THE LORD CHANCELLOR said, that the meaning of the 110th section of the Bankruptcy Act was not to be mistaken. The bankrupt, if not otherwise released, must proceed to obtain his discharge in the ordinary way. And in order to render this quite clear, the section expressly made the giving a full discovery a condition precedent to the discharge. Such discovery, where there was a deed of arrangement, might possibly be made under the deed; and if in the present case the trustees had certified that this had been done, the bankrupts might have been entitled to be discharged. But as such was not the case, they should have proceeded to make discovery, and get their release by a due course of proceeding in the bankruptcy, and the Commissioner should have ascertained whether the accounts which they had filed were sufficient. His Lordship would therefore discharge the order of release, and direct the Commissioner to proceed with the bankruptcy, till he was satisfied that the bankrupts had made a full discovery of their estate. Practice-Chancery Regulation Act, 1862Patent. Since the passing of the Chancery Regulation Act, 1862, it has become the rule of the Court to try all questions of fact itself, and the rule will only be departed from where the administration of justice in the particular suit renders a different course expedient. The rule applies with special force in patent cases. This suit was instituted for the purpose of restraining the defendants from infringing a patent alleged to be vested in the defendants, and for consequential relief. On the cause coming on to be heard before Vice-Chancellor Stuart, his Honour considered that the case was a proper one to be tried before a jury. Both plaintiffs and defendants were then desirous that the trial should take place before his Honour; and it was argued that under the Chancery Regulation Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 42), this was the only course competent to the Court. The Vice-Chancellor, however, considered that having regard to the number of causes set down, and the general state of business in his Court, the case might more conveniently be tried elsewhere; and accordingly, in virtue of the power reserved to the Court by the second section of the Act, he directed that the validity of the patent and the fact of infringement should be ascertained before a special jury in the Court of Common Pleas. Sir Hugh Cairns, Q.C., E. K. Karslake, and Lawson, for the plaintiffs, moved, that the order of the ViceChancellor might be discharged, and the cause be tried in the Court of Chancery. They argued, that every suit begun in the Court of Chancery was now to be completed there, unless some peculiar circumstances, arising in the particular suit, required a different course. For example, if a view of premises in Northum berland, or of things there, not moveable without great difficulty, were required, or if many of the witnesses were resident in that locality, such a state of things would render a trial in Northumberland the most convenient: 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42. Sir F. Kelly, Q.C., and W. W. Mackeson, for the defendants, contended, cluded themselves from objecting to the trial taking 1st. That the plaintiffs had by their conduct preplace in the Court of Common Pleas. 2nd. That the word "conveniently " in the before. mentioned Act was to be taken in the widest sense. No reply was called for. THE LORD CHANCELLOR, after stating that the facts did not warrant the conclusion that the plaintiffs had surrendered their right to make the present motion, said, that, in accordance with the statute, it was now the rule for the Court itself to hear every cause from beginning to end. The proviso in the Act of last year allowed certain exceptions to the rule. But in order for the proviso to apply, the administration of justice in the particular suit must be promoted by an action at Law, or a trial in another Court. In patent cases, where questions of law and fact of great inconvenience to cut the matter in half, and were sure to be largely intermixed, it was productive to send one half to be tried before a jury at Law, and leave the other half to be dealt with here. It was impossible by such a mode to arrive at a satis factory conclusion, except after many proceedings and shiftings, and after much expense consequent upon the misapprehensions to which such shiftings gave rise Not long ago a patent case, which had been several times sent backwards and forwards between the Courts of Equity and the Courts of Law, was ultimately decided on a simple question of law arising on the specifications. All these inconveniences might arise in the present instance from splitting the case in two, and there appeared to be no special circumstances to justify such a course. The order of the Vice-Chancellor would therefore be discharged. steps for nearly a month, by which time A had almost finished the building; B then discovered his mistake, and shortly afterwards filed a bill against A for an injunction and damages, on the ground of obstruction to light and air: Held (reversing the decision of WOOD, V.-C.), that B's acquiescence was not sufficient to deprive him of the right to an injunction at the hearing of the cause; but the bill was dismissed on the ground that B had sustained no substantial injury. Per TURNER, L.J.-If in a suit for an injunction and damages the injury to the plaintiff proves to be too trifling to sustain an injunction, the Court has jurisdiction award damages under the Chancery Amendment Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27); but Semble, the Court is not bound by section 1 of the Chancery Regulation Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 42), to entertain the question of damages. This was an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Wood, dismissing the bill with costs. The plaintiff Johnson was the lessee, and the plaintiff Burke was the under-lessee and occupier of the house No. 10, North Audley Street, and the defendant was the occupier of the next house. On the 28th of March, 1863, the defendant called at the plaintiffs' house late in the evening, and saw the son of the plaintiff Burke, whom he informed that he intended to build a photographic studio on a building at the back of his house adjoining the plaintiffs' yard, at the same time pointing out of the windows to the building. There were, however, two buildings at the back of the defendant's house, and Mr. Burke, supposing the lower building to be referred to instead of the higher, to which the defendant in fact referred, expressed no objection, and made no further inquiries about the proposed building. On the 8th of April the defendant began to prepare the higher building for the reception of the studio, and on the 16th began to erect the studio. On the 24th, the plaintiff Burke discovered that the studio was being erected on the higher building, and, after some remonstrances, the bill was filed on the 5th of May, for an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with, or keeping up, the studio, on the ground that it obstructed the access of light and air to the windows of the plaintiff's house, and for damages; at the time of the filing of the bill the studio was nearly finished. Willcock, Q.C., and Higgins, for the appellants. The delay of the plaintiffs, arising from mistake, if not from misrepresentation, ought not to deprive them of their rights, Isenberg v. The East India House Estate Com pany, M. R. 1863 (unreported); Gerrard v. O'Reilly, 3 Dr. & W. 414. The plaintiff, Johnson, was guilty of no laches, and, if necessary, the other plaintiff ought to be treated as a defendant, under section 49 of 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, Clements v. Bowes, 1 Drew. 684; Pollock v. Lester, 11 Hare, 266. The injury to the plaintiffs' house, was sufficient to sustain an injunction, Wilson v. Townend, 1 Dr. & Sm. 324; The plaintiffs were entitled to an inquiry as to damages, either with or without the injunction, Wedmore v. Mayor, &c., of Bristol, 1 N. R. 120, 187. Daniel, Q.C., and Goldsmith, for the respondent. 1st. The injury, if any, is too trifling to sustain an injunction. 2nd. The plaintiffs are bound by their laches, which was not caused by misrepresentation. plaintiffs had sustained any injury, however small, Willcock, Q.C., in reply, contended, that if the the Court having jurisdiction to inquire as to damages, was bound by the Chancery Regulation Act, 1862, to exercise its jurisdiction, and could not leave the parties to proceed at Law, Baylis v. Watkins, 1 N. R. 115. 17 DEC. 1863. TURNER, L.J., said, that the delay and acquiescenceof the plaintiffs, though sufficient to justify the Court in refusing an interlocutory injunction, was not sufficient to deprive them of their right to an injunction at the hearing, the dismissal of the bill on the ground of acquiescence amounting to a decision that a right once possessed had been absolutely and for ever lost. Upon the question, whether the Court ought to interfere by injunction in cases where the damages recoverable at law would be trifling, he would say nothing, as there had not been unanimity in the opinions of the Court upon that point; but this, at The evidence as to the alleged diminution of light least, was clear, that a plaintiff seeking for an injuncand air, was conflicting. It did not appear whether the plaintiff Johnson had any notice of the building of the studio before the filing of the bill. The cause having come on upon motion for decree, the Vice-Chancellor held, that the plaintiffs' right to an injunction was barred by delay and acquiescence, and that, under these circumstances, the Court had no jurisdiction to give damages. tion against an obstruction of light and air must show that his house had been rendered substantially less comfortable for purposes of occupation, and this, in the present case, the plaintiffs had failed to establish. Their case, therefore, for an injunction had failed. Then, as to damages, he was not satisfied that the question of the plaintiffs' right to damages was “a question of law or fact, cognisable in a Court of Common Law, on the determination of which the plaintiffs' title to relief in Equity depended," within the meaning of appeared that Messrs. Coutts & Co., the bankers, had section 1 of the Chancery Regulation Act, 1862, so as been in the habit of managing the affairs of the alleged to make it absolutely binding on the Court to go into lunatic, and had continued to make the usual paythat part of the case; but, as the Chancery Amendments during his illness, which payments included ment Act, 1858, had given the Court jurisdiction to an allowance to the petitioner, and which had been entertain the question, he thought that, having regard regularly paid. to the spirit of the subsequent Act, they ought, under the circumstances, to exercise that jurisdiction. He had, therefore, looked into several cases at Law, and, upon the authority of Back v. Stacey (2 Car. & P. 465); Parker v. Smith (5 Car. & P. 438); Pringle v. Wernham (7 Car. & P. 377); Wells v. Ody (7 Car. & P. 410), he considered that, on this point also, the plaintiffs' case failed. The bill ought to remain dismissed, but without costs, and there should be no costs of the appeal. Under these circumstances their Lordships had directed the petition to stand over, on the undertaking of the brother of the alleged lunatic not to remove him out of the jurisdiction of the Court. Their Lordships also directed Messrs. Coutts & Co. to continue the payments as hitherto. The matter was adjourned from time to time. 16 DEC. 1863. Bedwell, on behalf of the alleged lunatic, now applied for the dismissal of the petition; the physicians ap KNIGHT BRUCE, L.J., said, that but for the Chan-pointed by the Court having certified that that gentlecery Regulation Act, 1862, he should have preferred to let the cause stand over, with liberty to the plaintiffs to sue the defendant at Law. He could not agree with the Vice-Chancellor that a case of laches or acquiescence had been established against the plaintiffs; but he thought that the plaintiff's had failed to prove a case of nuisance either as to light or air. He should have been disposed to allow the parties to examine or re-examine witnesses on that question; but he agreed that, if the case was to rest as it was, the bill must remain dismissed, and that there should be no costs. Lunatic. Lords Justices.) Re ANON, an Alleged In an inquiry as to an alleged lunacy, the costs of the petitioner were ordered to be paid out of the estate of the alleged lunatic; notwithstanding that the alleged lunatic had recovered and was certified to be of sound mind. This was a petition for an inquiry in lunacy, presented by the wife of an alleged lunatic petitioning by her next friend. It appeared that the petitioner at the date of the petition was, and had been for some time, separated from her husband. In March last the alleged lunatic, when staying at an hotel in London, was seized with an attack of insanity. His brother was summoned, who removed him to a house in St. John's Wood. His brother and their only sister took up their abode with him. He there remained under the care of the family physician, and was constantly attended by two keepers. It was shown that he had previously suffered from similar attacks and had always recovered after a few months. His wife, on hearing of his attack, sent two physicians to visit him, but they were denied admittance. She then commenced proceedings in lunacy. It further man had recovered, and was now of sane mind. His client was willing to pay the costs of all parties, with the exception of those incurred by the petitioner. F. Waller, on behalf of the petitioner, asked for the costs incurred by her in the matter. He referred the Court to The Lunacy Regulation Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 86), sect. 11. TURNER, L.J., said, that he thought costs should be allowed to persons presenting petitions in lunacy, unless there were grave reasons for refusing them. It was very desirable that no one should be deterred by the fear of having to pay costs from interfering in behalf of persons unable to take care of themselves, and no obstacles should be thrown in their way. He was of opinion, therefore, that the costs of the petitioner ought to be paid out of the estate of the alleged lunatic. KNIGHT BRUCE, L.J., concurred. As this was the first case that had arisen under the Act of 1862 a discussion arose as to the form of the order. Ultimately the solicitor of the alleged lunatic offered to give an undertaking that his client would pay the petitioner's costs. This undertaking was accepted by the Court, and consequently no order was made. Minute.-Costs of the petitioner to be paid by her husband. All proceedings under petition to be stayed until further order. plaintiffs in the suit of Banner v. England, for leave to inspect, and for the production of certain documents in the custody of the Master in the Lunacy of Isaac Wood, deceased, under the following circumstances:In 1806, Isaac Wood was found a lunatic. He subsequently died possessed of considerable real and personal estate. The Master in Lunacy, by a report dated the 12th of January, 1849, found that one Thomas Copeland was the sole next of kin of Isaac Wood at his death, who accordingly obtained letters of administration to the estate and effects of Isaac Wood, and took possession of his personal estate. Thomas Copeland died on the 12th of December, 1850, having appointed John England, one of the defendants in the above suit, and Charles Bamford, since deceased, executors of his will, who duly proved it. time that has elapsed since the death of the lunatic. Bolton v. Corporation of Liverpool, 1 M. & K. 88; Re Sartoris' Lunacy, 1 N. R. 4. Greene, Q. C., in reply, cited, Re Fitzgerald, 2 Sch. & Lef. 432; TURNER, L.J., said that the present application wa a very important one as respected the rights of parties in a suit to the production of documents in the custody of the Master in Lunacy, and since it had been first mentioned he had communicated with the Registrar in Lunacy; his Lordship found that down to 1825 no one had been debarred from inspecting the proceedings in Lunacy. That, in his opinion, concluded the question. The order for inspection and production would be made as prayed in the petition. Costs to be costs in the cause. KNIGHT BRUCE, L.J., concurred. Lords Justices. 21, 1863. } On the 19th of June, 1862, the suit of Banner v. England was instituted by the plaintiffs, Edward Banner, and Sarah his wife. They alleged that Thomas Copeland was not the next of kin, or one of the next of kin of Isaac Wood, at the date of his decease, and prayed (inter alia) that it might be declared that the said Sarah Thompson, deceased, as one of the next of kin, according to the statutes of distribution, of Isaac Wood, the intestate, living at his decease, was entitled, and that the plaintiff Sarah Caroline Banner, as the legal representative of the said Sarah Thompson, deceased, is now entitled to a share of the whole of such personal estate of Isaac Wood, the intestate." Replication was filed on the 6th of August, 1863; but the time for closing evidence was extended by order. The plaintiffs now petitioned their Lordships that they might be at liberty to inspect all the documents in the matter of Isaac Wood, a lunatic, and in the custody of the Master, Registrar, and other officers in Lunacy, and to take copies and extracts therefrom as they might be advised at their own expense, and that the proper officers might be directed to attend with such documents upon any examination of witnesses at the hearing of the cause of Banner v. England, as the petitioners might require. ADAMS v. SwORDER. Annulled Bankruptcy—Order obtained by Fraud ▲, a bankrupt, by suppressing part of his estate, prevailed upon his creditors to accept a composition, and obtained an order annulling his bankruptcy under section 230 of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849: Held (reversing the decision of the Court below), that so long as this order remained unimpeached it must be treated as valid, and that consequently, A was entitled to have a sale made during the bankruptcy by his assignees to their solicitor set aside. This was an appeal from a decision of Stuart, V.-C. (reported 1 N. R. 546). The plaintiff was adjudicated bankrupt in July, 1856; in October, 1856, part of his estate, consisting of a life estate in freehold property, and a policy on his life, was put up for sale by auction by his assignees Greene, Q.C., and Bowring, in support of the and bought in, and, in the following December, the petition. Schomberg, Macnaghten, and Osborne Morgan, for the several defendants, opposed the production of the documents. 1st. By our answers we allege that we are nearer of kin to the deceased lunatic than the plaintiff, and we have administered as such nearest of kin. The Master in Lunacy, therefore, holds the documents in question for us, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to be in a better position than if the documents were in our own custody, and not that of the Court. same property was again put up and sold, at a price below the highest bidding at the former auction, to the defendant Ree, who was an auctioneer, and had been occasionally employed by the assignees in sales of the plaintiff's estate; the purchase was, in fact, made by Ree on the joint account of himself and the defendant Sworder, who was a member of a firm of solicitors employed by the assignees in their dealings with the plaintiff's estate, including the sale in question; this was known to the plaintiff shortly after the sale took place. In March, 1860, the plaintiff made a composition 2nd. The Court will take into consideration the with his creditors under the 230th section of the Bank rupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, and in May, 1860, an order of the Court of Bankrupty was made annulling the bankruptcy without prejudice to any sale made or any act done by the assignees; before the consent of the assignees was given to the annulling of the bankruptcy the plaintiff had by a deed, dated the 14th of March, 1860, and made between him and the assignees, ratified and confirmed all sales made by the assignees. In July, 1861, the plaintiff instituted this suit, to set aside the sale of the life estate and policy, on the ground of the relation of the defendants as solicitor and auctioneer to the assignees, and on the ground of undervalue. Upon the hearing of the cause, the cross-examination of the plaintiff elicited the fact, that he had in his last examination in the bankruptcy suppressed part of his estate, and thereupon the Vice-Chancellor, without entering into the merits of the case, dismissed the bill without costs, on the ground that the annulling of the bankruptcy, which gave the plaintiff the right to sue, had been procured by fraud. [It may be mentioned here, that shortly after the decision of the Vice-Chancellor the former assignees presented a petition in the Court of Bankruptcy, for an inquiry into the alleged suppression by the plaintiff, with a view of setting aside the annulling order, and an order for such inquiry was made by the Commissioner, but was discharged, on appeal, by the Lord Chancellor, on the ground that the assignees and creditors had notice at the time of one false statement in the plaintiff's examination, and could not, therefore, be taken to have relied on the truth of the examination.] of the assignees, and could not assist the defendants, who were not parties to it. Bacon, Q. C., and Marten for the defendant Sworder, and Hobhouse, Q.C., Waller, and Newbon for the defendant Ree. The plaintiff's right to sue (if any) is derived from the annulling order which was obtained by the plaintiff's fraud; but the Court will not assist a plaintiff in availing himself of an order so obtained, Earl of Bandon v. Becher, 3 Cl. & F. 479; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279. The annulling order, being the result of an arrange. ment, is equivalent to a deed re-assigning the bankrupt's property to him; just as an order protecting a wife's property under the Divorce Acts is an assignment from the husband to the wife, Rudge v. Weedon, 4 De G. & J. 216; Underwood v. Lord Courtown, 2 Sch. & Lef. 41; Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. (Ex.) 481; Rolt v. Hopkinson, 3 De G. & J. 177. The order expressly protects sales made by the assignees, and it would not have been made without that saving clause, Ex parte Smith, Buck. 262 n. ; Twogood v. Hankey, Buck. 65. The plaintiff is estopped by the deed of March, 1860, which he executed with full knowledge of this sale, and without which the assignees would not have consented to the annulling order; the defendants, though Malins, Q.C., and Herbert Smith for the plaintiff, not parties, could claim the benefit of the deed under in support of the appeal : The order annulling the bankruptcy is valid and subsisting, and the Court cannot take into consideration the grounds on which it was made; moreover, the pleadings raise no objection to the plaintiff's right to sue, on the ground that the order was obtained by fraud. The assignees during the bankruptcy had a right to set aside the sale to their solicitor, Gresley v. Mousley, 4 De G. & J. 78; Bailey v. Watkins, 6 Bligh, 275 n. ; Pooley v. Quilter, 2 De G. & J. 327; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 5. The plaintiff's right is barred by acquiescence. Herbert Smith, in reply. The right to set aside a voidable sale is an equitable interest, and may be assigned, Wearing v. Ellis (loc. cit.); Stump v. Gaby (loc. cit.). The saving clause in the annulling order, and the deed of March, 1860, only protected sales from being impeached on the ground of the bankruptcy having been annulled. The plaintiff had not acquiesced; he could not have sued before the bankruptcy was annulled. 22 DEC. 1863. Knight Bruce, L.J., said, that it was clear that the assignees, while the bankruptcy subsisted, could have set aside the sale made to their solicitor, what and, by the order annulling the bankruptcy, this right ever price might have been given; and he thought became vested in the plaintiff, Wearing v. Ellis, 6 De G. M. & G. 596; Charman v. Charman, 14 Ves. 580; Banks v. Scott, 5 Madd. 493. that, however censurable the plaintiff's conduct might have been, a good title to sue was vested in him by the annulling of his bankruptcy. The annulling order was still subsisting, and had The deed of March, 1860, was only for the protection not yet been successfully impeached; hence, even |