be converted into a trustee for the plaintiff by the mere fact that the amount which she received was equal to the full value of the house. It was paid to and received by her as indemnity for the loss which she had sustained, and, as already observed, does not stand in the place of the property insured. In Welsh v. Assurance Co., 151 Pa. St. 607, 617 (25 Atl. Rep. 142), relied on by the plaintiff, there was evidence that the life tenant intended to insure for the benefit of herself and the remainderman. The plaintiff argues that sound public policy requires that money received by a life tenant on a total loss by fire should be used in rebuilding, or should go to the remainderman, reserving the interest to the life tenant for life. This argument proceeds on the assumption that the proceeds of the insurance take the place of the property insured,-a view which, as we have seen, is contrary to our own and other decisions. We think that the decree dismissing the bill with costs should be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

Note. In the case of International Trust Co. v. Boardman, 149 Mass. 158 (21 N. E. Rep. 239), cited in the opinion, it is held that an attaching creditor who takes out an insurance upon the attached property, in the absence of an express agreement, is not in any manner bound to account to the judgment defendant for the proceeds of such insurance when recovered by such creditor. In the case of Burlingame v. Goodspeed, 153 Mass. 24 (26 N. E. Rep. 232), this principle is applied, by a divided court, to parties sustaining substantially the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee. It is said that insurance is a "personal contract" and “not at all incident to, or transferrable with, the subject matter.” May on Ins. 2nd Ed. § 6. The point actually decided in the case of Welsh v. London Assurance Corp., 151 Pa. St. 607 (25 Atl. Rep. 142), is that where the company issues its policy on the fee through the mistake of its agent, knowing that the insured is a life tenant only, it cannot resist the payment of the entire policy on the ground that the amount of the loss to be paid is greater than the value of the life estate. The question as to whether or not the life tenant was in any manner a trustee for the remaindermen was not before the court for decision and what is said upon that point must be regarded as a dictum.

Sec. 404.

EPITOME OF CASES.

"Sole ownership of the property "-Construction of forfeitures. In Texas it is held that the fact that the building is situated on land which is the separate

property of the wife of the insured, does not annul the policy by reason of a stipulation that it should become void, "if the interest of the insured be any other than entire, unconditional and sole ownership of the property." Warren v. Springfield Fire & M. Ins. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 446 (35 S. W. Rep. 810). The court say: "It is a primal rule the forfeitures are not favored, either in law or equity; and, as a corollary to it, provisions for forfeitures are to receive, when the intent is doubtful, a strict construction against those for whose benefit they are introduced. Webster v. Insurance Co., 53 O. St. 558 (42 N. E. Rep. 546; 53 Am. St. Rep. 658; 30 L. R. A. 719) ; West v. Insurance Co., 27 O. St. 1: 'A forfeiture is never carried by construction beyond the clear expression of the contract creating it; and if it be left in doubt, in view of the general tenor of the instrument and the relation of the contracting parties, whether given words were used in an enlarged or a restricted sense, other things being equal, that construction should be adopted which is most beneficial to the promisee.' Thus rule has been uniformly applied to conditions and provisions in policies of insurance, on the ground that, though they are inserted for the benefit of the underwriters, their office is to limit the force of the principal obligation. Webster v. Insurance Co., supra; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch 341; Palmer v. Insurance Co., Fed. Cas. No. 10,698; Pelly v. Assurance Co., 1 Burrows 349; Western & A. Pipe Lines v. Home Ins. Co., 145 Pa. St. 316 (22 Atl. Rep. 665; 27 Am. St. Rep. 703); Chandler v Insurance Co., 21 Minn. 85 (18 Am. Rep. 385); Riddlesbarger v. Insurance Co., 7 Wall. 386; Baley v. Insurance Co., 80 N. Y. 21 (36 Am. Rep. 570); Burleigh v. Insurance Co., 90 N. Y. 221; Griffey v. Insurance Co., 100 N. Y. 417 (3 N. E. Rep. 309; 53 Am. Rep. 202)." On this point see, Michigan Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Wich, 8 Colo. App. 409 (46 Pac. Rep. 687). Provisions for forfeitures are to receive, where the intent is doubtful, a strict construction against those for whose benefit they are introduced. Webster v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 53 O. St. 558 (42 N. E. Rep. 546; 53 Am. St. Rep. 658; 30 L. R. A.719). For construction of particular insurance policies, see Oakland Home F. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 47 Neb. 717 (66 N. W. Rep. 646; 58 Am. St. Rep. 663; 36 L. R. A. 673).

Where an agent writes a policy on his own property, it must be approved by the company before it constitutes a binding contract. Zimmermann v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 110 Mich. 399 (68 N. W. Rep. 215).

Sec. 405. Ownership in fee-Insurable interest. In a well considered case the authorities are collated and it is held that a vendee holding a bond for title upon the payment of the purchase money is owner in fee simple within the condition of a policy of insurance, in which it is provided that the policy shall be void unless the land upon which the building is situated be not "owned by the insured in fee simple." Loventhal v. Home Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 108 (20 So. Rep. 419; 57 Am. St. Rep. 17; 33 L. R. A. 258); see also Boulden v. Phanix Ins. Co., 112 Ala. 422 (20 So. Rep. 587). Conditions in an insurance policy rendering it void "if the interest of the insured in the property be not truly stated therein," or "if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership," are violated by the existence of a conveyance of the property by the insured to secure the payment of a debt, and the right of the insurer to enforce such forfeiture is not affected by the fact that such conveyance was of record at the time the policy was issued, the insurer having no actual knowledge of it. Orient Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 98 Ga. 464 (25 S. E. Rep. 560). To have an insurable interest the insurer must have a direct pecuniary interest in the preservation of the property, and his title, whether legal or equitable, may be defective or even bad, provided he have possession and use. Davis v. Phenix Ins. Co., 111 Cal. 409 (43 Pac. Rep. 1115). Citing, Bid. Ins. 156; Merrett v. Insurance Co., 42 Ia. 11; Herkimer v. Rice, 27 N. Y. 173; Riggs v. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 7 (25 N. E. Rep. 1058). An equitable interest in property is an insurable interDavis v. Phenix Ins. Co., 111 Cal. 409 (43 Pac. Rep. 1115). Citing, Bid. Ins. § 156. A policy of insurance is a prima facie admission by the insurers of the title of the insured to the property embraced in the policy. Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 47 Neb. 747 (66 N. W. Rep. 847). The interest of the husband in the dwelling house of his wife, used as a homestead by his family, is suf

est.

ficient to support a recovery by the two jointly on a policy of fire insurance issued to both. Webster v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 53 O. St. 558 (42 N. E. Rep. 546; 53 Am. St. Rep. 658; 30 L. R. A. 719).

Sec. 406. Change of ownership-Liens and incumbrances. A change in the title of insured property, which increases the interest of the insured from a lien holder to absolute ownership, is not such a change of ownership as requires notice to be given to the insurance company, under the terms of a subrogation contract which stipulates that the mortgagee shall notify the insurance company of any change of ownership; neither will such change release the company from liability to pay loss. Dodge v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 4 Kan. App. 415 (46 Pac. Rep. 25). A provision against a change of ownership is held not to be violated by the assignment by one partner to another of his interest in the firm properly insured, Wood v. American Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 382 (44 N. E. Rep. 80; 52 Am. St. Rep. 733); nor by the execution of a deed to secure debts already existing, German Ins. Co. v. Gibe, 162 Ill. 251 (44 N.E. Rep. 490). A sale and conveyance of the insured property terminates and avoids a policy which contains the following stipulation: "If the property be sold or transferred, * or if this policy shall be assigned before a loss, without the consent of the company endorsed hereon, * * then, and in every such case, this policy shall be void." Richmond v. Phanix Assur. Co., 88 Me. 105 (33 Atl. Rep. 786). An insurance policy which contains a condition that it shall be void "if there be a mortgage, bill of sale, or other lien upon the property hereby insured, or any part of it, either prior or, subsequent to the issuance of the policy, without the fact being indorsed hereon," is not invalidated by the existence of judgment liens against the insured at the time of the insurance. Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Schield, 73 Miss. 128 (19 So. Rep. 94).

*

*

The

Sec. 407. Change of use-Increase of hazard. designation of a building insured as a "dwelling" will be construed as descriptive of the property insured, and not a warranty that the building is then being occupied as a dwelling

house; and where the validity of the policy is dependent upon. whether or not the hazard was increased by a change in the use and occupancy of the property, the burden of showing an increased hazard is upon the insurance company. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 4 Kan. App. 16 (45 Pac. Rep. 789). Where a policy provides that it shall become void and of no effect if the property insured shall be occupied or used for an unlawful purpose, the prohibited use by a tenant avoids the policy, regardless of notice or knowledge thereof on the part of the insured; and if the policy becomes void because the premises have been put to a prohibited use, it is not reinstated and made again effective by the mere fact that such use was discontinued before the loss occurred. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Kan. App. 7 (45 Pac. Rep. 722). Where the change in the use of the building which increased the hazard in violation of the provisions of the policy has been discontinued before the loss, the insurer cannot take advantage of the forfeiture. Traders' Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256 (45 N. E. Rep. 255; 35 L. R. A. 595).

In a

Sec. 408. Vacant and unoccupied building. case where the authorities are collated, it is held that a dwelling house is "vacant and unoccupied " whenever it is no longer actually occupied and used as such, notwithstanding it may have household goods stored therein, be visited daily by the owners, and occasionally members of the owner's family sleep there. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 82 Md. 88 (33 Atl. Rep. 429; 51 Am. St. Rep. 457; 30 L. R. A. 633). To the same effect see Schuermann v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 161 Ill. 437 (43 N. E. Rep. 1093; 52 Am. St. Rep. 377).

Sec. 409. Conditions against subsequent insurance -Invalidity of subsequent policy. In a well considered case the conflicting authorities are collated and it is held, that where the policy contains the condition that it shall be void if other insurance is obtained without the consent of the insurer, in order to work such forfeiture by obtaining a subsequent policy from another insurer, such policy must be a valid one. Sweeting v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 83 Md. 63 (34 Atl. Rep. 826). The court say: There is a wide diversity of opinion