into another is wholly incompetent to show title in the latter. Bleckley v. White, 98 Ga. 594 (25 S. E. Rep. 592). For cases which depend upon particular facts and illustrate what is sufficient to establish title under a lost deed. See Thomas v. Ribble, Va. (24 S. E. Rep. 241). Ga. Code, § 2664, applied-presumption of gift from possession of land by a child of the holder of the legal title. Holt v. Anderson, 98 Ga. 220 (25 S. E. Rep. 496). In proving adverse possession it is not competent to show by reputation and general understanding in the neighborhood that a party owned or had title to the land in controversy. Goodson v. Brothers, 111

Ala. 589 (20 So. Rep. 443).

Sec. 313. Competency of witnesses. In a suit brought by a creditor to set aside a deed for fraud as to his debt, the grantee is not incompetent to testify in support of his title and the good faith of his conveyance for the reason that it necessarily involves transactions and communications had with a deceased grantor, whose personal representatives or heirs are made parties defendant to the suit. Farmers' Bank v. Gould, 42 W. Va. 132 (24 S. E. Rep. 547). A statute (How. Ann. Mich. Stat., § 7546) which provides that neither husband or wife "during the marriage or afterwards, without the consent of the other, shall be examined as to any communication made by or to the other during marriage," does not preclude the husband, after the death of the wife, from testifying that a certain instrument was delivered to him by his wife with instructions to deliver to another upon her death. Hagerman v. Wigent, 108 Mich. 192 (65 N. W. Rep. 756).

Sec. 314. Corporate action-Corporate existence. While the records of a corporation are usually considered as the best evidence of the action of the board, yet, upon an issue whether a resolution was passed authorizing a given contract or conveyance, the fact may be proved by parol. Boggs v. Lakeport Agricultural Park Ass'n., 111 Cal. 354 (43 Pac. Rep. 1106). Citing, 4 Thomp. Corp., § 1016; Wat. Corp., § 295. Corporate existence may be established by proof of charter and that the pretended corporation was acting as such

in the exercise of franchises and powers granted by the charter. East St. L. & C. Ry. Co. v. Belleville City Ry. Co., 159 III. 514 (42 N. E. Rep. 974). One who deals with a corporation in its corporate capacity will not be permitted to deny its corporate existence in order to evade a legal obligation or duty. Tuckaseegee Min. Co. v. Goodhue, 118 N. C.. 981 (24 S. E. Rep. 797).

EXECUTION SALES.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 315. As to what real estate may be sold on execution. An equitable interest in land is subject to attachment, Shanks v. Simon, 57 Kan. 385 (46 Pac. Rep. 774); and an equity of redemption may be sold on execution, Hammond v. Horton, 137 Mo. 151 (37 S. W. Rep. 825). In Nebraska it is held that the equitable interest of a judgment debtor, if not coupled with possession, cannot be subjected to the payment of his debt by levy of execution thereon, and sale under such levy; to make it available for such purpose, the aid of the court must be invoked by proper proceedings. First Nat. Bank v. Tighe, 49 Neb. 299 (68 N. W. Rep. 490). Lands conveyed in fraud of a judgment creditor may be sold by him on execution without waiting to bring an action to set aside the conveyance and a court of equity will enforce the title of the purchaser at such sale. Willard v. Masterson, 160 Ill. 443 (43 N. E. Rep. 771). A vested interest in real estate, although subject to divesture upon the owner's dying in a certain condition as to issue, may be sold on execution subject to such contingency. Stevens v. Mulligan, 167 Mass. 84 (44 N. E. Rep. 1080). Lands owned by a municipal corporation outside of its corporate limits and not used for any municipal purpose may be sold on execution against it. Murphree v. Mobile, 108 Ala. 663 (18 So. Rep. 740). Under S. Dak. Comp. Laws, § 5155, providing that "if the debtor redeem, the effect of the sale is terminated, and he is restored

to his estate," it is held that where property of a judgment debtor has been sold for less than the amount of the judgment and redeemed from such sale by the judgment debtor, the property may again be sold on a second execution issued on the same judgment for the balance due thereon. Scaman v. Galligan, 8 S. Dak. 277 (66 N. W. Rep. 458). Applying Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895, Art. 200, providing that "the writ of attachment may be levied on such property, and none other, as is or may be by law subject to levy under the writ of execution," it is held that the interests of several persons who contribute money to the purchase of lands the absolute title of which they cause to be conveyed to a trustee with full power of sale, for the purpose of enabling him to sell the property and account to them for the proceeds, are not subject to levy under a writ of attachment in favor of their creditors. Chase v. York Co. Sav. Bank, 89 Tex. 316 (36 S. W. Rep. 406; 59 Am. St. Rep. 48; 32 L. R. A. 785). Ky. Gen. Stat., ch. 38, Art. 12, § 1, applied-lands subject to execution. Mudd v. Durham, (33 S. W. Rep. 1116).

Ky.

Sec. 316. Exemption of property from execution sale -Insurance money. A judgment on a bond given by a plaintiff in an action for unlawful detainer under Mansf. Ark. Dig., 3351, 3352, is a judgment founded on a tort from which property cannot be claimed exempt where the exempting statute applies only to cases where the judgment is based on a contract. Gaines v. Toles, I. T. (37 S. W. Rep. 946). Insurance money realized from the destruction of municipal property which is exempt from execution, is also exempt; and the fact that the municipality erected a new building without the use of any part of the proceeds of the insurance on the building which had been destroyed, before the money was collected, does not defeat the right of the municipality to claim the exemption of such insurance money. Ellis v. Pratt City, 111 Ala. 629 (20 So. Rep. 649; 33 L. R. A. 264; 56 Am. St. Rep. 76). The court say: "It is well settled by the current of authority, that where a debtor's property being his family homestead, burns down, being insured against loss by fire, the insurance money takes place in the exemption statute of the property destroyed, and like

it is also exempt, and not liable to garnishment. Thomp. Homes. & Ex., § 750. The reason of the rule is found in the fact, that the property has been exempted by law for the use of the exemptor and his family, and he may insure it to protect himself and them from the loss. It is intended by the insurance, to secure the means, in case of loss, for the restoration of the property after its destruction by fire. Not to allow the insurance money after loss, to take the place of the property destroyed, and be exempt from liability to the debts of the exemptor, would, by a mere technical evasion, pervert the object and spirit of the statute of exemptions, always to be liberally construed in favor of the exemptor. The same rule applies to exempted personal property. Houghton v. Lee, 50 Cal. 101; Hall v. Fulgham, 86 Tenn. 451 (7 S. W. Rep. 121); White v. Fulgham, 87 Tenn. 281 (10 S. W. Rep. 501); Crawford v. Carroll, 93 Tenn. 661 (26 L. R. A. 415; 42 Am. St. Rep. 943; 27 S. W. Rep. 1010); Reynolds v. Haynes, 83 Iowa 342 (13 L. R. A. 719; 32 Am. St. Rep. 811; 49 N. W. Rep. 851); Kaiser v. Seaton, 62 Iowa, 463 (17 N. W. Rep. 664); Stebbins v. Peeler, 29 Vt. 289; Mitchell v. Milhoan, 11 Kan. 617; Cooney v. Cooney, 65 Barb. 524; Smyth, Homest. & Ex., § 102; Wap. Homest. & Ex., 609. A different rule has been announced in Wooster v. Page, 54 N. H. 125 (20 Am. Rep. 128), and in Smith v. Ratcliff, 66 Miss. 683 (14 Am. St. Rep. 606; 6 So. Rep. 460); but these cases are not sanctioned by the weight of authority. No reason can be assigned why a municipal corporation may not insure property owned by it for municipal purposes, against destruction by fire, and that the proceeds of the policy, in case of loss, shall not stand in the place of the property destroyed to be used by it for the restoration of the property. On principle and authority, the corporation in such a case will stand upon the same footing as to the insurance fund as an individual exemptor under statute who insures his exempted property. Fleishel v. Hightower, 62 Ga. 324."

Sec. 317. Issue, levy and return of execution. Where a statute (Starr & C. Ann. Ill. Stat., ch. 37, par. 67) requires all process to be sealed with the seal of the court, an execution not under the seal of the court is void and such an

execution cannot be amended in that particular after sale. Weaver v. Peasley, 163 Ill. 251 (45 N. E. Rep. 119; 54 Am. St. Rep. 469). Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 77, § 39, construed and applied-issue of execution against deceased judgment debtor -notice to nonresidents. Fitch v. Gray, 162 Ill. 337 (44 N. E. Rep. 726). Particular description in an execution held sufficient. Cedartown Land Imp. Co. v. Cherokee Land & Imp. Co., 99 Ga. 150 (24 S. E. Rep. 983). A levy on real estate is the endorsement of the levy on the writ describing the land and the description ought to contain the means or data for its identification. The memoranda is sufficient if made upon a separate piece of paper and subsequently transferred to the writ and properly signed, and the levy dates from the making of the memoranda and not from the time of its transcribing upon the writ. McMillan v. Gaylor, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 453). Where a levy of an attachment is made on land and the defendant is personally served, the court need not make an order directing the sale of the Pennsylvania Mortg. Inv. Co. v. Gilbert, 13 Wash. 684 (45 Pac. Rep. 43). Mere irregularity in the levy of an execution and in giving the statutory notice required, is held not to vitiate a sale of land made thereunder. Young v. Schofield, 132 Mo. 650 (34 S. W. Rep. 497). Applying Ga. Code, § 2914, it is held that an illegal levy made in good faith is effectual for the purpose of preventing dormancy of the judgment. Rogers v. Smith, 98 Ga. 788 (25 S. E. Rep. 753). It is held that the recitals in a sheriff's return showing a compliance with the requirements of the statute regarding notice and adjournment of sale are conclusive. Wilson v. Spear, 68 Vt. 145 (34 Atl. Rep. 429). A return of the levy of a writ of attachment in the words, "executed upon the

tract of land within mentioned," was held insufficient. Raub · v. Otterback, 92 Va. 517 (23 S. E. Rep. 883). The court say: "This levy is too vague and uncertain. The levy must contain such general description of the land, and with such substantial accuracy as will connect it with the sale when made, so that purchasers may know the land or interest therein to be sold, and be able to form some estimate of its value; and, further, the levy should describe the land with such precision that it may be easily identified, when conveyed, by looking