Mo. 131 (33 S. W. Rep. 778); Hahn v. Dawson, 134 Mo 581 (36 S. W. Rep. 233); Crandall v. Smith, 134 Mo. 633 (36 S. W. Rep. 612). A riparian owner is entitled to alluvial accumulation adjacent to and within the extended bound ary line of his lands. Mc Caman v. Stagg, 2 Kan. App. 479 (43 Pac. Rep. 86). Citing, New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Peters 662. Sec. 801. Diversion or pollution of waters. The fact that an obstruction in a navigable stream is a matter of public concern does not prevent the maintenance of an action by a person whose private interests are affected thereby, to protect such interests. Carl v. West Aberdeen Land & Improvement Co., 13 Wash. St. 616 (43 Pac. Rep. 890). Where the diversion or pollution of flowing water is the direct cause of damage to a riparian owner, his recovery therefor cannot be defeated by the fact that other causes over which the defendant had no control aggravated the damages. Cline v. Baker, 118 N. C. 780 (24 S. E. Rep. 516). An injunction will lie to prevent the diversion of a stream to the injury of the lower riparian owner, even though the diversion be for the purpose of irrigation, it appearing that the volume of water furnished by the stream was only sufficient to sustain the stock of the riparian owners and for ordinary domestic uses. Mastenbrook v. Alger, 110 Mich. 414 (68 N. W. Rep. 213). The operation of a factory which pollutes a running stream to the injury of a riparian owner may be enjoined. Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., 93 Wis. 1 (66 N. W. Rep. 713). The court say: "It is too well settled to need discussion at this time that a riparian owner of property is entitled to have the water of the stream flow to and through or by his land in its natural purity, and that anything done which so pollutes such water as to impair its value for the purposes for which it is ordinarily used by persons so circumstanced, causing offensive odors to arise therefrom, and injuriously affecting the beneficial enjoyment of adjoining property, may be restrained at the suit of the injured party; and neither distance from the source of pollution, nor public convenience, nor difficulty in avoiding the trouble can either justify or excuse the wrong; nor is actual pecuniary loss necessary in order that an action may be maintained to restrain it. The doctrine of equity applies that, where there is no adequate remedy at law, and there is an appreciable injury to a right, though no actual damage in the sense of ascertainable pecuniary loss can be shown, an action lies for damages against the person responsible for the wrong, and to restrain its continuance, and nominal damages will be presumed to sustain the action." SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. Sec. 802. EPITOME OF CASES. As to the right of specific performance. An action by a vendee for specific performance will not be defeated because he is unable to allege definitely whether or not one of the notes to be given for deferred payment was ever executed, or when the same was to be paid, the amount due being ascertainable from the contract. Peck v. Ashurst, 108 Ala. 429 (19 So. Rep. 781). Where a contract for the sale of land is entire, specific performance for the conveyance of a portion of the land upon the payment of a portion of the purchase money cannot be enforced. Neuforth v. Hall, 5 Kan. App. 726 (46 Pac. Rep. 982). Specific performance will not be decreed where it would deprive innocent third parties of their after acquired rights in the property. Owen v. McNally 113 Cal. 444 (45 Pac. Rep. 710; 33 L. R. A. 369). One who would seek the specific performance of a contract must not be guilty of laches; he cannot delay and speculate upon the chances of his bargain being advantageous or otherwise. Darling v. Cumming, 92 Va. 521 (23 S. E. Rep. 880). A vendor may maintain an equitable action. against a vendee for specific performance of a contract for the sale and conveyance of lands which he agrees to convey to the vendee, and the latter merely agrees to pay a certain sum as the price. Since the latter may, by a suit in equity, compel the execution and delivery of a deed of the premises, the vendor may also, by a similar equitable action, enforce the undertaking of the vendee, although the substantial part of his McPher- relief is the recovery of the money. Gates v. Parmly, 93 Wis. 294 (66 N. W. Rep. 253). The right of specific performance by a decree of a court of equity rests in judicial discretion and may be granted or withheld upon a consideration of all the circumstances and in a proper exercise of such discretion. Such a decree will not be granted in favor of a grantor when the title he avers is not good and marketable. son v. Schade, 149 N. Y. 16 (43 N. E. Rep. 527). serious doubt exists in the mind of the chancellor as to the intention of the parties to a contract for the sale of land, he will not decree its specific performance. Reilly v. Gautschi, 174 Pa. St. 80 (34 Atl. Rep. 576). In order to entitle a purchaser to demand a deed and maintain a bill for specific performance, it is sufficient that he is ready and offers to pay any sum that may be found to be due and still unpaid and to comply with the contract on his part. Monson v. Bragdon, 159 Ill. 61 (42 N. E. Rep. 383). Specific performance of a contract cannot be had where the contract cannot be specifically enforced against all the parties. Krause v. Kraus, 162 Ill. 328 (44 N. E. Rep. 736). Va. Sec. 803. Requisites of the contract sought to be enforced. The contract, in order to be enforced specifically, must be certain, definite, equal and fair and sufficiently precise to obviate misunderstanding as to its import. If it be wanting in these qualities a court of equity will decline to specifically enforce it and will leave the party to his remedy at law if there be any. Henley v. Hefferron, (24 S. E. Rep. 235). Citing, 2 Minor Inst. 786, 787. One who while negotiating by correspondence for the sale of property, conveys to his wife and subsequently accepts an offer from his correspondent, and after record of the deed, has not made a contract which can be specifically enforced against the wife in the absence of proof of authority from her to make or accept the offer. Brown v. Lapham, 22 Colo. 264 (44 Pac. Rep. 504). A mere unaccepted offer cannot be the basis of an action for specific performance. Smith v. Bateman, 8 Colo. App. 336 (46 Pac. Rep. 213). It is held that the whole consideration need not be recited in a contract for the sale of land in order to warrant specific performance. Kelley v. Mo. Thuey, (37 S. W. Rep. 516). A contract claimed to have been made by correspondence between the parties will not be specifically enforced where it appears that some of its terms and conditions have not been fully agreed upon by both parties. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Harrison, 93 Va. 569 (25 S. E. Rep. 888). No contract for the sale and purchase of land can be enforced by decree of specific performance unless it is mutual in its character, and certain in its terms. Heiland v. Ertel, 4 Kan. App. 516 (44 Pac. Rep. 1005). Sec. 804. By holder of a title bond. One who holds a bond for a deed conditioned upon payment of the purchase price and who has also obtained title to the promissory note executed to secure the payment of the same purchase money, may maintain a suit for specific performance against the holder of the legal title to the land. Fuller v. Bradley, 160 Ill. 51 (43 N. E. Rep. 732). The court say: "In contracts for the sale of land, the doctrine in equity is that, from the time of the contract, the vendor, as to the land, becomes a trustee for the vendee, and the vendee, as to the purchase money, a trustee for the vendor, who has a lien upon the land therefor. In equity, the vendor is treated as the owner of the money, and is deemed to stand seised of the land for the benefit of the purchaser." Citing, Story, Eq. Jur. §§ 789, 790; Lombard v. Congregation, 64 Ill. 477; Baldwin v. Pool, 74 Ill. 97; Sutherland v. Goodnow, 108 Ill. 528 (48 Am. Rep. 560); Robinson v. Appleton, 124 Ill. 276 (15 N. E. Rep. 761); Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. St. 114 (53 Am. Dec. 526); Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186; Dorsey v. Hall, 7 Neb. 460; Church v. Smith, 39 Wis. 492. Sec. 805. As against a subsequent purchaser. Where a vendor who has made a valid contract to sell and convey land, subsequently sells and conveys to another purchaser and such purchaser has notice of the prior equity of the first purchaser, he takes the place of the grantor and is bound to do that which he was bound in equity to do. Such a purchaser can be compelled specifically to perform the agreement by conveying the land in the same manner and to the same extent as the grantor would have been compeiled to do had he retained the legal title. Brinton v. Scull, N. J. Eq. (35 Atl. Rep. 843). All persons who subsequent to a contract of sale, derive from or through the vendor any interest in the land which is the subject-matter of such contract, with notice thereof, are bound to perform the same to the same extent that the original vendor would be bound if he had still retained the title in himself. Tate v. Pensacola, G. L. & Devp. Co., 37 Fla. 439 (20 So. Rep. 542; 53 Am. St. Rep. 251). Sec. 806. Particular cases. Where a vendor makes and delivers a written proposition to sell under seal, conditioned upon its acceptance within ten days, and four days later notifies the vendee that he withdraws such a proposition, to which notice the vendee gives no attention but within the ten days accepts the proposition in writing, the vendee will be entitled to specific performance. O'Brien v. Boland, 166 Mass. 481 (44 N. E. Rep. 602). Even where a married woman cannot bind herself to convey her land by a title bond, it is held that if she has executed a bond for title to real estate and is willing and offers to convey, the purchaser will not be relieved. Mullens v. Big Creek Gap C. & I. Co., Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 439). A will revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testator cannot be specifically enforced as a contract to convey lands as devised therein, the only other evidence being verbal declarations of the testator as to his intentions. Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 Ill. 270 (43 N. E. Rep. 1111). The right of a vendor to have specific performance of a contract for the sale of land is not barred by the existence of mortgages on the land amounting to far less than the contract price to be paid by the purchaser and which can be discharged out of the purchase money. Guild v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co., 57 Kan. 70 (45 Pac. Rep. 82; 57 Am. St. Rep. 312; 33 L. R. A. 77). Citing, Guynet v. Mantel, 4 Duer, 86; Halsey v. Grant, 13 Ves. 73; Oakey v. Cook, 41 N. J. Eq. 350 (7 Atl. Rep. 495); Thompson v. Carpenter, 4 Pa. St. 132 (45 Am. Dec. 681). Specific performance of a parol agreement to make a foster child, not legally adopted, an heir, in consideration of her personal services, will not be enforced as to real |