deed to the property levied on, are inferior to those of the purchaser under the deed. Campbell v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Colo. 177 (43 Pac. Rep. 1007). A judgment creditor, without actual notice, is in the same position as a bona fide purchaser, and the lien of his docketed judgment takes precedence over the equities of a grantee or mortgagee to have his deed or mortgage reformed. Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91 (66 N. W. Rep. 131).

In Colorado no distinction is made between judgment liens and attachment liens, as to time of enforcing same. Floyd v. Sellers, Colo. App. (44 Pac. Rep. 373). Where a lien created by a contract and a lien created by statute attach to property at the same time the latter has superiority. Watson v. May, 62 Ark. 435 (35 S. W. Rep. 1108). In Kansas, an unrecorded deed takes precedence over a judgment lien acquired after the execution and delivery of the deed, but before the same was recorded, although the judgment creditor has no notice of the deed. Smith v. Savage, 3 Kan. App. 556 (43 Pac. Rep. 847). Under Va. Code, 3567, a judgment becomes a lien and has priority from the first moment of the day on which it is confessed or rendered. Hockman v. Hockman, 93 Va. 455 (25 S. E. Rep. 534; 57 Am. St. Rep. 816). The case of Donovan v. Simmons, 96 Ga. 340 (22 S. E. Rep. 966), epitomized in Vol. IV, § 448, construing Ga. Acts 1889, p. 106, followed. Griffith v. Posey, 98 Ga. 475 (25 S. E. Rep. 515). Where a devise of lands was made to a widow to hold in trust for the maintenance and education of herself and children, the will providing that the devisees should have a division of the estate according to the rules of descent, each child to have one-half of his portion upon becoming of age and the balance after there was no possibility of litigation against the estate, it was held that when they reached majority the children could quitclaim their interests to the widow before the making of a division and she could subsequently give a mortgage on the land which would have priority over claims of persons furnishing necessaries for the maintenance of herself and children. Stern v. Hampton, 73 Miss. 555 (19 So. Rep. 300). The charge or license exacted for the privilege of selling intoxicating liquors under Ia Acts, 25th Gen. Assem., ch. 62, § 1, and

which is by that statute made " a perpetual lien upon all property, both real and personal, used or connected with the business," is not superior to a mortgage lien existing at the time the lien declared by the statute attaches. Smith v. Skow, 97 Ia. 640 (66 N. W. Rep. 893).

Sec. 470. Extent of judgment liens. The statutory period for the lien of a judgment is not extended by the levy of an execution and the filing of a creditor's bill, nor by a stipulation contained in the judgment that the execution shall not issue for a certain time. Gardenhire v. King, 97 Tenn. 585 (37 S. W. Rep. 548). The court upon setting aside a mere money judgment, has no power to continue in existence the judgment lien of the judgment set aside, in order that it may attach to such judgment as subsequently may be rendered in the same cause. Farmer's Loan & T. Co. v. Killinger, 46 Neb. 677 (65 N. W. Rep. 790). Sec. 460, 2d Hill's Code, Wash., as to lien of judgments on real estate, does not extend the lien to property previously conveyed by the debtor to his wife by deed valid and binding between the parties. Sawtelle v. Weymouth, 14 Wash. St. 21 (43 Pac. Rep. 1101).

Sec. 471. Attachment liens - Loss or waiver of liens. Proceedings in attachment for the collection of a debt are a rank and stringent remedy given by statute under certain conditions; and in order to seize and hold the property of the debtor and acquire a valid lien thereon before judgment, the statute must be strictly followed in obtaining the order and in the service of the same. Harding v. Guaranty L. & T. Co., 3 Kan. App. 519 (43 Pac. Rep. 835). The lien of an attaching creditor, acquired by attachment of real estate, the title to which is in his debtor, although the attachment is made without notice that his debtor had conveyed it to a bona fide purchaser, is defeated by actual notice of such conveyance, received before he levies his execution thereon, or has lawfully applied it in satisfaction of his debt; that until such application he has parted with nothing on faith of the title being in his debtor, and stands in the rights of his debtor. Reynolds v. Haskins, 68 Vt. 426 (35 Atl. Rep.

349). The right of attachment as against property liable for the debt is not waived or lost by proceedings to attach other property. Alabama Marble & Stone Co. v. Chattanooga Marble & Stone Co., Tenn. (37 S. W. Rep. 1004). A judgment creditor does not lose the lien of his judgment by advising the debtor to make a fraudulent conveyance of the land upon which said judgment is a lien. Fidler v. John, 178 Pa. 112 (35 Atl. Rep. 976). Hills' Ann. Ore. Laws, § 161, construed and applied-discharge of attachment liens. First Nat. Bank v. Mullaney, 29 Ore. 268 (45 Pac. Rep. 796). The effect of a sale of land on execution is to destroy all liens which are subsequent to the lien of the judgment upon which the execution was issued. Floyd et al. v. Sellers, Colo. App. (44 Pac. Rep. 373).

Sec. 472. Equitable liens and enforcement. One who has an equitable lien upon the land to secure the payment of a legacy, cannot recover from the holder of the legal title the amount of a policy of insurance which had been collected by such legal owner. Such lienholder cannot recover the rents and profits which have accrued while the land was held by the legal owner. Whitehouse v. Cargill, 88 Me. 479 (34 Atl. Rep. 276). Attorneys have no lien upon real estate attached in a divorce proceeding by a wife who dismisses her suit before issues are joined. Carden v. Carden, Tenn.

(37 S W. Rep. 1022). Whenever a creditor has a trust in his favor, or a lien upon property for the debt due him, he may go into equity, without exhausting legal processes or remedies. Ryan v. Spieth, 18 Mont. 45 (44 Pac. Rep. 403). Citing, Tuppon v. Evans, 11 N. H. 311; Holt v. Bancroft, 30 Ala. 193. Where the grantee accepts a conveyance of land in consideration of his rendering certain services to the grantor and he fails to do so, whereby the grantor is damaged, the grantor is entitled to a lien on the land to secure the payment of the damages. Miller v. Denny, 99 Ky. 53 (34 S. W. Rep. 1079).

Sec. 473. Lis pendens statutes applied and construed. A lis pendens filed under Mont. Code, Civ. Proc. 1887, § 70, in a suit to reform a description in a mortgage does not affect the title of a bona fide grantee of the premises who

acquired his title before the filing of the lis pendens but did not record it until after that time. Baker v. Bartlett, 18 Mont. 446 (45 Pac. Rep. 1084; 56 Am. St. Rep. 594). Considering the amendment to the Nebraska lis pendens statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 85) made by Sess. Laws 1887, p. 643, it is held: (1) That so much of said amendment as makes a lis pendens filed at the commencement of an action or cross action affecting the title to real estate constructive notice of such action to all persons, not parties thereto, who thereafter deal with the subject-matter thereof, is valid; (2) that so much of such amendment as makes a lis pendens filed at the commencement of an action or cross action affecting the title to real estate, or a lis pendens filed at any time after the commencement of such action or cross action, constructive notice of such action to the holders of liens, incumbrances, or conveyances of said real estate executed prior to the filing of such lis pendens, is unconstitutional and void. Sheasley v. Keens, 48 Neb. 57 (66 N. W. Rep. 1010). The benefit of a lis pendens may be lost by an unreasonable delay in the prosecution of the action or in reviving it after a dismissal. Pipe v. Jordan, 22 Colo. 392 (45 Pac. Rep. 371; 55 Am. St. Rep. 138). The court refers to the following cases: Hayes v. Nourse, 114 N. Y. 595 (22 N. E. Rep. 40; 11 Am. St. Rep. 700); Trimble v. Bothby, 14 Ohio 109 (45 Am. Dec. 526); Shiveley's Heirs v. Jones, 6 B. Mon. 274; Bybee v. Summers, 4 Or. 354; Hammond v. Paxton, 58 Mich. 393 (25 N. W. Rep. 321); Durand v. Lord, 115 Ill. 610 (4 N. E. Rep. 483).

Sec. 474. Pendente lite purchasers. A pendente lite purchaser is as conclusively bound by a decree affecting property specifically involved as if he had been a party from the beginning. Wilfong v. Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283 (23 S. E. Rep. 730); Elizabethport Cordage Co. v. Whitlock, 37 Fla. 190 (20 So. Rep. 255). A creditor in good faith acquiring his mortgage from the recorded owner is not affected by the fraud of the vendor or vendee, practiced in the conveyance of the title. The right of such mortgage creditor to seize and sell the property is not affected by the suit of the wife of the vendor to annul the sale on the ground it was a fraud on her rights, the suit being directed not against the mortgage cred

Lac

itor, but only against the reputed heir of the husband. cassaigne v. Abraham, 48 La. 1160 (20 So. Rep. 672). Pendente lite purchasers, after recordation of a notice of lis pendens, where that is required, though not formal parties, are bound by the adjudication touching the property purchased by them, involved in the suit, as if formal parties. Pendente lite purchasers are charged with notice of all the facts of which the record of the suit would inform them at the date of their purchase. But this is only for the purposes of that suit, and for the benefit of its parties, not for other separate suits or parties. Pendente lite purchasers occupying the estate, when the record charges their grantor with fraud in fact in the acquisition of the property, are chargeable with rents and profits. Stout v. Philippi Mfg & Mer. Co., 41 W. Va. 339 (23 S. E. Rep. 571; 56 Am. St. Rep. 843). The failure of the plaintiff to comply with the statute providing for the filing of a lis pendens notice, does not give to the purchaser from the defendant any rights unless he be a bona fide purchaser. Brown v. Cohn, 95 Wis. 90 (69 N. W. Rep. 71; 60 Am. St. Rep. 83). The court say: "The object of lis pendens is not, primarily, notice, but to hold the subject of the suit-the res -within the power of the court, so as to enable it to pronounce judgment upon it. It is deemed that every person is bound to know the law, and to take notice of what is transpiring in the courts, from the time when the process is served and the complaint filed until the final judgment is entered. The purchaser pendente lite is deemed to be represented in the litigation, by his vendor, and the purchaser is just as much bound by the final judgment rendered as is the party whose right he purchases." Applying Neb. Code, § 85, providing that "when the summons has been served, or publication made, the action is pending, so as to charge third persons with notice of pendency, and while pending no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject matter thereof, as against the plaintiff's title," it is held that one who purchases property bound by a decree of foreclosure is, in the absence of equitable considerations resulting from the circumstances of the particular case, charged with such notice as the record imparts, and is not entitled to personal notice of sale and con