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against the officer making them, held, that such a purchaser could not maintain replevin, that the property therefore remained in custodia legis and operated sub modo as a satisfaction of the first execution, and that the issuing of the second and the levy and sale under it were therefore unlawful, and the officer was liable accordingly. Blair v. Caldwell, 3 Mo. 354; Moss v. Craft, 10 id. 720: Williams v. Boyce, 11 id. 537; Blackburn v. Jackson, 26 id. 308; Thomas v. Cleveland, 33 id. 126. Freeman on Judg., § 475; Herman on Exec., § 176; Wells on Repl., §§ 243, 244. State Colvin v. Six. Opinion by Norton, J. [See ante, 130.—ED.]


A.SSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-NEGLECT TO PRESENT CLAIM WITHIN TIME-RIGHT TO SHARE.-Under the statute relating to insolvent debtors the creditor of an assignor, who does not present his claim prior to the payment of a dividend and within six months after publication of the notice of assignment, may afterward present his claim and receive a dividend thereon, equal to that paid to other creditors, in case there is money or assets remaining in the hands of the assignee sufficient to make such payment. Owens v. Ramsdell. 33 Ohio St. 442. Carpenter v. Dick. Opinion by Nash, J.

WILL-PROVISION REQUESTING SERVICES-LIABILITY OF ESTATE FOR DISCHARGE.-A testator provided in his will as follows: "I hereby request and desire William J. Harker, who has attended to my business, keeping my books and accounts, to continue to take charge of and keep the accounts of my estate for my executor and trustee, and in any way he can to assist in the settlement of my estate, so long as his services may be necessary, and for such services I allow him a salary of $1,500 per year, to be paid to him by my executor in monthly installments." Held, that this provision of the will in favor of Harker was not a legacy, but a testamentary provision requesting his services in the settlement of the estate and fixing the relation between him and the executors, in case he entered upon the performance of the services and the same were accepted by them; that the liability of the estate for the discharge of Harker was the same as if he had been wrongfully discharged from such service when in the performance of a contract with the executors, to serve upon the same terms and conditions. Harker v. Smith. Opinion by McCauley, J.


PARTNER.-(1) C. and M., partners, held as joint lessees a lease of certain premises for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, with covenants for payment of rent, taxes, and assessments. The partnership was dissolved, and C. conveyed to M. all his undivided interest in the leasehold. The assignee of the reversion brought suit on the covenants for rent, against C. and M. jointly, for arrears of rent accrued after the dissolution of the partnership. Pending the suit, M. being in default of answer, C. filed an answer denying all liability for reut, but afterward paid to the assignee of the reversion the sum of $500, who in consideration thereof negotiated and executed to him a release from all and any liability arising on or growing out of the lease, and forever discharged him from all and any covenants therein, and from all the obligations thereof. Held, there is not such a presumption that the above named sum was paid on accrued rent, and not in discharge of future contingent liability on the lease, as *To appear in 41 Ohio State Reports.

would entitle C. to recover such sum of M., as money paid for and on his account, upon an implied promise to reimburse C. therefor. The burden is not on M. to prove that such sum was not applied on the rent. The assignment by a lessee of all his rights and interests in the premises, without his lessor's consent, will not thereby discharge him from his express obligations, and he will therefore remain liable upon his original contract after his assignment. But as his liability thus remains, he is entitled to be indemnified by his assignee, against the payment of rent during the continuance of such assignee's term. While in the possession of the estate, and enjoying the benefit of the lease, there is an implied promise on the part of the assignee, that he will also take the burden from his assignor, and indemnify him against the claims of the lessor, while he holds under the assignment. Patten v. Deshon, 1 Gray, 330; Farrington v. Kimball, 126 Mass. 313; Moule v. Garrett, L. R., 5 Exch. 132; S. C., L. R., 7 Exch. 101; Burnett v. Lynch, 5 Barn. & Cres. 589. Nor is this principle inapplicable where one of two joint lessees assigns to the other all his interest in the lease. It is stated by Mr. Justice Willes, in Moule v. Garrett, supra, 7 Exch. 104, in expressing his concurrence in the decision on an appeal in that case, that where a party is liable at law by immediate privity of contract, which contract also confers a benefit, and the obligation of the contract is common to him and to the defendant, but the whole benefit of the contract is taken by the defendant, the former is entitled to be indemnified by the latter in respect of the performance of the obligation. C. did not cease to be an original debtor to the lessors for rent that had accrued after his making the conveyance to his joint lessee. But as between himself and McH., he was a surety, and upon payment to the lessors of any portion of such rent, he had his remedy over against McH. as principal, to be reimbursed. Wolveridge v. Steward, 1 Cr. & M. 644, 660. See also the opinion of Baron Parke in Humble v. Langston, 7 M. & W. 517, 530. (2) When a surety pays the creditor's claim, he must be legally bound for it, to enable him to recover the amount paid of the principal. And it must also appear, that at the time of the payment, the principal himself was under a legal obligation to pay. The surety cannot, by a voluntary payment, when not legally bound, place himself in a better position toward the principal, than that of one not a surety, who vol untarily pays money in the discharge of the debt of another person; and cannot by such voluntary payment impose upon the principal an obligation which he was not under at the time of the payment. Hollinsbee v. Ritchey, 49 Ind. 261. McHenry v. Carson. Opinion by Dickman, J.


NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-NOTICE OF DISHONORASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-NON-RESIDENT CREDITOR.-(1) A bank of this State bound as indorser of a note payable in New York and held there, failed and made an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The note not being paid at maturity, the holder caused it to be protested and notice to be given to the bank, but not having heard of the failure and assignment, gave no notice to the assignee. Held, that the notice given was sufficient to bind the bank. Bank v. Reynolds, 2 Cranch, C. C. 289; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 279. (2) If one, whose name appears on a note as indorser, is really the maker, it is his duty to provide for its payment, and if he fails to do so, and the note goes to protest, he is not entitled to notice. Merchants' Bank v. Easley, 44 Mo. 286; Harness v. Davies County Savings Bank, 46 id. 357;

Daniel Neg. Inst. (1st ed.) 1074. Donnell v. Lewis | That business is increasing and must continue to inCounty Savings Bank. Opinion by Ray, J.

crease, not only in the near future but for an indefinite period. No temporary expedient will satisfy the demands of the people, nor the exigencies of the case. No scheme is worthy of discussion which fails to organize a court that will endure without reconstruction for at least a century.

The proposition to curtail present liberty of appeal is an obnoxious one. The people will not resign any of the powers they now possess, nor ought they. The tendency of modern thought is the other way. The right of appeal is as sacred as the right to prosecute or defend, and every law which restricts that right is an interference with freedom of personal conduct. The restrictions at present existing are, to the extent that

they restrict, usurpations. It would be useless to quarrel with them now, for they have been so long a part of our jurisprudence that most of us have forgotten to murmur against their injustice; but any further limitation of the right to appeal from an unjust or unlawful decision of a court will never be consented to, and never should be.



Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your correspondent, "Arm," in his communication, vol. 31, p. 198, urging an amendment of Code Civ. Pro., § 1674, seems to have overlooked the very purpose of recording a notice of the pendency of an action. By an old rule or principle still in force, the purchaser of a thing in action, with knowledge of the litigation, is bound by the judgment as though he were a party to the suit. A lis pendens is but notice of the litigation, furnishing conclusive judicial presumption of knowledge of the suit in all persons dealing with the subject of the controversy, subsequently to its being recorded. After judgment, if an appeal be taken, the same suit continues, the matter is still the subject of the same litigation, knowledge of which would bind a purchaser, though the record notice of its pendency have been cancelled. Why not then continue such record notice until the right of appeal has expired? Not until then can it be said that that litigation has really been ended. The cancellation would not relieve a purchaser from the obligation of the final judgment rendered after the appeal if he had knowledge of the suit. The cancellation itself might furnish that knowledge if the purchaser examined the record. As the recording of a lis pendens is a substitute for giving personal notice of a suit pending aud of its subject-matter, the final determination of which can be found in the same records by a person contemplating purchase, and so interested in knowing the result of the litigation, it would seem that there is no need of any provision for the formal cancellation of the record notice; and that section 1674 might better be repealed than amended in the particular suggested by your correspondent. If it were so amended ther would be need of further provisions allowing a new record notice, upon perfecting appeal, that by the appeal the matter was still in controversy.

Yours truly, ELMIRA, N. Y., March 7, 1885.


RELIEF OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

One of your correspondents is almost ready to despair of the republic, because the Court of Appeals is two years behind in its work. The facts and statistics which he presents are sufficiently startling, and would provoke immediate action if we had not become familiar with them from long experience. We have grown accustomed to the law's delay. The conservatism of the bar has restrained agitation, and obvious considerations influence the judges against initiating discussion. But the time has now come when suitors, who are more interested in the matter than are lawyers or courts, ought no longer to submit to such postponement of judicial action as amounts substantially in many cases to denial of justice.

Your correspondent's statement of the present condition of the court may be accepted as the basis of a plan for its relief, and what is of higher moment, the relief of people whose rights of person and property are in abeyance. He might have gone much further however without enumerating all the reasons which Auggest the necessity for prompt and radical change in the Constitution of the court. The State of New York is not Rhode Island. We must provide judicial force adequate to the transaction of our judicial business.

The obvious remedy for the evil lacks one essential element of popularity. It is not complex, has no intricate and occult machinery. Its simplicity does not commend it to Solon, nor extort the admiration of Lycurgus. Any plain man can see that seven more judges and two divisions of the court must at once clear the calendar, but the scheme is not adopted because the wayfaring man might invent it. Besides it would require a constitutional amendment. What of that? A great many of our most precious institutions could never have existed without change in the fundamental law. The objection is fatuous. It has been made a great many times. John made it when the barons demanded Magna Charta. Constitutions must change whenever the necessity for change arises. Constitutions do not make the greatness of a people, people make Constitutions great.

Would fourteen judges and two divisions of the court relieve suitors and the court itself? If so, the question should be considered res adjudicata. It will be easy to establish such a court, and easy for the court to transact our business for us. The two divisious appear to be the bête noir of those who believe the country must go to the devil, if time honored customs are abolished. Men say they do not like a two-headed court. Why not? We have one already which has existed nearly forty years. Our General Term is a hydra, but no great harm has resulted. Conflicting rules of law and practice have prevailed for a time, but uniformity has finally been secured by decisions of the court of last resort; and even this fault would not inhere in a proper organization of that court with fourteen judges and two branches. A principle once established by either bench necessarily becomes law unto the other, as well as itself, "and the rest of mankind," and either division must be supernaturally ingenious to distinguish more shrewdly than does the present court between a former decision and the case at bar. Only one possibility of conflict could exist, and that could easily be avoided. If the improbable case should arise of the identical question coming before both branches simultaneously, both would unite in hearing argument and deciding.

Such a court would be elastic enough for all times. When the business shall have become so great that two divisions are unequal to its performance a third division may be created and so on indefinitely. The 858tem would endure beyond the period when Macaulay's New Zealander shall appear on London Bridge, and would not encroach on the natural rights of the people, who make Constitutions and laws, and for whose benefit Constitutions and laws exist. Something akin to this plan must be adopted, or the right of appeal

must be arbitrarily limited. The relief resulting from such limitation would necessarily be temporary, followed by further and still further limitations in the future, until the advocates of the system must eventually adopt the logic of Sir Boyle Roche concerning the preservation of the liberties of his country. E. M. M.

CANANDAIGUA, N. Y., March 5, 1885.

"ENJOIN." Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Kindly permit me to state a few reasons for dissenting from your conclusion (Alb. L. J., March 7, p. 181) that "Mr. Tucker is unquestionably right" in accusing our profession of perverting the meaning of the word "enjoined."


1st. Neither the verb "to enjoin" nor its substantive "injunction " is exclusively used, even in legal phraseology, in the sense of prohibition. Justice Story, following Eden and Jeremy, defines injunction as 66 judicial process, whereby a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ." Eq. Jur., § 861. That the latter signification has obtained the greater prevalence is due to obvious circumstances and exemplifies au ordinary tendency to linguistic expression.


2d. In English, as in German and cognate languages, we find verbs compounded with prepositions, either separable or inseparable. Such words as "forbid " and " gainsay" are examples of the latter; but the former are of far more frequent use. In some cases these separable prepositions are invariable; as, e. g., that of the verb to refrain from," where the preposition "from" is the only one admissible; in others the preposition is indefinitely variable, and constitutes the element on which the meaning of the verb depends.

"To go to" and " to go from," for example, indicate opposite processes; and yet we do not find it necessary to distinguish the preterite forms, in which the preposition is omitted; we get the sense of the connection. We ask, "Did he go to court?" or "Did he go from court?" aud the auswer to either question is, "He went" (without the preposition). In like manner, the sense of the verb "to enjoin" depends altogether on the connected preposition-"to" or "from" -expressed or understood with it. If for the sake of distinction in the latter case we are to employ the classic and elegant term "injuncted," similar cousiderations will require us in the former to adopt some such form as he "goed." The instances are precisely parallel.

If there were really a necessity for any change, the good words "restrain" and "prohibition," already in common legal use, would furnish adequate equivalents for "enjoin" and "injunction" without resorting to any such barbarous expedient as Mr. Tucker suggests.


3d. Separable prepositions are frequently omitted, even when they would seem to be necessary to convey the meaning of the writer. For instance, in the closing sentence of the paragraph immediately preceding that which has prompted this letter, you say, forms are rarely accomplished by riding rough-shod over the rights of the minority, a tendency to be guarded sedulously in a republic." The connection clearly shows that your idea was that the tendency referred to was to be sedulously guarded against; but Mr. Tucker would doubtless assert that "of course the writer of the paragraph intended that his words should mean the precise opposite" of what he said or wrote.

4th. The English is a living and progressive language aud old words are constantly taking on new meanings. Two centuries ago, for example, the verb "to let," now signifying to allow, means to hinder or obstruct; a

meaning which survives in the common phrase “without let or hindrance." "Prevent" used to mean to go before, for the purpose of preparing the way, or assisting; its modern signification is precisely the reverse. It is an unprofitable task to attempt to confine the meaning of any active word within the limits prescribed by its origin; enlightened usage is the sole foundation of authority in such matters; and the words "enjoin" and "injunction," in the sense to which Mr. Tucker objects, have long held too firm a place in the literature of our profession to be now disturbed by any philological fanciers. Yours very truly,

NEW YORK, March 9, 1885.

A. V. S.



We have frequently had occasion to commend this series. Except in Illinois, New York and New Jersey we believe there is no official reporting of the decisions of the intermediate courts of the whole State. The work in this series is faithfully and intelligently done, and the cases are pretty sure to be important and interesting, because they are all reversals. We note in this volume Holmes v. Nooe, p. 164, holding that under the Civil Damage Act exemplary damages may be awarded only when aggravating circumstances are shown, which is in harmony with the holding of our Supreme Court in Rawlins v. Vidvard, 30 Alb. L. J. 424; see also Neu v. MeKechnie, 95 N. Y. 632; S. C., 47 Am. Rep. 89.


THE following decisions were handed down Tues

day, March 10, 1885:

Judgmemt affirmed with costs-John Ackey, executor, appellant, v. Franklin J. Parmenter, respondent. Order of General Term reversed; that of surrogate affirmed with costs. Opinion by Ruger, C. J.— In re Accounting, of Executors of William Tilden.

-Order reversed with costs-In re Opening of Flushing Avenue, etc.-Order affirmed with costs-People ex rel. James R. Jessup v. John Kelly and others, commissioners, etc.; Frank D. Crim, executor, respondent, v. Rufus G. Starkweather, impleaded, etc., appellants; In re Petition of New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad to appraise lands of Bennett, eto.; In re Altering, etc., Main street in Sing Sing; Louis Wagner v. John Hodge and others.- -Appeal dismissed with costs-People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co.; In re Claims of Lykes and others; Reuben Hall, appellant, v. City of Buffalo, respondent.- -Motion to put on calendar denied on account of insuffi. ciency of papers, without costs-Chas. F. Holley, respondent, v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., appellant.Motion to prefer cause granted, without costs-People ex rel. Edward J. Wood, appellant, v. E. Henry Lacomb, respondent; People ex rel. Mason v. McClave.

-Motion to restore cause granted, without costsFranklin M. Miner, administrator, etc., v. City of Buf. falo. -Motion to open default denied, $10 costsKeuka Nav. Co. v. Jane Holmes.-Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with costs to the respondents represented on the argument in this court by Mr. Chandler and without costs to any other party-Samuel Weeks and another, appellants, v. Jacob Weeks Cornwell, respondent.- Motion to dismiss granted, unless within thirty days the appellant files an undertaking and pays the costs of this motion-Sarah E. Nichols, administratrix, respondent, v. Charles F. McLean, appellant.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, MARCH 21, 1885.


It is iminal and political cases.

T is proposed in Norway to adopt trial by jury in
But the Norwe-

gians, probably having read Mr. Hopkins' amusing sarcasms in this journal on the system, are seeking for an oracular opinion on this vexed topic. Mr. Nicolai Grevstad, of Minnesota, sends us a communication on the subject, in which he says: "But numerous reports of conflicting opinions as to the working of the jury system in the United States being circulated in Europe, the Norwegian people are cast somewhat into confusion as to what to believe. The undersigned therefore, at the request of leading Norwegian statesmen, who take a most prominent part in the present work of law reform in Norway, in order to prepare a report of as authentic value as possible, takes the liberty to request your opinion on the system of trial by jury, as outlined above." And he subjoins an exhaustive list of questions, with blanks for answers. gave trial by jury a high character in our answers, but we feel bound to say that we forgot all about the "emotional insanity" business, on which we commented last week, and we now call Mr. Grevstad's attention to those comments. Perhaps the matter will be of less practical importance in the frigid clime of Norway, where, we take it, adultery


and seduction are of much less frequent occurrence than in this country. But at all events we feel that candor dictates this qualification.

Although as we pointed out last week, crime seems decreasing in Great Britain, it cannot be said that this is due to capital punishment. An exchange says: "The average number of executions during the last twenty years has been less than 13 a year. During that time there have been 494 persons condemned to death, of whom 249 were executed and 18 sent to Broadmoor as insane. So that roughly speaking, one-half only of those condemned are, in the result, executed. The largest number hanged in one year was 22, which happened twice- that is, in the years 1876 and 1877, and the smallest number was 4, in 1871." This is in striking contrast with the facts in this country, where crime is frightfully increasing and executions are ten times more frequent than in Great Britain.

Georgia Bar Association, held at Atlanta last AuThe report of the first annual meeting of the gust, contains much of interest on the subject of judicial reform. The chairman of the committee on that subject, Judge Bleckley, observed in his report: "In the administration of justice there ought to be correctness, celerity and cheapness. The second alone is the topic of this report. Time is the increasing factor the growing element of modern life. Progress is the realization, in short time, of what formerly occupied long time. At least this is one form of progress, and that form with which we of the nineteenth century are in immediate contact a century that if measured by results in some of the spheres of human activity, might well count for a thousand years. How is it with practical remedial jurisprudence? Is it up with, or is it behind the age? Compare it with other business, public or private; with operations of the war department, the navy, the treasury, the post-office, the interior; with commerce, manufactures, banking, transportation, mining, farming; with the venerable and conservative vocations of teaching and preaching; with any thing, and what is its relative position? The main bulk of worldwork is ahead of it; several branches of that work, for instance, the postal service, general transportation, commerce and manufactures, are so far in advance that the law seems to crawl whilst they go on wings. Is this relative backwardness a neces

A correspondent writes us: "I write to ask your opinion about the advisability and utility of a proper review and criticism by a State law journal of the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State. In this State we never do such a thing, our reverence keeping us dumb, though the decision of the court may be judge-made law, and the quota-sary condition, rooted in the nature of things, or is

VOL. 31 - No. 12.

tion of the record show it to be dependent upon a judge-made record. I was thinking of advocating in our journal a proper criticism of the court for the benefit of bar, bench and Legislature. If not trespassing too much upon your time I would like to know what course your journal pursues, and what you think of the propriety and utility of such a scheme." We think that criticism of judicial decisions is one of the most important offices of a law journal. We do not think however that defeated attorneys ought to rush into print and criticise the courts in their own cases. They are not competent judges of the merits of their own cases. We have no dumb reverence" for our courts. If their decisions do not commend themselves to our


judgment we never hesitate to say so, and our col-
ested criticism.
umns are always open to temperate and disinter-
Occasionally we even let in a
smarting attorney to "swear at the court," but we
generally do it, as the Spartans made their slaves
drunk, for a warning to the children. The En-
glish law journals are admirable examples in this
matter. Their fearless and frequently severe criti-
cism of the decisions and conduct of the judges
undoubtedly does much toward rendering that ju-
dicial system tolerant and tolerable. The course
of Mr. Justice Manisty in the late Coleridge-Adams
trial is a fresh example. After all, the bar need
feel no great delicacy or reverence in this respect,
for the courts are overruling themselves and one
another almost every day.

it attributable to deficient energy and enterprise | most liberal compensation is meted out in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, Illinois and Louisiana." We print the table in another column. To the salaries of our own judges should be added a certain allowance for expenses, $1,200 a year, we believe, and the fact should be noted that in the city of New York the judges get $15,000 a year.

on the part of the legal profession? Can it be possible the law is to become obsolete; that the ages are to outgrow it; and that though sufficing for the past, it is not equal to the demands of the future? Will it be Bradstreeted as a failure? Surely this supposition cannot be entertained. And if not, the conclusion is imminent that either directly or indirectly, we lawyers are responsible for the wide chasm that separates the effective administration of the law from those industries, public and private, with which it ought to be abreast. Is it fit that a body of men so numerous, so cultivated, so capable, should suffer their quota of labor, their distinc-| tive calling, to remain hopelessly behind? Let a noble, manly pride answer in the negative." Judge Bleckley's plan for the collection of notes, and the like, is that the judgment shall be dispensed with, and that "the original writing shall be registered, filed and remain in the clerk's office, and that an execution founded upon it be issued by the clerk, and enforced by the sheriff. What would warrant a judgment on mere inspection is intrinsically as worthy of confidence without a judgment as with it. Relatively to the execution, it at last, is the real producer, and the judgment a superfluous middle-man." We regard this scheme as impolitic. Suppose that the note is forged, or that the considcration has failed, or that there are offsets, or that it has been paid — what then? Our system in this State is a fair and efficient one. The discussion on Judge Bleckley's report was very interesting. The judge defended his proposition with all his wit and vigor, but the matter was postponed to the next meeting. One reason advanced against such summary proceeding was the fact that "we make our obligations, generally, payable in the fall when our crops are gathered then we can pay, provided there has been no worm or drought. If there has been, we cannot pay. If there has been some mis-understand Mr. Tucker as advocating the use of fortune to us we want the delay of another year, and you may sue us at the spring term following, and get judgment at the following term." But it seems to us that the inability to pay is no reason against the right to a judicial determination that the debt is just, is due, and must be paid as soon as the drought and worm let up.

Mr. Tucker's comments on the legal use of the verb "enjoin " have called out considerable discus. sion. Our correspondents think Mr. Tucker wrong. But they do not convert us. There is no doubt that the best legal writers, such as Kent and Story, use the word in the sense criticised by Mr. Tucker. Webster gives this sense of the word, and cites Kent. It is significant however that Worcester does not give it. There is no doubt too that in the course of time certain words have come to have just the contrary of their original meaning; "let" is a familiar example. But what Mr. Tucker complains of is that the same word is used to mean two exactly opposite things—to do and not to do. This verbal blowing hot and cold in the same breath is certainly indefensible. It is "overworking" the verb -to quote Rufus Choate. We have plenty of good words to express the desired meaning-" prohibit," "restrain," "forbid." There is no need of corrupting and vulgarizing the language by this double and ambiguous use. When we want to prohibit the ringing of bells, for example, let us not say it is "enjoined," i. e., commanded; nor worse yet, "enjoined and forbidden," i. e., both commanded and prohibited; but let us say just what we mean in the correct use of the language, forbidden and prohibited. We are no purist nor "philogical fancier," but we think that this use of the word "enjoin " is radically wrong. We do not

"injuncted;" only a careless reading of his observations could lead to such an inference. His remarks on that coinage were only a sarcasm.


́N Henson v. State, 62 Md. 231, it was held that


for keeping a bawdy-house, evidence of the general reputation of the house is incompetent. The court said: "Counsel on both sides have with commendable diligence collected in their briefs all the authorities bearing upon the subject, and they certainly present much conflict and diversity of judi

The addres of Mr. Jones on the salaries of the bench is also full of interest. He says: "Upon a careful tabulation of the statistics I find that the sum of $4,221 represents the average salary paid by the States of this Union to a chief justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals - that the sum of $4,100 is the average salary paid to associate justices of the Supreme Court or Court of Ap-cial opinion and decision. They consist altogether peals; and that the average salary paid to circuit of cases decided by the courts in this country, and judges amounts to the sum of $3,158. * * of the conclusions drawn therefrom by our own With the exception of the States of Virginia, West American text-writers. No English decision is reVirginia and Oregon, there is no Commonwealth in ferred to, and we are not aware that the question this Union which does not pay to its circuit judges has ever been decided by an English court; and in larger salaries than those accorded in Georgia. The considering the question as it arises in this State

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