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tional surety, without the consent of the original makers, prevented the maintenance of an action on the note against them. Gardner v. Walsh, 5 El. & Bl. 83. But in an earlier decision, of perhaps equal weight, Lord Denman and Justices Littledale, Patteson,,and Coleridge held that in such a case the addition did not avoid the note, or prevent the original surety, on paying the note, from recovering of the principal maker the amount paid. Catton v. Simpson, 8 Adol. & F. 136; S. C., 3 Nev. & P. 248. See also Gilb. Ev. 109. And in a later case, in the court of chancery, upon an appeal in bankruptcy, Lords Justices Knight, Bruce and Turner held that the addition of a surety was not a material alteration of the original contract. Ex parte Yates, 2 De G. & J. 191; see also Angle v. N. West. Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 330; Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80; Greenfield Saving Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196, and cases cited. Mersman v. Werges. Opinion by Gray, J. [See 7 Am. Rep. 669; 27 Hun, 349; 1 id. 504, 506; 20 Eng Rep. 594; 13 Alb. L. J. 263; 29 id. 519.—ED.] [Decided Nov. 3, 1884.]


NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CHECK-PRESENTATION FOR PAYMENT-FAILURE OF BANK.-The presentation of a check to the bank on which it is drawn must be made within a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances into consideration; but where the check is given in a rural district, twenty miles distant from the place of payment, and not in time to reach the bank before it closed that day, and pressing business prevents the holder from presenting it the following day, and the next day being Sunday, on Monday morning it is placed in the local bank for collection, the delay is uot unreasonable, and if the bank has failed the holder may recover the amount of the check from the drawer. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Nutting v Burked, 48 id. 241. Sup. Ct. Mich., Oct. 15, 1884. Frieberg v. Cody. Opinion by Sherwood, J. [20 N. W. Rep. 813.]



INDICTMENT-ARSON-SUGAR-HOUSE- PLEADING.Section 2126, R. L., prescribes the penalty for burning a dwelling-house or its out-houses; section 4128 prescribes a less severe penalty for burning various other buildings specially named, or other house or building of another not constituting a dwelling-house or its out-buildings;" the indictment charged the respondent with burning a "certain building commonly known and called a sugar-house," but without averment that the" sugar-house" did not constitute a dwellinghouse or its out-buildings. The term sugar-house is not used in section 4128. Held, that the case does not come within the rule that a proviso or exception in a statute must be negatived when descriptive of the offense; and that the indictment is sufficient. A judgment on an indictment for the mitigated offeuse would be a bar to au indictment charging the same offense with aggravation. The views here shortly expressed are fully sustained and much amplified in Commonwealth v. Squire, 1 Metc. 258; Devoe v. Commonwealth, 3 id. 316; Larned v. Commonwealth, 12 id. 240; Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 15 Gray, 480; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 122 Mass. 454. Sup. Ct. Vt., Jan., 1884. State v. Ambler. Opinion by Rowell, J. [56 Vt. 672.]


THE THE new year promises well in the way of litigation. At the opening of the courts on Monday, January 5, there were 245 appeals on the calendar of the General Term of the Supreme Court, enough to keep the judges busy for some time to come. We understand that there are on the present General Term calendar in this department over one hundred appeals from interlocutory orders. The judges are complaining of the burden of work cast upon them, and it is hoped that some relief will be afforded by the Legislature. The delay in litigation in this city is intolerable, and works with equal hardship upon clients and lawyers.

As is usual at this season, New Year's presents were in order, and the city of New York was no exception to the rule. The citizens of New York were presented with three mayors within the space of twenty-four hours, one whom the people had elected to fill the office, and two whom they did not have in contemplation. Mayor Kirk utilized his brief term of office to make an appointment to the office of corporation coun. sel, but when the appointee tried to install himself he found that possession is nine points of the law, and the entrance was barred by a big iron gate, behind which the present incumbent had entrenched himself, aud the opposing forces held a parley through the grating. We understand that a case is to be agreed upon and submitted to the General Term so as to get a speedy determination of the question as to who is entitled to the office. Both parties are fortified by the opinions of eminent counsel, and the court will be called upon to decide where doctors disagree. The question seems to be narrowed down to whether Mayor Edson's term expired at midnight December 31, or continued until noon of January 1. If it did expire at midnight December 31 we do not see why Mr. Kirk's appointee is not entitled to the office. The Consolidation Act provides: "In case of a vacancy he shall so act until noon of the first Monday of January succeeding the election at which a successor is chosen." This language is used in reference to the president of the board of aldermen. Mayor Edson held his office under chapter 335, Laws of 1873, section 20, which provides: "The mayor shall be elected at a general election, and hold his office for the term of two years, commencing on the first day of January next after his election." Under this state of facts it would seem that Mayor Edson's term expired at midnight December 31, and that there was a vacancy to be filled by the president of the board of aldermen.

The Marie-Garrison suit continues to drag its slow length along. "Men may come, and men may go, but the reference goes on forever." Recently the defendants, after having consented to the selection of the present referee, became convinced that he was too good a lawyer for them, and made an application for his removal on the ground that he was prejudiced against the defendants, and also that he insisted on trying the action as one in equity instead of a suit at law. The judge to whom the application was made very properly held that the defendants must abide by their choice, and denied the motion.


An interesting question has just been decided by Judge McAdam, of the City Court. The defendant in an action in that court had returned a reply to a counterclaim, the jurat to which was signed "Jennie Turner, Notary Public,' as unverified. A motion was made by the plaintiff to compel the defendant to accept the reply as properly verified. It appeared that Miss Turner had been appointed a notary public by the governor and confirmed by the Senate. McAdam, C. J., held that the defendant cannot in a collateral proceedings, to which the notary is not a party, try the ques

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tion of her eligibility to the office. If women are to

In "the act to simplify and abridge the practice, plead

be allowed to usurp the lucrative office of notary pub-ings and proceedings of the courts of this State," as lic, what becomes of the prerogatives of the sterner reported by Arphaxed Loomis, David Graham, and sex? David Dudley Field, in 1848, and in that year adopted by the Legislature, it is provided by section 120 that complaints in actions shall be "a statement of facts constituting the cause of action without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended."

It seems inconsistent with the idea of simplicity contemplated by the Code to employ in this discussion these learned and scholastic terms and polysyllables, which may possibly puzzle the brains of some of the members of our Legislature who ought to understand before they vote on the question. It may require a purchase of the largest and latest edition of Webster or Worcester, with some doubt as to whether they can all be solved with the use of either or both.

January 12, 1885.

A bill has recently been drafted in this city for presentation to the Legislature, which, if passed, will accomplish a much-needed reform. This bill makes it a misdemeanor to solicit or be in any manner concerned in receiving or soliciting a contribution for any political purpose, from any person holding the office of judge or justice in any of the courts named in article 1, title 1, chapter 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or from any candidate to the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

It is further provided that any person who shall subscribe or pay, or cause any other person to subscribe or pay, any contribution or assessment for any politi cal purpose whatsoever, shall be ineligible for three years thereafter to hold the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

Every person elected or appointed to hold the office of judge or justice in any of said courts is required by the bill, before assuming his said office, to file in the office of the secretary of State an oath to the effect that he has not within three years prior to making said oath directly or indirectly subscribed or paid, or promised to pay, or solicited any other person within the same period to subscribe or pay, or promise to pay, any assessment or subscription or contribution in money or property for any political purpose what


The making a false oath is declared to be perjury, and the punishment for such offense is imprisonment for not less than two or more than ten years, and in addition disqualification from ever holding the office of judge or justice in any of said courts.

We hope to see this bill speedily passed, and think it would have the effect of elevating the judiciary.

The members of the Ladies' Health Protective Association are much encouraged at their success in having Mr. Kane convicted of maintaining a nuisance at the foot of Forty-sixth street and the East river. They propose to extend their organization to take in other portions of the city. They have shown a great deal of energy and ability in prosecuting their crusade against the bad odors in this city. If the male citizens were half as active New York would be a cleaner and more. desirable place to live in.

A synopsis of the business transacted by the City Court of New York has just been published in the Daily Register. There were 1,885 cases tried at the different trial terms, and only 97 appeals to the Court of Common Pleas. This speaks well for the judges of the City Court. The total amount of judgments rendered was $3,067,557.50.

NEW YORK, January 7, 1885.

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Editor of the Albany Law Journal:


According to Wait's Code of Civil Procedure and Parson's Pocket Code, §2532 reads as follows: "Proof of service of a citation, or a subpoena, issued from a Surrogate's Court, must be made in the manner prescribed by law for proof of service of a summons issued out of the Supreme Court. In every case, proof of service must be made by affidavit; or where the person served is of full age and not incompetent, by a written admission signed by him, accompanied with proof, by affidavit or otherwise, of the genuineness of his signature."

section, as given above, are contradictory and inconNow, prima facie, either the two paragraphs of this sistent, or the first paragraph is superfluous. "Proof Court" is elsewhere defined and provided for, and the of service of a summons issued out of the Supreme second paragraph of section 2532 either reiterates unnecessarily, or conflicts with the previous provision.

The mystery however is explained by consulting the section as originally passed with the statute at large, and as correctly printed in Bliss, Banks, and Throop's been omitted in Wait's and Parson's editions, between Codes, where it appears that the word "other" has words "every" and case at the commencement of the second paragraph. The correct reading therefore is: "In every other case, proof of service must be made by affidavit," etc.




NEW YORK, Jan. 12, 1885.



A Treatise on the Legal and Equitable Rights of Married Women; as well in respect to their property and persons as to their children. Second edition, revised and annotated fully down to the present. In two volumes. By William H. Cord, Counsellor at Law, Philadelphia. Kay and Brother, 1885. Pp. xi, 797, 823.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have received by mail (thanks for the same) two pamphlets. One by James C. Carter, entitled "A Paper on the proposed Codification of our Common Law," well written and able. The other, an answer to Mr. Carter's objections to Codification, by Robert Ludlow Fowler. On the merits I agree with Mr. Fowler, but object to the use of such words in the discus-treatises, but we are bound to say that the present sion as 6. denigration,' ," "deontology," "bicameral leg- work has independent merits as a commentary, and a islature," 'adytum," "logomachy," "dichotomy," peculiarly good classification and distribution of the and the like. subject. The author is a wise and interesting writer,

The first edition of this work was published in 1860. Since then the law of marriage has been greatly changed. It would seem that Bishop and Schouler have exhausted the topic in their celebrated and able

and he has a logical and orderly mind. Some topics are not treated with quite as much fullness of remark upon adjudications, as for example, the subject of estoppel of married women, in the short chapter on which we find no reference to Shivers v. Simmons, 54 Miss. 520; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 372, a very important case. The proof-reading is occasionally slovenly, as for example, we find the very important case of Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, set down in the table of cases twice, once as Vanvevorhis v. Bretnall, 84 N. Y. 41, and again as Vanvoorhies v. Bretnoll, 86 N. Y. 19. The book is very well printed, without padding.


The second volume of this important and carefully edited work, covering Copyright-Insurance, edited by Benjamin Vaughan Abbott and published by George S. Diossy, of New York, is at hand. We can but reiterate our opinion of the merits of the work, expressed on the publication of the first volume. See 29 A. L. J. 519.



HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Jan. 20, 1885:

Orders of General and Special Terms reversed, and the writ of prohibition quashed, and defendants permitted to proceed in the action of Faber v. Lawrence, as if the writ had not been issued, with costs to the defendants against the relator on this appeal-People ex rel. Alfred Lawrence, respondent, v. Elias Mann and others, appellants. Judgment affirmed with costs-Edward Delahaunt and another, respondent, v. Etna Fire Ins. Co., appellant: H. Winsor Arnold, appellant, v. Harvey Parmlee aud others, respondents; Robert T. Smart, respondent, v. Andrew J. Smart, appellant; Daniel McDermott, respondent, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant; Dennis G. Littlefield, respondent, v. Albany County Bank and others, appellants; Wm. H. Stratford, appellant, v. Edward R. Jones and others, respondents; James Hennessey, respondent, v. Greenwich Ins. Co., appellant; Henry Peunie, respondent, v. City of Brooklyn, appellant; Montague S. Marks, appellant, v. Edward M. Townsend and another, respondents; Hannah Lazear, appellant, v. Martha Ann Sly, respondent; Henry Van Gelder and another, appellants, v. James H. Prentice, respondent; Samuel A. Avila, respondent, v. Wm. Lockwood and others, appellants; Norman Porter, appellant, v. John Beale, respondent; Anna E. Blackmer, respondent, v. Arthur Holmes and others, appellants; Jay Ball, appellant, v. Edward P. Slafter, respondent; Henry L. Rogers, exr., etc., and another, respondents, v. Frank J. Squires, appellant; John P. Price, respondent, v. Ann Eliza Price, appellant: N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant, v. Village of Fishkill Landing, respondent; William E. Langan, respondent, v. City of Brooklyn, appellant; David Kipp, respondent, v. David W. McLean, appellant; James G. Averill and another, respondents, v. David Day, 2d, and others, appellants; Eliza J. Guion, appellant, v. Isaac Clark, respondent, Wm. Lee, respondent, v. Troy Citizens' Gaslight Co., appellant: Edward D. James, appellant, v. George Shea, respondent; John P. Higgins, appellant, v. Thomas J. Crichton, respondent; Temple Grove Seminary, respondent, v. Louis H. Cramer, receiver, and another, appellants; Squires L. Newberry, appellant, v. David Abrams, respondent; George H.

Hencken, Jr.,and wife, appellants, v. U. S. Life Ins. Co. and others, respondents; Edward P. Cutter, appellant, v. John D. Cutter, respondent; John Palmer, respondent, v. Thomas C. Platt, president, etc., appellant.Judgment of General Term reversed, and Judgment absolute ordered for the defendant with costs-James H. Coleman, respondent, v. Alfred E. Beach, appellant.- -Judgment reversed,new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Letitia Nolan, respondent, v. David H. King, Jr., appellant; Alfred Stout and another, administrators, etc., respondents, v. Lewis M. Smith, appellant; Hannah E. Hutchins, appellant, v. Orin B. Hutchins, respondent; Frank J. Mills and others, respondents, v. N. Holmes Odell and others, appellants; Hermanus Bucher, appellant, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co., respondents.Order of award of State Board of Claims affirmed with costs-George Mark and others, appellants, v. People. -Petition to vacate, etc., order of General Term reversed; that of Special Term reversed with costs-In re Petition of Solomon Mehrbach.-Appeal dismissed without costs-Abel H. Crosby, repondent, v. Sarah Stephan, appellant (two cases).—Appeal dismissed with costs--People v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. -Orders of General and Special Terms reversed and motion denied with costs in all the courts-Thomas F. Hayes, assignee, etc., appellant, v. Alex. V. Davidson, sheriff, respondent.- -Order affirmed with costs-Jas. E. Brett, respondent, v. Gustavus A. Brett and others, appellants; Catharine W. Cooke, appellant, v. Spencer C. Platt and another, respondents. Judgment of General and Special Terms reversed, new trial granted, cost to abide the event-Arnold T. Niver, respondent, v. Melville M. Crane and another, appellants. —Judgment, so far as allows interest, modified, and as modified affirmed-People, respondent, v. Gold and Stook Tel. Co., appellant; Same v. Western Union Tel. Co.

-Judgment of General Term and County Court reversed; that of Justices' Court affirmed with costs in all the courts-Edward H. Neary, appellant, v. George Robinson and others, respondents.-Judgment affirmed without costs-E. T. H. Gibson and another, respondents, v. National Park Bank of New York, appellants.- -Reargument ordered upon its merits, and also its appealability, and that the case may be placed upon any day calendar and brought to argument when reached-Addie M. Smith, respondent, v. Louis H. Cramer, receiver, and another, appellant.- Order of General Term reversed and judgment ordered for the plaintiff upon the verdict with costs-Jacob F. Wyckoff, appellant, v. Henry P. De Graff, respondent.

-Motion for reargument denied with costs-Alex. Rich, respondent, v. Simon Solomon and another, appellants. Order of General Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed with costs-Robert C. Clapp and others' executors, appellants, v. Thomas K. Hawley and others, respondents.- -Order affirmed with costs-Edward Place v. Peter Riley, respondent; John Wittaker and others, purchasers, appellants; In re petition of Union Stock Yard Co. to vacate assessment. --Order reversed and motion for mandamus deniedPeople ex rel. James S. Z. Stranahan, president, etc., respondent, v. Hubert O. Thompson, commissioner, etc.-Order of General Term refusing to dismiss the appeal of the city affirmed; appeal from order of reversal dismissed with one bill of costs upon the two appeals against the appellants-In re petition of New York and Harlem R. Co.-Ordered affirmed and judgment absolute ordered against the appellant with costs-Mary Ann Dunham, respondent, v. Deborah H. Buckley and others, appellants.

The Albany Law Journal.


yet their thirty-five millions are better represented by their 642 Lords and 670 Commoners, than our fiftyseven millions by our 76 Senators and 325 Congress men. We think we have national legislators enough. We are willing to admit that our 325 Congressmen do not know as much as their 670 Commoners, but we are inclined to believe that our 76 Senators know more than 642 Lords. Mr.



IN in article on "The French Law of Marriage," Shepard in conclusion point twitter or side to

the fact that President-elect Cleveland served two terms as vice-president of the association.

view, Mr. Edmond Kelly says: "The true test of the French Code is to be found in the manner in which it handles a subject that is essentially and necessarily complicated. Let a conveyancer turn from his life-study of our system of mortgages to Articles 2114 to 2195, all of them short seldom exceeding a few lines each, if he wants to know with what magic complications disappear before an able codi

fier. But the work must be done well. The evils that have resulted from the hasty adoption of a bad Code of Procedure in New York are a disgrace to our Legislature and not a reason against codification." We agree to every word of this. Of course Mr. Kelly refers to Mr. Throop's Code. Our original Code of Civil Procedure, adopted more than thirty years ago, construed, explained, and amended through a generation, was as nearly perfect as such a work can often be. It needed perhaps a score of amendments. At this stage new, radical and "hasty" work spoiled it, making its conciseness diffuse, disordering its method, obscuring its phrase ology, heaping up glosses, and converting the symmetrical and beautiful frame-work into an unwieldy and almost grotesque growth. We speak plainly, but sincerely on this subject, as we have often spoken before. Mr. Throop is a man of great learning, elegant scholarship, indefatigable industry, and untiring energy in furthering his purposes, but he is not the ideal codifier or reviser. We believe that even his personal adherents and admirers must sigh for the simplicity and certainty of the old Code, and regard his performance with patience rather than with approval.

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Mr. Elliott F. Shepard, late president of our State Bar Association, said several noteworthy things in his address at the late meeting. He said that our "collection laws are probably more inefficient than those of any other State." We know it is fashionable to say this, but we do not believe a word of it. We believe our collection laws are among the most efficient. We have had experience that leads us to say so. Let any one try the collection laws of other States, and he will conclude that ours are speedier and more efficient than most otbers. Mr. Shepard counsels the "contingent fee" lawyers to do a little work now and then for charity's sake, for the contingent-fee business, he says, "is speculation and not charity." Mr. Shepard remarks upon the superior expedition of trials in England. He calls attention to the fact that they have got two million additional voters in Great Britain. He thinks that although universal suffrage does not prevail there, VOL. 31-No. 5.

Mr. Ives, of the Assembly, has succeeded in referring the subject of general codification to a special committee. This is a great step in advance, and will do something to defeat the obstructionists. It is a quite significant fact that the governors of Ohio and Kansas have recommended general codification in their last messages. The people seem to want it, and the old lawyers would better stand from under.

In our remarks on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Ross, ante, 61 we should have said that Justices Bradley, Mathews, Gray and Blatchford dissented. We do not agree with the Virginia Law Journal that this decision "will no doubt soon be followed by the State courts very generally." The Federal Court has never had great success in persuading the State courts, and it is probable that a doctrine approved by Chief Justice Shaw and uniformly followed by every State except three or four will hold its own against a bare majority decision of the Federal Court. We do not believe in this sort of "protection" advocated by the Federal Court.

A new Law Quarterly Review has made its appearance in London, edited by Frederick Pollock. The opening number has the following leading articles:

Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds Redrawn and Illustrated, by Mr. Justice Stephen and the editor; the Franchise Bill, by Sir William R. Anson; the King's Peace, by the editor; Holtzendorff's Encyclopædie, by Dr. E, Grueber; Federal Government, by Professor A. V. Dicey; Homicide By Necessity, by Herbert Stephen; the Literature of International Law in 1884, by Professor T. E. Holland. The next number will contain the following: Early English Equity, by Hon. O. W. Holmes, Jr., of Boston; the Lunacy Laws, by T. Raleigh; Bracton, by Professor Vinogrodoff, of Moscow; Liability for the Torts of Agents and Servants, by Professor Pollock; Land Tenure in Scotland and England, by Robert Campbell. The articles already published are excellent, and much less soporific than English law quarterly articles usually are. The array of distinguished names above given and promised speaks well for the interest and prosperity of the magazine. Among the reviews in this number is one of Ball's "Leading Cases on the Law of Torts," which takes the author severely to task for appropriating Mr. Bigelow's

admirable labors in this field and striking out all the reference to American cases in the notes, calling it a "capital error," and characterizing the credit given Mr. Bigelow as "scant courtesy." We wish the new enterprise success, and we understand it has already a large American patronage. Mr. Charles C. Soule, 26 Pemberton Square, Boston, is the American agent.

The course of the New York police about the sparring match of Sullivan and Ryan reminds us of Justice Manisty's course in the Adams-Coleridge trial. In both cases the promise was given to the ear and broken to the hope. We almost wish the police would let these two brutes have an effectual combat. Nothing else will give this country peace. Nothing else will satisfy great "stalwart " statesmen like Mr. Conkling, and the rest of the $11,000 audience assembled to see the sport. It seems that New York is much more sensitive and humane than London. In New York a sparring match that did not leave a mark is stopped lest the ruffians might hurt one another; in London two hungry men kill and eat a little boy and get only six months' impris


The Court of Appeals have held that a justice of the peace is not disqualified on arriving at the age of seventy years. This reverses the opinions of the special and general terms, and confirms the opinion of ex-Attorney-General Russell, and the impression which we have had. See opinion in our present issue.

The same court have held the act prohibiting the making of cigars in tenement-houses unconstitutional, affirming the opinion of the general term. In our opinion a more glaringly indefensible act was never passed under the guise of a police measIt was a reproach to our legislation that such oppression could be exerted by the power of a few trade monopolists. See opinion in our present issue.


The last year has witnessed important changes in law journals in this country. Births, deaths, and amalgamations have marked the record. A very lively contest is waging between the West Coast Reporter and the Pacific Reporter, one or the other of which—we will not undertake to say which— The might advantageously be dispensed with. great anaconda, the American Law Review, swallowed the Western Jurist, and from the tender way in which it has been licking the Central Law Journal of late, we suspect it is preparing that for deglutition. The Ohio Law Journal and the Cincinnati Law Bulletin after a good deal of quarrelling have married one another, preserving both titles, which is not altogether convenient for citation. The Georgia Law Journal, we are informed by a correspondent, "which was projected at Atlanta some months ago, has perished in the green, and died untimely after

a budding promise of the first three numbers." We would amend by saying that it perished in the yellow-the color of its covers. Pennsylvania seems to be the banner State - the venerable Legal Intelligence, the Pittsburgh Legal Journal, and the Weekly Notes of Cases all continue in the even tenor of their way, and are all useful-the latter especially, in matter and form, is one of the most excellent of local records of legal decis ions. The Internal Revenue Record is one of the most readable of our exchanges, especially in its selected matter. We wish all such enterprises well, but nothing save experiment can satisfy anybody of the slender patronage at best of any law journal.

The very general attention attracted to Governor Hill's proposed reform in the taking of the decennial State census, incorporated in Senator Thacher's bill introduced into the Senate, has led us to look into the method pursued in this matter. The Constitution very clearly directs an enumeration of the inhabitants to be taken once in ten years, under the direction of the Legislature and for the specific purpose of fixing representation in the several senatorial districts. The gathering of minute statistical information was never directed by the Constitution and was not known until quite lately. The general government takes a decennial census of the most complete character, and the different bureaus and departments of the State now gather annually all the statistical information which can be of any value in suggesting legislation. The expense of taking the census in its present complicated form is enormous. It cost in 1875 $128,000 to the State and $265,000 to the sixty counties of the State. A simple enumeration can be taken at a comparatively trifling cost, and in a few days' time. In European countries the method is to take the census in twenty-four hours. It is proposed, for the securing of efficiency in their labors, to bring the enumeration under the civil service rules. The county clerks are given the appointment of the enumerators because the respective counties bear the salaries of the enumerators and because the county clerks would be apt to have a proper acquaintance with the work to be performed in their own districts. We shall now see whether our legislators can rise above party considerations in this matter.



́N Atwater v. Sawyer, 76 Me. 539, it was held that mere apprehension of insult is no excuse for an inn-keeper's refusal to receive a person as guest, without circumstances and facts justifying such apprehension. The defendant offered to prove "that eighty or a hundred men dressed in a certain uniform arrived in Newport, and that more or less of those men proceeded to the defendant's house, intoxicated, and behaved in a disorderly manner, threateuing to turn him and his house into the street;

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