tax lien. State ex rel. Hall v. McGill, 15 Ind. App. 289 (43 N. E. Rep. 1016). Under Ind. Rev. Stat., 1894, § 8611, an insane person may redeem from a tax sale of his land within two years after the expiration of such disability. Wagner v. Stewart, 143 Ind. 78 (42 N. E. Rep. 469). Ky. Gen. Stat., ch. 92, Art. 9, § 21, construed and applied-redemption by married women in five years. Anderson v. Batson, Ky. (37 S. W. Rep. 84). A mortgagor after foreclosure cannot redeem as "the owner of the land" under Mass. Pub. Stat., ch. 12, § 49, Da Silva v. Turner, 166 Mass. 407 (44 N. E. Rep. 532). Sec. 916. Notice of expiration of time for redemption. The provision of Ia. Code, § 894, requiring service of notice of the expiration of the time for redemption upon the person in possession of the land and the person in whose name it is assessed, is absolute, and a failure to observe it will afford ground for setting aside the tax deed. One who has not complied with this statute cannot claim the benefit of a statute of limitations for the protection of tax titles. Ia. Code, § 902, applied. Shelley v. Smith, 97 Ia. 259 (66 N. W. Rep. 172). Particular facts held to show such possession of land as entitle one to the notice provided for by Ia. Code, § 894. Shelley v. Smith, 97 Ia. 259 (66 N. W. Rep. 172). Where the name of the owner is marked "Unknown" in the assessment list, a notice of the expiration of the time of redemption, addressed to" Unknown," is sufficient. Hoyt v. Clark, 64 Minn. 139 (66 N. W. Rep. 262). Publication of a notice on a nonresident is properly addressed in the name of the person to whom the lands are assessed, as it appears on the tax duplicate. American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Crooks, 97 Ia. 244 (66 N. W. Rep. 168). Sec. 917. Tax deeds. Where the recitals in a tax deed show that the requirements of the statute regulating tax sales have not been complied with, it is invalid. Charlton v. Toomey, Colo. App. (43 Pac. Rep. 454). A tax deed which describes the land sought to be conveyed as a fractional part of a certain lot in a certain block, without designating any part of its boundaries, is invalid. Hill's Ann. Ore. Laws, §§ 2770, 2773, applied. Fory v. Palace Dry Goods & Shoe Co., 30 Ore. 196 (46 Pac. Rep. 786). Failure to serve upon the owner the statutory notice of an application for a tax deed renders it void. Towne v. Salentine, 92 Wis. 404 (66 N. W. Rep. 395). In Nebraska a county treasurer's tax deed is invalid either with or without a seal. Frank v. Scoville, 48 Neb. 169 (66 N. W. Rep. 1113). See Vol. IV, § 816. The issuance of a tax deed cannot be prevented for the reason that the tax sale was made in violation of an injunction prohibiting it unless it appear that such injunction was in existence at the time of the sale. Monell v. Irey, 47 Neb. 213 (66 N. W. Rep. 289). Under the revenue laws of Mo. 1872 a purchaser at a sale for delinquent taxes did not acquire any title until delivery of the tax deed to him, and one who holds merely a certificate of purchase was not a necessary party to an action to collect subsequent taxes under a statute requiring the suit to be brought against "the owner of the property." Hilton v. Smith, 134 Mo. 499 (33 S. W. Rep. 464). Construing and applying Fla. Laws 1883, ch. 3413, which provides for the assignment of the certificate of a tax sale by endorsement thereon and that a tax deed may be issued to one holding as an assignee, the deed reciting the transfer of the certificate of purchase, it is held that where the endorsement on a tax sale certificate is not an assignment thereof but amounts to the conveyance of the land described in the certificate, a tax deed issued to one claiming under such endorsement is invalid. Sanders v. Ransom, 37 Fla. 457 (20 So. Rep. 530). Under this statute it is held that a deed made in such a case which contains no recital showing that the grantee has become the assignee of the purchaser, is void. Ropes v. Kemps, 38 Fla. 233 (20 So. Rep. 992). Miss. Code, 1892, § 8776, applied -parol evidence to apply the description of land in a tax deed. Mixon v. Mixon v. Clevenger, 74 Miss. 67 (20 So. Rep. 148). Miss. Code, 1857, pp. 80, 81, applied-acknowledgment and recording of tax deed to the state. Edmondson v. Granberry, 73 Miss. 723 (19 So. Rep. 676). Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 7698, construed and applied-filing of tax deed as claim of title. Vastine v. Laclede Land & Imp. Co., 135 Mo. 145 (36 S. W. Rep. 374). Sec. 918. Tax deeds-Conclusiveness of as evidence of title-Constitutionality of statutes. The force and effect of a tax deed is to be determined by the statute in force at the time of its execution; and a change in the law upon this subject after one has purchased at a tax sale and before he has acquired his deed does not impair the obligation of the con. tract between the state and the purchaser. Deady & Lane's Ore. Code, pp. 767, 768, § 90, and Hills' Ann. Ore. Laws, § 2823, applied. Harris v. Harsch, 29 Ore. 562 (46 Pac. Rep. 141). Under Ia. Code, § 888, a statement in a tax deed of the fact of the assignment of the certificate of purchase is made "presumptive evidence of such assignment." American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Crooks, 97 Ia. 244 (66 N. W. Rep. 168). Under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 8624, providing that a tax "deed shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale of the premises described in the deed, and of the regularity of all prior proceedings, and prima facie evidence of a good and valid title in fee simple in the grantee of said deed," it is held that in an action of ejectment brought by the holder of a tax deed he is not required to prove that the delinquent owner had no personal property subject to sale. Richard v. Carrie, 145 Ind. 49 (43 N. E. Rep. 949). § 526, applied-conclusiveness of tax deed. enger, 74 Miss. 67 (20 So. Rep. 148). North Carolina Acts 1895, ch. 119, § 66; Acts 1887, chap. 137, § 74, providing that tax deeds shall be prima facie evidence of title which can only be defeated by showing that the property conveyed was not subject to taxation, or that the taxes were paid, and prohibiting persons from questioning the title conveyed thereby "without first showing that he or the person under whom he claims title had title to the property at the time of the sale, and that all taxes due upon the property have been paid by such person or the persons under whom he claims title as aforesaid," is constitutional; and such a deed is sufficient proof of title to entitle the holder thereof to maintain ejectment in the absence of any evidence of title in the defendant. Moore v. Byrd, 118 N. C. 688 (23 S. E. Rep. 968). This case is followed in the case of Peebles v. Taylor, 118 N. C. 165 (24 S. E. Rep. 797). Miss. Code, 1880, A statute (Md. Acts, 1890, ch. 566, § 54) making a court's order of ratification of a tax sale conclusive as to the regularity of the previous proceedings and sale, except in cases of fraud and collusion between the officer and the purchaser, is unconstitutional. Baumgardner v. Fowler, 82 Md. 631 (341 Atl. Rep. 537). The court say: "It is competent for the legislature to declare that a tax deed shall be prima facie evidence, not only of the regularity of the sale, but of all prior proceedings and of title in the purchaser; but the legislature cannot deprive one of his property by making his adversary's claim to it, whatever that claim may be, conclusive of its own validity, and it cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive evidence of the holder's title to the land. And Mr. Cooley, in treating the subject in his work on Taxation, says: 'That a tax deed can be made conclusive evidence of title in the grantee is more than doubtful. The attempt is a plain violation of the great principle of the Magna Charta, which has been incorporated in our bill of rights, and, if successful, would in many cases deprive the citizen of his property by proceed. ings absolutely without warrant of law or of justice. It is not in the power of any American legislature to deprive one of his property by making his adversary's claim to it, whatever that claim may be, conclusive of its own validity. It cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive evidence of the holder's title to the land, or of the jurisdictional facts which would make out title. But the legislature might doubtless make the deed conclusive evidence of everything except the essentials.' Cooley, Tax'n, 521." Sec. 919. Judicial proceedings to collect taxes. A statute (Minn. Laws 1893, ch. 150) which undertakes to authorize judicial proceedings to collect taxes, the lien for which has become extinguished, is unconstitutional. Kipp v. Elwell, 65 Minn. 525 (68 N. W. Rep. 105; 33 L. R. A. 435). A personal judgment cannot be rendered against one for taxes against whom no assessment has been made. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Mayor of Morristown, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 771). In California it is held that an action to recover a personal judgment for taxes and to enforce a tax lien on land is an action "upon a liability by a statute," and the limitations governing such actions apply to it, although the Cal. Code, Civ. statute gives taxes the effect of a judgment. Pro., § 338, subd. 1; Pol. Code, § 3716, applied. San Diego v. Higgins, 115 Cal. 170 (46 Pac. Rep. 923). Property in the hands of a receiver cannot be seized under an execution for delinquent taxes. Cleveland v. McCravy, 46 S. C. 252 (24 S. E. Rep. 175). In the absence of some evidence showing similarity of pronunciation of the names "Leane" and "Lane," they are not idem sonans and a tax sale under a judgment against "Lane" will not pass title to the land of "Leane." Barclay, J., dissenting. Geer v. Missouri Lum. & Min. Co., 134 Mo. 85 (34 S. W. Rep. 1099; 56 Am. St. Rep. 489). A tax judgment cannot be impeached collaterally by showing that entries made therein were made after the rendition of the judgment. Gribble v. Livermore, 64 Minn. 396 (67 N. W. Rep. 213). Where a judgment in proceedings to enforce taxes on real estate is in the form required by statute, the same 'presumption in favor of its regularity and validity exists as in respect to judgments in civil actions, but such presumption is not conclusive. It may be shown, by evidence dehors the record, that the court had not jurisdiction to render the judgment; as, for example, by showing that the delinquent list was not in fact published; but the presumption in favor of the validity of the judgment is not overcome by the mere fact that no affidavit of publication has been filed. Bennett v. Blatz, 44 Minn. 56 (46 N. W. Rep. 319), explained and qualified. Hoyt v. Clark, 64 Minn. 139 (66 N. W. Rep. 262). Each page of the tax judgment book was printed so that it might be filled in and signed as a complete judgment in itself. There were no blanks in the printed matter at the top of the pages above the columns provided for descriptions, etc., but all such blanks were filled in the printing. None of the pages were signed by the clerk, except the last one. It is held, if the proper columns and the proper entries therein are sufficiently continuous, all the pages from the first to the last one, which were so signed by the clerk, constitute but one judgment, and the same is valid on its face. But it is held from the statements in the settled case, there is sufficient doubt and ambiguity as to whether such columns and the entries therein were thus sufficiently continuous, that the doubt and ambiguity should be resolved in favor of affirm |