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such plat, will constitute an irrevocable dedication, notwithstanding the execution of the piat was not legally acknowledged. Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 Ill. 401 (45 N. E. Rep. 236). The court say: "A common-law dedication to public use may be made by grant or written instrument, by acts or declarations, by a survey, and plat fecorded without being acknowledged. Whatever evidences a purpose on the part of a proprietor of lands to set off certain parts thereof for the use of the public will be sufficient to evidence an intention to dedicate to such use. Where a common-law dedication is made, the legal title to the land so dedicated remains in the proprietor, charged with the same burdens which it would have if the fee was in the corporation for the use of the public. An owner of land may exhibit a plan of a town laid out with designated streets and alleys, and sell lots to individuals, representing to them that it is the plan of the town; and if he sells with reference to such plan, and a purchaser of a lot acquires it under such representations, then every easement, advantage, and privilege which the plan represents which is appurtenant to such particular lot will belong to it, and a grant or covenant of the existence and use of such streets, alleys, and public grounds so appurtenant will be implied to the extent indicated on the plan. Such appurtenant streets, alleys and public grounds, as to such purchaser, must remain open forever to the use of the public. Such purchaser's rights against a proprietor may be enforced as an individual right, because the law considers the conduct of the vendor in such case to be such that it is, in effect, an estoppel in pais against a private right in such vendor to close such streets, alleys and public grounds." In Illinois it is held that in order to constitute a statutory dedication by means of a plat, it must be made by some one authorized to make plats, and must be acknowledged by the owner of the land; an acknowledgment by one who signs himself as attorney in fact not being sufficient. Blair v. Carr, 162 Ill. 362 (44 N. E. Rep. 720). Where the statute requires the instrument of dedication to be acknowledged before certain officers, it will be invalid if acknowledgment be taken by others. Village of Vermont v. Miller, 161 Ill. 210 (43 N. E. Rep. 975).

Sec. 128. Acceptance necessary. Actual acceptance by a formal adoption is held to be necessary to impose on the public the duty of repairing and maintaining a dedicated street, but such acceptance is not essential to consummate the dedication so as to cut off the rights of the owner of the land. Mayor of Brigantine v. Holland Trust Co., N. J. Eq. (35 Atl. Rep. 344). In order that there may be a valid dedication to the public, there must be an acceptance in some manner. Slight evidence of acceptance is held to be sufficient. Town of Cambridge v. Cook, 97 Ia. 599 (66 N. W. Rep. 884). The right to accept an offered dedication may be lost by laches. Village of Vermont v. Miller, 161 Ill. 210 (43 N. E. Rep. 975). In order to establish the dedication of a private alley it is not necessary to show an acceptance by the municipality. Smith v. Young, 160 Ill. 163 (43 N. E. Rep. 486).

Sec. 129. Revocation of a dedication of a platted street. It is held by a divided court that a platted street which the authorities refuse to approve or recognize, and which has not in any manner been accepted by the public, is revocable at the will of the proprietor and the abutting owners, upon that portion to which the revocation applies, regardless of the wishes of the owners of property abutting on other portions of the street, it not appearing that their right of ingress and egress is materially affected by such revocation. Mahler v. Brumder, 92 Wis. 477 (66 N. W. Rep. 502; 31 L. R. A. 694).

Sec. 130. Dedication of public parks. Where the owner of land executes and places upon record a plat whereon is marked lots, streets and alleys, and a portion designated as a public park, and then sells lots with reference to such plat, the portion marked public park becomes irrevocably dedicated to a public use, notwithstanding the town or city to which the platted land is an addition never accepts the same and it subsequently becomes incorporated within the bounds of another town or city. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21 (43 N. E. Rep. 942).

Sec. 131.

Nonuser of dedicated lands-As to when the public may be estopped from claiming the benefit of the dedication. In a well considered, recent case, it is said: "It is well settled that, though land be dedicated to the public use by a private owner, so as to vest the title in the donee for such use, until, in the judgment of the trustee, the premises are needed for such use, mere nonuser for any period of time will not operate as an abandonment of the property so as to revest the title thereto in the donor. Reilley v. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526 (8 N. W. Rep. 417; State v. Leaver, 62 Wis. 393 (22 N. W. Rep. 576); Chase v. City of Oshkosh, 81 Wis. 313 (51 N. W. Rep. 560). The title being once vested in the public, the corporation in which it is situated, and upon which devolves the duty to administer the trust, has a broad discretionary power respecting the time when the public interests require the actual enjoyment of the property, as intended by the donor. It can allow such donor, in the meantime, for some purposes at least, to use the property as his own. Neither nonuser by the public, nor such actual use by the donor, standing alone, however long continued, will affect the status of the public right. Nowhere is this principle more thoroughly intrenched than in the jurisprudence of this state. We may go further, and say that, if the title be once vested in the public under a dedication by a private owner, with or without acceptance by the donee, as circumstances may require, and the property is thereafter erroneously assessed and taxes collected thereon of the donor, that will not, of itself, necessarily affect the rights of the public. That is sustained by numerous well-considered cases cited by appellant's counsel. Rhodes v. Town of Brightwood, 145 Ind. 21 (43 N. E. Rep. 942); Town of San Leandro v. Le Breton, 72 Cal. 170 (13 Pac. Rep. 405); Ellsworth v. City of Grand Rapids, 27 Mich. 250; Getchell v. Benedict, 57 Iowa 121 (10 N. W. Rep. 321). But, notwithstanding what has preceded, it is not an open question in this court that the conduct of a municipal corporation may be such that a change of its position will cause such injustice to those who have relied upon such conduct as to warrant the court in preventing such change by an application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais. This subject was so exhaustively discussed in Paine Lumber Co. v. City of Osh

kosh, 89 Wis. 443 (61 N. W. Rep. 1108),-opinion by Justice Pinney, that it is needless to go over the matter again at this time. It was there, in effect, held that, though a public corporation cannot alienate public streets and places, and mere laches on its part cannot defeat the public rights thereto, cases may arise where private rights have grown up so as to be in equity paramount to the public rights, and where the prevention of injustice requires the assertion of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in pais for the protection of such private rights. The ground work of the doctrine is that it would be a fraud in a party to assert what his previous course had denied, when, on the faith of such denial, others have acted. To prevent the injustice a change of position of such party would cause to such others, under such circumstances, where there is no adequate legal remedy, the doctrine of equitable estoppel comes in and does the work. That the equitable rule is applied as freely against the public as against private persons is not maintained, but that the courts may administer justice by its aid, even where that results in controlling the conduct of municipal corporations, when the facts are such, in the judgment of the court, as to demand it to prevent manifest injustice and wrong to private persons, is firmly established." Reuter v. Lawe, 94 Wis. 300 (68 N. W. Rep. 955; 59 Am. St. Rep. 892; 34 L. R. A. 733).

DEEDS.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 132. As to what constitutes a conveyance. An endorsement duly executed upon the back of a tax certificate in the following form: "I hereby transfer and assign all my right, title, interest, claim, and demand to the land described in this certificate to James T. Sanders and Jonathan N. Waller, their heirs and assigns, forever, for the consideration of $50 to me in hand paid," was held to operate as a conveyance of the property described in the certificate. Sanders v. Ransom, 37

Fla. 457 (20 So. Rep. 530). The court say: "The words 'transfer' and 'assign' are not the usual operative words of a conveyance of real estate, but still, we think, sufficient to transfer the title. No particular form of words is necessary to effect a valid conveyance of lands. If the words used show an intent to convey a present interest, they are sufficient for that purpose. 3 Washb. Real Prop., p. 428; 1 Devl. Deeds, § 211; Doe v. Hines, Busb. 343; Warv. Abst., pp. 192, 193." Where a contract for dissolution of the partnership provides that all the property should pass to one of the partners who already held the legal title to the partnership real estate, in which contract the retiring partner covenanted that he would execute and deliver to the other partner a good and sufficient deed for all his interest in the partnership property, in an equitable proceeding under such contract the duty to convey will be treated as equivalent to a conveyance. Marvin v. Stimpson, 23 Colo. 174 (46 Pac. Rep. 673). For particular case as to whether an instrument purporting to be an assignment of a deed operates as a conveyance, see Herndon v. Vick, 89 Tex. 469 (35 S. W. Rep. 141). A prosecution may be sustained under Tex. Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 550, making it a crime to forge any deed or conveyance of title paper in relation to conveying lands, for the forging of an instrument in the form of a deed though not acknowledged or witnessed. Lassister v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. App. 540 (34 S. W. Rep. 751).

Sec. 133. Failure of consideration. Where each of several devisees, in order to prevent a family quarrel and a contest of the will, agree to convey their interests to a certain party, provided all will join in the conveyance, the consideration of such conveyance fails if any fail to join therein. Donnelly v. Rafferty, 172 Pa. 587 (33 Atl. Rep. 754). Where the consideration for a deed is the marriage of the parties to it, it cannot be set aside for failure of consideration on account of facts which do not render the marriage either void or voidable. Barnes v. Barnes, 110 Cal. 418 (42 Pac. Rep. 904).

Sec. 134. Alterations and filling blanks. After its delivery, a grantor has no power whatever to alter or change

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