would be in the power of any single member. And as to those mortal feuds which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities."

We see that under this second and successful system of Federation there would be accorded to the several states of South Africa a large measure of autonomy, and this would harmonize with those feelings of regard which have been described as having grown up in them for their respective Governments, endeared to them more than ever as they have been by reason of the vicissitudes and struggles through which they have guided the states into the calmer atmosphere which now surrounds their existence. But combined with this autonomy there must be a Federal authority in direct relation with the individuals of the states. We shall deal later on with the machinery by which this Federal power should be exercised on individuals.

CHAPTER IX.

FEDERAL OBJECTS AND FEDERAL MACHINERY.

Objects described as federal by United States Constitution-By Constitution of Dominion of Canada-Constitution written-Not subject to legislature-Supreme over all authorities-Contrast to flexible constitution of EnglandHistorical origin of American Constitution-Similar written and supreme constitution for South African Federation— Idea familiar owing to existence of constitution ordinances in colonies and grondwets in republics-Provision in constitution for discharge of duties by federal governmentPresident-Mode of election and powers-Administration by cabinet preferable-Principles of cabinet government— Senate Powers and functions-Has succeeded-Desirable in South Africa-House of Representatives-Powers and duties-Desirable in South African Federation.

WHAT, then, are those purposes of government which may be said to be of common concern to the whole of the states composing the Federation? And what is the character of the Federal machinery? We shall best get an idea of these matters by enumerating the subjects which, by the constitution of the United States of America, have been reserved for the Federal Government.

"The administrative, legislative, and judicial functions for which the Federal Constitution provides

are those relating to matters which must be deemed common to the whole nation, either because all the parts of the nation are alike interested in them, or because it is only by the nation as a whole that they can be satisfactorily undertaken. The chief of these common or national matters are :

War and peace: treaties and foreign relations

generally.

Army and navy.

Federal courts of justice.

Commerce, foreign and domestic.

Currency.

Copyright and patents.

The post-office and post roads.

Taxation for the foregoing purposes, and for the general support of the Government.

The protection of citizens against unjust or discriminating legislation by any state.

"This list includes the subjects upon which the national legislature has the right to legislate, the national executive to enforce the Federal laws and generally to act in defence of national interests, the national judiciary to adjudicate. All other legislation and administration is left to the several states, without power of interference by the Federal legislature or Federal executive."

In the case of Canada, the distinction between the civil matters within the province of the Dominion Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures bears a general resemblance to that which prevails in the case of the United States of America, while criminal Bryce's American Commonwealth," p. 30.

1

6:

law is reserved for the Dominion Parliament, and no province has a right to maintain a military force.'

There is, then, a tolerable consensus of authority as to the objects which would be reserved for the Federal Government, and which would apply in South Africa as well as elsewhere, with some modifications to suit the special circumstances. Thus it would be a question whether the subject of natives should be reserved for the Federal Government to deal with or for the separate action of each state. We do not desire to lay down any hardand-fast line on these questions, but to raise the questions in a general form, so that they may be thought over and gradually a matured opinion may be formed upon them. If we know and appreciate the manner in which this great question has been dealt with by others, we are more likely to arrive at a correct conclusion in our case.

Before we proceed to examine the machinery by which the American Constitution provided for the discharge of the duties of the Federal Government, we must draw attention to the character of that Constitution itself. We will subsequently examine in further detail some of its principal provisions, but we now desire to draw attention to one most important characteristic. The United States Constitution is a written Constitution, and its authority stands above every other authority in the United States; its provisions override all acts, whether of the President or

1 For some account of the Canadian Constitution see article "Federal States of the World," 19 cent., July, 1884, by J. N. Dalton.

Congress, or of the legislatures of the several states composing the Federation. The acts of any of these authorities, whenever they transgress the rules laid down by the Constitution, limiting their functions, and prescribing their spheres of action, are absolutely void, and may be set aside by the private citizen. Now, in England this distinction between its Constitution and its Parliament does not exist. The Parliament represents the whole nation, it is not in theory merely an organ of the community, but it represents the community itself. It is a sovereign assembly, and there are no limits prescribed to its powers by any superior authority; each separate Parliament, when once elected, is in theory the whole people, and it may make or unmake any law, it may fundamentally alter the whole political fabric of the country if it is so minded. The late Sir Henry Maine, in his work on "Popular Government," has drawn attention to this feature of the British Constitution in contrast with the system of the United States of America, and has pointed out the serious dangers to which it is open by reason of this extreme facility for bringing about change, and he inclines to some provision for a check upon this absolute power of change.1

It is true that the Constitution itself may be amended in the proper manner by the people of the

1 Sir Henry Maine, " Popular Government," p. 240: "But of all the infirmities of our Constitution in its decay, there is none more serious than the absence of any special precautions to be observed in passing laws which touch the very foundation of our political system."