holding; and where such a tenancy is shown to exist it can be terminated only by agreement, express or implied, or by notice for the time and in the manner prescribed by law. Farley v. McKeegan, 48 Neb. 237 (67 N. W. Rep. 161).

Sec. 440. Holding over. In Alabama it is held that where a tenant having a lease for a year holds over after the expiration of his term, the lessor may treat his possession as a tenancy for another year. A. G. Rhodes Furniture Co. v. Weedon, 108 Ala. 252 (19 So. Rep. 818). Where a lessee under a lease for two years holds over after the expiration thereof and the lessor receives rent according to such lease, the tenancy becomes one from year to year. Belding v. Texas Produce Co., 61 Ark. 377 (33 S. W. Rep. 421). In Kansas, a tenant under a written lease for two years, who holds over after the expiration thereof, with the assent of the owner, becomes a tenant from year to year, and his tenancy can only be terminated by a written notice to that effect given three months prior to the end of the year. Wheat v. Brown, 3 Kan. App. 431 (43 Pac. Rep. 807). Where a tenant holds over after the expiration of his lease for a whole year, under a parol agreement invalid on account of the statute of frauds, and the landlord accepts rent and allows the tenant to enter upon another year, he becomes a tenant from year to year. Amsden v. Atwood, 68 Vt. 322 (35 Atl. Rep. 311). In an action for possession brought against one holding over the defendant may, under the general denial, show that he holds over under an extension of the lease by contract with the lessor. Hamlin v. Engle, 14 Ind. App. 685 (42 N. E. Rep. 760); Hamlin v. Engle, 14 Ind. App. 685 (43 N. E. Rep. 463). Where a tenant holds over with knowledge that the premises have been rented to another, a crop raised by him is subject to the rental contract between the landlord and the new tenant, at least to the extent of his liability under his contract for holding over. Bain v. Wells, 107 Ala. 562 (19 So. Rep. 774). A tenant who as part of the consideration for his lease has erected buildings on the premises, cannot, when holding over with the landlord's permission, be charged with additional rent on account of such buildings. Peirce v. Grice, 92 Va. 763 (24 S. E. Rep. 392).

Sec. 441. Notice to quit. A tenant who has denied his landlord's title and claims ownership of the premises is not entitled to notice to quit. McCarthy v. Brown, 113 Cal. 15 (45 Pac. Rep. 14). Under McClain's Iowa Code, § 3190, where the time for the termination of the tenancy is fixed by agreement, no notice is necessary. Waller v. Vermitt, 97 Ia. 518 (66 N. W. Rep. 763). Applying Kan. Gen. Stat., 1889, ch. 55, § 5, which provides that "all tenancies from year to year may be terminated by at least three months' notice, in writing, given to the tenant prior to the expiration of the year," it is held that a tenant under a lease for one year, who holds over and continues to occupy the premises for several years after the expiration of the term specified in the lease, with the assent of the landlord, becomes a tenant from year to year, and the tenant cannot terminate the tenancy without giving to the landlord a written notice for at least three months before the end of the year. Ware v. Nelson, 4 Kan App. 258 (45 Pac. Rep. 923). Particular case in which the landlord was held not to have waived defects in his tenant's notice to terminate the tenancy. Whicher v. Cottrell, 165 Mass. 351 (43 N. E. Rep. 114).

Sec. 442. Attornment by tenant. Ordinarily a tenant cannot, during the continuance of the lease or tenancy, make a valid attornment to a third person. Jenkinson v. Winans, 109 Mich. 524 (67 N. W. Rep. 549). A tenant has no power to attorn to a third person without first surrendering the possession of the premises to the landlord from whom he obtained the same, or without the consent of the latter to such attornment. Pence v. Williams, 14 Ind. App. 86 (42 N. E. Rep. 494).

Sec. 443. Surrender. The surrender of a written lease under seal may be proven by parol. Alschuler v. Schiff, 164 III. 298 (45 N. E. Rep. 424). An executed verbal agreement to surrender a written lease is not within the Wisconsin statute of frauds (Rev. Stat., § 2302) providing that "no estate or interest in lands

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rendered unless by act or operation of law or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party

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rendering the same." Goldsmith v. Darling, 92 Wis. 363 (66 N. W. Rep. 397); Lovejoy v. Mc Carty, 94 Wis. 341 (68 N. W. Rep. 1003). Where a lessee, after he has sold to another his unexpired term and placed him in possession, notifies his lessor that he must look to the latter for rent and such lessor executes a lease to the new tenant, canceling the original lease, the transaction operates as a surrender. Morgan v. McCollister, 110 Ala. 819 (20 So. Rep. 54). Where a tenant, admitting his liability under the lease, advised his landlord of his inability to perform its conditions and solicited the latter to take charge of the premises, and the latter, without advising the lessee of his intentions, proceeded to take charge and manage the premises, it is held that the conduct of the parties amounted to a surrender. Williamson v.

Grossett, 62 Ark. 393 (36 S. W. Rep. 27). Unless a landlord accepts a surrender with the understanding that the lease is to be cancelled the lessee is not relieved from liability for damages occasioned by his breach of the lease. Scheelky v. Koch, 119 N. C. 80 (25 S. E. Rep. 718). A provision by which a surrender is to satisfy all damages between the parties does not apply to accrued rentals. Edmonds v. Mounsey, 15 Ind. App. 399 (44 N. E. Rep. 196). Where a lessor accepts a surrender of the lease by the lessee such lease expires at that time within the meaning of the covenant therein that the lessee will deliver the property over to the lessor, "at the expiration of this lease," in as good condition as when he received it. Such acceptance terminates the relation of landlord and tenant, but it does not terminate the relation of debtor and creditor between the parties on account of liabilities already incurred. Marshall v. Rugg, Wyo. (44 Pac. Rep. 700; 45' Pac. Rep. 486; 33 L. R. A. 679). A lessee seeking to establish a surrender by virtue of an agreement with the lessor's agent must clearly show the authority of the agent to make such agreement. Lovejoy v. Mc Carty, 94 Wis. 341 (68 N. W. Rep. 1003). One tenant in common cannot, without the consent of his co-tenants, bind their interests by a surrender. Edmonds v. Mounsey, 15 Ind. App. 399 (44 N. E. Rep. 196).

Sec. 444. Surrender by operation of law. The surrender of a lease by operation of law by a lessee of a wharf

from a city does not arise by his abandonment of the wharf and the subsequent occasional collection of wharfage by the city. Aberdeen Coal & Min. Co. v. Evansville, 14 Ind. App. 621 (43 N. E. Rep. 316). The court say: "There can be no doubt but that a surrender will sometimes take place by operation of law, and when it does so the tenant will not be liable for the rent after such surrender. If the landlord dispossess the tenant, or if the tenant abandon the premises, and the landlord let them to another tenant for a distinct term, and collect rents from such tenant, such acts operate as a surrender in law. Miller v. Michael, 13 Ind. App. 190 (41 N. E. Rep. 467); Phene v. Popplewell, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 334; Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351 (19 Am. Rep. 416); Thomas v. Cook, 2 Barn. & Ald. 119. In order to constitute a surrender by operation of law, there must be some decisive act on the part of the landlord, showing his intention to deprive the tenant of his estate. Phene v. Popplewell, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 334; Bessell v. Landsburg, 7 Q. B. 638. A surrender by the tenant may take place by express agreement between the parties, or by acts which are equivalent to an agreement. 1 Washb. Real Prop. 354; Tayl. Landl. & Ten. § 507. In the case at bar the abandonment of the premises by the appellant did not of itself discharge it from the payment of the rent. The city must have done something which signified its intention to resume the possession of the premises either for itself or for another tenant. There was no permanent occupancy of the premises by other persons, nor is there any finding that such occupancy was procured by the city, or, in other words, that it created a new lease or tenancy."

Sec. 445. Wrongful eviction by landlord. The fact that the use for which a lessee has leased premises is rendered impracticable and valueless by a lawful act of an adjoining tenant of the lessor does not constitute an eviction by the latter. Oakford v. Nixon, 177 Pa. 76 (35 Atl. Rep. 588; 34 L. R. A. 575). A lessee who is compelled to vacate the premises on account of the landlord's failure to furnish proper and sufficient heat as required by the contract, is no longer liable for rent. Bass v. Rollins, 63 Minn. 226 (65 N. W. Rep. 348). Where a building has been rendered untenantable

by fire an entry by the lessor to make repairs which are completed in a reasonable time, the lessee making no objection, will not constitute an eviction. Phillips & Buttorff Mf'g. Co. v. Whitney, 109 Ala. 645 (20 So. Rep. 333). A tenant who is wrongfully evicted by a landlord, while he has a crop growing on the land, cannot recover as damages the full value of the matured and gathered crop without making any allowance for rent; nor is the landlord entitled in such a case to compensation for gathering the crops over the objection of the tenant. Fefcoat v. Gunter, 73 Miss. 539 (19 So. Rep. 94). A life tenant is evicted from a room in a house, so as to constitute a breach of a bond securing the right to its occupancy, when denied access to the room by passing through the house, if there is no other mode of access thereto and the occupation is abandoned in consequence thereof. The measure of damages in such a case includes the rental value of the room, up to the commencement of the action, and the present worth of the rental value from that time forward during the life tenant's expectation of life, based upon mortality tables. Grove v. Youell, 110 Mich. 285 (68 N. W. Rep. 132; 33 L. R. A. 297). Where a landlord, by the removal of adjoining buildings, purposely renders the leased premises unsafe and uninhabitable and then procures their condemnation and removal by the municipal authorities, such acts constitute an eviction. Silber v. Larkin, 94 Wis. 9 (68 N. W. Rep. 406). A lessee may recover damages which he has suffered on account of being evicted under an illegal judgment obtained by his lessor which was subsequently reversed upon appeal. Mengelle v. Abadie, 48 La. 669 (19 So. Rep. 670). A tenant who yields. possession to his landlord upon the latter's wrongfully bringing an action of ejectment against him is constructively evicted, and may recover as damages the difference between the rental value of the premises for the unexpired term and the rent stipulated in the lease, the cost of moving, and any actual damage to his business occasioned thereby. Jennings v. Bond, 14 Ind. App. 282 (42 N. E. Rep. 957).

Sec. 446. Farming on the shares-Title to crops. A contract by which one agrees to farm the land of another for a certain portion of the crop is not a contract of hire, but