that one who is in possession of land adverse to the tenant in remainder for a period of seven years, during which time he pays the taxes, will acquire a valid title to the estate in remainder, notwithstanding the existence of an outstanding estate for life, the estate of such claimant not being in privity with the life tenant. Nelson v. Davidson, 160 Ill. 254 (43 N. E. Rep. 361; 52 Am. St. Rep. 338; 31 L. R. A. 325). As against cotenants, an adverse possession is interrupted by the bringing of a suit for partition in which the title and interest of the cotenant is recognized. Nickrans v. Wilk, 161 Ill. 76 (43 N. E. Rep. 741). The possession of a life tenant cannot be adverse to the remainderman. Lumley v. Haggerty, 110 Mich. 552 (68 N. W. Rep. 243). The possession of a vendee who takes possession under a contract to pay the purchase money is not adverse until he makes such payment or repudiates the title of his vendor to the latter's knowledge. Goodwin v. Markwell, 37 Fla. 464 (19 So. Rep. 885); Alleghany Co. v. Parrish, 93 Va. 615 (25 S. E. Rep. 882).

Sec. 37.

Landlord and tenant-Parental and filial relations. A tenant, by simply "holding over" after the expiration of his lease, does not hold adversely. Until he surrenders possession of the leased premises, or by some unequivocal act notifies the landlord that he no longer holds under the lease, he cannot claim that his possession is adverse. Schields v. Horbach, 49 Neb. 262 (68 N. W. Rep. 524). As between those sustaining parental and filial relations, the possession of the land of the one by the other is presumed to be permissive and not adverse. To make such possession adverse there must be some open assertion of hostile title and knowledge thereof brought home to the owner of the land. O'Boyle v. McHugh, Minn. (69 N. W. Rep. 37). A husband's joint possession with his wife of land to which she holds the legal title is not adverse to her. Wells v. American Mortg. Co., 109 Ala. 430 (20 So. Rep. 136). A widow's possession under her right of quarantine is not adverse to the heirs of the estate. Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Ala. 160 (20 So. Rep. 604). A widow remaining in possession of her husband's lands, under How. Ann. Mich. Stat. § 5744, until dower is assigned or

partition made, does not hold adversely to the heirs. Lumley v. Haggerty, 110 Mich. 552 (68 N. W. Rep. 243).

ALIENS.

* *

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec: 38. Property by descent-Construction of statutes-Inheritable blood. The Iowa statute, Acts 22d Gen. Assem., Ch. 85, §§ 1 and 2, provided that "nonresident aliens are prohibited from acquiring title to or taking or holding any lands or real estate in this state by descent, devise, purchase or otherwise only as herein provided. * Any nonresident alien may acquire and hold real estate to the extent of 320 acres, * * * providing that within five years from the date of purchase of said property the same is placed in the actual possession of a relative of such purchaser, the occupant being related to such owner within the third degree of kindred. * * And further provided that such occupant become a naturalized citizen ten years from the purchase of said property as aforesaid." Under this statute it is held that nonresident aliens can acquire and hold land by purchase only and not by devise or descent. Burrow v. Bur row, 98 Ia. 400 (67 N. W. Rep. 287). The court say: "It is a general rule of construction that a proviso will not enlarge, but rather restrain, qualify, or explain, the clause to which it refers. It seems to follow, then, that when the statute permits an alien to acquire real estate,-not to take it,—providing that within five years from the date of purchase' it is placed in the possession of a relative of such purchaser' who is to become a naturalized citizen within ten years from the purchase, the mode of acquisition is restricted to that of purchase, and cannot be enlarged to embrace descent. Construing the whole act together, it is manifest that this was the intention of the legislature. Any other interpretation of the language used would largely moderate, if not entirely destroy, the force and effect of the language used in the first section of the act."

6

At common law it is held that an alien has no inheritable blood. Utassy v. Giedinghagen, 132 Mo. 53 (33 S. W. Rep. 444). In Illinois an alien cannot maintain a suit to set aside the probate of a will in which real estate alone is devised, on the ground that such alien is prohibited from inheriting the land and therefore has no interest in the estate. Fele v. Lemberger, 163, Ill. 338 (45 N. E. Rep. 279).

ASSIGNMENTS FOR CREDITORS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 39. Constitutionality of insolvency laws. A creditor of an insolvent debtor, whose claim accrued before the enactment of the insolvency law under which such debtor is seeking discharge from his debts, may prove his claim and receive his dividends without waiving his right to insist that the discharge feature of such statute is, as to his claim, a law impairing the obligation of his contract, in so far as it assumes to discharge his claim without full payment. That such feature of an insolvency law is unconstitutional as to creditors whose claims existed at the time the law was enacted, is well settled. But the entire body of such a law is not unconstitutional as to such creditors. So far as the law provides for the transfer of the debtor's property to an assignee, to be distributed among his creditors, it is valid as to all creditors; and therefore no creditor, even though his debt was in existence when the insolvency law was passed, can levy upon such property after the title thereto has vested in the assignee under the terms of the statute. The fact that the levy was made intermediate the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and the execution of the formal assignment is immaterial where the statute declares that when the assignment is executed it vests the title in the assignee as of the time when the proceedings were commenced, and annuls all levies between these two dates. Elton v. O'Connor, 6 N. Dak. 1

(68 N. W. Rep. 84). N. Dak. Rev. Codes, ch. 38, construed. See opinion for extensive review and collation of authorities.

Sec. 40. What constitutes-Execution. A conveyance of his property by one who is insolvent to a grantee, in which the grantee is empowered to sell the property and convey it in the grantor's name and apply the proceeds to the payment of his debts, any surplus being returned to such grantor, is not an assignment for the benefit of creditors; and until some of the grantor's creditors have accepted the instrument the grantee can not maintain an action to set aside an attachment levied on the property in a suit against his grantor. Tittle v. Vanleer, 89 Tex. 174 (34 S. W. Rep. 715; 37 L. R. A. 337). A deed of assignment by an insolvent firm of “all their property * * * for the benefit of all their creditors," made to the party named as assignee, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and appointing him "their true and lawful attorney, with full power and authority, to do all acts necessary in the premises for the full and complete execution of said trust," was held to convey to the assignee the fee, although there was no habendum clause in the deed. Middleton v. Taber, 46 S. C. 337 (24 S. E. Rep. 282). In order for an assignment by partners to be valid it must appear on its face that it assigns, not only the partnership property, but also all of the non-exempt individual property of each of the partners. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co. v. Brooks, 65 Minn. 184 (68 N. W. Rep. 5). Where a statute (Mill. & V. Tenn. Code, 2733) requires that the debtor making a general assignment shall annex thereto a full and complete inventory or schedule, under oath, of all his property of every description, it is held that an assignment accompanied by verified schedule reciting that it contains a complete list of the property of the debtor "subject to execution" is not sufficient. McMillan v. Watauga Bank, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 765). The verified inventory must show that the assignment includes all of the assignor's property. Powers v. Goins, Tenn.

(35 S. W. Rep. 902). Under the statute of Minnesota (Gen. Stat. 1894, §§ 4227-4240) every assignment for the benefit of creditors, whether made under the assignment or insolvency laws of the state, is void, unless duly acknowledged. Bennett

v. Knowles, 66 Minn. 4 (68 N. W. Rep. 111). In construing Neb. Comp. Stat., ch. 6, §§ 1-6, it is held that unless a deed of assignment is witnessed it is absolutely void. Sager v. Summers, 49 Neb. 459 (68 N. W. Rep. 614); overruling Deere, Wells & Co. v. Losey, 48 Neb. 622 (67 N. W. Rep. 462). The Minnesota insolvent law of 1881 (ch. 148) is applicable to private corporations; and where a deed of assignment of a corporation is signed by its president and secretary under its corporate seal, and is properly acknowledged, it will be presumed to have been executed under proper authority. Fanish v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 64 Minn. 175 (66 N. W. Rep. 198).

Sec. 41. Presumption of acceptance by creditorsFiling notice of assignment. Construing Colo. Sess. Laws 1855, p. 43, § 4, providing that "in case of the assignment of property for the benefit of all the creditors of the assignor, the assent of the creditors shall be presumed;" and § 6, requiring an assignee to file a notice of his deed of assignment with the clerk and recorder of each county where real estate affected by the deed is situated, and makes such filing constructive notice to a purchaser or incumbrancer, of the transfer, it is held that the presumption of assent by the creditors does not arise until the notice provided by § 6 has been filed; and an individual creditor of a member of an assigning firm, who, without notice of its deed of assignment and before the statutory notice is filed, attaches land owned individually by such member, his attachment has priority over the assignment. Spangler v. West, Colo. App. (43 Pac. Rep. 905). Substantially the same construction is given to this statute in Thatcher v. Valentine, 22 Colo. 201 (43 Pac. Rep. 1031).

Sec. 42. Exempt property. A deed of assignment may properly reserve such property of the assignor as is exempt from execution. Haynes v. Hoffman, 46 S. C. 157 (24 S. E. · Rep. 103). A general exception of exempt property from an assignment, without specifying it, does not, ipso facto, make the deed void for uncertainty or fraudulent and void as against creditors. Parker v. Cleaveland, 37 Fla. 39 (19 So. Rep. 344). Citing, Frank v. Myers, 97 Ala. 437 (11 So.