expended solely for the purposes of education and instruction " refers to actual use and does not exempt real estate leased for other purposes. Conn. Pub. Acts 1879, ch. 24 construed and applied. City of Hartford v. Hartford Theological Sem., 66 Conn. 475 (34 Atl. Rep. 483). Applying Tenn. Const. Art. 8, § 2, which exempts from taxation "all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes " it is held that a building held by a practicing attorney and occupied as a residence by him cannot be exempt from taxation on account of his wife conducting a school therein. Edmonds v San Antonia, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 155 (36 S. W. Rep. 495.)

Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3820, which exempts all buildings "exclusively occupied" as churches or belonging to ecclesiastical societies it is held that a church regularly used for religious worship does not lose its right to exemption. because it is occasionally rented for entertainments and conventions. First Unitarian Soc. v. Town of Hartford, 66 Conn. 368 (34 Atl. Rep. 89). Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120, § 2, exempting from taxation "all church property actually and exclusively used for public worship, when the land (to be of reasonable size for the location of the church building), is owned by the congregation," is held not to exempt camp meeting grounds owned by several congregations for public worship but the title to which is in a corporation formed by them. People ex rel. Breymeyer v. Watseka Camp Meeting Ass'n., 160 Ill. 576 (43 N. E. Rep. 716). Upon an extended discussion and consideration it is held by a divided court that Ky. Const., § 170, providing that "institutions of purely public charity, and institutions of education not used or employed for gain by any person or corporation, and the income of which is devoted solely to the cause of education," exempts from taxation the property of a corporation known as The Kentucky Female Orphan School, no matter in what part of the state the property is situated if the income therefrom is devoted to the support of the institution, although pay may be received from pupils receiving the benefit of the institution, all the funds thus realized being devoted solely to the maintenance of the school. Trustees Ky. Female Orph. School v. Louisville,

Ky.

(36 S. W. Rep. 921). For

further application of this statute see City of Louisville v. Board of Trustees Naz. Lit. & Ben. Inst. Ky. (36 S. W. Rep. 994); City of Louisville v. Southern Baptist Theo. Seminary, Ky. (36 S. W. Rep. 995). For case depending on particular facts in which property used for charitable purposes was held exempt, see Woman's Home Missionary Soc. v. Taylor, 173 Pa. 456 (34 Atl. Rep. 42).

Sec. 897. Exemption of agricultural lands from municipal taxes. In the absence of a statute exempting agricultural lands annexed to a town, which receive the benefit of municipal protection, they are liable to municipal taxation, although they are not divided into blocks or lots. Briggs v. Russellville, 99 Ky. 515 (36 S. W. Rep. 558; 31 L. R. A. 193). Construing Iowa Acts 23d Gen. Assem., ch. 1, which exempts from taxes "for any city purpose certain sized parcels of land within a city which shall "in good faith be occupied and used for agricultural or horticultural purposes," it is held that the statute does not exempt lands merely temporarily occupied and used for agricultural purposes, when purchased for speculation with the intent to lay the same out into lots and sell them; and that special assessments for curbing and paving are not taxes or assessments "for any city purposes. Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Mf'g Co., 97 Ia. 286 (66 N. W. Rep. 176; 35 L. R. A. 63).

Sec. 898. Assessment of taxes.-Statutes construed. Entries as to the valuation of land made in private books kept by an assessor in his office for his convenience do not bind the municipality for whom he is acting, and a property owner who relying thereon fails to ascertain the valuation of his property as fixed by the regular official assessment, can not enjoin a tax sale thereof because his property was assessed too high. West Portland Park Ass'n v. Kelly, 29 Or. 412 (45 Pac. Rep. 901). It is competent for the legislature, by curative act, to validate a defective levy which it might originally have authorized to be made in the manner in which it was done. Shattuck v. Smith, 6 N. Dak. 56 (69 N. W. Rep. 5). For the purpose of taxation the right of way and roadbed of railroads, in the absence of statutory regulations, are

treated as real estate. Ala. Laws, 1894-95 p. 488 applied. Purifoy v. Lamar, 112 Ala. 123 (20 So. Rep. 975). Citing, Welty, Assessm., § 142; Hil. Tax'n, 273, 276; 1 Desty, Tax'n, 396; Cooley Tax'n, 367; People v. Cassity, 46 N. Y. 46; People v. Beardsley, 52 Barb. 105; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 101 N. Y. 322 (4 N. E. Rep. 127); Sangamon & M. R. Co., v. County of Morgan, 14 Ill. 163 (56 Am. Dec. 497). Conn. Gen. Stat., § 3845, applied-assessment of life estates. White v. Portland, 67 Conn. 272 (34 Atl. Rep. 1022). Fla. Laws, 1887, ch. 3775; Laws, 1890-91 ch. 4039, appliedmunicipal assessments of the city of Jacksonville. Parker v. Jacksonville, 37 Fla. 342 (20 So. Rep. 538). La. Acts, 1888, No. 85, § 11; Acts 1890, No. 106, § 11, applied-supplemental assessment-notice. Hodding v. New Orleans, 48 La. 982 (20 So. Rep. 199). 2 Wag. Mo. Stat., ch. 118, § 65 applied-authentication of assessor's book by county clerk. Taft v. McCullock, 135 Mo. 588 (37 S. W. Rep. 499). Mo. Rev. Stat., § 7755, applied-taxation of bridges. State ex rel Glenn v. Mississippi R. Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 321 (35 S. W. Rep. 592). In applying N. H. Gen. Laws ch. 53, § 2; ch. 54, § 11, which provide that "real estate must be taxed in the town where it is situated," it is held that the value of a water power created by a dam in a river which forms the boundary between towns is to be apportioned to the lands under it in the different towns for the purpose of taxation, although the water power is used entirely for the operation of a mill in one of the towns. Amoskeag Manuf g Co. v. Town of Concord, 66 N. H. 562 (34 Atl. Rep. 241; 52 Am. St. Rep. 825). A statute (N. Dak. Comp. Laws, § 880), relating to proceedings by city councils which provides that "the yeas and the nays shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances and on all propositions to create any liability against the city or for the expenditure or appropriation of its money," does not require that yeas and nays be taken upon the passage of a resolution levying a general city tax. Shattuck v. Smith, 6 N. Dak. 56 (69 N. W. Rep. 5). Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2733, construed and applied-assessment of leased lands owned by a municipal corporation. Zumstein v. Consolidated Coal & Mining Co., 54 O. St. 264 (43 N. E. Rep. 329). The presumption that an assessment for taxes has been regularly

made which arises from the existence of a tax deed, regular on its face, may be rebutted. Harris v. Harsch, 29 Ore. 562 (46 Pac. Rep. 141). For an extensive consideration of the subject as to whether the county courts in West Virginia when passing upon the question of legality or illegality of the listing of property for taxation, act judicially, see State v. South Penn. Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80 (24 S. E. Rep. 688).

Sec. 899. Assessment of taxes-In whose name assessment should be made. A tax title based upon an assessment made in the name of one who is not the owner is void. Towne v. Salentine, 92 Wis. 404 (66 N. W. Rep. 395); Martin v. Southern Ath. Club, 48 La. 1051 (20 So. Rep. 181). Under Mill. & V. Tenn. Code, § 625, requiring property to be assessed in the name of the owner it is held that a life tenant in possession of real estate is the owner thereof for the purpose of taxation. Ferguson v. Quinn, 97 Tenn. 46 (36 S. W. Rep. 576; 33 L. R. A. 688). Ordinarily leased premises should be assessed in the name of the lessor, but improvements made by a lessee who has the right to remove the same should be assessed as his personal property, and an assessment of both the land and improvements, in such a case, against the lessor is void. East Tennessee V. & G. Ry. Co. v. Mayor of Morristown, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 771). Applying W. Va. Acts 1891, ch. 36, it is held a privilege or liberty or license to search and explore the land for oil or other minerals, coupled with a grant to dig and remove them, and convert them to the grantee's own use, if in fee or for life, creates an incorporeal freehold right in the real estate, which may be assessed to the grantee separately from the land or its surface, and, if the minerals be found and produced, creates a freehold interest, which should be assessed separately on the land books; but such privilege, liberty, or license, and such interest, if limited to a term of years, are not held and owned as the whole or a part of a freehold ownership, within the meaning of the act, and should not be separately assessed to the mining licensee or lessee on such land books. State v. South Penn. Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80 (24 S. E. Rep. 688). For particular case considering as to when a lessee claiming under a perpetual lease is the owner of premises for the pur

pose of taxation, see State ex rel Glenn v. Mississippi R. Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 321 (35 S. W. Rep. 592). Land appearing of record in the name of a corporation is properly assessed in that name although it has been changed by legislative enactment. City of Hartford v. Hartford Theological Sem., 66 Conn. 475 (34 Atl. Rep. 483). Ditto marks under the word “Unknown,” in the column of the assessment roll headed "In Whose Name assessed," is a sufficient statement that the owner's name is unknown. Hoyt v. Clark, 64 Minn. 139 (66 N. W. Rep. 262).

Sec. 900. Assessment of taxes-Description of property. It is not essential for a valid assessment of property on the tax rolls that it should follow exactly the deed of the property to the tax debtor. It is sufficient assessment if it conforms to it, and identifies the property. Chopin v. Pollet, 48 La. 1186 (20 So. Rep. 721). An assessment of street lots by the boundaries derived from the act by which the property was conveyed, though giving the changed names by which two of the boundaries were known at the date of the assessment, and stating the number of the lots as they are given in the act was held sufficient to support a tax sale, although the depth of the lots are not correctly stated. Poland v. Dreyfous, 48 La. 83 (18 So. Rep. 906). A description of land upon a tax book as follows: "Texarkana Water Co., west part S. W. S. W. Sec. 20, T. 15, range 28, 30 acres: valuation, $30,000.00," was held insufficient as a description of a tract of land of that size and value belonging to such company where only a part of said tract was located in the "west part S. W. S. W." Texarkana Water Co. v. State, 62 Ark. 188 (35 S. W. Rep. 788). The owner of land subject to taxation cannot avoid the payment of taxes because the description of the land on the assessment roll and tax list does not refer to a lawfully existing recorded plat or subdivision. It is sufficient if the description, by reference to generally known plats or otherwise, describes the land with such certainty as to afford notice, and protect the owner's right. Kershaw v. Jan sen, 49 Neb. 467 (68 N. W. Rep. 616). The provisions of R. I. Pub. Stat. ch. 42, § 4, requiring that "separate tracts or par cels shall be separately described and valued as far as practi