decree the sale of choses in action upon the application of judgment creditors. The case of Davison v. Whittlesey, 1 MacArthur, 163, was much relied on by the plaintiffs. It was decided on the authority of Tompkins v. Fonda, supra, which, having been based on the New York statute, should have had no weight where, as in the District of Columbia, no such statute was in force. Nor are we satisfied to adopt the reasoning of the court in Davison v. Whittlesey. After stating that at law the right to have dower assigned could not be reached, it is said: "But in equity it is otherwise. The widow has no right in conscience to deprive her creditors of the benefit of her right of dower for the satisfaction of their claims by continuing in joint possession with the heirs, and neglecting to ask for a formal assignment, which assignment, if made, would enable the creditors to reach her dower by execution." It must be remembered that in the case at bar there is not only no fraud alleged by the plaintiffs, but they have disclaimed any intention of charging bad faith or collusion between the defendant and the heirs at law who are in possession of the land in which she is entitled to have dower assigned to her. In the position she has assumed in this case she is only standing upon her legal rights. It is conceded that at common law, aside from such statutes as have been enacted in some of the states, though not in Maryland, the defendant's right of dower is not liable for her debts. And while it may be said, perhaps, in one sense, that "in conscience she ought not to deprive her creditors of the benefit of her right of dower" for the payment of their just claims, yet the same may be said of any one who relies on the statute of limitations or exemption laws to defeat such a claim. If debtors could be required by a court of equity to abandon their legal rights, and to subject themselves to the dictates of conscience, or to some law regarded as higher than the law of the land, they would doubtless seldom plead the statute of limitations, or rely upon the provisions of homestead or exemption laws. But whenever these statutes are properly and reasonably pleaded, they are as binding in a court of equity, which is sometimes called a court of conscience, as they are in a court of law. And recognizing this right to stand upon one's legal rights, it has been held that the neglect or refusal to have dower assigned does

not amount to fraud. Maxon v. Gray, 14 R. I. 641; Buford v. Buford, 1 Bibb, 305. This is only another application of the well-settled principle of equity that "where a rule, either of statute or common law, is direct, and governs the case in all its circumstances or the particular point, a court of equity is as much bound by it as a court of law, and can as little depart from it." 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 64. Applying here, then, the conceded common-law rule that the creditor has no legal right to look to the unassigned dower (it being a chose in action) for the satisfaction of his claims, it follows that equity will not aid him.

Much reliance was also placed upon the language used by Chancellor Bland in the case of Watkins v. Dorsey, 1 Bland, 531. To the same general effect, also, is Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126, where it is said that it is within the general jurisdiction of a court of chancery to assist a judgment creditor to reach and apply to the payment of his debts any property which, by reason of its nature only, and not by reason of any positive rule exempting it from liability for debt, cannot be taken on execution at law; as in the case of trust property in which the judgment debtor has the entire beneficial interest, of shares in a corporation, or of choses in action. While the rule thus stated may be, when properly applied, admitted to be correct, we cannot agree with the application of it sought to be justified by Watkins v. Dorsey, nor with the broad application of the rule, as in Ager v. Murray, to all choses in action. In the case first named Chancellor Bland said that the facts before him expressed one of the then-existing deficiencies of our Code; and, after stating that both real and personal property of a debtor had been subjected to be taken on execution at law, he says: "There are, however, still several kinds of property which a debtor may hold, lying beyond the reach of his creditors," and he mentions as in this class stock in corporations and things in action. The case from which we have quoted the foregoing language of the Chancellor was decided in 1829. But very soon thereafter the act of 1832 (chapter 307), now codified, was passed, by which any interest of a debtor in stock of a corporation may be taken and sold under an execution at law. But no such act has ever passed in this state by which the thing in action here attached could

be so taken and sold. That there is no such statute is the main foundation of this proceeding in equity, for, if there were a remedy at law, the bill in this case was properly dismissed. It was held in Watkins v. Dorsey that, where a party cannot obtain relief at all, either by an ordinary execution or by the extraordinary remedy of outlawry or attachment of the person by reason of the peculiar situation of the property or the equitable nature of the title, he may obtain relief by bill in equity. But we think it is apparent that this language, even if it was not so intended, should be limited so as to relate to the enforcement of some existing legal right, for a court of equity, however broad and far reaching its powers are, cannot create new rights, not before existing at law, and then take jurisdiction to pass upon and enforce them because the law affords no remedy. It is perhaps but fair to infer that the language of the chancellor related to property situated like that in Harris v. Alcock, 10 Gill & J. 226 (32 Am. Dec. 158), to which case he refers, where it was held that the equitable interest of the defendant in personal property, which, under the circumstances of that case, could not be taken by execution at law, might be attacked in equity. Nor do we assent to this view that the mere abolition of the extraordinary remedies of outlawry and attachment of the person would confer jurisdiction in equity. Such a conclusion would be in conflict with reason, as well as with modern authority. It would certainly not seem to follow that, if the law had always and consistently refused to give an execution against things in action, and had allowed only the extraordinary remedies just mentioned, that upon the destruction of the latter the former would not only thereupon spring into existence, but become remedies appropriate for a court of equity. The contrary conclusion would, we think, be more reasonable, namely, that, the legislature having abolished execution against the person which was used for the purpose of getting satisfaction out of the debtor's effects which could not be reached by other executions, and having failed to provide any new remedy to take its place, it was not intended there should be any. And so it has been held in Donavan v. Finn, 1 Hopk. Ch. 59 (N. Y.) (14 Am. Dec. 531); Buford v. Buford, 1 Bibb. 305; Greene v. Keene, 14 R. I. 388, 397 (51 Am. Rep. 400). 'Equity fol

66

lows the Law," and, as we have seen, a rule either of statute or common law is as potent in a court of equity as in a court of law. 1 Story, Eq. Jur., § 64. Whatever may at one time have been the vague and general rule as to the limits and extent of equity jurisdiction, it is now well settled that "no court of chancery at this day would attempt to supply the defects of law by deciding contrary to its settled rules in any manner, to any extent, or under any circumstances, beyond the already settled principles of equity jurisprudence." 1 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 47. In reference to the New York cases cited in Ager v. Murray, supra, namely, McDermutt v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. 687, and Spader v. Hadden, 5 Johns. Ch. 280, it may be said that they were both prior to Hadden v. Spader, 20 Johns. 554, in which Platt, J., said there was such a conflict of authority and dicta upon this question that he felt at liberty to decide it upon sound principles of justice and public policy, and that he was not prepared to extend the jurisdiction of equity to any other cases than those wherein the property itself was liable to execution at law, and which had been also assigned in fraud of creditors; holding also that the power to subject choses in action of the debtor had not been conferred upon the courts, and suggesting the necessity for legislation. It has been supposed that this expression of opinion led to the statute which was afterwards passed in New York conferring jurisdiction upon courts of chancery to entertain a bill like the one filed in this case.

It would seem to be reasonably clear from the authorities already cited and the discussion of them that, in the absence of a statute, and in the absence of fraud or some other ground of equity jurisdiction, a court of equity has no power to subject the defendant's unassigned right of dower to the payment of her debts. But this conclusion will, we think, be placed beyond doubt by a brief consideration of some of the adjudications of the highest courts of other states. In the case

Maxon v. Gray, 14 R. I. 641, which was decided in 1885, the very question now before us was passed upon. That case, like this, was a bill in equity by judgment creditors for a decree for a sale of an unassigned right of dower, and in an able and elaborate opinion the court came to the conclusion, after reviewing many of the previous cases, that equity had no jur

isdiction. To the same effect is Green v. Keene, 14 R. I. 388 (51 Am. Rep. 400). In Creswell v. Smith, 2 Tenn. Ch. 416, it was held that chancery has no power to reach stocks or things in action, even in the hands of third persons, unaffected with fraud or trust, without the aid of a statute. Keightley v. Walls, 27 Ind. 384; Williams v. Reynolds, 7 Ind. 622. In the case last cited it is said equity will not subject choses in action to the payment of a judgment creditor, because equity only aids the law, and will, therefore, not interfere, except as to such property as may be sold on execution at law. In the case Buford v. Buford, supra, the same view was enforced in the absence of a statute, and in concluding its opinion the court said, "The bare circumstances of a debt cannot be made the foundation of a bill." The views upon the question of jurisdiction expressed in all these cases are in accord with the rule as laid down by Mr. Adams. "Equity," he says, " does not create new rights which the common law denies, but it gives effective redress for the infringement of existing rights, where, by reason of the special circumstances of the case, redress at law is inadequate." Adams, Eq., p. 6; Phelps, Jud. Eq., § 158. The plaintiffs have failed to bring their case within the limits of equity jurisdiction as established and practiced in this state, their bill must be dismissed. "When a creditor," says Chancellor Sanford in Donovan v. Finn, supra, “comes into this court for relief, he must come not merely to obtain a decree or satisfaction of a judgment, but he must present facts which form a case for equity jurisdiction." Such facts the creditors who filed the bill now before us have entirely failed to set forth, and we therefore agree with the learned court below that the demurrer to the bill was properly sustained, and the bill was properly dismissed. Decree affirmed.

Sec. 108. Subjecting unassigned dower to the payment of debts. Before assignment a widow's right to dower is a mere chose in action and is not subject to execution. Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212 (52 Am. Dec. 262); Blain v. Harrison, 11 Ill. 384; Norman v. Willett, 48 Ill. 534; McMahan v. Gray, 158 Mass. 289 (22 N. E. Rep. 923; 5 L. R. A. 748; 15 Am. St. Rep. 282). In the last case cited it is held that under the statute of Massachusetts (Pub. Stat., ch. 151, § 2, cl. 11, as amended by Statute 1884, ch. 285) a widow's creditors may by the aid of equity subject her unassigned dower to the payment of their claims. In