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Illinois it is held that a right of dower in lands unassigned is such an interest as may be reached by a judgment creditor by the aid of a court of equity. Petefish, Skiles & Co. v. Buck, 56 Ill. App. 149; Thompson v. Marsh, 61 Ill. App. 269. However, the statute of this state (ch. 22, § 49) provides that a judgment creditor with an execution returned nulla bona may file a bill in chancery "to compel the discovery of any property, money, or thing in action due" his debtor and such court may decree satisfaction of the judgment out of any "money or things in action" belonging to the debtor, but the cases cited do not seem to rely on the statute. They cite the New York cases referred to in the principal opinion, and in the case of Petefish, Skiles & Co. v. Buck, the court say: "In the case of Tompkins v. Ford, 4 Paige (N.. Y.) 448, it was held that the right of dower is such an interest as may be reached by the aid of an equitable court, and applied to the satisfaction of a judgment against the dowress in the manner contemplated by the bill in the case at bar. Nor do we regard the ruling in that case as resting, as is suggested, upon the particular provisions of the statute of the state of New York, but think it but declaratory of a general and fundamental doctrine of equity."

Sec. 109. Widow's estate in unassigned dowerConveyances. A widow left in possession of her deceased husband's lands in which she has an unassigned right of dower cannot enjoin the enforcement of a previous judgment for possession rendered against her husband in favor of third parties. Smith v. Whitsett,

Tenn. (36 S. W. Rep. 1048). The court say: "Prior to the assignment of dower, there is no privity between the husband and wife as to the husband's lands, so far as such privity is based upon the right of dower. The right of dower confers no title to any part of the husband's land after his death until assignment of dower is made. Until then the wife has no seisin or right of entry in any part of the husband's land, and the heir can well maintain his writ of entry against her, to which her claims of dower would constitute no defense. It is a mere right, which does not ripen into a title until some specific portion is set out and assigned as dower." Unassigned dower cannot be released or conveyed to any one except the owner of the fee, Sloniger v. Sloniger, 161 Ill. 270 (43 N. E. Rep. 1111); nor can it be released to a stranger to the title, Union Brewing Co. v. Meier, 163 Ill. 424 (45 N. E. Rep. 264). In Arkansas it is held that an alienee of a widow's dower before assignment acquires no rights which he can enforce at law, but he may, in equity, have her dower set aside and assigned to him, Barnett v. Meacham, 62 Ark. 313 (35 S. W. Rep. 533); but in Minnesota it is held that a consummate right of dower, although still unmeasured, is a vested property interest which may be assigned or conveyed, and the title of the assignee is unaffected by the fact that the probate court subsequently assigns the dower to the widow, she holding the bare legal title thus conferred in trust for assignee who has priority over subsequent judgment creditors of the widow, Dobberstein v. Murphy, 64 Minn. 127 (66 N. W. Rep. 204).

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 110. Curtesy of husband. The statutes of Mississippi have not abolished the estate of curtesy initiate but have converted it from a vested to a contingent estate. Hill v. Nash, 73 Miss. 849 (19 So. Rep. 707). A husband cannot claim curtesy in lands in which his deceased wife was not seized with the present right of possession. Verhine v. Ragsdale, 96 Tenn. 532 (35 S. W. Rep. 556). By virtue of a decree of confirmation of a judicial sale of vacant and unoccupied lots or lands, the purchaser has, by construction of law, such possession as amounts to such seisin in fact as will entitle the husband of such purchaser to curtesy in such lots or land. Seim v. O' Grady, 42 W. Va. 77 (24 S. E. Rep. 994). A husband who joins with his wife in the execution of a mortgage upon her land cannot claim an estate by curtesy as against the mortgagee. Haden v. Peirce, 165 Mass. 359 (43 N. E. Rep. 119). A tenant by curtesy is liable for taxes. White v. Portland, 67 Conn. 272 (34 Atl. Rep. 1022). In Virginia, in the absence of some provision to the contrary in the instrument creating a separate estate in a married woman, she may defeat her husband's curtesy by will. Va. Code, § 2513, applied. Kiracofe v. Kiracofe, 93 Va, 591 (25 S. E. Rep. 601).

Sec. 111. Widow's right of dower-Lands in which it may be claimed. The right of a widow to have dower in lands conveyed by her husband is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the conveyance. Purcell v. Lang, 97 Ia. 610 (66 N. W. Rep. 887). The fact that lands of which the husband died seized were paid for out of the proceeds of a sale of land belonging to his former wife, in which he held an estate by curtesy, does not deprive his subsequent widow of her right to dower therein. Vance v. Vance, 118 N. C. 864 (24 S. E. Rep. 768). The wife of an owner of the legal title to lands cannot assert dower therein against the owners of the equitable title. McKneely v. Terry, 61 Ark. 527 (33 S. W. Rep. 953). Under Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 4513, a widow can only claim dower in such lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at some time during the mar

riage. Garrison v. Young, 135 Mo. 203 (36 S. W. Rep. 662). A widow cannot claim dower in lands which before her husband's marriage he had sold by an oral contract and his vendee had gone in possession who took a deed from the husband alone after the marriage. Va. Code, § 2268, construed. Chapman v. Chapman's Trustees, 92 Va. 537 (24 S. E. Rep. 225; 53 Am. St. Rep. 823). Ala. Code, §§ 1910, 1911, 2354, 2355, construed and applied-effect of widow's ownership of separate estate upon her right of dower. Jackson v. Isbell, 109 Ala. 100 (19 So. Rep. 447).

Sec. 112. Dower in lands "exchanged "-Construction of statute. In construing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 17, which provides that where land is "exchanged" for land, dower cannot be claimed in both pieces, it is held that a wife who in consideration of her release of dower in a conveyance by her husband accepts his note for a specific sum which she subsequently enforces against his estate, is not barred from claiming dower in lands conveyed to her husband in part consideration of the first conveyance. Hartwell v. De Vault, 159 Ill. 325 (42 N. E. Rep. 789). The court say: "The word 'exchange,' as used in the statute, has the same meaning which it had at common law. 1 Scrib. Dower, p. 286, § 11; 1 Washb. Real Prop., marg. p. 158, § 11. The rule that a widow is not to be endowed of both parcels of land exchanged is as ancient as the common law. Cass v. Thompson, 1 N. H. 65 (8 Am. Dec. 36). An exchange,' as defined by Blackstone, 'is a mutual grant of equal interest; the one in consideration of the other. The word "exchange" is so individually requisite and appropriated by law to this case that it cannot be supplied by any other word or expressed by any circumlocution. The estates exchanged must be equal in quantity, not of value, for that is immaterial, but of interest; as fee simple for fee simple, a lease for twenty years for a lease for twenty years, and the like.' 2 Bl. Comm., marg. p. 323; 1 Scrib. Dower, p. 284, § 7. The word 'exchange,' when used in reference to real estate, has at common law the definite and well-defined meaning above expressed in Blackstone. 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 115; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 892, and cases in note. It is not sufficient that the par

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ties make ordinary deeds, for the deed must be one of exchange, and to that mode of conveyance the word 'exchange' is essential. Cass v. Thompson, 1 N. H. 65 (8 Am. Dec. 36). In Wilcox v. Randall, 7 Barb. 633, it was held that the word 'exchange,' as used in a statute like ours, which provides that, if a husband seised of an estate of inheritance in lands exchange them for other lands, his widow shall not have dower of both, but shall make her election within a year, etc., is to receive the same interpretation which is applied to it when used at common law, in reference to that species of conveyance; and it was also there held, that there is no exchange of equal interests where a part of the consideration. consists of money or personal property, and a part of land."

Sec. 113. Release of Dower. Release of dower is a good consideration for a conveyance of land by a husband to his wife. Hilbish v. Hattle, 145 Ind. 59 (44 N. E. Rep 20); Halferty v. Scearce, 135 Mo. 428 (37 S. W. Rep. 255). A conveyance by a husband to his wife in consideration of her relinquishment of dower in the lands which he owns does not apply to lands which he has already conveyed, and she is not required to renounce such conveyance in order to claim dower in lands previously conveyed by her husband. Mo. Rev. Stat. 1889, § 4530, applied. Halferty v. Scearce, 135 Mo. 428 (37 S. W. Rep. 113). An insane wife is a necessary party to a proceeding under Va. Code, § 2625, by a husband of an insane wife to sell real estate and have her right of dower released. Hess v. Gale, 93 Va. 467 (25 S. E. Rep. 533).

Sec. 114. Jointure. An antenuptial conveyance of land to an intended wife reciting that she is "to have and to hold the said lot and parcel of land as aforesaid, as jointure, and in lieu and full satisfaction of her whole dower in his estate," precludes her from claiming dower in the lands of her husband, including lands acquired by him during the marriage. Bryan v. Byran, 62 Ark. 79 (34 S. W. Rep. 260). The couri say: "Jointure is defined to be a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife of lands and tenements, to take effect in profit and possession presently after the death of the husband, for the life of the wife at least.' The effect of jointure

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* if accepted, is to bar dower. Grogan v. Grogan, 27 Ohio St. 50; Wentworth v. Wentworth, 69 Me. 247; Culberson v. Culberson, 37 Ga. 296; Andrews v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79; 1 Washb. Real Prop., pp. 324, 330, § 17; Trevis' Ex'rs v. McCreary, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 151; Vance v. Vance, 21 Me. 364; Perryman v. Perry, 19 Mo. 469; Miller v. Goodwin, 8 Gray, 542. See also, Charles v. Charles, 8 Grat. 486 (56 Am. Dec. 155).”

Sec. 115.

Assignment of dower.

A petition by a

widow for the assignment of dower must show that her hus band was seized of such an estate in the lands in which she seeks to have dower as to entitle her to assert that right. Garrison

V.

Young, 135 Mo. 203 (36 S. W. Rep. 662). A judgment allotting dower to a widow in all the lands of her husband, to which all the heirs and adverse claimants are made parties, will estop her from asserting a parol trust in any of such lands. N. C. Code, § 2103, 2111, 2112, applied. Boyd v. Redd, 118 N. C. 680 (24 S. E. Rep. 429). In North Carolina affirmative relief cannot be granted to defendants in a special proceedings before the clerk of the superior court for the allotment of dower. Vance v. Vance, 118 N. C. 864 (24 S. E. Rep. 768). In Maine it is held that, where a dower is assigned by the sheriff under a writ of seisin of dower, it must be from each separate parcel, and of such portion of each as will produce. one-third of the net income of the whole, and the lands assigned should be set out definitely by metes and bounds. Skolfield v. Skolfield, 88 Me. 258 (34 Atl. Rep. 27). Under Georgia Code, § 4045, notice to the administrator of an estate of the widow's application for dower is all that is required unless she be administratrix, and while creditors and all persons interested may be heard in such proceedings atter the return of the commissioners, they cannot complain of vant of notice. Fussell v. Short, 96 Ga. 524 (23 S. E. Rep. 506). Under W. Va. Code, ch. 65, § 10; ch. 104, § 1, an action by a widow to recover her dower must be brought within ten years after the death of her husband, Smith v. Wehrle, 41 W. Ta. 270 (23 S. E. Rep. 712). Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 41, § 44, applied-assignment of dower in proceedings to sell land to pay debts. Oettinger v. Specht, 162 Ill. 179 (44 N. E. Rep. 399)

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