Dyer, 49 Vt. 74; Wilder y. Davenport, 58 Vt. 642 (5 Atl. Rep. 753); Cummings v. Black, 65 Vt. 76 (25 Atl. Rep. 906); Graves v. Mattison, 67 Vt. 630 (32 Atl. Rep. 498); Martin v. Carlin, 19 Wis. 454 (88 Am. Dec. 696), and note; Galvin v. Collins, 128 Mass. 525.

CEMETERIES.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 57. Title to cemetery lot-Rights of one using. In the recent case of Bessemer Land and Imp. Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135 (18 So. Rep. 565; 56 Am. St. Rep. 26), the supreme court of Alabama say: "It seems to be very generally agreed that a dead body is not the subject of property right, and becomes, after burial, a part of the ground to which it has been committed, and that an action quare, clausum fregit, may be maintained by any person who has the fee to the soil, if entitled also to the possession, againt one who digs and disturbs the grave. But to entitle one to this action he must have the actual or constructive possession of the soil. Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 284 (96 Am. Dec. 759); Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (39 Am. Rep. 465); Guthrie v.. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 136; Page v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17 (56 Am. Rep. 481); Shipman v. Baxter, 21 Ala. 456; Ledbetter v. Blassingame, 31 Ala. 496; McInerny v. Irvin, 90 Ala. 276 (7 So. Rep. 841); 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 54; Bonham v. Loeb, 107 Ala. 604 (18 So. Rep. 300). When one buries his dead, therefore, in soil to which he has a freehold right, or to the possession of which he is entitled, it would seem there is no difficulty in his protecting their graves from insult and injury, by an action of trespass against a wrongdoer. But, bodies are most commonly interred in public cemeteries, where the parties whose duty it is to give them burial, are not the owners of the soil by deed properly executed, and have no higher right than a mere easement or license. Of such it is held, that they do so under a mere license, and their exclusive

right to make such interments in a particular lot would be limited to the time during which the ground continued to be used for burial purposes; and upon its ceasing to be so used all they could claim would be, that they should have due notice and an opportunity to remove the bodies to some other place of their own selection, if they so desire, or on failure to do so, that the remains should be decently removed by others. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 50, and authorities cited; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 33. In Partridge v. First Independent Church, 39 Md. 637, a case of one who buried in a church cemetery under license from the trustees, it was held, that while the license continued, the grantee could bring trespass or case for any invasion of disturbance of the grave, whether done by the grantors or strangers. But it was said, 'If in the course of time it should become necessary to vacate the ground as a burying ground, all that he could claim in law or equity, would be that he should have due notice and the opportunity afforded to him of removing the bodies and monuments to some other place of his own selection, or that, on his failing to do so, such removal should be made by others.' 1 Washb. Real Prop., § 33; Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411. In Paige v. Symonds, 63 N. H. 17, it was said: 'Such right of burial is not an absolute right of property, but a privilege or license, to be enjoyed so long as the place continues to be used as a burial ground, subject to municipal regulation and control, and legally revocable whenever the public necessity requires. It is a right of limited use for purposes of interment, which gives no title to the land,' analogous to the grant of a pew in a meeting house, and resembling a pew tenancy. Craig v. First Presbyterian Church, 88 Pa. St. 42 (32 Am. Rep. 417); Kincaid's Appeal, 66 Pa. St. 411; Windt v. German Reform Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. 471; Richards v. Dutch Church, 32 Barb. 42; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1, 21; Bryan v. Whistler, 8 Barn. & C. 288; Wood v. Ledbitter, 13 Mees. & W. 837. It would seem, therefore, to accord with right principle and authority, that where one is permitted to bury his dead in a public cemetery, by the express or implied consent of those in proper control of it, he acquites such a possession in the spot of ground in which the bodies are buried, as will entitle him to action against the owners of the fee or

strangers, who, without his consent, negligently or wantonly disturb it. This right of possession will continue as long as the cemetery continues to be used; but if, for proper and legal reasons it should be discontinued, and the license withdrawn, and the bodies of the dead are to be removed, it must be done decently, only after due notice to the party entitled, if known, and such notice can be given." Title to a lot in a burial ground may be acquired by adverse possession. Zirngibl v. Calumet &C. C. & D. Co., 157 Ill. 430 (42 N. E. Rep. 431).

CHARITABLE USES.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 58. Conveyances for-Definiteness required. Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 1776, Art. 34, which prohibits conveyances of real estate to religious societies except for certain purposes, it is held that a conveyance to a religious society, which does not designate the purpose for which it is made is void. Trustees of Zion Church v. Hilken, 84 Md. 170 (35 Atl. Rep. 9). It is held that a trust for the use of the white ministry and white membership of the Methodist Episcopal church in the United States of America, subject to the usages and ministerial appointments of said church as from time to time authorized and declared by the general conference of said church and the annual conference in whose bounds the said premises are situated," is held invalid on the ground that it does not sufficiently designate the cestuis que trustent. Trustees M. E. Church in East Baltimore Station v. Trustees Jackson Square Evang. Luth. Church, 84 Md. 173 (35 Atl. Rep. 8). A devise "to the furtherance of such benevolent objects, such as the support of the ministry, repairs of the church edifice, or other benevolent objects as may be designated from time to time by the said Union Church in its regular action as a church of the Missionary Baptist persuasion," is held invalid for indefiniteness in the objects of the trust. Fones v. Green, Tenn. (36 S.

W. Rep. 729). A charitable use to a specified trustee, "to use and expend the same for the promotion of the religious, moral and social welfare of the people in any locality whenever and wherever he may think most needful and necessary," will fail for indefiniteness. Livesey v. Jones, 55 N. J. Eq. 204 (35 Atl. Rep. 1064).

Sec. 59. Conveyances for-Validity of Perpetuities. A deed to a church organization is not rendered invalid by the fact that there is a mistake in the name of the grantee, if it can be shown what organization was intended. Simmons v. Allison, 118 N. C. 763 (24 S. E. Rep. 716). A deed conveying trust property for a charitable use may contain a limitation to the effect that upon the beneficiary ceasing to exist the property shall be held in trust for another. Parish of Christ Church v. Trustees of Donations, etc., 67 Conn. 554 (35 Atl. Rep. 552). A gift of land for the support of churches or to pay the expense of preaching any particular religious doctrine is a gift for a charitable use and is excluded from the operation of the rule against perpetuities. Alden v. Rector of St. Peter's Parish, 159 Iil. 631 (42 N. E. Rep. 392). The rule against perpetuities does not apply to gifts to charitable uses. A gift to a charitable use, with a direction that no part thereof shall at any time be alienated, does not create a perpetuity, in the sense forbidden by law, but only a perpetuity allowed by law and equity in cases of charitable trusts. Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659 (35 Atı. ` Rep. 1072; 55 Am. St. Rep. 594; 35 L. R. A. 113).

Sec. 60. Conveyances for-Construction of. Where a conveyance of a lot of land on which an Episcopal church had been erected by voluntary contributions was made for a nominal consideration, and was therefore a gift by which the lot was conveyed to a religious society incorporated as a Protestant Episcopal church, and to their successors, "but not to their assigns," with an habendum in these words: "To have and to hold unto the said party of the second part and their 'successors forever, with this express condition and limitation: That neither the said party of the second part, nor their successors, shall at any time sell, mortgage, or in any way convey

the said lands and premises, or any part thereof, and that no building shall be kept, maintained, or erected thereon, except for the purpose of public worship and teaching in accordance with the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the Protestant Episcopal church in the United States of America, and also except the proper outbuildings appurtenant thereto," it was held that the grant was of the entire estate, to hold to the use exclusively for public worship and teaching in conformity with the usages, rites, and ceremonies of the Protestant Episcopal church. A conveyance in the form above set out does not create a condition, for the breach of which the grantor may enter as for a forfeiture of the estate, but creates a trust which the grantee taking the legal estate is bound to perform; to be enforced not by a forfeiture of the title, but by those methods by which a court of equity compels the performance of such trusts. The grant being to a religious society incorporated as a Protestant Episcopal church, the object for which the donee was incorporated is an important element in the construction of the instrument by which a charity is created. Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659 (35 Atl. Rep. 1072; 55 Am. St. Rep. 594; 35 L. R. A. 113). Where there is no condition attached to the gift of land to a town and the donee is authorized to appropriate the land for a certain specified purpose and "for any other necessary public use," an appropriation of a part of the land to a particular use did not exhaust the power of the town to apply the same land to a different necessary public use when no longer needed for the original purposes. The discretion to determine the character of the use implies the power to change it. Newell v. Town of Hancock, N. H. (35 Atl. Rep. 253).

Sec. 61. Mortmain statutes-Where in force. The statute of mortmain has never been adopted into the jurisprudence of the State of Virginia. Fayette Land Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 93 Va. 274 (24 S. E. Rep. 1016). The court say: "The statute of mortmain has never been adopted into the jurisprudence of this state. Lomax Dig. (2d Ed.), p. 815; Rivanna Nav. Co. v. Dawsons, 3 Grat. 21 (46 Am. Dec. 183); Marshall v. Conrad, 5 Col. 364. It is safe to say, therefore, that there is no proceeding authorized