of the debt secured by it. Kuen v. Upmier, 98 Ia. 393 (67 N. W. Rep. 374). Where a mortgage was made to secure payment of a negotiable promissory note, the parties making such note and mortgage are not necessarily entitled to protection as to payments to the mortgagee, made solely on the presumption that the original payee of the note still remained the holder thereof. Bull v. Mitchell, 47 Neb. 647 (66 N. W. Rep. 632). Payment and satisfaction extinguishes the lien of a mortgage; and where a mortgage has been paid and satisfied it cannot be revived by a parol agreement of the mortgagee to assign it to a third person as security for a new loan to the mortgagor as against a subsequent mortgagee having no notice of the agreement. Bogert v. Striker, 148 N. Y. 194 (42 N. E. Rep. 582; 51 Am. St. Rep. 684). A quitclaim deed by a mortgagee to his mortgagor, delivered at the time of the execution of the mortgage and as part of the same transaction will not be considered as a release of the mortgage simply because it bears a later date than the mortgage. Kelly v. E. F. Hallack Lum. & Mfg. Co., 22 Colo. 221 (43 Pac. Rep. 1003). Where the payee of a negotiable note made for his accommodation acquires the fee to the premises upon which a deed of trust was given by the maker of the note to secure its payment, transferred such note to a third person to whom he afterwards paid the amount due, it was held that the original maker was thereby released but that the payee could reissue the note as against himself and by its transfer to another carry to him the deed of trust given by the original maker, and the last holder was unaffected by a release of such deed executed upon the first payment of the note of which he had no knowledge. Kelly v. Staed 136 Mo. 430 (37 S. W. Rep. 1110). Particular agreement in a mortgage providing for the release of portions of the premises upon payments being made upon the indebtedness, construed. Lane v. Allen, 162 Ill. 426 (44 N. E. Rep. 831). A statute (Ala. Code 1886, § 1868) requiring the holder of a mortgage to enter of record partial payments made by a debtor, when he shall request the same, and providing a penalty for failure to do so, is constitutional. Gray v. Rogers, 109 Ala. 624 (20 So. Rep. 37).

Sec. 572. Authority to receive payment-Agents. Authority of one as agent to receive interest on a mortgage debt, does not afford ground for inferring authority to collect the principal, where such a one is not intrusted with the possession of the securities. Richards v. Waller, 49 Neb. 639 (68 N. W. Rep. 1053); Western Security Co. v. Douglass, 14 Wash. 215 (44 Pac. Rep. 257). The fact that one receiving money due another has not possession of the instruments by which the indebtedness is evidenced is not conclusive of the question of the authority, or lack of it, in the party receiving the money, to collect it, but is a circumstance or fact to be considered in the determination of such question. Thomson v. Shelton, 49 Neb. 644 (68 N. W. Rep. 1055). The maker of a negotiable note secured by a mortgage can only discharge his liability by payment to the holder thereof, or some one authorized by him to receive payment. The fact that the holder of a negotiable note secured by mortgage is a stockholder in a corporation to which she had made it her custom to send the interest coupons for collection, does not constitute such corporation her agent to receive payment of the principal debt. Wilson v. Campbell, 110 Mich. 580 (68 N. W. Rep. 278; 35 L. R. A. 544). Where payment of a negotiable note secured by a mortgage was made to an investment company of which the mortgagee was manager, and such payment was never forwarded to the party to whom such note had been transferred, it was held that the mere fact that antecedent payments, made in like manner, had been made to be forwarded to the transferee of such note, and had been so forwarded, did not bind the holder of the note as to the final payment not forwarded, it being shown by the evidence that such holder had never in any way held out or recognized the mortgagee as his agent. Bull v. Mitchell, 47 Neb. 647 (66 N. W. Rep. 632); Richards v. Waller, 49 Neb. 639 (68 N. W. Rep. 1053). As to whether one has authority to receive payment of a mortgage is held in some cases to be a question for the jury. Reid v. Kellogg, 8 S. Dak. 596 (67 N. W. Rep. 687); Thomson v. Shelton, 49 Neb. 644 (68 N. W. Rep. 1055). For particular fact cases in which the evidence is held sufficient to show that the person receiving payment had authority to do

so, see Wilson v. La Tour, 108 Mich. 547 (66 N. W. Rep. 474); Ziegan v. Stricker, 110 Mich. 282 (68 N. W. Rep. 122) Particular case in which the payment made to the wrong party assuming to own the mortgage is held to be at the risk of the party making such payment. Padley v. Neill, 134 Mo. 364 (35 S. W. Rep. 997).

Sec. 573. Release by mistake or without authority. An entry of satisfaction, made by the mortgagee's attorneys under misapprehension of the facts and without authority may be cancelled by a court of equity. Land Title & T. Co. v. Kohlenberg, N. J. Eq. (35 Atl. Rep. 295). Mortgages cancelled and satisfied of record through a mistake of fact may be reinstated as against an intervening mortgagee whose mortgage was taken before the cancellation and with notice of the mortgages sought to be reinstated. Seeley v. Bacon, N. J. Eq. (34 Atl. Rep. 139). Where the mortgage debt has been assigned, a purchaser in good faith, without notice of the assignment, will be protected by a release of the mortgage executed by the original mortgagee. Cram v. Cottrell, 48 Neb. 646 (67 N. W. Rep. 452). A satisfaction entered on the record by a mortgagee, after he has sold and delivered the notes secured by the mortgage to a third party, will protect a subsequent mortgagee in good faith, or bona fide purchaser of the mortgaged premises, in case he had no notice, at the date of the purchase or the payment of the consideration, that the debt was assigned or was unpaid, or that the release was unauthorized, but as to all other persons the lien of the mortgage will not be impaired. Mathews v. Jones, 47 Neb. 616 (66 N. W. Rep. 622). Where one to whom a deed of trust is made to secure the payment of a note executed by the grantor to another, through several intervening conveyances acquires from the grantor his equity and before the debt secured becomes due executes and releases the trust deed to the grantor, and all the instruments are recorded, a subsequent mortgagee of such trustee is charged with notice that the release was unauthorized and he holds his mortgage subject to the original trust deed. Appleman v. Gara, 22 Colo. 397 (45 Pac. Rep. 366).

Sec. 574. Penalty for failure to enter satisfactionStatutes construed. Ala. Code 1886, § 1869, appliedrecovery of penalty for failure to enter satisfaction-evidence. Horton v. Barlow, 108 Ala. 417 (18 So. Rep. 890). In an action against a mortgagee to recover the penalty provided by N. Dak. Comp. Laws, § 4365, for his failure to execute a discharge or satisfaction of the mortgage when it has been paid, it is held that the statute which gives the penalty and which alone is the source of the right to recover, must be specially pleaded. Greenberg v. Union Nat. Bank, 5 N. Dak. 483 (67 N. W. Rep. 597). Kan. Laws, 1889 ch. 175, § 1, authorizes an attachment against the property of a foreign corporation for a refusal or neglect to release a mortgage on real estate when the mortgage has been fully paid and demand properly made. An action to recover the penalty authorized by this statute cannot be maintained until a demand for such discharge has been made, and it can only be brought within one year after the cause of action accrues; but, where no demand is made until more than one year after a demand should have been made, the action to recover the penalty is barred by the statute of limitations. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Stucki, 4 Kan. App. 424 (46 Pac. Rep. 42).

Sec. 575. Strict foreclosure. The remedy of strict foreclosure should not be resorted to except in very extreme cases, and a judgment, in effect, giving it to one holding as a purchaser under a prior foreclosure of a senior mortgage, by denying a junior mortgagee the right to have a foreclosure and sale of the premises, will not be upheld unless such purchaser show that he purchased in good faith, relying on the regularity and sufficiency of the proceedings; that the subsequent lienor had knowledge of the sale, and permitted the purchaser to make the purchase and enter into possession without disclosing the existence of his incumbrance, or calling attention to the defect in the proceeding. Denton v. Ontario Co. Nat. Bank, 150 N. Y. 126 (44 N. E. Rep. 781).

Sec. 576. Breach authorizing foreclosure. The fact that a mortgage contains a covenant by the mortgagors to pay the taxes when due, and a power of sale in case of failure

to pay principal or interest when due, "or in case of nonpayment of any taxes" on the mortgaged premises, does not give the mortgagee the right to foreclose his mortgage upon a mere breach of the mortgagor's covenant to pay taxes, the mortgage containing no other covenants touching the payment of taxes or the effect of their nonpayment. Heller v. Neeves, 93 Wis. 637 (67 N. W. Rep. 923; 68 N. W. Rep. 412). Where the right to foreclose on account of failure to pay interest and taxes exists, it cannot be defeated by a subsequent tender of the principal and interest before the principal becomes due. Da Silva v. Turner, 166 Mass. 407 (44 N. E. Rep. 532). Where a mortgagee is entitled to treat the whole debt as due, upon the mortgagor's failure to pay interest, he is not required to give the latter notice of his election to do so. before bringing suit to foreclose, the action to foreclose being sufficient. Hawes v. Detroit Fire & M. Ins. Co., 109 Mich. 234 (67 N. W. Rep. 329); Kansas Loan & T. Co. v. Gill, 2 Kan. App. 488 (43 Pac. Rep. 991). Where the mortgage gives the mortgagee the right to foreclose upon default in payment of interest, and his right to exercise this option accrues he does not lose it by mere delay unless his conduct is such as will estop him from asserting it. Glas v. Glas, 114 Cal. 566 (46 Pac. Rep. 667; 55 Am. St. Rep. 90); Kansas Loan & T. Co. v. Gill, 2 Kan. App. 488 (43 Pac. Rep. 991).

Sec. 577. Mortgage to secure agreement to support mortgagee-Place of performance-Breach. Where the consideration of a deed is the grantee's mortgage on the premises conditioned that he will support the grantors, during life, no place being specified where such support shall be furnished. them, they are not obliged to receive such support at the mortgagor's house, but are entitled to have it at such reasonable place as they may select; and when, with knowledge of such selection, the mortgagor fails to furnish such support required by his contract, and declares his intention not to do so, or pay for any support which may be furnished by others, the condition of the mortgage is broken, and an action of foreclosure may be maintained for the reasonable value of the support provided by others, though it was provided without the request of the mortgagor or demand upon him to fur