146 Ind. 160 (44 N. E. Rep. 993). A child adopted by a husband under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 837, does not become the child of his wife so as to be entitled to claim rights as such under the statute of descent. Keith v. Ault, 144 Ind. 626 (43

N. E. Rep. 924).

Sec. 188. Rights of child adopted in one state to inherit lands in another state. A child adopted in one state, in substantial compliance with its laws, has the same right to inherit lands from its deceased adopting parent in another state as is given to adopted children by the statute of such state. Gray v. Holmes, 57 Kan. 217 (45 Pac. Rep. 596; 33 L. R. A. 207). The court says: "A personal or relative status lawfully acquired in one state or country will generally be recognized by the courts of another state or country. This proposition was clearly stated by Chief Justice Gray, in Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 246 (37 Am. Rep. 321), as follows: It is a general principle that the status or condition of a person-the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other's property -is fixed by the law of the domicile, and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other state, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy. Subject to this limitation, upon the death of any man, the status of those who claim succession or inheritance in his estate is to be ascertained by the law under which that status was acquired. His personal property is, indeed, to be distributed according to the law of his domicile at the time of his death, and his real estate descends according to the law of the place in which it is situated; but in either case it is according to those provisions of that law which regulate the succession or the inheritance of persons having such a status'. The opinion is replete with learning upon the whole subject of the law of place as affecting the status of a person changing his domicile, or having property rights in other states, or countries, and it was held that a child adopted under the laws of Pennsylvania would be recognized as such upon the removal of the adopting father with the child into the state of Massachusetts. This case was cited with approval by the supreme court of Illinois in Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 111. 536 (36 N. E. Rep. 628,

39 Am. St. Rep. 196; 23 L. R. A. 665), where it was held that a decree adopting a child is a declaration by competent authority operative to change its status, and, ipso facto, to render it that which the law declares it to be,-an heir of the person adopting,-and to make it capable of inheriting from him in all respects as if it were his own child, born in wedlock, and it may inherit property in other states than that in which the adoption was had from its adopting parents. The supreme court of Rhode Island, following the Massachusetts and Illinois cases, held, in Melvin v. Martin, 18 R. I. 650 (30 Atl. Rep. 467), that the status of a person is to be determined by the law of his domicile, and such status, with its incidental rights of succession and inheritance, should be recognized in another state when there is nothing in its laws to prevent it. We consider these cases to be founded upon indubitable reasoning, and that their authority should be followed in this state.".

Sec. 189. Bastards. The law of the state where real estate is situated determines the right of inheritance of illegitimate children. Ky. Gen. Stat. 1888, p. 716, §§ 3, 4, applied. Leonard v. Braswell, 99 Ky. 528 (36 S. W. Rep. 684; 36 L. R. A. 707). The fact that an illegitimate child can inherit from a testator does not give him any estate in a devise made by the testator to a class of kindred to which he belongs. Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me. 395 (34 Atl. Rep. 180). In construing Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2631, providing that "if a man shall marry the mother of a bastard child and acknowledge it as his own, such child shall be deemed legitimate," it is held that an acknowledgment thus made is conclusive and cannot be subsequently contradicted by proof that the person making it did not beget the child. Binns v. Dazey, 147 Ind. 536 (44 N. E. Rep. 644). Applying Ariz. Comp. Laws 1877, ch. 30, § 3, providing that "all marriages of white persons with negroes, mulattoes, Indians or Mongolians, are declared illegal and void," it is held that a child of a white man and an Indian woman between whom a contract of marriage had been made on an Indian reservation within the territory, according to the law of the woman's tribe, is not entitled to inherit from her father; and the provisions of the statute of descent (Re

vised Stats. par. 1470) providing that "the issue also of marriages deemed null in law shall nevertheless be legitimate' does not make such a child legitimate, so as to give her the right of inheritance, for the reason that there was no marriage in fact. In re Walker's Estate Ariz. (46 Pac. Rep. 67). A child of a slave mother, whose father died before the wife and child became free, cannot inherit from his father. Hereford v. Rabb, Miss. (19 So. Rep. 201). Where a voidable slave marriage was disaffirmed by the husband on procuring his freedom, and another valid marriage contracted by him the issue of the second marriage are his lawful heirs. Butler v. Butler, 161 Ill. 451 (44 N. E. Rep. 203). Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 75, §§ 3, 4; Pub. Laws, 1887, ch. 14, construed and applied-inheritance by illegitimate children. Messer v. Jones, 88 Me. 349 (34 Atl. Rep. 177); Lyon v. Lyon, 88 Me. 395 (34 Atl. Rep. 180). La. Civ. Code, Art. 199, construed and applied-rights of illegitimate and legitimated children. Marionneaux v. Dupuy, 48 La. 496 (19 So. Rep. 466).

Ind. Rev.

Sec. 190. Descent to surviving husband. Stat. 1894, § 2642, providing that " if a wife dies testate or intestate leaving a widower, one-third of her real estate shall descend to him, subject, however, to its proportion of the debts of the wife contracted before marriage," being a provision in lieu of curtesy, should be liberally construed and the interest which the husband takes under this statute cannot be subject to the payment of the general debts of the decedent, the costs of administration, funeral charges, etc. Kemph v. Belknap, 15 Ind. App. 77 (43 N. E. Rep. 891).

Sec. 191. Descent to surviving wife-Statutes construed. A surviving wife cannot be deprived of her rights in her husband's property by specific performance of his contract to give the property to a relative, made before his marriage and of which the wife had no notice. Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444 (45 Pac. Rep. 710; 33 L. R. A. 369). A provision made in an antenuptial contract for a wife in lieu of dower does not affect her rights as heir of her husband. Starr & C. Ann. Ill., Stat., p. 879, § 1, cl. 3, applied. Christy

v. Marmon, 163 Ill. 225 (45 N. E. Rep. 150). In Georgia, when a man dies intestate, leaving a widow and children, the title to his realty vests in the latter, subject only to the former's right to take a child's part, or have dower assigned therein. Snipes v. Parker, 98 Ga. 522 (25 S. E. Rep. 580). In construing Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2640, providing that "if a husband dies intestate leaving a widow, one-third of his real estate shall descend to her in fee simple from all demands of creditors," it is held that a widow takes the interest which descends to her absolutely; that it is subject only to liens for taxes, purchase money, and mortgages in which she has joined; that she is entitled to have all the personal estate, and the other two-thirds of the real estate, marshaled and applied to the discharge of such liens, that her interest may be preserved and secured to her. Kemph v. Belknap, 15 Ind. App. 77 (43 N. E. Rep. 891). Under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 2487, a second or subsequent childless wife of one having children alive by a former wife took a fee simple estate in one-third of her husband's real estate, which under the statute, descends to his children, regardless of any disposition made by him in his will; and Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2644, which gives a second or subsequent childless wife only a life estate in one-third of her husband's real estate has no retroactive effect. Rushton v. Harvey, 144 Ind. 382 (43 N. E. Rep. 300). Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, §§ 2644-2646, construed-constitutionality questioned-estate taken by subsequent childless wife-conveyance by heirs of husband. Smith v. Smith v. McClain, 146 Ind. 77

(45 N. E. Rep. 41).

Sec. 192. Conveyance by widow remarryingStatute construed. In construing Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, § 2641, providing that "if a widow shall marry a second or any subsequent time, holding real estate in virtue of any previous marriage, and there be a child or children or their descendants alive by such marriage, such widow may not during such second or subsequent marriage, with or without the assent of her husband, alienate such real estate, and if during such marriage, such widow shall die, such real estate shall go to her children by the marriage in virtue of which such real estate came to her, any there be," it is held that a child adopted

by a husband alone is not a child "by marriage" within the meaning of the statute so as to prevent his wife from alienating lands received from her husband during her subsequent marriage. Keith v. Ault, 144 Ind. 626 (43 N. E. Rep. 924).

Sec. 193. Widow's quarantine. Construing and applying Ga. Code, § 2571, which provides that where a man dies, leaving an estate, and leaving a widow, or a widow and a minor child or children, such widow may have set apart for the benefit of herself and minor child a year's support out of the estate of her deceased husband, it is held that as soon as the husband dies, his widow acquires under the provisions of this section, a vested interest to a year's support, which interest is superior to all claims of creditors or of adult children of the deceased; that her subsequent marriage does not affect this right; and where such year's support set apart to her consists of land she may sell and convey the same in fee for the purpose of deriving from the proceeds a support for herself and child, and the validity of such sale is not affected by the fact that part of the proceeds was applied for the payment of a fine assessed against such widow so as to obtain her discharge from imprisonment. Swain v. Stewart, 98 Ga. 366 (25 S. E. Rep. 831). A widow holding an execution against the administrator of her deceased husband for a year's support has the right to redeem land which the latter in his life time had conveyed to another for the purpose of securing a debt; and, upon her so doing, may have the land sold under her execution, and take its proceeds in preference to a judgment creditor of the intestate, whose judgment was obtained before the execution. of the security deed. Commercial Bank v. Burkhalter, 98 Ga. 736 (25 S. E. Rep. 917). Applying Ala. Code, § 1900, giving the widow the right to retain, free of rent, the dwelling house where her husband resided, until her dower is assigned, it is held that her possession under this statute is not adverse to the heirs of the estate; and her rights thereunder are not forfeited by her removing from the premises and renting the same or by her subsequent marriage. Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Ala. 160 (20 So. Rep. 601). A widow's possession of her husband's lands under How. Ann. Mich. Stat., § 5744, until dower is assigned or partition made is not adverse to the