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could collect the money back, finally settled and gave the note to avoid a lawsuit, and he does not assert that his judgment was overcome, or that he gave the note through fear arising from a threat of criminal prosecution. As bearing upon the question of duress, his act of payment of the note is as potent as if no transfer had been made; he did not learn of the transfer till in the act of payment. He gave the note and paid it in settlement of a claim for a larger sum. The whole testimony, or that on the part of the plaintiff, did not warrant a finding of 'that degree of severity, either threatened and impending or actually inflicted, which is sufficient to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.' There is no threatened exercise of power from which he needed immediate relief; if sued, he could defend. It may be conceded that the rule has become settled that any contract produced by actual intimidation is voidable, not only where the circumstances were sufficient to intimidate a man of ordinary firmness, but were sufficient to and did intimidate the particular person because of his or her infirmity, though insufficient to intimidate one of ordinary firmness. The question of duress ought not to be submitted on a scintilla of evidence
In Estate of Mueller, Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, January, 1885, Pittsb. Leg. Journ., April 1, 1885, J. M. took out a policy of life insurance for the benefit of his wife M.," by whom he had children and with whom he continued to live as his wife until his death. Held, that M. had an insurable interest in A.'s life, notwithstanding he had a prior undivorced wife in life at his death. The court said: "The test of insurable interest is that the beneficiary named in the policy has an interest in the continuance of the life of the party insured; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564. The principle is stated in different form in the Supreme Court of the United States (Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 460), thus: 'Indeed it may be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, or advantage from the continued life of another creates an insurable interest in such life.' Thus it is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life, and in that of his wife and children; a woman in the life of her husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor.' Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 460. The Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383, applied the principle to the case of a divorced woman who had borne children during coverture to the insured; and the Supreme Court of Georgia in Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338, held that a woman who had married the insured with the knowledge that he had another wife then living undivorced had an insurable interest in his life. * * * Judged by the reason of the principle, there can be no doubt that Maria Mueller had an insurable interest in the life of John Mueller, when the policy was taken out for her benefit. She had married
him in good faith, had borne him children, had kept his house, had aided him in business and helped him accumulate his estate; and 'he had treated her as his wife, had supported her as such, she had passed in society as such, and was dependent upon him for support.' Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Paterson, supra. She had therefore, as in fact occupying the relation of wife, a deep interest in the preservation of his life. But she had also an interest as the mother of his children. He was under a natural obligation to maintain them until they could maintain themselves: Cooper v. Scott, 62 Penn. St. 139; and he was under a legal obligation for at least part of their minority to assist their mother in their support. This policy of life insurance was in no sense an equivalent for such an obligation, and could not be considered as adequate compensation for its loss. There is no principle of public policy, justice or humanity upon which to found a discrimination against the right of Maria Mueller in the policy in evidence. She was married under our laws; lived as a faithful wife and mother; the policy was taken out for her benefit; and her estate is entitled to the proceeds, under our laws."
In Poole v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 35 Hun, 29, the defendant, which ran trains from Oswego to Fulton station, entered into an agreement with one Hatch, who ran an omnibus from Fulton station to Fulton village, distant about a mile therefrom, by which the defendant's agent, at Oswego, sold tickets to Fulton village, and Hatch sold tickets at the village to Oswego; the fare charged for the whole distance being the sum of the two separate fares, and each party accounted to the other for the fares received for it. The tickets were on separate cards; one a railroad ticket from Oswego to Fulton, the other an omnibus ticket from the station to the village. The plaintiff having purchased tickets at Oswego for the village, and having been injured while going in the omnibus from the station to the village through the negligence of the driver, brought this action to recover the damages thereby sustained against the railroad company. Held, that it could not be maintained. The court said: "The separate tickets delivered to the plaintiff, whether regarded as contracts or tokens, are insufficient evidence to justify the conclusion as a matter of law, or of fact, that the defendant contracted to carry the plaintiff beyond Fulton station. Milnor v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 363. In this case the defendant issued coupon tickets and checked the plaintiff's baggage over a connecting road. The baggage was burned while in the custody of the connecting road, and it was held that the tickets and check were insufficient evidence to authorize the conclusion that defendant contracted to carry over the connecting road. In Kessler v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 538, the plaintiff purchased a coupon ticket from the Baltimore and Ohio Railrood at Washington, for Buffalo, over the defendant's road, and checked her baggage
through, which was never delivered. The plaintiff failed to show that the baggage came into the possession of the defendants, and it was held that the tickets and checks were insufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the connecting roads were liable as joint contractors. In Isaacson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 94 N. Y. 278; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 142, it was held that a check upon baggage through to New Orleans was evidence of a contract to safely deliver to a connecting road, but not evidence of a contract to deliver at New Orleans. The same principle is decided in Knight v. Portland R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Myrick v. Mich. Central R. Co. 107 U. S. 102; Gass v. New York Providence & Boston R. Co., 99 Mass. 220; Burroughs v. Norwich & Worcester R. Co., 100 id. 26; S. C., 1 Am. Rep. 78; see also Whart. Neg., §§ 582, 583; 2 Rorer Railroads, 975. Each ticket is, as it purports to be, an independent contract or token, one by the railroad to carry from Oswego to Fulton station, and the other by the omnibus line to carry from Fulton station to Fulton village. In Buxton v. North Eastern R. Co., L. R., 3 Q. B. 549, the defendant,. by a single ticket, agreed to carry the plaintiff to a station on a connecting road. The plaintiff was injured on the train of the connecting road and the defendant was held liable. The same rule was held in regard to the carriage of goods in Bristol & Exeter Railway v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cas. 194. The rule in England differs from the rule generally laid down in the United States. For a discussion of the English and American rule, see 3 Alb. Law J., 485; 2 Am. Law Rev. 426." See Cent. Railroad v. Combs, 70 Ga. 533; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 582.
THE CODE OR CHAOS?
NOR a long time past gentlemen who know all about the proposed Civil Code have been advocating its adoption, against the vehement opposition of other gentlemen, who also know all about the proposed Civil Code. While the war is yet unended, it is possible that some remarks from one who knows nothing about the Civil Code may not be out of place. In this position I stand; but the humiliation which would ordinarily attend such a confession of ignorance is unfelt by me, for the reason that I have, as I think, a sufficient justification. Let any one endeavor to ascertain what laws of this State are actually in existence, and then let him declare how much time remains for the study of proposed laws. Unless he be a prodigy, he will, I think, find ample justification for a profound ignorance of proposed laws.
Now upon this subject of the present condition of our statutes I do claim the right to a hearing. It has for years been my practice, on the appearance of the annual flood from the legislative halls of New York, to examine carefully the laws of former years and to note what they have suffered at the hands of the law-mixers. To any one who takes this
course, strange revelations will be made. He will find laws repealed, and then repealed three or four times in addition, and then repealed once more in order to make death certain under an apparent belief that a law can be killed only by repeated blows; and he will discover that after all this heroic treatment, these same laws have been calmly amended by some legislature, oblivious of repeals. He will see a legislature, moved by the conviction that a certain law should be repealed, repealing an entirely different law - an act very much like that described by the Irishman when he told how he killed the rat: "The first time I hit him I missed him, and the second time I hit im in the same place where I missed him before." And finally he will observe, with dismay, that after these repeated legislative Donnybrook-Fairs, in which laws are indiscriminately knocked on the head, most of the laws that ought to be repealed still stare at him from the statute books, with all the similitude of life. Dead enough, no doubt, the majority of them; supplanted by subsequent laws covering the subject, and so killed by indirect repeal. But they ought to be put out of misery by direct action and not left in this painful uncertainty as to whether they are alive or not. If any one desires an example of these comatose laws, let him read the Penal Code, and then, turning to the Revised Statutes, find nearly every law relating to crimes in full force, except as it is indirectly repealed by the Penal Code.
But it is not alone in the matter of repeals that wonder is excited by the action of those singular beings, whom a mysterious dispensation of Providence permits to sit in the legislative halls of this State. They seem to imagine that their reputation as legislators depends upon the quantity rather than the quality of their work, and that every law of which they deliver themselves is a credit mark in their favor. So it comes to pass that they often assail a perfectly peaceable law, with diabolical fury, loading it with amendments until it is flattened out of shape. And in groping through this labyrinth of amendments, stumbling occasionally over a repeal, nowhere. one frequently arrives All this is familiar to those who have made a careful examination of the laws of this State, and it would be unnecessary to mention it but that the productions of the opponents of the proposed Code owl-like breathe an apparent complacency satisfaction in the present condition of things. I use the word "apparent " because I do not wish to accuse any one, without absolute proof, of being contented with the laws as they are. And yet, a few days ago, I read an extract from an article in the Albany Evening Journal in which the laws of New York received as flattering mention as if they were incapable of improvement. If the author of that article had the creation of a world on hand, he would rest when he reached chaos and pronounce it " good." But with the exception of the Evening Journal- unless, indeed, the article was written by the "funny man" of that paper-I
think it safer to speak of contentment with the present state of the law as simply "apparent, under the rule that every man is to be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. With this understanding I wish to make a few statements, which I believe to be easily within bounds.
I. That in no civilized State in the world are the laws in such frightful disorder as in the State of New York.
II. That nearly every action, brought under any statute which has been in existence twenty years or more, can be successfully defended by reason of some amendment or repeal hidden away in a corner of some subsequent statute and generally overlooked.
III. That the opponents of the Civil Code-and for that matter, the advocates of the Civil Code may be asked a dozen different questions on a dozen different parts of statutory law; and with an allowance of a week in which to answer each question, WE noticed Mr. Reed's first volume on its appear
REED ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.*
they will be unable, after twelve weeks have elapsed, to construe the laws? Not at all, but simply to state what laws are in force. Attorneys often rely upou some unauthorized revision of the statutes, leaning upon a reed which, if not broken, is at least weak in places. It is less to be wondered at that legislatures occasionally do the same thing, and flattering themselves that they are amending or repealing portions of the Revised Statutes, merely fire a shot in the air, which hits nothing. I do not mean to condemn, in toto, unauthorized revisions. The work is generally well done. But the "reviser" who, in the time usually allowed for such a feat, attempts to pick his way through the wilderness of laws spread out on the statute books of this State, keeping to the right paths and making no missteps, has a task beside which the cleansing of the Augean stables was child's play.
ance as a forerunner of the work, but postponed an extended discussion of it until the second and third should have been published. The three make au important contribution to our literature, and no one is likely to go over the field for years to come, if at all. If our estimate of the effect of the undertaking is correct, it is highly improbable that any other one man will examine the cases antedating Mr. Reed's treatise. Much more improbable is it that there will be a new writer, for whatever might be the ardor of a student with a fresh enthusiasm and a favorable aptitude, unrestrained by the need of his time for other employment, he would be deterred, as till the present no one has been, by the fact that he would thus enter into competition with a standard work. We think the book takes this rank. The first volume impressed us to a degree that forced a high encomium, and a second perusal has increased our respect and approval of it. The others we have gone over once. The three will live as a correct criticism and classification of all the learning on the subject.
The chief thing to be desired is repeal, repeal, repeal. Why should one be forced to hold continual post-mortems on ancient statutes to determine whether they are really dead? If any Legislature, at the end of its session, in answer to the question "what have you to show as the result of your labors?" could answer "not one new law nor any amendment of an old law. Not one smallest scrap of that kind. But we have repealed some thousands of laws which cumbered the statute books "the members of that Legislature would, I think, deserve to be hailed benefactors of the people and to have statues erected in their honor.
It may be thought that I have wandered some distance from the subject which I ought to have considered, viz., the advisability of adopting the proposed Civil Code. But all that I have said is, I think, pertinent, and for this reason: In the remarks of the opponents of the Code I have failed to find any clear recognition of the fact that our laws are in a state of chaos; but on the contrary, these gentlemen appear to be contented with the existing condition of affairs. For myself, I should be satisfied with a thorough revision of the statutes. This
would not, indeed reach those portions of the com-
Of the coming of revision, however, I see no sign.
ROCHESTER, March 31, 1885.
To the learned a sincere judgment of this kind means the praise that is most valuable; yet there is more to be said; by which we intend that the work has a literary excellence also, and that besides its comprehensiveness, accuracy and literary excellence it induction that rarely appears in modern text books. shows a philosophic spirit of adjustment, of judicial Fearne lost it in discussing Murray's opinion, brought to light by Perrin v. Blake, and smaller men than he have lost it oftener. Some of our writers, unhappily, have had but little of it to lose. Mr. Reed turns from his enormous labor to manifest his sense of the vacillation and folly to which he is nowhere unjust, and of which a hasty reader might believe him unconscious, in a suggestion of statutory remedy, or in an allusion, as he progresses in the disentanglement of unreconcilable judgments, to a witticism like that of Judge Biddle when the court was stating the efficacy of instruments of writing. § 444. On the 21st of last June we quoted from his preface to illustrate the doctrine that codification cannot be fairly opposed by the argument that statutes give rise to discussion otherwise avoidable. We are not now on that subject, but we glance at it in finding evidence of ability here to do more than state what has been wrangled over, and to
*A Treatise on the Statute of Frauds and other like enactments in force in the United States of America and in the British Empire. By Henry Reed, of the Philadelphia Bar. In three volumes, Kay & Brother, Philadelphia,
extract the point of a mass of decisions. The book is the great aid to us because it not only embodies the cases, but also exposes the few dominant principles to which all the cases might be reduced, which principles, is Mr. Reed thinks, might be now safely embodied in statutes, to guide us as substitutes for the gigantic bulk of the reports.
General and broad rules may not be drawn from legislation or case law on subjects of business or governmental management, but the Statute of Frauds was an enactment in the sphere of morals, designed as a canon of jurisprudence as distinguished from government. It embodies an enduring principle. Mr. Reed's first chapter shows that before it the judicial mind was tending to the creation of limitations not much less effective than those of the statute, and certainly as effective as those which equity found in the statute when the chancellor chose to be lenient. This of course only means that the need for the statute was felt by the profession before it was provided. Sugden and Spence, as Mr. Reed shows in one of his later notes, thought this. The enactment accomplished at once the result that the judges would have assured after a slow progress in, presumably, a good many years. It was in one sense then, and we do not imply more than we say, a codification. The need for it was not a po. litical need. It represents no conflict of material interests, marks no triumph of faction; it is without the channel of the selfish legislation of force. The statutes of laborers, of liveries, were partisan edicts. So charitable a system as the law of Amendment bore the traces of a struggle, and to-day suggests the commons' decorous rebuke of the man who built Westminster clock, and their sympathy for the man whose money, the vulgar believe, was taken to pay for it. The statutes for the Selling of Salmons and Eels, their Vessels, Packing, etc., touching Worsted Weavers of Yarmouth and Linn; concerning Peter-pence and Dispensation, were no more parcel of the jurisprudence of England than the statutes De Donis, Quia Emptores, Extenta Manerii, or 12 Car. 2, cap. 24. No one could ever think of making a philosophical system from them. The Statute of Frauds, on the other hand, is an expression of the ethical system that is mainly made up of principles that could not easily be formulated, and that appears on the statute book in so few laws that one can readily enumerate them. And Mr. Reed has made it clear, that as it was the fruit of an extended experience created by men who sat as judges, as in brief it was the expression of a doctrine gradually evolved, so after this lapse of time, the important judicial exceptions to it which have flourished in the sanction of many years are now ripe for similar concise legislative enactment. The work has been written successfully to show that courts have, when unfettered by authority, and the Legislature can, "formulate such rules that the only real occupation for a judicial tribunal will be the ascertainment of facts in the particular controversy."
To find this in the work is to find all that one wants, so long as the legislation is not furnished. To produce this has demanded an effort of intellectual labor of the severest kind. The logic is inexorable, but the book is not severe, as too closely set together. The arrangement commences with the birth of the statute; involves its history and reputation, the extent of its sway, whether to Barbadoes, St. Kitts, Newfoundland, Maryland, etc.; how far the adoption of it, or its extension in any direction involved the acceptance of English decisions upon it; how it is to be applied, whether by the law of the forum or of the locus contractus, etc. The refinements drawn from cases of contracts made in one place and to be executed in another; made abroad to be performed in the forum; made in the forum to be performed abroad, are pa
tiently marshalled and disposed of. Upon this there is erected the enormous superstructure of law, more or less applicable wherever a Statute of Frauds is known. The opening chapters, the third, fourth and fifth, relating to guaranties, are in analysis and precis iou, and in the life and vigor due to the author's use of his own language in stating the cases, admirable in every way. The propositions which they involve are clearly stated and profusely illustrated; while the chapter on promises of administrators or executors closes with a table of conclusions. There are eight chapters upon the subject of the memorandum, and five upon trusts, equally remarkable for their literary proportion and their rational solution of the difficulties of conflicting authorities.
As to method, the names of cases are mainly given in the notes, and instances of thorough citation of authority will be found in vol. 1, pp. 156, 190, 490; while for apt condensation we refer to note m to section 355; to note p to section 382; to note s to section 393. Sections 359, relating to the signing of the memorandum; 388, as to whether a delivery of deeds in escrow constitutes a memorandum; 407, discussing how far in the memorandum a designation or description of the parties as "6 ""trustee,' vendor," "representative," proprietor," etc., will answer as substitute for a name; and 434, ou the decisions of our State as to whether contemporaneous written contracts show a consideration are excellent. They do not stand alone. The appendix contains the statutes of England and the United States; and there is a table of cases filling 140 pages. In publisher's work the book is luxurious.
CLOUGHESSY V. CITY OF WATERBURY.
Where there is ice on a city sidewalk over which there is much travel in such condition as to be dangerous to travellers, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the walk safe, it is responsible for the consequences if the duty is neglected. CTION for an injury from falling upon ice on a sidewalk in Waterbury, soon after 6 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1880. The injury consisted of a bad fracture of the leg just above the ankle joint. Bank street is one of the principal business streets in Waterbury, and the sidewalks on both sides of the street were generally in good condition at the time of the accident, with the exception of the place where the accident occurred. The sidewalk at that place was in a dangerous condition at the time by reason of smooth ice upon it for nearly the entire width of the walk, which rendered it very slippery and dangerous. There was no structural defect in the walk, which was made of concrete, and is a hard and nearly level walk, from eight to ten feet in width, constructed with a little slope toward the street, but no more than is necessary to permit the water to flow off readily. Bank street at that point is very nearly level. There were no ridges of snow or ice on the walk where the accident occurred, and its dangerous condition was owing entirely to its being covered with glare and smooth ice, which had accumulated to the thickness of about one inch. The sidewalk in this locality had been in this smooth, slippery and dangerous condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, and at the time of the accident there was no sand or other substance upon the walk to make it more safe for travel, but it had been per
*To appear in 51 Conn. Reports.
mitted by the defendant to remain in this slippery and dangerous condition. Some sand was sprinkled upon the walk the day after the accident. The weather was intensely cold at the time, the thermometer at its highest point on the day of the accident being only five degrees above zero, and ranging from five to twelve degrees below zero at the coldest part of the day.
The city at the time of the accident, with a little care and attention to the walk in question could have made it safe for travel. The ice had been cleared off above and below the place of the accident by the adjoining proprietors, but at this point had negligently been suffered to remain. The plaintiff did not know of the slippery condition of the walk. He came out of a dark alley-way near by, and while in the exercise of reasonable care, fell after he had taken a step or two on the walk. The street and sidewalk were lighted at the time by lights shining from the store windows upon that side of Bank street. No notice or complaint of the slippery and dangerous condition of the sidewalk had been made to any officer of the city, or to the owner or occupants of the adjoining premises, before the accident. The plaintiff recovered a verdict of $1,300, and defendant appealed.
S. W. Kellogg and G. E. Terry, for appellant.
J. O'Neil (with him M. Myers), for appellee.
LOOMIS, J. In Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566, it was held that the mere fact that a highway is slippery from ice upon it, so that a person may be liable to slip and fall upon it while using ordinary care, if the way is properly constructed, and there is no such acoumulation of ice and snow as to constitute an obstruction, and nothing in the construction or shape of the way which occasions any special liability to the formation or accumulation of ice upon it, it is not a defect or want of repair which will authorize a jury to find that it is not safe or convenient for travellers within the meaning of the statute. Hoar, J., in giving the reasons, said: "If a city was made liable for this cause it would have to be extended also to country roads, and the same rule would apply to pavements or roads made slippery for horses by suow or ice, or even by rain. * *It could never have been intended by the Legislature to impose upon towus aud cities of the Commonwealth a responsibility so extensive, or that the phrase 'safe and convenient for travellers' should receive such an interpretation. It would require of all towns an examination of all their roads so incessant and minute, and the application of an efficient remedy would be so laborious and expensive that it would be mauifestly unreasonable to require or expect it. The freezing mist of a single night may glare over the whole territory of a town. The formation of thin but slippery ice in our climate is an effect which may be so sudden and extensive, and which may continue or be renewed for such a length of time that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for towns to make adequate provisions against it." Notwithstanding this powerful presentation of objections, we think the principles heretofore accepted by this court will render the reasoning inapplicable in this State so far as the case at bar is concerned.
In Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Coun. 419, Seymour, J., in giving the opinion of the court, says: "When an ice storm covers the entire surface of the earth with ice, the public authorities cannot be expected to scatter sand and ashes upon all places of public travel within their limits, * * * but it has become familiar law in Connecticut that some duty in regard to snow and ice devolves upon cities and towns. Accumulation of snow and ice may produce such a condition of the road as to cause it to be dangerous
and defective, and in each particular case of alleged defect from such cause the question will depend upon an inquiry of fact whether under all the circumstauces of the case the road was in a reasonably safe conditiou, and whether those who were bound to keep the road in repair are justly chargeable with negligence and want of reasonable care in relation to it." If the Massachusetts court could have accepted the distinction above mentioned it is obvious the reasoning referred to would lose all its force. The argument of the learned counsel may be summarized thus: If a city is liable in respect to any smooth ice it is liable for all, and if liable for all it is a burden too heavy to be borne; there is practically no power to perform it, and where there is no power to do, there is no duty to be done. We hold, on the contrary, that if ice is found on the sidewalks to a limited extent, in a dangerous condition, whether smooth or otherwise, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the passage safe for travel, it ought to do it, and is responsible for the consequences if the duty is neglected. But if a sudden ice storm covers all the territory of a town it would be impracticable to apply the remedy, and it would be considered and treated as would an extraordinary inundation of its streets by a flood.
But it may be suggested that we overlook the logic of the Massachusetts court, which is, that to make a city liable the street must be found defective, and if a small amount of ice existing for a long time is a defect, so is a large amount, coming however suddenly. But it should be borne in mind that the existence of a defect in the street is but one fact among several, all of which are indispensable to impose a liability for an injury caused by such defect upon the city. The latter must be found guilty of some negligence or want of reasonable care in regard to the matter. A defect may exist, and yet the city or town may not be liable for the injury occasioned by it. To determine this question all the circumstances must be considered. The decision of the case at bar must be understood to refer only to the particular circumstances found by the court, namely, that the place of injury was on one of the principal business streets of the city; that the sidewalks on both sides of that street were in good condition, except at the precise place of the accident, which was very dangerous by reason of glare, smooth ice; that it had been in this same condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, aud that no saud or other substance had been put upon the ice to make it more safe, as might easily have been done, but it had been permitted by the defendant during all this time to remain in the same slippery dangerous condition; aud that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary care, slipped aud fell upon the ice, and was thereby injured.
Our decision is that uuder such circumstances we cannot say that the court below erred in finding the defeudaut liable, and this decision we regard as in harmony with all previous decisions by this court, and as logically required by the principles heretofore accepted by the court.
[See 47 Am. Rep. 744.]
DECEIT - FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO AP PRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. BOURN V. DAVIS.* False and fraudulent representations by the vendor to the vendee concerning the appraisal of the property by ap*S. C., 76 Me. 223.