together form the parish of Kidderminster, are quite distinct, electing their own churchwardens and overseers, and making up distinct lists of voters. Welsby, for the respondent. These separate parishes I might call townships, and if there is only one parish church for these two townships-and the case does not say there are two churches, then the two lists would appear on the same church door. [BYLES, J. Yes; but the statute says that the lists are to be published on other places of worship than the parish church, and we must take judicial notice that in such a place as Kidderminster there is more than one place of worship.] Wansey v. Perkins, 7 M. & G. 127, 137; were cited. Mellish, Q.C., for the respondent, was not called upon. ERLE, C.J.-The objector has complied with all the essential requirements of the statute. Mr. Karslake, however, objects that he has used the name instead of the pronoun "your ; " but the statute has been substantially followed. The next objection is, that the names are transposed; but the Interpretation Clause, section 101, provides that no misnomer or inaccuracy of description shall vitiate a notice. I think that the Welsby thought he could not further maintain the notice was essentially what the statute requires. decision of the revising barrister, and THE COURT held that the notice was insufficient, as the objector must show on what list his name appears. A person claiming to vote is not bound to find out in which of a number of separate lists an objector's name appears. WILLIAMS, J.-The only question is, has the statute been complied with? The information conveyed by this notice is precisely the same as if it were in the form in the schedule. I think the notice, therefore, is essentially in the required form. BYLES, J.-I am of the same opinion. "Your" is Judgment for the appellant. the pronomen, instead of which the objector has used the nomina. Then it is said that the names are transposed. I doubt whether the surname is not more important than the Christian name in such a case as this, for in looking down the list it would more easily be found if placed first. KEATING, J., concurred. FORCE, Appellant, FLOUD, REGISTRATION APPEAL. Notice of Objection-6 Vict. c. 18, Sch. B. Notices of objection to parties objected to as unentitled to vote, are sufficient if they are substantially in the form given in 6 Vict. c. 18, Sch. B. No. 11. Ex. 6 Nov. 1863. Judgment for respondent, DICKENSON v. NORTH-EASTERN This was an appeal from a decision of the revising barrister for the city of Exeter. In this case the form of the notice of objection was itself objected to as bad. Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93)— 6 Vict. c. 18, ss. 13, 17; Rogers on Elections, 121, 122. Illegitimate Child. An illegitimate child is not a person in whose interest or for whose benefit an action can be maintained under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93). The The plaintiff sued as administratrix of one Hannah Dickenson, who was killed by the alleged negligence of the defendants upon their line of railway. action was brought for the benefit of the plaintiff (as mother of the deceased), and William Dickenson, the child of the said Hannah Dickenson. Upon the trial, before Mellor, J., at the last Durham Summer Assizes, it appeared that William Dickenson was the illegiti mate child of the deceased; and his Lordship directed the jury that the damages must be assessed only in the interest of the mother. The jury found accordingly for 1507. Price, Q.C., now moved for a new trial, contending that there had been misdirection. He submitted, that there being no words of exclusion, the word There is no case in which a departure from the form "child" in the Act meant any child of the deceased, has occurred, illegitimate as well as legitimate. He cited Dickenson v. Wright, 29 L. J. Ex. 150; in Error, the rent, and that notice had been rightly given to 30 L. J. Ex. 113; Regina v. Brighton, 30 L. J. M. C. 197; Follit v. Kotzow, 29 L. J. M. C. 128; POLLOCK, C.B.—We are of opinion there should be Ex. 10 Nov. 1863. con Rule refused. PEEK, Appellant, v. THE WATERLOO AND SEAFORTH LOCAL BOARD OF By the 69th section of the Public Health Act, 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, it is enacted that, "In case any present or future street or any part thereof (not being a highway) be not sewered, levelled, paved, flagged and chanwild to the satisfaction of the Local Board of Health, such barl may by notice in writing to the respective owners or occupiers of the premises fronting, adjoining, or abetting upon such parts thereof as may require to be red, &c., require them to sewer, &c., the same !hia a time to be specified in such notice; and if such actice be not complied with, the said Local Board may, if they shall think fit, execute the works mentioned or referred to therein; and the expenses incurred by them in so doing shall be paid by the owners in default according to the frontage of their respective premises.” The 2nd section of the same Act defines the word "ner," as used in the Act, to mean "the person for the time being receiving the rack-rent of the lands or premises in connection with which the said word is *d, whether on his own account-or as agent, or trustee far any other person, or who would so receive the same if such lands and premises were let at a rack-rent.” The Local Board of Health for the borough of Seafrth served notice on one Richard Formby, as owner of ertain premises, to sewer, &c., the street in front of then. Formby was, at the time notice was given, rcing rent for the premises apparently as absolute fer, from the tenant occupying them, and continued to so for some time afterwards. He was not, however, the real owner of the premises, or in any way entitled receive the rent. The actual owner did not attempt prevent Formby from receiving the rent, nor did he any way assert his right to the land for a considerperiod after the serving of the notice. The Local Hard, at the time of the notice, had no knowledge of facts: Held, that the person to be treated as owner for the poses of the Act was the person de facto receiving Formby. This was a case stated by the magistrates, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The question arose under the 2nd and 69th sections of the Public Health Act, 11 & 12 Viet. c. 63, and the 62nd section of the Local Government Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98. The 69th section of the Public Health Act enacted, part thereof (not being a highway), be not sewered, that "In case any present or future street, or any levelled, paved, flagged, and channelled, to the satisfaction of the Local Board of Health, such board may by notice in writing to the respective owners or occupiers of the premises, fronting, adjoining, or abutting upon such parts thereof as may require to be sewered, &c., or channelled, require them to sewer, &c., the same within a time to be specified in such notice; and if such notice be not complied with, the said Local Board may, if they shall think fit, execute the works mentioned or referred to therein; and the expenses incurred by them in so doing shall be paid by the owners in default, according to the frontage of their respective premises, and in such proportion as shall be settled by the surveyor." The same section further enacts, that these expenses may be recovered from the owners "in a summary manner, or the same may be declared by order of the said Local Board to be private improvement expenses, and to be recoverable as such in the manner hereinafter provided." The 2nd section of the same Act, which is the Interpretation Clause of that statute, thus defines the meaning of the word "owner" as used in the Act. "The word owner shall mean the person for the time being receiving the rack-rent of the lands or premises, in connection with which the said word is used, whether on his own account, or as agent or trustee for any other person, or who would so receive the same if such lands and premises were at a rack-rent." The 62nd section of the Local Government Act, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, enacts, that "Where the Local Board have incurred expenses for the repayment whereof the owner of the premises for or in respect of which the same are incurred, is made liable, either by application of or agreement with the owner, or by the Public Health Act, 1848, or by any Act incorporated therewith, or this Act, the same may be recovered from the person who is owner of such premises when the works are completed, for which such expenses have been incurred in the manner provided by the Public Health Act, 1848." The case stated that the clerk to the respondents made, in February, 1863, an information, and preferred it to the Justices in the proper petty sessions, charging that one R. Formby was, on the 15th of May, 1861, the owner of certain premises situate, &c., which road on the day and year aforesaid was not sewered, &c., to the satisfaction of the said Local Board of Health, who had, by a certain writing, dated 15th of May, 1861, sealed with their common seal, and signed by five of their members, given the said R. Formby notice as owner of the said premises, they being premises fronting the said road, within the space of fourteen days from the date thereof, to sewer, &c., so much of the said road as the said premises fronted; and that in case the said R. Formby failed to comply with the notice within such time, the Local Board might execute the said sewering, and that the expenses incurred must be paid by the said R. Formby, together with costs in default, if any, as therein mentioned. Neither R. Formby nor any other person did the requisite works within the time required, whereupon the Local Board executed the same, and they were completed on the 13th of March, 1862. In the information it was alleged that Francis Peek, the appellant, subsequently to the date and service of the notice became, and was at the time of the completion of the works, the owner of the said premises. The respective surveyor had duly apportioned the cost of executing such sewering, &c., and he declared Peek's proportion to be 1157. 8s., which had been duly demanded of Peek, and which he refused to pay, and which the respondent had not declared to be private improvement expenses contrary to the statute, &c. On the hearing, the Justices ordered the appellant to pay the 1157. 8s., and 10s. costs, to be levied by distress, or to undergo seven days' imprisonment. Upon the hearing of the information, the respondents proved that the road was not a highway repairable at the public expense at the date and service of the said notice. That R. Formby did not reside in the respondent's district at the date or service of the said notice. The notice was served on R. Formby by being directed to him, and transmitted through the postoffice. It was also proved that the land described was occupied by one J. Caddick, with other premises, and that R. Formby received the rent of the whole from him at the date of the notice, and up to the 2nd of February, 1862; and that also R. Formby gave Caddick notice, dated 30th of July, 1861, to quit the premises on the 2nd of February, 1862, which Caddick did. R. Formby received the rent of the whole up to Candlemas, 1862, and the receipt for it was produced; it appeared as if he received such rent as absolute owner. On the hearing of the information, it was admitted by the appellant that the notice had been served on R. Formby, that the work had been properly done, and the apportionment correctly made, and it was proved by the production of a conveyance dated 31st of October, 1860, that the appellant became and was the owner thereunder of the said premises, having purchased the same from one James Formby, and that he never had any knowledge of the notice of the 15th of May, 1861, until the works had been executed. The appellant had driven cattle off the land so purchased, which cattle he believed to belong to W. F. Caddick, but he never told Caddick or respondents that he had purchased the land described in the notice. The land consists of sand hills, covered with a kind of grass on which donkeys will graze, and the appellant had turned out his donkeys to graze, but he did not tell Caddick of that. The appellant had never set apart or railed off the land. The Justices were of opinion that R. Formby was in receipt of rent for all the premises on the 15th of May, 1861, the date of the notice, and that the appellant was owner thereof at the time of the completion of said sewerage works on the 13th of March, 1862, and that the appellant was liable for the payment of costs of such sewerage works, and convicted him accordingly. The question for the decision of the Court was, whether the appellant was bound by the notices to R. Formby. C. Pollock, for the appellant. Can The real owner was James Formby, who conveyed the premises to the appellant in October, 1860. After this conveyance, and up to Candlemas, 1862, Richard Formby had been receiving rent for the land. the respondent contend that a mere payment of rent for land to a person who has no right to receive it, will make that person an owner according to the definition of the word given by section 2 of the Public Health Act? [BRAMWELL, B.-I understand you to contend that notice to the person who merely receives the rent is not notice to the owner.] Certainly not, unless he receives it in the capacity mentioned in the Act. [PIGOTT, B.-The respondents might have obviated the difficulty by giving notice to the occupier.] Just so. Under the 2nd section of the Public Health Act, notice can be served on the occupier or on the owner. The best way of deciding this question is, to consider the definition of the word "owner," given in the interpretation clause of the Act (section 2). "Owner" is there stated to mean a person who receives the rent of premises on his own account, or as agent or trustee for another. In the present case, R. Formby did not receive the rents on his own account, and there are no reasons whatever for saying that he took them as agent or trustee for another. [BRAMWELL, B.-Then R. Formby received the rent by pure mistake ?] The case is not quite definite on this point; but there are no grounds for assuming that he received as agent for his brother J. Formby, who was the next owner before the conveyance to the appellant. The statute, when it speaks of a person receiving the rent, means a person who receives it by virtue of some legal right. If the money has been received by pure mistake, the receiver is not an owner within the Act. L. Temple, for the respondents. The question is, whether the respondents have followed the directions of the Act in this case. They find that the rent is paid to R. Formby, and notice to quit given by him to the tenant is also proved. The respondents therefore have complied with the Act so far as they could. [PIGOTT. B.-Should not the respondents have treated R. Formby as owner throughout the whole proceedings? This they have not done.] They have served with notice the person receiving the rent, and that is all the Act requires. R. Formby was liable to the real owner for the money he received. [BRAMWELL, B.-Suppose a tenant pays rent to a supposed landlord, who has no right to the premises, could the latter be served with notice ?] Yes; or else Local Boards would be under the necessity of inquiring into the title to ascertain who is the real owner. [PIGOTT, B.-In cases of any doubt, why not serve notice on the occupier?] The occupier might be a wrongful one also. The intention of the Legislature is shown by their using the words "receiving the rent," instead of "entitled to receive the rent." The notice to R. Formby was sufficient. C. Pollock, in reply. POLLOCK, C.B.-We assume no question to arise here as to the character of the rent which may be taken to be a rack-rent. Such being the case, I am of opinion that our judgment should be for the respondents. It would have been better, no doubt, to have served notice on the occupier, which would have avoided the difficulty; but here notice has been given to the person actually receiving rent, and who was, in my opinion, an "owner" according to the definition of the word given by the interpretation clause of this Act. Notice having been properly served, the appellant was rightly made liable for these expenses. BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. At the time notice was given, R. Formby was receiving the rents of the premises, and was the ostensible landlord. | The question then is, whether the Act which requires notice to be served on the owner, and defines owner as a person receiving the rent, &c., means a rightful receiver? I am of opinion that such was not the intention of the Legislature here, and that a de facto receiver is meant by the words used in the Act. This notice was, therefore, sufficient, having been given to the person actually receiving the rent. I do not consider that the Legislature meant to oblige the Local Boards to ascertain who is the rightful owner of the lands, &c., with which they have to deal. All they ean be reasonably expected to do is, to find out who is the de facto receiver of the rent. I do not see that there is any hardship on the appellant here. He has been negligent enough to allow rent to be paid for his land to the wrong person, and is not, I think, in a position to complain. CHANNELL, B.-I concur. I quite agree that the person, owner de facto, was the proper person to be served with notice. A person receiving rent for land may, in the absence of anything tending to show that he receives it for another, be assumed to receive it for his own account. The notice was sufficient to originate proceedings, and, if they were properly continued, everything was done in compliance with the Act. I do not see that there is any hardship on the owner in the present case. PIGOTT, B.-Notice to R. Formby, and proper execution of the works, having been admitted, the only question which remains is, whether the provisions of the Act with regard to notice have been complied with. Although my mind is not free from doubt on the subject, I do not, on the whole, consider that notice to the rightful owner is made requisite by this Act. Assuming this, notice to the de facto receiver of rent would be sufficient. If there was any hardship on the appellant in this case, it was his own fault. Judgment for the respondent. Ex. 13 Nov. 1863. S EASTON and Another v. PRATT and Another. Lease under Power-Repairing Lease. Where a messuage and premises, used as a tan-yard, were devised to M E for life, with power to grant "building or repairing leases" for the term of sixty-one years, and M E demised to H for forty years, II cove. nanting only in the terms usual in farming and other leases, to repair, amend, and paint, &c. :— Held, that this was not a good repairing lease, under the terms of the power. EJECTMENT, to recover a piece of land, messuage, and premises, situated at Bermondsey, which had for many years been used as a tan-yard. The plaintiffs claimed under the will of one Charles Easton. It appeared that in the year 1795, the then Marquis of Salisbury conveyed the premises in question to the above-named Charles Easton, who by his will, dated the 4th of September, 1828, devised the same premises as follows:- He devised "All that his freehold house, sheds, yards, and premises, &c., at which he then resided, unto his three daughters, Sarah Smith Easton, Abigail Easton, and the said Mary Easton, to hold to them and the survivors and survivor of them, during the term of their natural lives, with full power to them or her to grant leases thereof, or of any part thereof, for a term or terms not exceeding twenty-one years, at a rack-rent, and without taking any premium or premiums for the same, or on building or repairing leases for the term of sixty-one years." Charles Easton died in 1832. On the 20th of September, 1859, Mary &c., to enter upon the premises to view the state of repair of the same. Shortly after the date of this lease, Hunt deposited (Limited), to secure money lent to him by them, and on the 3rd of August, 1860, he and the said Mary Easton joined in executing a legal mortgage of the above premises to the same company, to secure a further sum of money advanced by them to Hunt. Eventually, Hunt and Mary Easton both became insolvent, and the mortgagees took possession of the premises under the powers contained in the mortgage deed. Mary Easton died in September, 1862, and the plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the premises from the defendants, who were tenants to the mortgagees, on the ground of the above lease of the 29th of September, 1859, being an invalid execution by Mary Easton of the power given her by her father's will. The cause came on for trial before Bramwell, B., at the last Croydon Assizes, when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs, leave, however, being reserved to the defendants to move to set it aside; and it was arranged that the state of the premises at the date of the lease should be ascertained by reference to an arbitrator then named. In pursuance of the reference, the arbitrator made his award to the effect that, at the time of the lease, with the exception of one shed, which had been recently rebuilt and put into good repair, the premises, though in fair tenantable repair-regard being had to their class and condition-were, never Easton (who was then the survivor of the three daughters, devisees of Charles Easton), by indenture of lease made between herself, of the first part, and Henry William Hunt, of the other part (being the lease in ques-it with the Real and Personal Advance Company tion), demised the premises to Hunt; and the following are the parts of the lease important for the present question "The said Mary Easton, pursuant to and in exercise of the hereinbefore-recited power or authority, and of every other power or authority enabling her in that behalf, doth demise and lease unto the said H. W. Hunt the said house, sheds, &c. (being the premises in question), to hold the same, with their appurtenances, unto the said H. W. Hunt, his executors, &c., from the 29th of September instant for the term of 40 years, at the yearly rent of 1107. And the said H. W. Hunt covenanted that he the said H. W. Hunt, his executors, &c., should and would, at his and their own costs and charges, when and as often as need should require during the term thereby granted, well and sufficiently repair, uphold, support, paint, maintain, amend, and keep the thereby-demised premises, and all buildings thereafter erected by him thereon, and all pavements, water-fences, &c., and other appurtenances belonging, or which should belong, to the same premises, in, by, and with all manner of needful and necessary reparations, cleanings, scourings, and amendments whatsoever. And the said demised premises, with the appurtenances, as being in all things well and sufficiently repaired, upheld, supported, amended, and kept together, with all doors, wainscots, locks, keys, bars, staples, hinges, hearths, marble and other chimney-pieces, mantel-theless, so old, as to be likely at any time to become pieces, chimney-jambs, foot-paces and slabs, covings, glazed windows and sashes, windows, window shutters, partitions, pumps, pipes, posts, rails, racks, mangers, and all such things as now are, or at any time hereafter during the said term hereby granted shall be, anyways fixed or fastened to, or set up, in or upon, or which shall belong to the said demised premises, shall and will, at the expiration, or other sooner determination of the term hereby granted, peaceably and quietly surrender and yield up unto the said Mary Easton, or her assigus, or the person or persons entitled as aforesaid. And further, that he the said Henry William Hunt, his executors, administrators, and assigns shall and will, as often as need shall require during the term hereby granted, bear, pay, or allow a reasonable share or proportion of the cost or charge of making, supporting, repairing, amending, and cleansing, as well all party walls, party gutters, common sewers, public sewers, and drains belonging, or which at any time during the term hereby granted shall belong to the said demised premises, as also of all drains and common or public sewers in the said parish of Bermondsey, into or through which any water or soil coming or running, or to come or run, from the said messuage or dwelling-house and premises hereby demised, or any part thereof, shall pass." Power is then reserved to the said Mary Easton, or her assigns, untenantable, and unfit for the purpose for which they had been used, by the mere operation of time and ordinary wear and tear. A rule having been obtained pursuant to the leave reserved, Lush, Q.C., and Murphy, now showed cause. The question is, whether or not the lease of the 29th September, 1859, to Hunt was a good execution by Mary Easton of the power given to her in that behalf. It was not a building or repairing lease within the power, for Hunt only covenants to make the ordinary repairs, &c., enjoined on the lessee in every ordinary lease, Doe d. Dymoke v. Withers, 2 B. & Ad. 896. The power gave the alternative of making leases either for twenty-one years or for sixty-one yearsbecause, if it were thought advisable to carry on the old business, then the first kind of lease would be advantageous; whereas if building or repairing leases should be thought preferable, then the larger term of sixty-one years would be the most convenient. Here, however, the lease was within neither of the powers. The words must be read as on building and repairing leases.” The arbitrator substantially found that at the time the lease was made the premises required no repairs for the ordinary purpose of letting. |