179) imposing a penalty upon a lessee who wrongfully holds possession after breach of his lease and notice to quit does not impair the obligation of contracts, as to existing leases. Woodward v. Winehill, 14 Wash. 894 (44 Pac. Rep. 860). An injunction will not be granted a lessor to prevent his lessee from enjoying the use of alterations made in the building without authority, but which do no material injury, where he has a right to sue for a breach of the lease or to terminate it for violation of its provisions. Brown v. Niles, 165 Mass. 276 (43 N. E. Rep. 90). Particular misrepresentations made by agent of lessor held not sufficient grounds for rescinding a lease. Merritt v. Dufur, 99 Ia. 211 (68 N. W. Rep. 553). So. Dak. Comp. Laws, §§ 1361-1369, construed and applied-granting ferry license by county commissioners. Nixon v. Reid, 8 S. Dak. 507 (67 N. W. Rep. 57; 32 L. R. A. 315).

LICENSE.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 465. Revocation of license-Improvements. Where valuable improvements have been constructed upon lands in pursuance of a revocable parol license equity may impose as a condition of such revocation, that the licensee may remove his improvements, if that can be accomplished without material loss, or if not, that the licensor shall make just compensation therefor, as the circumstances of the case may require. Flick v. Bell, 115 Cal. 555 (42 Pac. Rep. 813). A grant of an interest coupled with a license may render it irrevocable. McLeod v. Dial, 63 Ark. 10 (37 S. W. Rep. 306). Under 1 Hill's Ann. Wash. Code, § 1422, providing that all conveyances of any interest in, and all contracts creating any incumbrance on real estate, shall be by deed, a verbal license to enjoy permanent privileges on the land of the licensor is revocable at his will, though money has been expended thereon by the licensee. Hathaway v. Yakima Water, Light & Power Co., 14 Wash. St. 469 (44 Pac. Rep. 896; 53 Am. St.

Rep. 874). Citing Crosdale v. Lonigan, 129 N. Y. 604 (29 N. E. Rep. 824).

Sec. 466. Title of licensee under revocable license. In Wisconsin it is held by a divided court that a licensee under an unrevoked license to cut and remove timber for which he has paid full value, has sufficient title in the timber covered by his license to support replevin for the timber when wrongfully cut by a trespasser. Keystone Lumber Co. v. Kolman, 94 Wis. 465 (69 N. W. Rep. 165; 59 Am. St. Rep. 905; 34 L. R. A. 821). The court say: "This question does not seem to have been often passed upon by the courts. The case of Gamble v. Cook, 106 Mich. 561 (64 N. W. Rep. 482), seems to be in point. In that case it was held by the supreme court of Michigan that a vendee in a land contract, which gave him the right of possession, and to cut and remove timber, had title in the timber sufficient to maintain replevin for timber cut by a mere trespasser. No doubt, in that case the legal title to the timber was in the vendor until severance by the trespasser. No reason is perceived why that case is not sound in principle. The trespasser gets no legal title or right in the timber through his wrongful act, as against any person who has a legal right or interest in it. The licensor has no just claim, for he has sold it and has had his pay. He makes no claim. He is not injured. To preserve the fiction of legal title in him, beyond the severance, can have no other effect than to obstruct justice. In justice, the severed timber should belong to the licensee, who has bought and paid for it. He might have employed the trespasser to cut and remove it. In that case there would be no doubt that the title to the severed timber would be in him. No reason is perceived why, when the timber is cut by one unauthorized, the licensee may not at once assume possession of it; why he may not adopt the act of the wrongdoer, in the severance, as his own, and ratify, so to speak, the unauthorized act-somewhat in analogy to the principle by which the unauthorized acts of agents are ratified or a tort is waived. That view has the merit, at least, of doing complete justice among the parties."

LIENS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 467. Judgment lien-Estate to which it attaches. Where a judgment debtor takes in himself in trust for another the title to property purchased after the rendition of a judg ment, the consideration of such judgment not having any reference to the real estate in question, such property held not subject to the lien of such judgment. Baird v. Williams, 4 Okla. 173 (44 Pac. Rep. 217). Section 78, Ch. 70, p. 871, Code Civ. Proc., Stat. Okla., 1890, construed in connection with Chap. 69, Art. 6, § 9, Stat. 1890, means that real property is liable only to all judgments and attachments against the actual owner, unless the title to the property should in fact be taken in the name of another than the actual owner, should be sold under execution, and to an innocent purchaser for value and without notice of the trust or unless the trustee should encumber such real property by mortgage or judgment for value advanced upon the security of such encumbrance. Baird et al v. Williams, 4 Okla., 173 (44 Pac. Rep. 217). A judgment creditor of a married man is not entitled to have his judgment made a general or specific lien upon the husband's one-third interest in the real property of the wife during coverture. Sudbo v. Rusten, 66 Minn. 108 (68 N. W. Rep. 513). One whose name is inserted in a deed by mistake and who conveys to the intended grantee, upon discovery of such mistake, does not acquire any interest in the land to which the lien of a judgment against him could attach. Bucknell v. Deering, 99 Ia. 548 (68 N. W. Rep. 825). In Nebraska, a judgment in the district court is not a lien upon an equitable interest in real estate of the debtor. First Nat. Bank v. Tighe, 49 Neb. 299 (68 N. W. Rep. 490). One who acts as a mere conduit through which title to land is transferred from one to another does not acquire any interest to which the lien of a judgment against him can attach. Roberts v. Robinson, 49 Neb. 717

(68 N. W. Rep. 1035; 59 Am. St. Rep. 567). A judgment lien attaches merely to the interest of the judgment debtor in the land, and nothing more. Smith v. Savage, 3 Kan.

App. 556 (43 Pac. Rep. 847). The holder of a judgment lien cannot acquire a greater interest in land than his debtor possessed. Coldiron v. Asheville Shoe Co., 93 Va. 364 (25 S. E. Rep. 238).

Sec. 468. Judgment lien-As to when it attachesRevivor-Indexes. While a default judgment is standing on the docket upon a motion to set it aside, made the next day after the rendition of the judgment, it is not a final judgment so as to be a lien on the judgment debtor's real estate prior to the lien of other subsequent final judgments rendered against him before the disposition of the motion by the court. Crane v. Richardson, 73 Miss. 254 (18 So. Rep. 542). A decree of divorce adjudging alimony against the husband operates as a judgment against him and a lien on his real estate in the county, though the property was not specifically described in the bill or decree. Hall v. Harrington, Colo. App. (44 Pac. Rep. 365). In North Corolina a justice judgment when duly docketed in the office of the clerk of the superior court, becomes a judgment of the superior court to all intents and purposes, and is a lien on all the real estate of the defendant in the county where it is docketed, which continues for ten years from the date of the docketing. Dysart v. Branderth, 118 N. C. 968 (23 S. E. Rep. 966). A statute (S. & B. Ann. Wis. Stat., § 2905a) which provides that "a judgment or decree affecting real estate shall only be a lien from the time it is actually docketed," does not apply to a judgment foreclosing a mortgage for the reason that it does. not create a lien, but merely enforces a lien previously created by the mortgage itself. Huntington v. Meyer, 92 Wis. 557 (66 N. W. Rep. 500). A judgment of foreclosure rendered without the filing of lis pendens required by S. & B. Ann. Wis. Stat., § 3187, is good on collateral attack. Huntington v. Meyer, 92 Wis. 557 (66 N. W. Rep. 500). In Virginia it is held that a judgment creditor may maintain his suit in a court of equity against the heirs to subject the real estate of the decedent to the payment of his debt, without having revived

his judgment at law against the personal representative. James v. Life, 92 Va. 702 (24 S. E. Rep. 275). Under the Pennsylvania statute, Act of Feb. 24, 1834, § 25, it is held that the lien of a judgment, existing against a decedent at the time of his death, need not be revived every five years as against his heirs and devisees. Colenburg v. Venter, 173 Pa. St. 113 (33 Atl. Rep. 1046). Construing N. C. Code, § 433, requiring an index and cross index of judgment liens it is held that where there are several judgment debtors in a docketed judgment, the index should and must specify the name of each one, but it is not necessary that a judgment be indexed as to more than one of several plaintiffs. Hahn v. Mosely, 119 N. C. 73 (25 S. E. Rep. 713).

In

Sec. 469. Judgment liens-Priority of liens. Louisiana, where several parties have obtained and recorded judgments against a common debtor, who, prior to the obtaining of the judgments, made a fraudulent conveyance of his property, on the return of the property to the debtor the judgments will rank according to the date of their recording. Schwabacher v. Leibrook, 48 La. 821 (19 So. Rep. 758). A personal judg ment rendered against a mortgagor, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, becomes a lien on all the real estate of the judgment debtor in the county, and is superior to the lien of a prior judgment against the same defendant, on which no execution has ever been issued, where more than one year had elapsed from the date of its rendition to the first day of the term of court in which the personal judgment was rendered in the foreclosure proceeding. Thompson v. Hubbard, Kan. App. (44 Pac. Rep. 1095). Under West Virginia Code, 1891, ch. 139, § 7, it is held that a "convention of lienholders," on publication of notice to all lienholders to present their liens against the land of a party, will not bar the purchase-money lien of a vendor of such land, who retains the legal title and who is not an actual party to the suit. Nor is a lien reserved in a deed passing title barred by such convention, unless its owner be an actual party. Benson v. Snyder, 42 W. Va. 223 (24 S. E. Rep. 880). The rights of an attaching creditor, with knowledge of facts which, on further inquiry, would have resulted in the knowledge of a third person's unrecorded