until his disability is removed; and his quitclaim deed of the confiscated property before removal of his disability is ineffectual to convey title nor does it become valid by the subsequent removal of his disability so as to prevent the descent of the fee to his heirs. Menger v. Carruthers, 3 Kan. App. 75 (44 Pac. Rep. 1096). The court say: "While under the recent decisions of the United States supreme court, we think that the estate forfeited by the proceedings under the confiscation act and the joint resolution of congress of the same date was the life estate of the offender, the fee remaining in him after the confiscation, yet he had no power of alienating any interest in the real estate remaining in him until his disability was removed by the amnesty and pardon proclamation of the president of December 25, 1868. Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U. S. 92 (10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231); Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U. S. 546 (12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 868); U. S. v. Dunnington, 146 U. S. 338 (13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79). In the case of Jenkins v. Collard, supra, Jenkins, the offender, had, prior to the issuance of the proclamation of pardon and amnesty, conveyed the real estate confiscated by warranty deed, and the court held, that while under the ruling in Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U. S. 202, Jenkins had, at the date of his conveyance, no power of alienating the reversion or remainder of the estate, yet he was at liberty to add to this deed the ordinary covenants of seisin and warranty and that the same legal operation upon future acquired interests must be given to them as when accompanying conveyances of parties whose property had never been subjected to confiscation proceedings; and that as his deed was accompanied with a covenant of seisin on his part, and that he would warrant and defend the title against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever, that warranty estopped him, and all persons claiming under him, from asserting title to the premises against the grantee and his heirs, and assigns, or conveying it to any other party; and that subsequently under the general amnesty and pardon proclamation, any disability that had previously rested upon him against disposing of the remaining estate which had not been confiscated was removed, and he stood, with reference to that estate, precisely as if no confiscation proceedings had ever been had; and that the amnesty and pardon, in removing the

liability resting upon him respecting that estate inured equally in its benefits to his grantee. In Railroad Co. v. Bosworth, supra, it was held that a condemnation under the confiscation act and a sale under the decree left the remainder, after the expiration of the confiscated life estate, vested in the offender, so that he could dispose of it after receiving a full pardon of the president. But in Chaffraix v. Shiff, 92 U. S. 214, an action was brought for specific performance of contract for the purchase of real estate. The contract expressly stipulated that the purchaser would not be bound to accept the sale if the titles were not good and valid. The title offered was that of a purchaser at a confiscation sale, to whom, after the sale, Surget, the person as whose property the land was confiscated, had released without warranty, and it was held that such a title is not a complete and valid one; that it is ineffective beyond the life of Surget, and that his release did not enlarge it.'"

Sec. 272. Fee simple estate. A conveyance executed to one as a trustee which provides that upon the death of the beneficiaries named therein the estate shall "go absolutely" to the children of one of them, vests the title to the fee in such children. Hunt v. Hunt v. Nolen, 46 S. C. 356 (24 S. E. Rep. 310). A deed to "M and the heirs of her body" to have and to hold unto the said "M and the heirs of her body, to her and their heirs and assigns, forever” is held to create in her a conditional fee which becomes absolute after issue born to her. Miller v. Graham, 47 S. C. 288 (25 S. E. Rep. 165). A conveyance to W., trustee, "to hold as the absolute property of" the grantee's wife, naming her, "that she may have a permanent home for her life, and his children by her a pittance," is held to convey a fee simple to the wife. Fackler v. Berry, 93 Va. 565 (25 S. E. Rep. 887; 57 Am. St. Rep. 819). Where the conveying part of the deed conveys an absolute fee simple estate to the grantees, a subsequent clause providing that upon the death of either of them "without an heir, her interest to revert to the survivor," is void. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 30, § 9, applied. Palmer v. Cook, 159 III. 300 (42 N. E. Rep. 796; 50 Am. St. Rep. 165).

An absolute devise in fee cannot be reduced by a request

幣 * *

as to the disposition the devisee shall make of the estate. Taylor v. Brown, 88 Me. 56 (33 Atl. Rep. 664); In re Bellas' Estate, 176 Pa. 122 (34 Atl. Rep. 1003); Rogers v. Winklepleck, 143 Ind. 373 (42 N. E. Rep. 746). A devise by a testator to his wife, of a house and lot, "to use, occupy or dispose of as she may think proper," and it was directed that, if she "should continue in the use, occupation, and ownership of the said house and lot and furniture and household goods until her death," the same should then go to his children, was held to give her a fee simple estate, the limitation over being void. Benz v. Fabian, 54 N. J. Eq. 615 (35 Atl. Rep. 760). Where a testator by a joint devise gives all of his property to his wife during her life, and after this provision makes special devises to other relatives to take effect upon his wife's death, and at the conclusion of his will gives the "remainder" to his wife "to dispose of as she may choose or desire at her death," it is held by the last clause the wife takes a fee in such "remainder." Byrne v. Weller, 61 Ark. 366 (33 S. W. Rep. 421). Where after giving specific sums of money to his children, a testator devised all the residue of his property, both real and personal, to his wife "subject to a division among the aforesaid heirs, at her death, in accordance with their obedience to her, as she shall deem proper," the wife took a fee simple. Rogers v. Winklepleck, 143 Ind. 373 (42 N. E. Rep. 746). Where real estate is devised in terms denoting an intention that the primary devisees shall take a fee on the death of the testator, coupled with a devise over in case of his death without issue, the words refer to a death without issue during the lifetime of the testator, and the primary devisee, surviving the testator, takes an absolute estate in fee simple. Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248 (42 N. E. Rep. 623). See opinion for extensive collation of authorities. For particular devise held to create an estate in fee, see Potts v. Kline, 174 Pa. 513 (34 Atl. Rep. 191).

Sec. 273. Creation of fee simple-estate-Statutes construed. Applying Ala. Code, § 1852, which provides that in all cases where "absolute power of disposition is given, not accompanied by any trust, and no remainder is limited on the estate of the donee of the power, he is entitled

to an absolute fee," it is held that where a devisee is empowered "to sell, dispose, and enjoy said property to her sole and separate use during her natural life, and to dispose of the same by will or deed at any time," she takes a fee, with power to mortgage. Wells v. American Mortg. Co., 109 Ala. 430 (20 So. Rep. 136). Applying Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2737, providing that "every devise in terms denoting the testator's intention to devise his entire interest in all of his real or personal property, shall be construed to pass all of the estate in such property," it is held that where a testatrix by separate items devised to each of her four children a described tract of land employing in each instance the words "my express will is that after my death my beloved son (or daughter) * * shall have and own in his (her) name " the land described, it was held that the devisees took estates in fee. Korf v. Gerichs, 145 Ind. 134 (44 N. E. Rep. 24). Under a statute providing that "all devises of real estate shall pass the whole estate of the testator in the premises devised, *

unless it appear by a devise over, or by words of limitation, or otherwise in the will, that the testator intended to devise a less estate," it is held that a devise giving the husband or testatrix the "whole income while he lives" followed by an unlimited power of sale, with no restriction on the appropriation of the proceeds, passes a fee simple. Kieffel, v. Keppler, 173 Pa. 181 (33 Atl. Rep. 1043). Under a statute (Pa. Act. Apr. 8, 1833) providing that all devises of real estate shall pass the whole estate of the testator in the premises devised, although there be no words of inheritance or of perpetuity, unless it appears by a devise over, or by words of limitation, or otherwise in the will, that the testator intended to devise a less estate, a devise by a testator to his wife, followed by the provision, " and she may will it, I mean the old homestead, to any of my children at her own discretion," was held to vest in her fee simple. Ahl v. Bosler, 175 Pa. 526 (34 Atl. Rep. 805).

Sec. 274. Estates tail. In Connecticut a devise to a testator's child to go to the children of other devisees if the devisee "should die without issue" creates an estate tail in the first devisee which is not enlarged by the birth of issue

and his issue, if any there be, take by way of contingent remainder. St. John v. Dann, 66 Conn. 401 (34 Atl. Rep. 110). Where a testator devised land to his wife for life and then provided as follows: "I leave and bequeath unto my granddaughter Nancy Ramsey all the real property that my wife enjoys during her life, and at my wife's death I bequeath the same property that she held during her life to Nancy Ramsey and to the heirs of her body; but if she should die and leave no child or children, then in such a case the said property shall be sold to the best advantage, and equally divided among my other legatees and their heirs," it was held that upon the widow's decease N. R. took an estate tail, and the "other legatees and their heirs " an executory estate in fee. A tenant in tail may bar the entail by a conveyance under Pa. Act 1799, and a reconveyance to such tenant vests in him a fee and bars all executory devises. Ralston v. Truesdell, 178 Pa. 429 (35 Atl. Rep. 813).

Sec. 275. Estates tail-Conversion into other estates. A devise to trustees in trust for the daughter of the testator, naming her," and all her children, if she shall have any," was held to vest a fee in the daughter, she having no children at the death of the testator, which was not divested by the birth of children subsequently. Silliman v. Whitaker, 119 N. C. 89 (25 S. E. Rep. 742). The court say: "It was settled in Wild's case, 6 Coke, 17, decided in the forty-first year of Elizabeth (1595), that a devise to B, and his (or her) children, B. having no children when the testator died, is an estate tail. If he have children at that time, the children take as joint tenants with the parent. This has been uniformly followed in England. In the late case in the House of Lords of Clifford v. Koe, 5 App. Cas. 447, Wild's case was reaffirmed; opinions being delivered seriatim by Lord Chancellor Selborn, Lord Hatherly, Lord Blackburn, and Lord Watson, unanimously sustaining Wild's case, and stating that ' for these three hundred years it has been the uniform ruling' in England. Theob. Wills, 334; Hawk. Wills, 198. In this country, estates tail having been turned into fee simple, while Wild's case has been uniformly followed as in England, it has been with the necessary modification that, where the