deed for the uses and purposes therein stated. Witness my hand and seal this...... A. D. 189..." Laws, 1896, p. 240. day of Sec. 176. Oklahoma. (See Vol. I, § 91.) "A warranty deed to real estate may be substantially in the following form, to-wit:-Know all men by these presents; That consideration of the sum of ..... ... party of the first part, in dollars, in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the following described real property and premises, situated in .......... county, Territory of Oklahoma, to-wit: ....... together with all the improvements thereon and the appurtenances thereunto belonging, and warrant the title to the same. Το have and to hold said described premises unto to the said party of the second part, ... heirs and assigns forever, free, clear and discharged of and from all former grants, charges, taxes, judgments, mortgages, and other liens and incumbrances of whatsoever nature. Signed and delivered this ..... ..... day of ...... ...... 189... Laws 1897, p. 101, § 41. "A quit claim deed to real estate may be substantially the same as a warranty deed, with the word 'quitclaim' inserted in connection with the words, 'do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey' as follows: 'Do hereby quitclaim, grant, bargain, sell and convey,' and by omitting the words, ' and warrant the title to the same.' Laws, 1897, p. 101, § 42. "Every deed or other instrument affecting real estate, executed by a corporation, must be acknowledged by the officer or person subscribing the name of the corporation thereto, which acknowledgment must be substantially in the following form to-wit: to be the identical person who subscribed the name of the maker thereof to the foregoing instrument as its (attorney, in fact, president, vice president, or mayor as the case may be) and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free and voluntary act and deed, and as the free and voluntary act and deed of such corporation, for the uses and purposes therein set forth." Laws, 1897, p. 102, § 45. "An acknowledgment by individuals of any instrument affecting real estate must be substantially in the following form, to-wit: Territory of Oklahoma, for said county and Territory, on this ...... .... .. County ss. Before me .... in and and to me known 189.., personally appeared ...... to be the identical person who executed the within and foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that ...... ...... executed the same as .... free and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth." Laws, 1897, p. 99, § 37. Acknowledgments taken out of the territory in the United States may be taken before any notary public, clerk of a court of record, or commissioner of deeds; duly appointed by the governor of the territory, for the county, state or territory where the same is taken. Laws, 1897, p. 100, § 38. Sec. 177. Pennsylvania. (See Vol. I, § 93.) For statute validating defective acknowledgments made prior to 1896, see Laws, 1897, p. 214. Sec. 178. Texas. (See Vol. I, § 98; Vol. II, § 143; Vol. III, § 196.) A certificate in the language of the statute (Tex. Rev. Stat. 1879, Art. 4309) reciting, "personally appeared before me, J. A. and N. A., his wife, both known to me (or proven to me on the oath of ..........) to be the persons whose names are subscribed" was held sufficient upon the ground that it sufficiently showed the intention of the officer to show that he knew the parties executing the deed and therefore the words enclosed in parentheses could be rejected as surplusage. Adams v. Pardue, Tex. Civ. App. (36 S. W. Rep. 1015). Sec. 179. Wisconsin. (See Vol. I, § 104; Vol. II, § 147; Vol. IV, § 167.) Ch. 125, Laws, 1895, p. 212, referred to in Vol. IV, § 167, is expressly repealed by Laws, 1897, ch. 124, p. 204, § 1. This latter statute re-enacts the form of acknowledgment given in Vol. I, § 104. See Laws, 1897, p. 204, § 2. "If such conveyance shall be executed in any other state, territory or district of the United States, it may be executed in the manner and acknowledged in the form prescribed in the next preceding section, or according to the laws of such state, territory or district, and the execution thereof may be acknowledged before any judge or clerk of a court of record, notary public, justice of the peace, mastery in chancery or other officer authorized by the laws of such state, territory or district to take acknowledgments of deeds therein, or before any commissioner appointed by the governor of this state for such purpose; and if executed within the jurisdiction of any military post of the United States, not within this state, it may be acknowledged before the commanding officer thereof." Laws, 1897, ch. 124, § 3. Section 4 of this act contains the same provisions as set out in Vol. II, § 147. DEFINITIONS. EPITOME OF CASES. Sec. 180. Miscellaneous definitions. "Charitable" and "eleemosynary" are interchangable terms. People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 (45 Pac. Rep. 270; 35 L. R. A. 269). The term children as employed in the Georgia 66 Code, § 2664, is held not to include a bastard. Floyd v. Floyd, 97 Ga. 124 (24 S. E. Rep. 451). High-water mark," when applied to a non-tidal river, means the highest limit reached by the water when the water is unaffected by freshets and contains its natural and usual flow. Morrison v. First National Bank, 88 Mo. 155 (33 Atl. Rep. 782). "Owners and holders" of land as used in Nev. Gen. Stat. 1895, p. 53, exempting such from procuring a license to keep sheep, defined. State v. Wheeler, 23 Nev. 143 (44 Pac. Rep. 430), collating numerous cases. "Reputed owner," defined. Santa Cruz Rock Pav. Co. v. Lyons, Cal. (43 Pac. Rep. 599). Property in the sense in which it is used in the constitutional provision, that it shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, is that "dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects and generally to the exclusion of all others." Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Highways, 161 Ill. 247 (43 N. E. Rep. 1100). DESCENT. IN RE PEARSON'S ESTATE. (110 Cal. 524.) Descent of property acquired from an ancestorNext of kin-Statute construed. Construing Cal. Civ. Code, § 1386, subd. 6, providing that, "if the decedent leave neither issue, husband, wife, father, mother, brother nor sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree," and § 1394 which provides that, "kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to the intestate by descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all of those who are not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded from such inheritance,' it is held that where property of a decedent inherited from his father descended under § 1386, the sisters and brothers of the decedent's deceased mother shared equally with those of his father. MCFARLAND, J. Sec. 181. Statement of the case. This is an appeal by Ira Mathewson, Daniel Mathewson, Henry Mathewson, Rhoda Smith and Lucy A. Angell from parts of an order of partial distribution of the estate of Hiram Arthur Pearsons, deceased. Although said deceased left a will, the part of his estate here in question is, for reasons not necessary to be stated, to be distributed as though he had died intestate. His next of kin of equal degree are aunts and uncles, and are the appellants, who are sisters and brothers of the decedent's mother, Ann Charity Pearsons, and Clarissa P. Wheeler and Lucy A. Valentine, who are sisters of the decedent's father, Hiram Pearsons. Lucy A. Valentine being now dead, her estate and interests are represented by her administrator, Joseph W. Reay. The greater part of the estate to be distributed came to the deceased, Hiram Arthur Pearsons, by gift and devise of his father, Hiram Pearsons, deceased; while a lesser part came to him from his mother, Ann Charity Pearsons. The probate court held that all of said estate which came from the father should be distributed to said Clarissa P. Wheeler and the administrator of said Lucy A. Valentine, and that the appellants should share only in that part of the estate which came to the deceased from his mother. Appellants contend that the whole of the estate of the deceased should be distributed equally to all the aunts and uncles. This contention presents the only question to be determined on this appeal, and it appears to us quite clear that it must be sustained. Sec. 182. Descent to next of kin-Property acquired from ancestor-Blood of ancestor-Statute construed. The rule which governs here is the one declared in subdivision 6 of § 1386 of the Civil Code, and is as follows: "If the decedent leave neither issue, husband, wife, father, mother, brother nor sister, the estate must go to the next of kin in equal degree." In the case at bar "the next of kin were the seven aunts and uncles of the decedent, and they were "in equal degree;" therefore the estate goes to them in seven equal parts. Next of kin means of course next of kin of the decedent. Our Code has no allusion to "the blood of the first purchaser," and makes no attempt at any distinction founded upon the sources from which the estate of a decedent may have been derived, except in the single instance of kindred of the "half blood." But no question of the rights of kindred of the half blood arises in this case, for all the aunts and uncles were the decedent's kindred of the whole blood, of equal degree. Respondent's whole contention rests upon the theory that' § 1394 of the Civil Code changes the rule of § 1386 above quoted. But to see the mistake of that theory it is only necessary to observe that § 1394 deals entirely with the case of kindred of "the half blood," not with kindred of the whole blood, whose rights had already been fixed by § 1386. Section 1394 is as follows: "Kindred of the half blood inherit equally with those of the whole blood in the same degree, unless the inheritance came to the intestate by descent, devise or gift of some one of his ancestors, in which case all those who are not of the blood of such ancestor must be excluded from such inheritance." Here the words "all those" clearly refer to their antecedents in the sentence "kindred of the half blood." Kindred of the half blood being the subject. of the main proposition of the section, is necessarily the subject of the exception which follows the word "unless." The section simply means that kindred of the half blood shall inherit equally with those of the whole blood, except in a certain case, and in that case kindred of the half blood shall not inherit. And who are kindred of the half blood? Why, of course, kindred of the half blood of the decedent. There were none such in the case at bar. If the next of kin of equal degree of the intestate, be some of the whole blood and some of the half blood of the intestate, the half bloods shall not inherit if they are not of the blood of the person from whom the intestate inherited the property to be distributed; but, if all be kin of the whole blood of the intestate, or if the half bloods be of the blood of the ancestor, then all share alike. Kindred of the whole blood, if next of kin, share in all of the estate of the decedent, no matter from what source it come. Sec. 183. Same-Cases reviewed. Respondents present no case arising under a statute like ours which at all conflicts with the foregoing views. On the other hand they are clearly stated in the Estate of Kirkendall, 43 Wis. 167, which respondents cite. In that case the intestate, Mary Jane Kirkendall, had inherited her estate from her mother. She left no |