Rep. 759). Citing, Hill v. Newman, 38 Pa. St. 152 (80 Am. Dec. 478), and criticising Webster v. Improvement Co., 140 Mass. 526 (6 N. E. Rep. 71).

Sec. 512. Labor on a mining claim-Statutes construed. Construing Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1183, providing that any person performing labor on a mining claim shall have a lien thereon for his work, whether done at the instance of the owner or his agent; "and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or other person having charge of any mining, * shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this chapter," it is held that a lien can not be claimed for labor performed by one for a person whom he knew not to be the owner, and not to be working the mine as the representative of the owner. Jurgenson v. Diller, 114 Cal. 491 (46 Pac. Rep. 610; 55 Am. St. Rep. 83). Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1192, which provides that every building or improvement mentioned in § 1183, constructed upon any lands with the knowledge of the owner, shall be held to have been constructed at his instance, and his interest in the land shall be lienable accordingly, unless he shall, within three days after obtaining knowledge of the construction, alteration or repair, post a written notice that he will not be responsible for the same, etc., does not give the right of a lien to one for work performed in " drifting in a tunnel" in a mining claim upon the land of another, who had knowledge of such work and did not give the notice required by the statute. Jurgenson v. Diller, 114 Cal. 491 (46 Pac. Rep. 610; 55 Am. St. Rep. 83). The court say: "Drifting in a tunnel' (the only work in which, so far as appears, defendant knew plaintiff to be engaged) means, as we understand the mining phrase, taking earth, gravel, or ore from ground made accessible by means of the tunnel, is not synonymous with running a tunnel'; and is not the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or improvement on or in a mine,-the knowledge of which must be brought home to the owner before any duty becomes incumbent upon him under said section 1192. This construction of the statute is not intrinsically unjust. It is equitable to require the owner who sees going forward an unauthorized building

or other beneficial improvement upon his property to give notice that he will not be responsible there for. Avery v. Clark, 87 Cal. 628 (25 Pac. Rep. 921); but this consideration fails when the work consists in a subtractive process,the removal of the very corpus of the property; as well require one who sees a trespasser cutting his timber to post notice of his nonliability, under penalty of having his land subjected to a lien for the labor."

Sec. 513. Improvements by a vendee. A party in possession of real estate under a bond for a deed will be deemed the owner" thereof for the purpose of creating a mechanic's lien thereon, as against a subsequent mortgagee of the same party. Mulvane v. Chicago Lumber Co., 56 Kan. 675 (44 Pac. Rep. 613). Where a landowner agrees with a prospective vendee that if he will erect certain houses upon his land according to fixed specifications he will aid him by the advancement of certain moneys and upon the completion of the buildings free from all liens, convey the premises to him, taking back a mortgage for the funds advanced, and such person causes the buildings to be erected but fails to pay therefor and relinquishes his rights under the contract to the owner, a lien may be enforced against the property for the erection of the building. Shearer v. Wilder, 56 Kan. 252 (43 Pac. Rep. 224). A lien may be acquired for improvements made by a vendee in possession under a contract of purchase; but if there is no agreement between the vendor and vendee of the land that the improvements shall be made, the lien can only attach to the interest of the vendee, and will be subsequent and inferior to the lien of the vendor for any balance of the pur chase price for the land remaining unpaid. Fuller v. Pauley, 48 Neb. 138 (66 N. W. Rep. 1115). Where a vendor by his contract of sale authorized his vendee to take possession and erect certain buildings upon the completion of which title is to be conveyed to him, the vendee becomes the owner of the property within the meaning of Tenn. Acts 1889, ch. 103, requiring notice of mechanic's liens to be given the owner of the property upon which they are sought to be enforced, and in such case mechanic's liens arising on account of the construction of such buildings by the vendee may be enforced

against the property. Ragon v. Howard, 97 Tenn. 334 (37 S. W. Rep. 136). The court say: "When a vendor, holding the legal title, consents for and directs avendee to have improvements placed upon the property, with the expectation and intention of putting the legal title in him when the buildings are completed, if the legal title is thus placed the lien of the mechanic attaches as against both parties. Rollin v. Cross, 45 N. Y. 766. In Warvelle on Vendors (volume 1, p. 209, § 23) it is said, in substance, that where a vendor, by his contract of sale, expressly authorized the vendee to make erections and improvements on the premises, and particularly if he agrees to advance money to aid in such improvements, and, before the termination of the contract and notice thereof, a mechanic performs labor or furnishes material for the erection of buildings on the land, the latter will not be required to look alone to the title held by the vendee, but may enforce his lien against the legal as well as the equitable title. To the same effect is Phil. Mech. Liens (3d Ed.), § 69, citing and commenting on many cases which proceed upon the idea that under such circumstances the party purchasing and in possession is the owner,' in the sense of the statute, and, unless he shall be so considered, mechanics and material men will be defrauded of their liens. Again it is held that when a mechanic or material man has a lien as against the purchaser of a lot, or one who has a contract to purchase it for improvements put upon it, and the purchaser acquires the legal title, the lien covers all the time of the work, and is a charge upon the fee subsequently acquired. McGraw v. Godfrey, 56 N. Y. 610; Kneel. Mech. Liens, § 19. See, also, Lion v. McGuf fey, 4 Pa. St. 126 (45 Am. Dec. 678); Loonie v. Hogan, 9N. Y. (5 Seld.) 435 (61 Am. Dec. 683) et seq.; Phil. Mech. Liens, § 69.' In Lyon v. McGuffey, supra, it is held that the mechanic's lien on an equitable estate attaches to an after-acquired legal title the moment it vests in the same person. Colman v. Goodnow, 36 Minn. 9 (29 N. W. Rep. 338; 1 Am. St. Rep. 632); 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 11, 12, and notes."

Sec. 514. Improvements by lessee, husband and others not owners. A lien cannot be enforced for improvements made by a lessee in pursuance of an express contract

between him and his lessor that the lessee is to pay for such improvements and that no lien is to be created against the property therefor, although it is provided that the lessee may deduct the moneys so expended by him from the rent. Boone v. Chatfield, 118 N. C. 916 (24 S. E. Rep. 745). Construing Wis. Rev. Stat., § 3314, which provides that the lien shall attach to and be a lien on the real property of any person on whose premises such improvements are made, such owner having knowledge thereof and consenting thereto, and laws 1887, ch. 466, which provides that this statute shall not be considered as giving a lien " where the relation of landlord and tenant exists," it is held that ch. 466 was not intended to apply to a case where a person contracts with another to build a building for such person on his land, though coupled with an agreement that such other shall occupy the premises as tenant of such person. Bentley v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386 (66 N. W. Rep. 505). Pa. Act Aug. 1, 1868, and Act May 18, 1887, applied-improvements by lessee-notice to owner. Hall v. Blackburn, 173 Pa. 310 (34 Atl. Rep. 18). A lien may be enforced against the property of a married woman for labor and materials furnished under a contract made with her husband while acting as her agent and which has been ratified by her. Bumgartner v. Hall, 163 Ill. 136 (45 N. E. Rep. 168). Where a statute (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 1191) gives a lien to "any person, who at the request of the reputed owner of any lot in any incorporated city or town, grades, fills in, or otherwise improves the same, or the streets or sidewalks in front of or adjoining the same," it is held that a lien may be claimed by one who performs work on the street in front of a lot under contract with a husband who stated that the property was community property, although the wife held the record title. Santa Cruz Rock Pav. Co. v. Lyons, Cal. (43 Pac. 599). The principle that the owner of the absolute interest in property may be estopped from setting up his ownership against a lien claim thereon, arising from a contract with a party in possession having less than the absolute interest cannot be invoked by laborers upon a sawmill against an owner who is not interested in the operation of such sawmill or in its output, is guilty of no fraud or deceit upon the lien claimants, and who knew nothing of their employment, or that any

labor had been performed by them, and such labor in no respect increases the value of the property upon which the lien is claimed. National Bank v. Williams, 38 Fla. 305 (20 So. Rep. 931).

Sec. 515.

Public buildings-Public bridges-Bond of contractor. Utah laws 1890, p. 24, § 1, providing "that whoever shall do work or furnish materials by contract, express or implied, with the owner of land, for the construction of any building upon such land, shall have a lien upon such land, building, or other improvement," does not give one a lien for materials furnished to one erecting a public school house under a contract with the board of education of Salt Lake City. Board of Education v. Salt Lake Pressed-Brick Co., 13 Utah 211 (44 Pac. Rep. 709). Iowa Acts 20th Gen. Assem., ch. 179, construed and applied-lien upon public buildings. Epeneter v. Montgomery Co., 98 Ia. 159 (67 N. W. Rep. 93).

Applying the statute exempting county property from execution sale it is held that a bridge erected by a contractor for a county is not subject to mechanics' liens, although the statute (Hills' Ann. Or. Laws, § 3669) enumerates bridges in the class of property which is subject to such liens, it being presumed in the absence of the word "public" the statute applies only to private bridges. First National Bank v. Malheur Co., Or. (45 Pac. Rep. 781). The court say: "A public bridge is a part of the highway, and, whether constructed by the state or any of its public corporations, is held in trust for a public use; and the statute emphrasing a rule of public policy, wisely prohibits the sale of such property upon execution. The reason assigned for the existence of this rule in the absence of a statute upon the subject, is that, if the property held by a municipal corporation in trust for the public were subject to sale upon execution, the title thereto might become vested in a private person, thereby depriving the public of its right to the use of such property, and public policy forbids that the public shall be deprived even temporarily of such use. Leonard v. City of Brooklyn, 71 N. Y. 498 (27 Am. Rep. 80); Portland Lumbering & Manufacturing Co. v. School Dist. No. 1, 13 Or. 283 (10