by which to test the liability of the owner to it. Steppe v. Alter, 48 La. 363 (19 So. Rep. 147; 55 Am. St. Rep. 281). It is held that Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 670, 2322, must be construed together as laws in pari materia; and, being thus construed, they conclusively relate to the injuries which may be inflicted by falling walls, or materials composing them, upon neighbors or passers-by, and not to those resulting to occupants of the buildings or guests therein assembled; and that a member of a surprise party visiting the house of a friend for the purpose of spending an evening in social amusement, sustaining injuries by means of a falling gallery, cannot recover damages of the owner of the building, who had leased it as a place of residence to the friend whose house the party visited. Mc Connell v. Lemley, 48 La. 1433 (20 So. Rep. 887; 55 Am. St. Rep. 319; 34 L. R. A. 609).

Sec. 122. Contributory negligence. While it is the duty of the master to keep his premises in a safe condition, so as not to endanger the life or limbs of the servant, yet the servant will be denied relief against the master for injuries arising out of the unsafe condition of his premises, if with ordinary prudence the servant could have avoided the injuries. McCarthy v. Whitney Iron- Works Co., 48 La. 978 (20 So. Rep. 171). A man carrying a heavy trunk for hire from a dwelling house, and declining assistance, who in so doing breaks through a platform a few steps above the sidewalk, fracturing his leg, cannot recover damages from the owner of the house who did not know of any defect in the platform, if it was well built and still in apparent good condition, showing no indication that it is unsafe, and has been built only seven or eight years and has always been kept well painted. Badde ley v. Shea, 114 Cal. 1 (45 Pac. Rep. 990; 55 Am. St. Rep. 56; 33 L. R. A. 747). A guest who occupies a room in a hotel with knowledge of defects in the construction of the hotel assumes the risk of injury; and the owner of the hotel is not liable for injuries resulting from defective construction of certain portions thereof by the lessee under a contract giving him title to material used and a right to remove the same. Glass v. Colman, 14 Wash. 635 (45 Pac. Rep. 310).

Sec. 123. Liability of municipalities and officers. In a recent case the authorities are exhaustively reviewed and it is held that a city is liable to a patron of its water works for hire, whose property is consumed through the negligence of the city in permitting such works to get out of repair. Lenzen v. New Braunfels, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 335 (35 S. W. Rep. 341). A city is required to use reasonable care to protect pedestrians from falling into excavations upon private lots adjacent to side walk. Wiggin v. St. Louis, 135 Mo. 558 (37 S. W. Rep. 528). Ohio Laws Vol. 85, p. 34, providing for the erection of fire escapes to all buildings of a certain height in cities of a certain class held unconstitutional because not general in its operation. Cincinnati v. Steinkamp, 54 O. St. 284 (43 N. E. Rep. 490). It is held that counties are not liable for injuries occasioned by defective bridges on highways. Board of Commissioners v. Hemphill, 14 Ind. App. 219 (42 N. E. Rep. 760).

DEDICATION.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 124. As to what constitutes-General principles. In determining the question of dedication of a way to the public the intent of the donor is a paramount question, and the intent to so dedicate must expressly appear, or must be fairly inferred from the acts of the donor. Silva v. Spangler, Cal. (43 Pac. Rep. 617). Citing, People v. County of Marin, 103 Cal. 224 (37 Pac. Rep. 203; 26 L. R. A. 659); Hewitt v. Mayor of Pulaski, Tenn. (36 S. W. Rep. 878.) Where the acts of an owner of real estate are relied upon to prove that he has dedicated it to the public, the acts must be such as to clearly manifest an intention on his part to dedicate it, and the public must have so acted with reference to the property as to indicate an intention of acceptance of the property dedicated. Acts of an owner which amount to a dedication of his property to the public must be

such as indicate an abandonment of the use of the property exclusively to the public. City of Omaha v. Hawver, 49 Neb. 1 (67 N. W. Rep. 891). A vendor selling different portions of his property to others may by private contract create a private way although it opens out upon a public street and is used in a similar manner. A plain and positive intention to dedicate to public use is an essential element of a dedication, and the intention must be shown by acts or language so clear as to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis, or at least to clearly convince the judicial mind. De Grilleau v. Frawley, 48 La. 184 (19 So. Rep. 151). Dedication may be presumed from long user by the public. Woolard v. Clymer, Tenn. (35 S. W. Rep. 1086). In a recent case the supreme court of Virginia say: "Dedication is an appropriation of land by its owner for the public use. It may be express or implied. It may be implied from long use by the public of the land claimed to have been dedicated. Dedication is not required to be made by a deed or other writing, but may be effectually and validly done by verbal declarations. The intent is its vital principle, and the dedication may be made in every conceivable way that such intention may be manifested. It must, however, be manifested by some unequivocal act, and is not effectual and binding until accepted. When the intention of the owner to make the dedication has been unequivocally manifested, and there has been acceptance by competent authority, or such long use by the public as to render its reclamation unjust and improper, the dedication is complete." Buntin v. City of Danville, 93 Va. 200 (24 S. E. Rep. 830). Citing, City of Richmond v. Stokes, 31 Grat. 713; Talbott v. Railroad Co., Id. 685; Harris' Case, 20 Grat. 833; Kelly's Case, 8 Grat. 632; Hall v. McLeod, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 98 (74 Am. Dec. 400); Harding v. Jasper, 14 Cal. 642; Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U. S. 716; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. Eq. 213 and notes thereto; State v. Trask, 6 Vt. 355 (27 Am. Dec. 554, and note thereto); 2 Greenl. Ev., § 662; and Washb. Easem. 180, 184. Before the owner of real estate can be divested of his property by a claim that land has been dedicated by such owner to the use of the public, the proof must be very satisfactory either of the actual intention to dedicate or such acts or declarations as

should equitably estop the owner from denying such intention. City of Ottawa v. Yentzer, 160 Ill. 509 (43 N. E. Rep. 601).

Sec. 125. As to what constitutes-Particular cases.

Where a railroad company whose line crosses an alleged street, acquiesces in the use of the same by the public, with knowledge that it is being improved by the public for street purposes, will be stopped to question its dedication. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Greensburg, J. & P. St. Ry. Co., 176 Pa. St. 559 (35 Atl. Rep. 122; 36 L. R. A. 839). The fact that a way granted to individuals is used by others without objection, is not sufficient to establish a dedication to the public. Silva v. Spangler, Cal. (43 Pac. Rep. 617). A deed insufficient in form, executed to a municipality, may be evidence of a dedication. Morris v. School Dist. No. 86, 63 Ark. 149 (37 S. W. Rep. 569). For cases which depend upon particular facts and which illustrate what constitutes a dedication, see Patterson v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 172 Pa. St. 554 (33 Atl. Rep. 575); Frankford & S. P. City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia, 175 Pa. St. 120 (34 Atl. Rep. 577); Gray v. Haas, 98 Ia. 502 (67 N. W. Rep. 394); Kansas City Milling Co. v. Riley, 133 Mo. 574 (34 S. W. Rep. 835); Town of Holly Grove v. Smith, 63 Ark. 5 (37 S. W. Rep. 956); Spaulding v. Wesson, 115 Cal. 441 (45 Pac. Rep. 807); Alton v. Meeusenberg, 108 Mich. 629 (66 N. W. Rep. 571).

Sec. 126. As to what constitutes-Maps and plats. It is held that if the owner of the fee lays out a plan of lots and conveys one of them by reference to the plan, the dedication of all the streets in the plan to public use is complete and irrevocable; and that where a prior mortgagee of the owner releases his mortgage as to the lot thus conveyed, it is such a recognition of the plan by the mortgagee as shows his assent to the dedication. Pry v. Mankedick, 172 Pa. St. 535 (34 Atl. Rep. 46). Citing, Indianapolis v. Kingsbury (1884), 101 Ind. 200; Rowan's Ex'rs v. Town of Portland (1847), 8 B. Mon. 232; Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan (1892), 133 Ind. 331 (32 N. E. Rep. 1017); Thaxter v. Turner (1892), 17 R. I. 799 (24 Atl. Rep. 829); 2 Smith, Lead. Cas. (7th Am. Ed.) 154: 2 Dill. Mun. Corp., par. 640, note 4; Vreeland v. Torrey

(1881), 84 N. J. Eq. 312; Hague v. Inhabitants of West Hoboken (1873), 23 N. J. Eq. 354. The presumption of dedication which arises from conveyances made with reference to a platted street may be rebutted by showing that no intention to dedicate existed at the time of the grant. This absence of intention will be inferred from a clause in the grant which specifies that the reference to the platted street is for the purpose of description only and not for the purpose of showing the dedication to a public use. Mayor of Baltimore v. Fear, 82 Md. 246 (33 Atl. Rep. 637). In order to have an effectual statutory dedication, the dedicator must be the owner in fee. One who is not an owner can no more pass title by dedication than he can by deed, and no one not holding under the dedicator is estopped to deny his title to the property thus attempted to be dedicated. Kansas City Milling Co. v. Riley, 133 Mo. 574 (34 S. W. Rep. 835). The purchaser of a lot calling to bound on a street not yet opened by the public authorities is entitled to a right of way over it, if it is not on the land of his vendor, to its full extent and dimensions, only until it reaches some other street or public way. Mayor of Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77 (33 Atl. Rep. 435). Where ground is platted by a person who does not have title or whose title afterwards fails, if the real owner recognizes the plat and conveys lots according to the description therein and abutting upon grounds designated in the plat as public, he is estopped afterwards to claim the ground so designated; for by adopting, referring to and making that plat a part of his deeds of conveyance for the several lots sold, the real owner adopts the entire plat as his own with all its dedications and reservations. Smith v. Young, 160 Ill. 163 (43 N. E. Rep. 486). Persons who buy land according to plats or plans whereon streets are marked, acquire irrevocable rights to such streets; and this dedication operates not only in favor of those who buy from the donor but also in favor of those who buy in the general locality where the way or street is located. Wilson v. Acree, 97 Tenn. 378 (37 S. W. Rep. 90).

Sec. 127. Maps and plats not legally executed. The making and recording of a town plat, in which streets, alleys and a public square are marked and a sale of lots pursuant to