ing than would, in ordinary cases, constitute a tenancy for a year. Now the rule of law is, that a renting of a tenement for an indefinite period, and an occupation for a year, constitute a tenancy for a year. In the present case it was conceded that the tenancy could nct be considered a monthly tenancy by reason of the restriction upon quitting or determining the tenancy. The monthly rent being excluded in determining the character of the tenancy, to what other conclusion can we come than that it was a hiring of the tenement indefinite as to character, but terminable at a month's notice on either side on any of the specified quarterdays? And the house having been actually occupied under that hiring for upwards of two years, it appears to us it must be considered to have been an occupation under a hiring for a year. Many cases have been decided with reference to settlements by hiring and service which establish that a hiring at weekly wages, determinable at a month's notice, and service under such hiring for more than a year, gives a settlement. Regina v. Hampreston (5 T. R. 205) and Regina v. Great Yarmouth (5 M. & S. 114). These cases are analogous to the present so soon as the effect of the statute 6 Geo. 4, c. 57, s. 2, is We are, therefore, of opinion, that the rule for quashing the order of Sessions must be made absolute. determined. C. P. 17 Nov. 1863. } Rule absolute. SMITH, Appellant, v. HALL, Registration Appeal-Right to Vote-Receipt of Parochial Relief or other Alms-2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 36. Persons in receipt of eleemosynary incomes, in which they have a legal interest, are not disqualified from coting by 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 36. Semble, a decision of a parliamentary committee on a right to vote, primâ facie establishes the right. This was an appeal from the decision of the revising barrister for the borough of Sandwich. In this case the claimant was an inhabitant of the borough of Sandwich, and was objected to as disqualified from voting, on the ground that he was in receipt of parochial relief or other alms. It appeared that the claimant was a member of the hospital of St. Bartholomew's, in Sandwich, which was founded about eight hundred years ago. In the earliest collection preserved of rules of this hospital, it was provided that none should be admitted members of the hospital unless of the age of 50 years and upwards, except decayed jurats, lame and impotent persons, and such as were unfit for husbandry, that they should be inhabitants of the town of Sandwich, and having no competent means to live. The minimum age of candidates for admission was at first 40, but was afterwards, in the 17th century, fixed at 56. The history of this hospital, and of the neighbouring hospital of St. John's, a like foundation, is to be found in Boy's "History of Sandwich," p. 1792, &c. The case stated that the members formed a corporation by prescription, that each individual occupied a separate house, which he himself kept in repair, that the income of the landed estates of the hospital was equally divided among the members, there was no instance of any member having been turned out, and that they had always voted before by the usage of the borough. The funds of the hospital contributable to the support of the members were spoken of in the rules of the hospital as "the gratuities and other benefits by law belonging to them." The present Charity Commissioners and the Mayor of Sandwich had a power of visiting the hospital; but it did not appear that they had ever ejected, or could eject, a member of it. The revising barrister allowed the vote. Hayes, Serjt. (Bourke with him), for the appellant. The claimant is not the holder of an equitable freehold, so as to entitle him to vote, according to the cases of Faulkner v. The Overseers of Boddington, 3 C. B. (N. S.) 412; Heartly v. Banks, 5 C. B. (N. s.) 40 ; Freeman v. Gaisford, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 68. [BYLES, J.-That was not the objection; the objection was, that the respondent had received "parochial relief or other alms," not that he had no estate.] Then, it is stated that the claimant is a member of a brotherhood, all of whom are elected because they have "no competent means to live." They receive the alms merely ex gratia. They have no title as of right to the funds. He cited, The Aylesbury Case, Elliott on Qualification, &c., 257; The Taunton Case, 1 Doug. 370; Rogers' on Law of Elections, 171 (last ed.) Welsby, for the respondent. It being undenied that they are qualified, unless the 36th section of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, disqualified them, I submit that the members of this hospital are neither in receipt of parochial relief nor "other alms," Rogers' Law of Elections, 171; The Bedford Charity, 2 Doug. 123. The cases show that the Legislature intended only those to be disqualified who are receiving alms contributed to the poor-rate. [WILLIAMS, J., referred to The Borough of Sandwich Case, cited in Heywood on County Elections, 265.] Hayes, Serjt., in reply. ERLE, C.J.-I am of opinion that these votes are good. These persons have a right to vote, unless disqualified by the 36th section of the Reform Act. I cannot find that the recipients of the proceeds of these lands of the hospital are disqualified at the passing of the Reform Act; on the contrary, the Sandwich Case, referred to by my Brother Williams, shows that a parliamentary committee had considered the matter, and had decided that they were qualified. The meaning of this 36th section is, that people who are in receipt of alms, in some way contributed to the relief of the poor, are disqualified. WILLIAMS, J.-I agree. The circumstances under which the revenues of this hospital are shared, are not such as impose a disqualification upon the members within the meaning of the 19th section. A parliamentary committee has so decided, in effect. Serjeant Shepherd, in his work on Elections-a work of great accuracy-quoting from Heywood's books, says :"Perhaps the best rule is to distinguish between charities which are of such a nature as to imply that the partaker of them is in a state of indigence and abject dependence, and those from which no such inference can be drawn. With respect to the former, they, like parochial relief, may work a disqualification of those who receive them, by proving their incapacity to exercise a will of their own in the choice of a representative. BYLES, J.-I agree. I collect from the case that this is the case of a corporation by prescription, and the proceeds of the landed estates of the hospital are, by law, divisible among the brethren. Each lives on his own property, and is entitled to receive his share out of the revenues of all the landed estates. In the cases cited by my Brother Hayes, there was none in which there existed a legal right to receive the alms in question. The case referred to by my Brother Williams, is a decision upon this very point. KEATING, J., concurred. C. P. 24 Nov. 1863. } the jury could say anything to the contrary; the ont going tenant never surrendered, but he sometime appeared, sometimes kept away, during the admittance There were no fines, escheats, reliefs, or right ɗ common, but the lord could seize the land at the tim of the ceremony of admittance, if and until the ren: due to him was paid. The rent from time immemoria had been fixed and small. No tenant had ever beet evicted by the lord. There was no livery of seisin. no customary grant. The barrister allowed the vote. T. Chitty for the appellant. The claimants were no copyholders, but mere squatters; they want all the essential characteristics of copyholders. There can be no other tenures than freehold and copyhold, for the 12 Chas. 2, c. 24, destroyed all others. The tenants are probably tenants from year to year. He cited, Co. Cop. 14 ; Co. Litt. 58; Vin. Abr. "Copyholder," "Grant;" Mellish, Q.C., for the respondents. Here the tenants are summoned on a jury, they pay fixed small rents, they have never been evicted; arrears of rent are a charge upon the land itself; these facts are inconsistent with a tenancy at will, or from year Judgment for the respondent. to year. [He was stopped by the Court.] GARBUTT, Appellant, v. TUDOR, REGISTRATION APPEAL. Customary Freeholds-2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 19. Tenants of customary freeholds are entitled to vote by virtue of 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 19, except in such special instances of this tenure as do not allow the tenants permanent estates. This was an appeal from a decision of the revising barrister for the North Riding of Yorkshire. The claimant possessed certain land in the manor of Seaton, the property of the Marquis of Normanby, and the question was, whether it was "copyhold or other tenure, except freehold," within the meaning of the 19th section of 2 Will. 4, c. 45. The custom of the manor was very peculiar. The tenants, of whom the claimant was one, were liable to be summoned on a jury on the admittance of a new tenant, who was entered by the steward on the roll as admitted, unless T. Chitty, in reply. The argument on the other side makes out that this is a freehold customary tenure; this tenure, I submit, was extinguished by the 12th Charles 2, c. 24, having been in this case, as appears in the case, existent from time immemorial. He also cited, Passey v. Pittingham, 17 C. B. 299. ERLE, C.J.—The revising barrister was right. I cannot say what the estate is, but it is a permanent interest, and the question is, is it a freehold interest! There are no signs of its being a tenure at will, nor does it appear to be the case of mere squatters on the land, as the learned counsel suggested. I believe, if the history were looked into, it would be found that these tenants were originally tenants at will, and that their estate gradually grew up. From the facts statel by the revising barrister, I think that the claimant has a permanent estate in the land, and the statute says, that any one having such an estate of any tenure except freehold, is entitled to a vote. Keane, in support of the rule, contended that, from the silence of the statute on the subject, the Legislature did not intend to interfere with the old laws regarding infants. THE COURT (Erle, C.J., Williams, Byles, and WILLIAMS, J.-I am of the same opinion. There are many curious tenures, especially in the north of England, and they are called customary freehold or tenant-right, and there has been much controversy as to whether they are copyhold or freehold; but here it is immaterial whether they are the one or the other. It is difficult to say of what tenure they are; perhaps they were encroachures upon the waste, but the lord is here dealing with them as set out in the case, and I think the revising barrister was right in thinking that this was some sort of tenure as distinguished from the 11, 12 Nov. 1863. relation of landlord and tenant. * On its appearing that the defendant was an infant :Held, that the judgment must be set aside, though without costs. This was an action for breach of promise of marriage. The writ had been served, but the defendant had not appeared, and did not appear all through the proceedings, which were taken in accordance with the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76). They ended in a writ of inquiry, in which, in the absence of the defendant, the jury gave the plaintiff 5007. damages. This term, Keane obtained a rule, calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the judgment should not be set aside, on the ground that the defendant was an infant. Keating, JJ.)—The judgment must be set aside, but without costs. Ex. BUSH and Another v. Martin. Pleading-Statute of Limitations. Plaintiffs, executors of one J B, sued the defendant as clerk to certain local commissioners, for money due for work and services, &c., rendered by J B as an attorney and solicitor to the said commissioners. The defendant's third plea showed, amongst other things, that the money claimed accrued due more than six years before action; but it did not say that there was no cause of action within six years of the suit : Held, not good as a plea of the Statute of Limitations. DEMURRER.- Declaration by the plaintiffs, as executors of John Bush, against the defendant, as clerk to the commissioners under a Local Act of Parliament for paving, &c., the town of Bradford, in the county of Wilts, for money payable for work, &c., of the said John Bush in his lifetime, as the attorney of the said commissioners, and for fees, &c., for money paid, and for money due on accounts stated in the lifetime of the said John Bush, and since his death. Third plea. That this action was commenced on the 22nd of August, 1862, and that the debts and moneys in the declaration mentioned accrued due many years before the said commencement thereof; that is to say, part thereof, to wit, 57. 19s. 8d., accrued in and prior to the year 1841, and the residue thereof, to wit, 2607. 13s. 9d. in and prior to the year 1850. And the defendant further says, that the said commissioners had not, at the time of the accruing of the said debts, &c. (The plea then went on to show that the commissioners had not, nor could they have, any funds raised under the said Act applicable to meet the plaintiff's claim.) Demurrer, and joinder in demurrer. Lopes appeared to support the demurrer. The Solicitor-General and Bullar appeared for the defendant. POLLOCK, C. B.-I think the plaintiffs are entitled to our judgment. It was suggested that the plea might be taken as an informal plea of the Statute of Limitations; but that statute may be defeated, either by the cause of action having accrued within six years, or by a fresh promise, or by part payment. This application is not made under the 27th section (enabling the Court to allow a defendant to appear on an affidavit of merits), but on the strict ground of the irregularity. [BYLES, J.-But remember there was no cause of To say, therefore, that the cause of action accrued action, and yet you have got judgment.] more than six years ago, is perfectly compatible with the action being now maintainable. therefore, insufficient. * The plea is, pleas, and accepted the 117. 5s. in discharge, &c. The cause came on for trial before Pollock, C.B., at the Derby Spring Assizes, 1863. After the case had been proceeded with for a short time, his matter in dispute between the parties was one of Lordship stated, that it appeared to him that the account, and that, in his opinion, the case should be BRAMWELL, B.-We gave judgment in the main case yesterday. The plea here, however, shows on the face of it that the claim was upwards of six years old, and it is contended, on the part of the defendant, that it therefore amounts to an informal plea of the Statute of Limitations. I think, however, that is not so. The plea only says that the cause of action accrued upwards of six years ago, but it does not say that there was not a cause of action within the six years. It may have accrued twice, and the plea, to be a good one, should say that it did not accrue within referred to an arbitrator. A verdict was then entered for the plaintiff, and an order of reference was drawn up, stating that it was ordered by the Court, by the consent of the parties to the suit, that a verdict should be entered for the plaintiff, subject to the award of an arbitrator therein named, to whom the said cause was thereby referred, with liberty to order and direct for whom and for what sum the verdict should be finally entered, and to settle all matters in difference between the parties, and to order and determine what the said arbitrator should think fit to be done by either party respecting the matter in dispute; so as the said arbitrator should make and publish his award in writing of and con Costs of Cause-Reference-County Court Act, cerning the matters in dispute ready to be delivered 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 11. To a declaration on the money counts for 211. 10s. 6d. the defendant pleaded first as to 51. parcel, &c., never indebted. As to 51. 5s. 6d. other parcel, a set-off. As to residue, payment into Court of 111. 5s. The plaintiff joined issue on the two first pleas, and accepted the sum paid into Court in discharge, &c. On the case coming on for trial before POLLOCK, C.B., his Lordship having stated that he considered the case a proper one for a reference: a verdict was entered for the plaintiff, and an order of reference was drawn up, by which the cause and all matters in difference were referred to an arbitrator, with power to direct for whom and for what sum the verdict should be finally entered. It was also declared by the order that the arbitrator should possess the same powers of certifying as a Judge at Nisi Prius, and that the costs of the cause should abide the event of the award. The arbitrator found, on the first issue, that the defendant owed the plaintiff 51. 5s. 6d., besides the sum paid into Court; and, on the second issue, that the plantiff owed the defendant 21. 9s. 44d., and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the balance of 21. 16s. 1d.; but did not certify: Held, that the plaintiff had "recovered" the sum of 21. 16s. 1d. within the meaning of the 11th section of the County Court Act, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61; and that, therefore, he was deprived of his costs by that statute. In this action the declaration was on the money counts for 21%. 10s. 6d. The defendant pleaded, 1st. As to 51. parcel, &c., never indebted. 2nd. As to 51. 5s. other parcel, a setoff. As to the residue, payment into Court of 11. 5s. The plaintiff joined issue on the first and second * Bush v. Martin, 3 N. R. 90. to the said parties, or either of them who should require the same, on or before the last day of Easter Term then next. The order of reference further stated that the said arbitrator should possess the same powers as a Judge at Nisi Prius as to certifying, and that the costs of the said cause should abide the event of the said award, and that the costs of the reference and award should be in the discretion of the said arbitrator, with power to direct and award to, and by whom, and in what manner, the same should be paid. The arbitrator by his award ordered that the verdict entered for the plaintiff should be vacated, and found, as to the first issue joined between the parties, that the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 51. 5s. 6d. over and above the sum of 117. 5s. paid into Court and as to the second issue, that the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in the sum of 21. 9s. 44d. ; and further ordered that the sum of 21. 9s. 41d. assessed for the defendant should be allowed out of and deducted from the said sum of 51. 5s. 6d. found to be due to the plaintiff from the defendant; and that the defendant should pay the plaintiff the sum of 21. 16s. 14d., the balance. He also ordered that the plaintiff should pay the defendant his costs of and incidental to the reference and award, and that the plaintiff should bear his own costs of the same. did not certify for costs. He On the 4th of November, Michaelmas Term, 1863, Streeten obtained a rule to show cause why the plaintiff should not recover his costs of his action, and why the Master should not tax the same. 12 Nov. 1863. Fitzjames Stephen showed cause against the rule. The plaintiff is deprived of his costs by section 11 of the County Court Act, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61. The plaintiff here has recovered a sum less than 207. The authorities clearly show that he is not entitled to costs in such a case as this; Cooper v. Pegg, 16 C. B. 264, is in point. In that case the cause was referred; a verdict being entered for the plaintiff for 500l., with 40s. costs, the costs of the suit to abide the event. The arbitrator found in favour of the plaintiff, but ordered the damages to be reduced to one farthing. The Court held that the plaintiff had recovered by verdict the sum of one farthing, and that therefore the case came within the 2nd section of Lord Denman's Act, 3 & 4 Vict. c. 24, s. 2, and that the plaintiff was deprived of costs by that statute; and they ordered that part of the postea which stated that the plaintiff was to have 40s. costs to be struck out. The other side will probably rely on Wigens v. Cooke, 6 C. B. (N. s.) 784, but in that case the record was withdrawn, and the cause therefore referred without a verdict being entered the costs of the cause were there to abide the event. The arbitrator found for the plaintiff on one issue, and gave him a farthing damages. It was held that therefore the plaintiff had not recovered by verdict of a jury, and that the case did not come within Lord Denman's Act: and that as the costs of the cause were to abide the event, and the event was in favour of the plaintiff, he was entitled to his costs. The ground of the decision there, was-that the plaintiff had not "recovered" the sum by the verdict of a jury, and that therefore the clause in the award governed the question of costs. Jones v. Jones, 7 C. B. (N. s.) 832, differs from Cooper v. Pegg and the present case in the same manner. There the cause was referred before verdict. [BRAMWELL, B., referred to Kelsey v. Stubbles, 32 L. J. Ex. 6; 1 N. R. 104.] The [POLLOCK, C. B.-It is much to be regretted that these words were inserted into the order of reference. When I referred the case I did so merely because it seemed to me a fit one for arbitration, and I had no idea of giving the plaintiff his costs.] Had there been no verdict, we should have been clearly entitled to costs. As it is, we are still entitled to them; because the parties have agreed the costs shall follow the event of the award. [POLLOCK, C. B.-They have not agreed so. was a compulsory reference.] This It was a reference by consent; because a Judge at Nisi Prius has no power to compel a reference under such circumstances as the present; and, therefore, we look to the reference to see the agreement as to costs. It is to be observed that the reference is not merely of the cause, but of all matters in dispute. [POLLOCK, C. B.-Is any other matter disposed of by the award?] POLLOCK, C.B.-I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. The case turned upon an action brought in one of the Superior Courts, in which less than 207. was recovered. The parties were living within twenty miles of each other, and the action clearly came within the jurisdiction of the County Courts. The facts were, that, on the case coming before me on the Midland Circuit, I pointed out that the question was only one of account, and suggested that it should be considered by some one who could properly decide on such matters. The cause was then referred, and the arbitrator has decided upon it. [His Lordship read the award.] The arbitrator has merely found the facts, and has not given them their legal effect by disposing of them as matter of plea. Substantially, however, he has decided the issues, and there were no other matters in difference than those in the cause, and on which he The officer of the Court made a has decided. sepablunder in not striking out of the order of reference the clause as to other matters in difference; but Mr. Streeten failed to show that there were any other questions decided between the parties than those in the original case. Streeten, in support of the rule. The plaintiff is entitled to his costs, as the order of reference states that the costs are to abide the event, and the arbitrator has, on the whole, found in favour of the plaintiff, as the defendant has to pay him 27. 16s. 14d. [BRAMWELL, B.-The finding of the arbitrator is irregular. He should have found on the issues rately. The set-off is, properly speaking, found for the plaintiff, as he was not indebted to the defendant in an amount equal to that part of the claim to which the defendant had pleaded a set-off. Practically we may take it that the issues are found in favour of the plaintiff, with a verdict for 27. 16s. 1d.] Ultimately, the plaintiff recovered by the verdict of The plaintiff is entitled to his costs under the words a jury, qualified by an award under 207., and he is of the order of reference, Frean v. Sargent, 8 L. T. 467. not, in my opinion, entitled to costs. Several cases were referred to in support of the |