately discharged on the 4th May, 1855, under the
any hold which he may have upon his debtor's Insolvent Debtors' Act. On the 9th November, 1859,
property. the plaintiff re-registered his judgment in the Court of Common Pleas. In 1861 certain leasehold property that this rule should be discharged. There is no pro
BRAMWELL, B.—I am of the same opinion, and think was granted to the defendant, which he mortgaged in vision in the 19th section of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 the same year to one Daniel Rolls, and upon a subse.
for the entry in the Master's book of the satisfaction quent sale of part of the land by Rolls' representatives,
or extinguishinent of a judgment; and even if the the purchaser, by reason of the said judgment, having debtor pays the debt, there is no provision made by been registered as aforesaid, refused to complete. the statute for entering that fact on the Register. Application was therefore made by the vendors to the senior Master of the Court of Common Pleas to make Why are we to say then, that because of the incon
venience to vendors, an entry such as is here asked an entry in his book, against the entry of the said
for ought to be made ? Mr. Keane, however, says judgment, that since the date and registration thereof that the fact of the judgment having been satisfied the plaintiff had caused the defendant to be arrested
cannot be entered on our records. I am inclined, upon a ca. sa. is suel on the said judgment, and the said however, to think that the judgment is gone ; but if Master intimated his willingness to make such entry that is not so, all events, by an entry on our upon the authority of a Judge's order. A summons
records of the defendant's arrest under ca. sa., and was then taken out for that purpose, but the learned Judge referred the matter to the full Court.
upon reference to the records of the Insolvent
Debtors' Court, the whole matter will appear as to The above rule nisi having been obtained,
the effect of the judgment upon the real estate of the Prentice now showed cause.
defendant. Here it is a third party who applies to the Court,
CHANNELL, B.--I think also that this rule should and so the case is distinguishable from that of
be discharged. The judgment is the act of this Court, Lewis v. Dyson, 21 L. J. Q. B. 194.
but the registration is made by virtue of the statute, The case of
and I think we have no power to do that which is Wells v. Gibbs, 3 Beav. 399, and 4 Jur. 1176,
asked for, as it is for the Court of Common Pleas alone is expressly in the plaintiff's favour. The Act is silent ,
to control the act of its officer in re-registering the as to any entry upon the Register of satisfaction of a
Pigott, B., concurred. D. D. Keane, in support of the rule.
POLLOCK, C.B., directed the jury that if they were of REGINA V. SILLIM and 4, 5, 17, 18, 19, 20,
opinion that the claimants haul endeavoured to equip,
Others, 21, 23 Nov. 1863.
dc., the ship in an English port, in such a manner as THE ALEXANDRA.
would prepare her to commit hostilities, with the intent
prohibited by the statute, they were to find for the Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, c. 69–Crown, but that otherwise they were to find for the
Equipment in this country of Vessels for claimants. The jury found for the claimants :-
Held by POLLOCK, C. B., and BRAMWELL, B., that
this ruling was correct, and that the equipment, d'c., Section 7 of the Foreig Enlistment Act, 69 Geo. 3, forbidden by the statute, is an equipment for war, and C. 69, enacts that “If any person within any part of that to constitute the offence created by the Act, the equip. the United Kingdom or in any part of his Majesty's ment must be intended to be so completed that the vessel dominions beyond the scas, shall, without the leave and when she leaves port shall be in a condition at once to licence of his Jajesty, first hud and obtained, equip, commence hostilities, and that there haul been no such furnish, fit out, or arm, or attempt to equip, &c., equipment of the “ Alexandra” :or procure to be equipped, dt., or shall knowingly aid, Held by CHANNELL, B., that the equipment forbidden assist, or be concerned in the equipping, &c., of any ship by the statute is an equipment for war, but that where or vessel with intent or in order that such ship or vessel the equipment, without being intended to enable the vessel shall be employed in the service of any forcim prince, at once to commit hostilities, is yet capable of being used state, &c., as a transport or storeship, or with intent to for war, evidence showing the existence of the intent cruise or commit hostilities against any foreign prince, required to constitute the offence, might justify the jury in &c., with whom his Majesty shall not then be at war, finding that such equipments were equipments for war :or shall within the United Kingdom, &c., issue or Held, by Pigott, B., that any kind of equipment if deliver any commission for any ship or vessel to the given to the vessel with the intent required by the intent that such ship or vessel shall be einployed as Statute, is suficient to constitute the offence made penal aforesaid, every such person so offending shall be deemed by the Act. guilty of a mis lemcanor, &c. : and every such ship or vessel, with the tackle, apparel, and furniture, together This case arose on an information alleging the for. with all the materials, arms, ammunition, and stores feiture of the vessel “ Alexandra” under the 7th which may belong to or be on board of any such ship or Section of the Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, vessel, shall be forfeited.”
c. 69. On the trial of an information framed under the That Statute is entitled “An Act to prevent the abore section of the Act, and filed by the Attorney. Enlisting or Engagement of his Majesty's Subjects to General against the owners, builders, d'c., of the vessel serve in a Foreign Service, and the Fitting out or “ Alexandra,” alleging the forfeiture of the ship by Equipping in his Majesty's Dominions, vessels for reason of her having bech built for the service of the Warlike purposes without his Majesty's Licence.” Confederate States of America, evidence was given that The preamble is as follows : “Whereas the enlistthe vessel was adapted for a gun-boat, and was not ment or engagement of his Majesty's subjects to serve suited for mercantile purposes, being much more strongly in war in foreign service, without his Majesty's licence, constructed than a merchant ship would be, and having and the fitting out, equipping, and arming vessels by no room for slowing cargo; that her bulwarks were his Majesty's subjects, without his Majesty's licence, lower and much stronger than those of a merchant for warlike operations in or against the dominion or vessel, and such as would admit of being fired over; and territory of a foreign prince, State, &c., or persons exerthat there were preparations for fitting hammock-racks cising or assuming to exercise the powers of governon the bulwarks, which are very unusual in merchant ment in any foreign country, province, or part of any ships, but common in men-of-war.
province, &c., may be prejudicial to and tend to enThere were, however, no preparations for guns on danger the peace and welfare of this kingdom; and board her at the time she was seized. It was shown whereas the laws in force are not sufficiently effectual that the vessel was constructed by the order of, and for preventing the same; be it enacted,” &c. under the superintendence of, the agents in this country Section 7 enacts, “That if any person within any of the Confederate States. It was admitted that the part of the United Kingdom, or in any part of his ship was not suitable for a transport or storeship. Majesty's dominions beyond the seas, shall, without