a question put by his Honour, said that they had no objection to the dismissal of the motions being without prejudice to any fresh application to be made by the defendants after the answers had come in. KINDERSLEY, V.-C., said that the defendants had utterly failed in proving that their application could be granted with justice. They had not shown that a different course to that adopted had been open to the plaintiff. If he had joined all or any number of the defendants together in one suit, his bill would have been demurrable. If, on the other hand, he had filed bills in the first instance against only one or two, he would have been met, in subsequent suits against others, by the rule of this Court, that a patentee, seeking to restrain an infringement of his rights, must not have slumbered upon them. The difficulty of proceeding against all the 134 at once would not have been admitted then as a sufficient excuse, for each one could have replied that he had nothing to do with the rest. It had been put, that the plaintiff's course was grossly oppressive, both to the individual defendants, and to the public at large. But the burden on each defendant was not increased by the fact that others were burthened equally (for his Honour could not take notice of any increased expense to which the plaintiff's course might put the association which had been referred to); and as for the public grievance, the Court, though it would struggle against a multiplicity of suits, must respect the plaintiff's recognised rights. Each of the four motions amounted substantially to this: That some one suit should be selected (whether by the plaintiff, or, according to the fourth motion, by the defendants), and that the rest of the defendants should not be compelled to answer till that one cause had been decided. It had been argued, in support of the motions (though the point was not put forward in the notices), that an issue ought to be directed to try the validity of the patent; and it had been represented as a consequence which must follow from directing an issue, that the Court would deem it useless to go in the mean time into the second of the two questions involved in each suit, viz., the fact of infringement, and to require answers from the different defendants. Now, his Honour would assume that, at a proper time, the defendants might ask the Court to direct an issue. Even the plaintiff might consent to an issue, yet, without inconsistency, persist in requiring answers respecting every matter upon which he would be entitled to a decree as to the alleged acts of infringement, if he should succeed in proving the validity of the patent. The defendants had urged that they were ready, without answering, to give the plaintiff all the information of which he really stood in need at the present stage of the suit; and that their answers -if they should be compelled to answer-would contain nothing as to the alleged infringements. But the rule was, that, if a defendant answered at all, he must answer in full. Sometimes, when an answer con tained all that was material to the plaintiff, with a view to enable him to get a decree,' the Court had not forced the defendants to include in it burdensome accounts, which would be equally useful to the plaintiff if furnished after the hearing. Perhaps De la Rue v. Dickinson (loc. cit.) was a case of that nature. But certainly the Court would not excuse defendants from answering in full, on the ground, that, if the plaintiff failed in proving the validity of the patent, such answers would be useless to him. Nor could the number of suits make any possible difference. Each defendant would incur no expense, except about his own answer; and the plaintiff had, as against each, a right to an answer as to all matters on which he might obtain a decree against him. His Honour put out of his consideration the question whether the previous actions at Law had established the validity of the patent. He also assented entirely to the abstract proposition, that, where a person having a single right had, either at Law or in Equity, proceeded against many separate individuals for infringement of that right, this Court would struggle to prevent the mutiplicity of suits. But the defendants had made a mistake in making their application at the present stage of the cause. The Court could not interfere at present without infringing on the clear and elementary right of the plaintiff. The motions must be dismissed with costs; but without prejudice to any similar application to be made by the defendants, after their answers had been put in. 24 Nov. 1863. A motion was this day made before the Lord Chancellor by way of appeal against the above decision, when his Lordship directed the motion to stand over till the first day of sittings after term, in order that the defendants might give such particulars of the machines manufactured, used, or sold by them as would enable him to ascertain the different classes of alleged infringement. His Lordship intimated, that, when this was done, he would reduce the number of suits so as to correspond with such classes, and directed, in the meantime, that all proceedings in the several suits should be stayed. wasting securities), that the tenant for life was entitled to the income of the fund in specie from the testator's death :Held, also, under the circumstances, that the tenant for life of a sum of 300,000l., directed to be set apart by the trustees, but which had not been set apart by them when the bill was filed, was entitled to interest on such sum from the testator's death. Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 209, explained. Where, under orders given in Chambers, a sum of stock was sold shortly before a dividend was due :Held, that the tenant for life of such sum was entitled o receive out of the proceeds of the sale, a sum equal to the apportioned part of such dividend from the last dividend day up to the day of sale. The testator in this cause, Stephens Lyne Stephens, by his will, dated the 5th of December, 1851, after making certain bequests, gave to his wife the defendant Yolande Lyne Stephens, and to the plaintiffs Sir Richard Williams Bulkeley and Sir John William Lubbock, and to Baron Rehausen their executors administrators and assigns, the sum of 300,0007. upon trust, to invest the same as therein mentioned, and to pay the income thereof to his wife, for her life; and after her death such legacy was to fall into the residue of his estate; and after giving various annuities and legacies the testator devised and bequeathed all his residuary real and personal estate to the same trustees, upon trust, to sell and convert, and to invest the proceeds in government or real securities, and to hold the trust fund upon trust to pay the annual produce to his said wife for her separate use without power of anticipation; and after her death, upon trust, to pay assign and transfer the fund unto and amongst such of the issue of the testator's uncle William Lyne, and of the testator's deceased uncles the Rev. Richard Lyne, Edward Lyne, and Joseph Lyne, as should be living at the testator's death (excepting Eliza Philadelphia Lyne, and John Millett Lyne). And the testator declared that it should be lawful for the trustees or trustee to permit all or any part of his said residuary personal estate to remain upon the same securities in which it might be found at his death, for so long as they should in their discretion, and without being answerable or accountable for the exercise of such discretion, think expedient or proper. And the testator thereby appointed his wife sole executrix of his will. The testator died on the 28th of February, 1860. The bill was for the general administration of the estate, and was filed by the trustees, other than the widow, against her and three of the "issue" interested in the residue. Such "issue" at the time of the testator's death, comprised eighty-nine persons; but the number was subsequently increased to ninetythree, four more children answering to the description of such issue, having been born within nine months of the testator's death, the last of whom was born on the 19th of November, 1860. The estate, which was very large, included a sum of 13,000l. Brazilian 6 per cent. Home Stock, 130,000Z. Bank of England Stock, 2,9237. Terminable Bank Annuities, 40,000l. Russian 5 per cents., and 12,000l. Royal Exchange Stock. No part of the estate had been realised or converted by the trustees when the bill was filed, and no sum had been set apart to answer the legacy of 300,0007. The usual administration decree had been made, and certain parts of the estate, including the Brazilian 6 per cents., had been subsequently converted. The cause now came on upon further consideration, and upon an adjourned summons to vary the Chief Clerk's certificate and upon petition. The main question was, whether any and what interest was to be allowed to the widow, the tenant for life, during the first year from the testator's death; 1st, upon the 300,000l. legacy, and 2nd, upon the general residue. The Brazilian 6 per cents. had been sold shortly before a dividend was due, under an order in Chambers, and a claim was made by the widow to receive out of the proceeds of such sale a sum equal to the apportioned part of the current dividend from the last dividend day up to the day of sale. Malins, Q.C., and B. B. Rogers, for the trustees, submitted the questions to the Court. An objection was made by counsel to a child who was born on the 19th of November, 1860, being admitted to share, on the ground that such child might not have been in esse at the testator's death. His Honour inquired if there was any authority for excluding such child, and no such authority being cited, intimated that the child must be allowed to share. On behalf of the persons interested in remainder, Bacon, Q.C., Osborne, Q.C., Cole, Q.C., Hinde Palmer, Q.C., Greene, Q. C., Wickens, Dewsnap, C. M. Tatham, Marten, Macnaughten, Westlake, Woodhouse, Rowcliffe, and Birley, argued :— 1st. As to the 300,000l. legacy, that it was clearly settled that where the income of a pecuniary legacy was given to one for life, with remainders over, the tenant for life could not claim interest during the first year from the testator's death, Gibson v. Bolt, 7 Ves. 96; 2nd. As to the residue, that the discretionary power to postpone conversion did not take the case out of the rule in Dimes v. Scott (loc. cit.); and that the tenant for life would only be entitled to a sum equal to the dividend on so much Consols as the proceeds of the residue, if turned into money at the end of a year from the testator's decease, would have purchased, such dividends to be computed from the death of the testator, Taylor v. Clark, 1 Hare, 162; Holgate v. Jennings, 24 Beav. 623; Craig, Q.C., Martindale, and Cotton, on behalf of the tenant for life, argued that the power to postpone conversion took the present case out of the operation of the rule in Dimes v. Scott, and that that rule had only been adopted in cases where there had been some wrongful dealing with the fund, or where the fund consisted of wasting securities. They cited and commented on, Angerstein v. Martin, T. & R. 232; and all the circumstances of the case, and, doing so, he could find nothing either in the conduct of the parties or the state of the investments that would warrant him in depriving the tenant for life of the income actually yielded by the testator's estate from the time of his death. As to the interest on the 300,0007. legacy, his Honour thought it hard to see any difference in principle between that and the income of the residue. The usual rule as to interest on legacies was not applicable to such a case as this. It was true that the legacy had not been carried to a separate account, and so strictly appropriated, but he should be doing a very harsh thing if he were on that account to deprive the widow of the interest Macpherson v. Macpherson, 1 Macq. H. of L. Ca. on her legacy, when there was more than that amount 243; Howe v. Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 148; Caldecott v. Caldecott, 1 Yo. & Coll. C. C. 312; Hume v. Richardson, 31 L. J. Ch. 713; 8 Jur. (N. s.) 686. It was STUART, V.-C., in giving judgment, said that it was impossible not to see the difficulties of reconciling the various decisions in the books, though he thought much of that difficulty arose from the over-hasty adoption of general rules, which, if strictly adhered to, would work injustice in particular cases. impossible to apply the same rule to cases where the estate mainly consisted of leaseholds or terminable annuities, and where the estate consisted of good permanent securities. He was of opinion, however, that Sitwell v. Barnard (6 Ves. 541), Angerstein v. Martin (loc. cit. ), and Hewitt v. Morris (T. & R. 241), were still the law of the Court. Dimes v. Scott (loc. cit.) did not appear to his Honour strictly applicable to the case before him. It had often been said, both by Judges and counsel, that there was a rule in Dimes v. Scott, but if there was in fact any rule laid down in that case, such rule applied only where there had been a course of conduct pursued which made it difficult for the Court to do justice to the various parties in any other way. His Honour then commented upon Sitwell v. Barnard, and pointed out the lengths to which the Court had gone in that case in order to do justice between the parties. His Honour then observed, that in the present case, a sale was directed, and the widow was made tenant for life of the fund which was to result from such sale. If the matter had rested there, certain recent cases might have had a direct application, but the testator proceeded to declare "that it should be lawful for the trustees, &c." (his Honour read the power to postpone conversion). That was a large discretion. What was the scope and object of that discretion, and of all the other directions about conversion and investment? Surely, the benefit of all parties, first of the widow, and then of those in remainder. His Honour would act upon what he considered to be the only sound principle, viz., to look at the whole scope of the will, in the hands of the trustees by whom that legacy was to be invested. The question of the apportionment was then raised. Hinde Palmer, Q.C., against the widow's claim, insisted that the present case was not within the Apportionment Act, 4 & 5 Vict. c. 22. Osborne, Q.C., on the same side, cited, Scholefield v. Redfern, 1 N. R. 465; 9 Jur. (N. s.) 485. Craig, Q.C., contrà, cited, Lord Londesborough v. Somerville, 19 Beav. 295. securities the Court did not make an order of the HIS HONOUR said, that, ordinarily, on a change of kind here asked for, but this was a strong case in favour of the tenant for life, and, although he gave full force to the reasoning of the Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, in Scholefield v. Redfern, (loc. cit.) he where the sale of the stock in question had been made thought that it did not apply in the present instance, under the authority of the Court at various periods for the benefit of the estate, and where, moreover, under the will, the tenant for life had been held entitled to receive the income actually produced by the testathe case of Lord Londesborough v. Somerville (loc. cit.) tor's estate at the time of his death. He thought that Master of the Rolls decided that case, viz., on that of was exactly in point, and on the ground on which the that the widow was entitled to the apportionment she the general justice of the case, he was of opinion This was a petition presented by a married woman by her next friend for the appointment of new trustees of a fund to the dividends of which she was entitled for her separate use during her life. The petition charged the husband of the petitioner with cruelty and extravagance, and affidavits were filed by the petitioner in support of such charges. The husband filed affidavits answering those charges, and bringing counter-charges against the petitioner. Greene, Q.C., and Rudge, appeared for the petitioner, Swanston, for the husband. HIS HONOUR said, that the practice of introducing irrelevant and personal matter into such petitions was greatly to be reprehended, and in granting the order prayed for, directed that so much of the costs on both sides as were properly occasioned by the introduction of irrelevant matter into the petition should be paid by the next friend, but that the husband should pay the costs of so much of his own affidavit as related to the counter-charges brought by him against his wife-the costs of so much of the petition as related to the appointment of new trustees, and other legitimate matter, to come out of the estate. Copyright Act (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 18)— Republication-" Separately or Singly." The proprietors of a weekly journal published in parts, under the form of supplementary numbers to the journal (which were sold either with or without the current numbers), certain tales which had appeared some years previously in the journal. The tales were in this manner reproduced in conjunction with other matter, which had also been previously published in the journal, though not in the same numbers as the tales, so that the supplementary numbers were not simply reissues of old numbers : Held, that such a republication of the tales was so far "separate and single' as to be inconsistent with the rights reserved to the author by the 18th section of the Copyright Act. This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the defendants, Messrs. Johnson and Wilson, the present proprietors of the London Journal, a weekly publication, from publishing certain tales comprised under the title of "The Chronicles of Stanfield Hall," under the following circumstances: In 1849, the plaintiff was employed by the then proprietor of the London Journal to compose, and he did compose, three tales called "Ulrick the Saxon," "The Heiress,” and “Cromwell, or the Protector's Oath," which were comprised under the common title of "The Chronicles of Stanfield Hall," and were pub lished in that journal during the year, a part appearing each week. He was paid weekly, at the rate of 107. per week. He did not, however, assign to the proprietors of the London Journal any of the rights which are granted or reserved to authors by law. The defendants, on the 18th of October, 1862, commenced publishing weekly a supplementary number of the London Journal, purporting "to be had with or without the current number of the London Journal," and containing each week parts of several tales which had previously appeared in the London Journal. In the supplementary number for the 27th of June, 1863, the publication of the tale called "Ulrick the Saxon,” under the title of "Stanfield Hall, by John Frederick Smith, Esq.," was commenced, and this republication had been continued by the appearance of a further part of that tale in each succeeding supplementary number, and in the heading of each supplementary number there was printed in capital letters, “A reissue of John Frederick Smith's best tales, 'Stanfield Hall,' and 'Amy Lawrence, the Freemason's Daughter.'" The plaintiff had not given his consent to such republication. By section 18 of the Act to Amend the Law of Copyright (5 & 6 Vict. c. 45), the proprietors of Reviews, Magazines, or other periodical works have the same copyright given to them in the articles published in such reviews, magazines, or periodical works, and paid for by such proprietor, as is given by that Act to the authors of books, except that the authors of articles so published periodically may, after twenty-eight years from their first publication, publish the same in a separate form for the remainder of the term given by the Act, and it is also provided, that, during the term of twenty-eight years, the publisher shall not publish any work "separately or singly" without the consent previously obtained of the author or his assigns. Bacon, Q.C., and Westlake, argued that the republication in question was a "separate and single" publication within the proviso of the section of the Ac above referred to. They cited, Mayhew v. Maxwell, 1 J. & H. 312; Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin, 16 Sim. 199. Malins, Q.C., and Speed, contended that this was not a separate or single publication; inasmuch as it was virtually nothing more than a reprint of old numbers of the journal, although the articles were arranged differently, and various matters of ephemeral interest were omitted; and they remarked that it would not be possible to purchase any one of the tales in question, except intermixed with other tales, all of which had formerly appeared at various times in the journal. STUART, V.-C., thought that the view taken of the proviso by the Vice-Chancellor of England in the Bishop of Hereford v. Griffin (loc. cit.), and afterwards adopted Previously to 1858, the goods traffic of the railway at Stevenage was carried on by means of a siding on the east side of the line, over which quantities of manure, for the use of the farmers and gardeners in the neighbourhood, were carried. by Wood, V.-C., in Mayhew v. Maxwell (loc. cit.), viz., | side of the Great Northern Railway, in the immediate that the right of the publisher was merely to publish an neighbourhood of the Stevenage station. article in a particular manner, viz., in the number of the periodical in which it should have first appeared, or in an exact reprint of that number, was also the view which he was bound to adopt. And inasmuch as the tales in question were republished in a form different from that in which they first appeared, and conjoined with different matters, he considered that such republication was contrary to the rights of the plaintiff as author, and he must, therefore, grant the injunction asked for. Practice-Injunction-Nuisance-Legal Right -25 & 26 Vict. c. 42-Delay-Acquiescence. Where a plaintiff complains of an infringement of a legal right, and there has been ample opportunity to establish the right at Law, the Court will not interfere by injunction unless this has been done,-notwithstanding the Act 25 & 26 Vict. c. 42. 4, being owner of a house in the neighbourhood of a railway station, where the traffic carried on was to a large extent in manure, allowed a siding to be made adjoining to his house without inquiry as to the purpose for which it was to be used. The siding was afterwards chiefly used for unloading trucks of manure, but the business was at first carried on so as not to annoy A. Three years after the siding was made, he began to complain of the nuisance; but took no active steps to bring it under the notice of the company till nine months later, during which period the traffic was increasing. Three months afterwards he filed a bill seeking to restrain the company from using the siding so as to interfere with the wholesome enjoyment of the house. No action at Law had been brought : Held, at the hearing, that on the grounds of delay and acquiescence, he was not entitled to the relief sought. The plaintiff was owner of a house at Stevenage which was built in 1856, and was situated on the west In the year 1858 a siding was constructed on the west side of the line, between the railway and the plaintiff's house. This siding was principally used for unloading manure. It appeared from the evidence of the station-master at Stevenage for the time being, that, while the siding was being constructed, the plaintiff complained to him respecting the position of the gateway leading from the siding into the road by which the plaintiff's house was approached. It did not appear that he made any inquiry regarding the use to which the siding was to be applied, or made any objection to its being used for the manure traffic. It also appeared that in the year 1859, the quantity of manure brought to Stevenage station was 782 tons; and in 1862, 1,184 tons. The trucks were sometimes allowed to remain at the station for one or two weeks, and the manure was also sometimes stacked there. In The plaintiff admitted that the traffic was at first carried on so as to cause him little or no annoyance; and, according to the evidence of the station-master, he even regarded it as beneficial to his property. December, 1861, he for the first time complained of it. During the summer of 1862 the nuisance went on increasing, yet, as it appeared, even in March or April, 1862, he represented to a person with whom he was in treaty for the sale of the house, that the inNo active steps were taken by the plaintiff to bring convenience thereby caused was not serious. the matter under the notice of the company till November, 1862; some correspondence thereupon took place, which continued till the 3rd of January, 1863. Nothing having been done by the company up to that time to abate the nuisance, the plaintiff, on the 19th of January, 1863, filed his bill in this suit, praying that the defendants might be restrained from using the siding for the deposit or stacking of manure or other matter whereby any noxious, offensive, or unhealthy fumes, vapours, or stenches might be caused or emitted, or from permitsive matter to remain on the siding, or using the siding ing their trucks or waggons containing any such offenin such manner as to interfere with the quiet and wholesome enjoyment of his house by himself and his family. Immediately after the filing of the bill, the nuisance was considerably abated; and in consequence no apThe cause now came on to be heard. plication was made for an interlocutory injunction. Willcock, Q.C., and Roxburgh, were for the plaintiff. They submitted that the nuisance in the present case was such as to entitle them to damages at law, |