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98 Ga. 372 (25 S. E. Rep. 455); Webster v. Symes, 109 Mich. 1 (66 N. W. Rep. 580); Smaltz v. Boyce, 109 Mich. 382 (69 N. W. Rep. 21). As to applicability of particular instructions to the jury in actions for damages on account of fire, see New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606 (24 S. E. Rep. 264); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miller 109 Ala. 500 (19 So. Rep. 989); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Malone, 109 Ala. 509 (20 So. Rep. 33); Webster v. Symes. 109 Mich.. 1 (66 N. W. Rep. 580); Wills v. Lance, Ore. (43 Pac. Rep. 487); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Motzner, 2 Kan. App. 342 (43 Pac. Rep. 785); Write v. New York C. & St. L. R. Co., 142 Ind. 648 (42 N. E. Rep. 456); Flanaghan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 112 (67 N. W. Rep. 794).

Sec. 816.

Miscellaneous notes. The proximate cause of damages to a building by fire when cotton is stored therein without right is the storage of cotton therein, if except for that the fire could have been extinguished with little or no damage. Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 35 (33 S. W. Rep. 615; 54 Am. St. Rep. 812; 31 L. R. A. 604). One who negligently sets out a prairie fire, which causes the destruction of the property of another, is liable for the injury sustained, when it is such as reasonably should have been foreseen as the natural and probable consequence of the negligent act. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCollum, 2 Kan. App. 319 (43 Pac. Rep. 97). Iowa Code, § 3890, applied-starting fires on prairie land-liability of principal for negligence of his servant. Lewis v. Schultz, 98 Ia. 341 (67 N. W. Rep 266). Particular fact case as to the liability of one operating a steam threshing outfit for the destruction of grain by a fire arising from the engine, see Holman v. Boston Land & Sec Co., 8 Colo App. 282 (45 Pac. Rep. 519).

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 817. As to what contracts are within the statThe statute of frauds does not apply to judicial sales. Warchime v. Graf 83 Md 98 (34 Atl. Rep. 364). A parol agreement by a grantee to reconvey real estate to his grantor is within the statute of frauds and does not create an express trust in such real estate in favor of the grantor. Thomas v. Thomas, 48 Neb. 266 (67 N. W. Rep. 182). An oral agreement with respect to the making of a will by which both real and personal property may be given or withheld, is within the statute of frauds. Dickin v.. Dickin v. McKinlay, 163 Ill. 318 (45 N. E. Rep. 134; 54 Am. St. Rep. 471). A contract by a landowner, to take down a barn upon his own premises and erect the same upon the land of another, is not a contract for the sale of an interest in lands within the meaning of the statute of frauds. Scales v. Wiley, 68 Vt. 39 (33 Atl. Rep. 771).

Sec. 818. Same-Statutes construed and applied. The Illinois statute of frauds, Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 258, § 1, provides that "No action shall be brought to charge any per son upon any contract for the sale of any land, tenements or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them, for a longer term than one year, unless such contract or some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing, signed by such party. This section shall not apply to sales upon execution or by any officer or person pursuant to a decree or order of any court of record in this state." Under this statute it is held that an agent may make a valid lease for four years although his authority is not in writing. A seal is unnecessary to such a lease and may be treated as a surplussage. McIntosh v. Hodges, 110 Mich. 319 (68 N. W. Rep. 158). Under How. Ann. Mich. Stat., § 6179, no estate or interest in lands other than

leases for one year or less can be created by an oral contract. Smalley v. Mitchell, 110 Mich. 650 (68 N. W. Rep. 978). Under the statute of frauds (Cal. Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 6) requiring "an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or commission" to be in writing, a valid extension of such a written agreement cannot be made by parol. Platt v. Butcher, 112 Cal. Sup. 634 (44 Pac. Rep. 1060).

Sec. 819. Parol extension of time given in a written contract. Where a man purchased a farm, and agreed in writing that the vendor should have all the timber suitable for lumber, except the hard maple, to be cut and taken off before the first day of April, 1891, it was held that this was a sale of only so much of the timber as the vendor of the farm should take off within the time limited; that the timber not taken off within the limited time adhered to the land, and lapsed into the fee, freed from the contract of sale; that until taken off, the title and possession of the timber remained in the owner of the farm; that a verbal extension of the time within which to take off such timber is within the statute of frauds, and to be valid must be in writing; and that such verbal extensions of time, reliance thereon, and consequent delay in taking of such timber, is not such fraud as will take the case out of the statute. Clark v. Guest, 54 O. St. 298 (43 N.

E. Rep. 862).

Sec. 820. Sufficiency of memoranda-Several papers construed together. In a recent case the supreme court of Virginia say: "It is well settled that where the memorandum of the bargain between the parties is contained in separate pieces of paper, and these papers contain the whole bargain, they form together such a memorandum as will satisfy the statute, provided the contents of the signed paper made such reference to the other written paper or papers as to enable the court to construe the whole of them together as constituting all the terms of the bargain. But if it be necessary to produce parol evidence in order to connect a signed paper with others unsigned, by reason of the absence of any internal evidence in the contents of the signed paper to show a reference

to, or connection with, the unsigned papers, then the several papers taken together do not constitute a memorandum in writing of the bargain so as to satisfy the statute. It is not necessary that the signed paper should refer to the unsigned paper as such. It is sufficient to show that a particular unsigned paper, and nothing else can be referred to, and parol evidence is admissible for that purpose." Darling v. CumCiting, Benj. Sales

ming, 92 Va. 521 (23 S. E. Rep. 880). (6th Am. Ed.), §§ 220, 221. Several letters and telegrams may be linked together so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum. White v. Breen, 106 Ala. 159 (19 So. Rep. 59); Underwood v. Stack, 15 Wash. St. 497 (46 Pac. Rep. 1031). It must describe the real estate with reasonable certainty. Darke v. Smith, 14 Utah 35 (45 Pac. Rep. 1006). A written agreement of which there are two copies, one signed by each of the two contracting parties therein, is binding upon both, to the same extent as if there had been only one copy of the agreement, and both had signed it. Morris v. McKee, 96 Ga. 611 (24 S. E. Rep. 142.)

Where posses

Sec. 821. Parol gifts of real estate. sion is taken in pursuance of a parol gift, improvements made, and the donee changes his situation or condition upon the faith of the gift, it may be enforced in equity; but the gift must be shown by clear and satisfactory evidence. Flanigan v. Waters, 57 Kan. 18 (45 Pac. Rep. 56). The ground upon which courts of equity consider part performance of a parol gift as creating an equity to have it specifically executed notwithstanding the statute of frauds, is that it would be a fraud upon the party if it were not completed; but if the acts done under the gift be of such a character that they can be fully compensated in damages it will not be specifically executed. Trout v. Trout's Ex'r, Va. (25 S. E. Rep. 98). In ejectment it appeared that defendant's grantor entered into possession in 1871 under a parol gift from the original owner; that he built a house, and occupied it for over 17 years; that the donor died in 1874, and the plaintiffs, who are his heirs, asserted no claim to the land until about 15 years after that event. Held, plaintiffs having neglected to assert their rights for so long a time, a judgment, supported by evidence of the

original gift, confirming the title of defendant's grantor, will not be disturbed. Baca v. Wootton, 8 Colo. App. 94 (44) Pac. Rep. 850). Citing, Wat. Spec. Perf., §§ 284, 291; Allison v. Burns, 107 Pa. St. 50; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435. A parol gift of land may be specifically enforced where the donee takes possession and makes valuable improvements upon the faith thereof. Darke v. Smith, 14 Utah 35 (45 Pac. Rep. 1006). For cases which depend upon particular facts and illustrate when a parol gift of land will be enforced, see Wilson v. Wilson, 99 Ia. 688 (68 N. W. Rep. 910).

Sec. 822. Presumption of gift-Illegitimate child. Georgia Code, § 2664, provides that "the exclusive possession by a child of lands belonging originally to the father, without payment of rent, for the space of seven years, shall create conclusive presumption of a gift, and convey title to the child, unless there is evidence of a loan, or of a claim of dominion by a father acknowledged by the child or of a disclaimer of title on the part of the child." It is held that this section does not apply to an illegitimate child, on the ground that at common law the words child or children meant only legitimate child or children, and that as between the putative father and the illegitimate child, the law does not recognize any relationship except in certain cases where express provision is made. Such illegitimate child may acquire title by a parol gift followed by exclusive possession and the making of val uable improvements in pursuance of such gift. Floyd v. Floyd, 97 Ga. 124 (24 S. E. Rep. 451).

Sec. 823. Parol sales. In Pennsylvania it is held that "In order to take a parol contract for the sale of lands out of the operation of the statute of frauds its terms must be shown by full, complete, satisfactory, and indubitable proof. The evidence must define the boundaries and indicate the quantity of land. It must fix the amount of the consideration. It must establish the fact that possession was taken in pursuance of the contract, and at or immediately after the time it was made; the fact that the change of possession was notorious, and the fact that it has been exclusive, continuous, and maintained. It must show performance or part perform.

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