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in his power to do this. The term "rescinded," as he employs it, is convertible with "repudiated." It was as easy for him to repudiate as singly to rescind his promise. In an action to recover the amount of a judgment theretofore rendered the plaintiff is entitled to recover interest upon the costs adjudged to him from the date of the original judgment to the time of recovery. Whoever may be equitably entitled to the costs when collected, his legal title to and right to recover the unpaid costs is clear (Abbey v. Fish, 23 Ohio St. 413), and as by force of section 1319 of the Revised Statutes, his costs are "carried into his judgment; and as he is liable at any time after failure to sue out process for his costs or the return thereof unsatisfied, to respond, upon the order of court, to a writ issued for the benefit of those entitled to them for the costs adjudged in his favor, with interest thereon, it is difficult to see why his right to interest should depend upon his actual payment of such costs.14 Viner Abridg.457; Rogers v. Burns,27 Penn.528; Klock v. Robinson,22 Wend. 157; Denning's Appeal, 34 Conn. 204; McCausland v. Bell, 9 S. & R. 388; Hamer v. Kirkwood, 25 Miss. 95; Gatewood v. Palmer, 10 Humph. 466; Graham v. Newton, 12 Ohio, 210. Emmitt v. Brophy. Opinion by Owen, J.

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DEED-CONDITION, PAYMENT OF DEBT SHOULD RENDER VOID,MORTGAGE IS NOT ABSOLUTE CONVEYANCE IN TRUST.-The owner in fee of real estate conveyed the same to a trustee to secure a debt to a third person. After the granting clause to the trustee in fee there was a condition that if the debt was paid at maturity the conveyance was to be void, otherwise the trustee was authorized to sell the land at public sale to pay the same. Held, this conveyance was a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, and not an absolute conveyance in trust to secure the debt. Where the conveyance to a trustee is a collateral security, merely for the payment of a debt, with the condition that it shall become void upon its payment, and with a power to sell the land in case of default, it is a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage. The grantor parts with his title conditionally only. If there is no such condition but the conveyance is an absolute deed of trust for the purpose of raising money to pay a debt if not paid as agreed, the grantor parts with all his legal estate, and whatever rights he has are in their nature equitable merely. Hoffman v. Mackall, 5 Ohio St. 130; Woodruff v. Robb, 19 Ohio, 217; Eaton v. Whiting, 3 Pick. 485. The fact that the deed was made to a trustee with power of sale does not change its character in this respect, same cases. Moore v. Burnet, 11 Ohio, 334, and Morris v. Way, 16 id. 469, are deeds of trust, without a condition that they were to be void if the debt was paid; hence they are the conveyances of an absolute estate in trust to secure a debt, with a power of sale in the trustee to execute the trust, while Woodruff v. Robb, supra, and the case at bar have such a condition. The former divests the grantor of his legal estate, leaving nothing but an equity to the grantor; while the latter is a security for the debt, defeasible upon its payment. The cases of Moore v. Burnett and Morris v. Way are not in conflict with Woodruff v. Robb. Both forms of instruments are mortgages in equity. In the latter the legal estate remains in the mortgagor after default, as against all the world, except the mortgagee, while in the former the legal title passes absolutely, leaving an equity merely in the grantor. With this distinction between absolute deeds of trust with power of sale, and conditional deeds of trust with like power, defeasible upon payment of debt, the cases are reconcilable. In the former case there is no legal estate remaining in the grantor, and therefore no judgment lien, while in the latter the legal estate remains in the grantor in pos

session, in favor of judgment creditors, subject to the mortgage. See Baird v. Kirtland, 8 Ohio, 21. Martin v. Alter. Opinion by Johnson, C. J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF PENDENCY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Permit me through your columns to call attention to section 1674 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and what seems to me to be a strong necessity for its amendment. Upon the entry of judgment the successful party has a right to enforce it immediately, unless stayed by an order designed to give the loser an opportunity to perfect an appeal, and so prevent the immediate operation of the judgment. But under the terms of the section referred to a notice of pendency of action cannot be cancelled, although the defendant may have succeeded in the action, until the time to appeal has expired. The plaintiff may not intend to appeal, yet if he does not consent to the removal of the lis pendens it must remain on record at least thirty days after judgment, and as much longer as may be necessary to make a motion and obtain an order removing it. The existence of such a cloud upon the title to land, even for such a period, must often prove embarrassing and damaging.

I was forcibly impressed with the incongruity of this provision recently in a case where a creditor's action was successfully resisted on the ground of fraud in procuring the judgment sued on. Judgment was at once entered in favor of defendant setting aside plaintiff's judgment, the docket of which was immediately marked cancelled, an execution was issued for costs, etc. But on applying to the judge who decided the case for an order cancelling the notice of pendency of action he declared himself unable to grant it till the time to appeal had expired.

The provision is clearly inconsistent with the scheme of the Code which allows the immediate enforcement of a judgment upon its entry, and the section should be amended by striking out the words "and the time to appeal has expired." It seems unreasonable, while giving a party the benefit of his judgment in almost every particular at once upon its entry, to withhold for such a period his right to remove a cloud from his title.

The section seems also to be obnoxious to the further objection that the taking of an appeal in such a case, even without security, is sufficient to enable the appellant to retain the lis pendens on the record. As it reads now it certainly does not mean that while the lis pendens cannot be cancelled before the time to appeal has expired, it may be cancelled after such time has elapsed and an appeal has been taken. Au appeal without security merely allows the enforcement of the judgment pending the appeal, and as such enforcement does not carry with it a right to cancel the lis pendens, it would seem that it must remain until perhaps the Court of Appeals has reviewed the case. As provisional remedies do not survive to a defeated party after judgment, and as a lis pendens is (or at least has been held to be) very much in the nature of a provisional remedy, it does not seem just or in har mony with the spirit of the Code to suffer one appealing without security to hold what is practically an attachment upon his adversary's laud for an indefinite period without providing for some compensation for the damages that may be expected to follow to the respondent.

Yours respectfully.

NEW YORK, Feb. 24, 1885.

ARM.

MANDAMUS TO COMMISSIONERS OF EXCISE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The purpose of writing this short article is to propound a query under the excise laws. Can commissioners of exoise, who have refused on proper application to grant license, be compelled to do so?

In Graham & Lane's Excise Laws of the State of New York, page 76, they say: "The act of 1845, allowing a local option vote, is generally acquiesced in as at least substituted by the election of excise commissioners by the people, with power to grant or refuse licenses, and to approve of applicants and their qualifications, as well as the discretion to decide whether the applicants have a good moral character or not. This leaves the door open for a refusal to grant any license, as those of extreme views may claim no man to be moral who sells intoxicating liquors, and on this ground alone might not 'approve' of the applicant. The board cannot be compelled to grant licenses."

Can such substitution be made? It is true that the language of the act is that they shall have power to license. But for the board to refuse a license on the ground alone that the applicant would be of immoral character to so sell, though legally licensed, would seem to be an abuse of legal discretion, and subject to correction. ⚫ J. B. DALEY.

PRATTSVILLE, N. Y

CHEAP JUSTICE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I thank you for those excellent words in your last issue: "Litigation should be made cheaper rather than dearer." I am strongly in favor of abolishing all costs except actual disbursements. It is poor people, not rich people, are oftenest wronged and who most need the power of the State to set them right. If that power-or the exercise of it-be beyond their means, it is denied to them. It becomes the luxury of the rich aud not the relief of the poor. Among the poor, not one wrong in ten is ever redressed, for want of the means of redressing it. Our cruel system of what is called "extra allowances," deters many a man of moderate meaus from seeking redress of his wrongs; and the fact that he is so denied redress invites other aud further wrougs, in that it promises impunity to the wrong-doer. This is foreign to the ends of government. It does not tend to encourage patriotism among that class upon whom we depend to repel invasion and fight our battles. If justice be only for the rich, "file upon your law!" If the State be too poor to mete out justice to all let her retrench some of her needless, prodigal expenditures, for humanity points in that direction. A bureau in every county, where the cause of the poor man should be espoused at the public expense, would be less out of harmony with the old but now almost forgotten practice of suing in forma pauperis, and could be easier justified upon principle than many of our at present unrebuked modes of expending the public money. I am reminded in this connection of the words of the great Webster; let me recall them: "Justice, sir, is the great interest of man on earth. It is the ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together. Wherever her temple stands, and so long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness, and the improvement and progress of our race; and whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and dis. tinction, whoever cleans its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august dome still higher in the skies, connects himself in name and fame and character with that which is and must be as durable as the frame of human society."

Ever truly yours, I. T. WILLIAMS. CHAPPAQUA, WESTCHESTER CO., N. Y.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

SMITH'S LEADING CASES.

This is the eighth American edition, published in four volumes, by T. & J. W. Johnson, of Philadelphia. To make room for the new matter, the editors have omitted the cases of Ormichund v. Baker and Auriol v. Mills. It is superfluous to speak in detail of this work. It is an unrivalled classic, affording a complete magazine of information on the subjects of the cases reported. It ought to be in every lawyer's library. The editors have done their work well, and the publishers deserve the encouragement which they seem to have met.

SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY.

This is the first American, from the sixth English edition, and published by W. H. Stevenson, of St. Louis. The English publication is well known, and is of great excellence, aud the present edition is supplied with reference to American cases by Mr. John D. Lawson, and is thus made a practically useful book in this country. See 10 Alb. Law Jour. 381.

HARE'S ILLUSTRATIONS IN ADVOCACY.

This is the first American edition of a well-known English publication, and is issued by W.H. Stevenson, of St. Louis. The book is interesting, but advice on this subject is a good deal like advice on good manners or religion. If the advocate does not exist in the man, all the advice in the world will not make the man an advocate. So all these hints about examination of wit. nesses and the like, of which we have so many, are more amusing than useful. In short, good advice is very useless; as an old lawyer-friend of ours is wont to say, if a man is wise he doesn't need it; if he is a fool he will not heed it. But it is well enough to read Hare, and David Paul Brown, and O'Donovan, and all the others who formulate recipes for making lawyers and advocates.

TUCKER'S MONROE DOCTRINE.

The Monroe Doctrine, a concise history of its origin and growth. By George.F. Tucker, of the Boston Bar. Boston: Geo. B. Reed, 1885. Pp. 138.

The title-page tells the whole story as to the scope of this work, It is an interesting review of the origiu and growth of what is called by courtesy "the Monroe doctrine," although it certainly was not original with Mouroe. He simply made the best and most popular formulation of it. The author gives also a summary of the arguments in favor of and against it. The same subject has been intelligently, although less elaborately, treated by Mr. Gilman in bis life of Monroe in the "American Statesmen" series.

KNEELAND ON ATTACHMENTS.

A Treatise on the Law of Attachments in Civil Cases, together with the leading statutory provisions of the several States and Territories of the United States in relation to suits by attachment, and a collection of forms. By S. F. Kneeland. New York: Geo. S. Diossy. Pp. xxvii, 722.

This work is by a practitioner who has had a large experience in the branch of practice of which he treats. The reader will agree with him in his assertion, in the preface, that such a person, other things being equal, is better qualified to write a treatise on a particular topic than a mere theorist; but his work does not need the apology which he makes for it. A man's being busy is no excuse for his putting forth a poor law book. But this is not a poor law book. So far as we can judge from a necessarily oursory examination, it is a very good one. It is certainly thorough and exhaustive, and shows the charac

teristics of the knowledge that a practical man has of the needs of the profession. It is well printed.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

THE

following decisions were handed down Tuesday, March 3, 1885:

Teunis P. Osterhoudt, tax payer, etc, respondent, v. John Rigney and others, appellants. Judgment affirmed. The cases of Osterhoudt v. Butler and others; Same v. Trodden and others; Same v. Murphy and others; Same v. Brackett and others; Same v. Hyland and others, are governed by the decision in this case and should also be affirmed, but with but one bill of costs in this court in the six cases. -Judgment reversed, new trial granted, without costs to either party in this court-Teunis P. Osterhoudt and others, respondents, v. Board of Supervisors of Ulster county, appellant.- -Judgment affirmed with costs-Samuel F. Edwards, appellant, v. New York & Harlem R. Co., respondent; Jonathan E. Robinson and another, executors, etc., respondent, v. Eph A. Smith and others, impleaded, etc., appellants; Margt. Barry,respondent, v. Patrick Lambert, executor, etc., appellant; John A. Lambert, executor, etc., respondent, v. Horace Craft and another, executors, etc., appellants; Angeline M. Snook, administratrix, etc., respondent, y. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., appellant; Joseph M. Pray and another, executors, appellants, v. Joseph Hegeman, executor, respondent; Frank Wilson, executor, respondent, v. Henry R. Reynolds and another, appellants; James C. De Bevoise, administrator, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; Mary E. Bacon, administratrix, respondent, v. Horace B. Claflin and others, appellants; Mary Hughes, administratrix, respondent, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., ap pellants; Lewis W LIBRARY respondeut, v. N. Y. C.'& R. R. Co., apportant; James McKeen, executor, appellants, QF James D. Fish and another, receivers respondents; Henry Moyer, administrator, responde. C. & RR, appellant; Catherine McDonald, executrix, respondent, v. Frederick Bester, appellant Hiram L. Doolittle, executor, etc., respondent, v. Timothy Hoyle and others, appellants; Edward Ellsworth, executor, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellant; Constance D. Price, respondent, v. Walter J. Price and

others, executors, appellants; Wm. W. Thomas and another, administrators, respondents, v. Utica & Black R. R. Co., appellants; Frances E. Castle and others, respondents, v. Harvey A. Koch, sheriff, etc., appellant; John Drabriskie, administrator, respondent, v. Long Island R. Co., appellant; Margaret Moore, executrix, appellant, v. City of Albany, respondent; Edward B. Lord, administrator, respondent, v. Wm. Tiffany and another, appellant; Wm. A. Poucher, administrator, appellant, v. Robert C. Scott, etc, respondent; Jacob Werle, administrator, respondent, v. Long Island R. Co.; Richard P. Bisden, respondent, v. Lutgarda Augarica De La Rua, executrix, appellant. -Judgment affirmed, costs to be paid by appellant In re Petition of Mary J. Lyman to revoke probate of will of Lewis S. Phillips, appellant, v. Mary B. Phillips, executor, respondent.- -Order of General Term reversed and judgment at Circuit affirmed-Mary Powers and another, administrators, respondents, v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. Co., appellants.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the eventGeorge C. Hemingway, administrator, respondent, v. Jacob S. Poucher, impleaded, etc., appellant; Jeremiah Eighmie, respondent, v. Edgar D. Taylor, administrator, appellant; Willard Parker, Jr., and others, executors, appellants, v. Albro B. Stroud and others, executors, respondents; James Murphy, Jr., administrator,

respondent, v. City of Brooklyn, appellant; James Fitzpatrick, administrator, etc., appellant, v. N. Y., N. Haven & H. R. R. Co., respondent.-Judgment of General Term recovered, judgment of Special Term affirmed, except as to the women's hospital and as to that reversed and the provision declared to be void, with costs to all parties to be paid out of the fundAsa L. Shipman, executor, respondent, v. Isabella G Rollins and others, aqpellants. Order of General Term reversed and proceedings and order of the commissioners affirmed with costs-People ex rel. John J. McCarthy, respondent, v. Board of Police Commis sioners, appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-Adelaide R. Kenny, respondent, v. Edwin A. Weed, appellant; Kate T. Ryckman, respondent, v. Gerritt W. Ryckman, appellant.-Appeal dismissed with costsJennie Roat, appellant, v. J. R. Van Duzer and others, respondents (two cases); Jacob S. Freedman, assignee, respondent, v. Isaac Burman and others, appellants.

-Orders of General Term affirming the order of the Special Term confirming the report of the commissioners, and adjudging that the respondent is entitled to costs, etc., are affirmed, and the appeal from the order denying the motion to remit the case to the commissioners is dismissed, with costs to the respondent of one appeal-In re Application of the Cortland and Homer Railroad to cross, etc.-Order affirmed without costs of appeal, and remittitur heretofore sent down requested to be returned-Benj. Wright, receiver, respondent, v. Mary A. Nostrand, impleaded, appellant.-Judgment of General Term reversed and decree of surrogate affirmed, with costs-In re Estate of Andrew Hood, deceased.-Judgment of General Term approving decree of surrogate affirmed with costs of this appeal to the respondent to be paid out of the estate, but without costs to any other party—In re Final Settlement of Joseph H. Mahan, executor.

Motion for reargument denied, with costs-People v.

Gold Stock Tel. Co.; Same v. Western Union Tel. Co.

-Motion for reargument denied, with $10 costsJohn P. Higgins, appellant, v. Thomas J. Crichton, respondent.

NOTES.

TWO

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WO new law journals have come to us. The Kan sas Law Journal, published at Topeka, is a small octavo of sixteen pages, weekly, and is devoted to the legal affairs of that State. The Columbia Jurist is published- -we do not know how often-by the Columbia Law School students, and is filled with weighty matter. The proof-reading is not faultless. For example, we cannot believe that Prof. Dwight ever spoke of a "bee-tail estate." That would be a very difficult estate to hold. We wish both these new journals all the success they deserve.- -There is a dreadful report about our President-elect. He is said to have been 'busy with Marble all day." This is worse than Vinnie Ream's efforts.Represeutative Reed, of Maine, is quoted by the San Francisco Chronicle as saying: "I was admitted to the bar in California, and Judge Wallace examined me. I'll take my oath nobody was ever admitted to the bar with as simple an examination. When I went up for examination the great question of the hour was the legal-tender act. Everybody was discussing its constitutionality. Some said it was constitutional, others said it was unconstitutional. The first question Judge Wallace asked me was, 'Is the legal-tender act constitutional or unconstitu tional?' I didn't hesitate a moment. I said simply, 'It is constitutional.' 'You can pass,' said Judge Wallace. 'We always pass a man who can settle great constitutional questions off-hand.'"'

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, MARCH 14, 1885.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE

HERE is a bill pending before the Legislature of this State which proposes to amend the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to defendants who

set up the plea of insanity, and among other things provides that when a person is tried on the charge of murder, and he interposes the plea of insanity as his defense, and is acquitted on this ground, the jury shall so state in their verdict of acquittal, and that the court shall then order such person to be committed to a State lunatic asylum during his natural life, with the provision however that the governor may order the discharge of the person so committed whenever he shall be satisfied that it may be done with safety to others. The present provision is that the court, upon such acquittal, "must, if they deem his discharge dangerous to the public peace or safety, order him to be committed to the State lunatic asylum until he becomes sane." The proposed amendment would be a theoretical improvement, but we doubt whether it amounts to a substantial improvement. These "emotional " criminals are always cured the moment they have killed their victim. Like Cole, who killed Hiscox, they are sane the instant before and sane the instant after, and insane only at the instant of the killing. What a farce it would have been to put Cole in the insane asylum; or Sickles, who was no more morally irresponsible at the moment he slew Key, than he was afterward, when he forgave his wife like a christian, and served his country like a patriot. The result of this bill would be simply to go through the form, for in nine cases out of ten the defendant must be discharged as soon as committed. The only effective measure practicable would be to make confinement in the insane asylum imperative for a given length of time, with the privilege of discharge after that. A still more effective measure would be to punish adultery and seduction and the like as crimes, capitally, if need be, and then if the offended man took the law into his own hands, to punish him as a criminal, or to shut him up as an insane person for life, without privilege of discharge- estop him by his plea. We have no sympathy with this emotional insanity plea. If a man's wife or sister is seduced, and existence is intolerable to him until he has hunted down and killed the seducer without giving him any warning or any chance for his life, why then let him not sneak away under the pretext of insanity, but let him walk up and take his hanging like a man, and be done with the existence which is hateful to him; or if he thinks he was crazy, let him face the consequences of such a plea. If the seducer is so dangerous to society as to deserve the killing, the avenger is so dangerous as to deVOL. 31-No. 11.

Women

serve the mild restraint of a lunatic asylum. These
acquittals after all embody the most effective argu-
ment against jury trial. When we read the history
of such trials, we feel for once an approach to sym-
pathy with those who say, with Bumble, slightly
modified, "the jury is an ass.” This emotional
plea is a disgrace to our jurisprudence and our ad-
vocates. It deifies our profession at its most igno-
ble and human nature at its most lawless point.
The scenes on these trials are disgusting.
are always fainting away; the insane culprit is pale
with suspense; the clerk is so agitated that he can-
not ask the jury if they have agreed; the jury are
always breaking down in tears; everybody is em-
bracing and hand-shaking; the court-room is al-
ways bursting into a tornado" of applause; and
then they all go out and "paint the town red." A
perusal of Mr. Donovan's "Modern Jury Trials and
Advocates" will show that we do not exaggerate.
Mr. Donovan truthfully says: "Fifty years ago the
plea of emotional insanity was unknown; now it is

66

a sheet anchor to the rich and influential." A sentence more damning of our profession was never written. In the present state of the law there is hardly any necessity for putting in the plea at all, and so counsel thought in Sickles' case, where they boldly justified the deed as an act of revenge, although they did throw out the "sheet-anchor" to windward. We repeat, we do not see that this bill will make much practical difference in the administration of our laws.

A letter from the Honorable Charles Reemelin, in the Cincinnati Weekly Law Bulletin for March 2d last, contains some curious comments on codification. The author's proposal seems to be that the general government should codify the State constitutions. Some day, no doubt, even State constitutions will be so numerous and complex that reduction in some shape will be necessary for this species of legislation as for all others. But we are at a loss to understand how the Federal government can assist in the work, and in fact what affair it would be of theirs. Federalism is a beautiful product of human ingenuity, but a confusion of Federal functions may assist neither the cause of codification nor the cause of good government.

The Virginia Law Journal has recently made several excellent suggestions for the improvement of law-reporting. In the current number it says: "Can nothing be done to shorten the titles of cases cited in judicial opinions, and in printed arguments of counsel? Here is a not inconsiderable source of waste and annoyance which might be remedied to some extent. Take for example a late case from the United States Supreme Court, which has been 'dragging its slow length along' through the legal journals under the style of Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad v. Duane O. Ross,' and will soon wriggle itself entirely across the page of many a reported case. Now, what is the

6

6

use of all this name? Why would not 'Railroad v. Ross' answer every possible purpose? There is no use for a title to the case except for identification and reference, and it does not matter in the least about the full name of the unfortunate engineer, nor the full legal designation of the road on which he was injured. And again, when Dick, Tom and Harry sue Harry, Tom and Dick, what is the use in reporting or citing the case as Dick, et als. v. Harry, et als.?' Yet this is the constant habit of reporters, judges and counsel; and if one of the parties on either side happens to be a party in a representative capacity, the case will almost certainly appear and reappear as Dick, Adm'r, etc., et als. v. Harry, Trustee, etc., et als.' Why not make it a uniform rule to drop all titles and descriptions, and report and cite every case by the name of one plaintiff and one defendant? Corporation cases, particularly those of banks and railroads, often furnish long and exasperating titles, which ought to be reduced in every case to 'Bank v. and

99

v. Railroad,' and vice versa. We assent to most of this. It is however convenient sometimes to have the corporate title expressed in full, or so nearly so as to distinguish the party from other corporations. For example, there are a great many cases of "Railroad v. Smith," and the like. But all christened names, and descriptions, and " ex rels.," and the like, are vexatiously superfluous. In the American Reports we have always used the shortest form, and so they do in the American Decisions.

In the case of Groth v. Washburn, 34 Hun, 509, the following are the "catch-lines" preceding the head-note: "Statute of limitation an action by a husband to recover damages for injury sustained by his wife is governed by the six years' limitation Code of Civil Procedure, section 382." And the following is the head-note: "An action by a husband to recover damages sustained in consequence of injuries inflicted upon his wife by the defendant's negligence, where such damages consist in the loss of the services of the wife, and in moneys expended for necessary medical aid and attendance upon her during her illness, and in employing other persons to render the services which she had theretofore performed, is an action to recover damages for an injury to property, and not for a personal injury, and it may therefore be brought within six years from the time it arises, as provided in section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Now one or the other is superfluous. The "catch-line" should be: Statute of limitation — action by husband for injury to wife." The head-note then would be quite right. Perhaps we have said it before, but we will run the risk of repetition, and say that this sort of reporting reminds us of the ministers who read the hymns all through before the choirs sing them. Mr. Hun's reports are so admirable in other respects that we would fain have him recognize the proper office of the "catch-line."

"L

There is one species of Anglo-mania that ought to be encouraged in this country, and that is the imitation of the English dealing with criminals and their administration of criminal law. As we learn from the London Law Times, at the recent Lewes Assizes Lord Coleridge made some observations as to the general diminution in crime in England and Wales, as shown not merely at these assizes, but by the returns for the last ten or twelve years throughout the country. "When I recollect," said his lordship, "what assizes were when I was a young man, and observe that notwithstanding the more frequent gaol deliveries, the actual number of persons in the prisons of England has for the last ten or twelve years steadily declined, it is a matter on which we may heartily congratulate ourselves. We must not make too much of it, as it may have arisen from a concurrence of causes which may not be permanent; but for the present, at all events, it is satisfactory to find that upon returns which cannot deceive, and which include the whole of the prisoners in England and Wales, there has been a steady diminution in crime for the last ten or twelve years." Mr. Justice Denman also, at Derby, said that judges in many parts of the country had noticed that crime was diminishing in England. So far as the Midland Circuit was concerned, he was happy to give the strongest confirmation to that view. If he might judge from what had happened in every one of the counties in which he had been holding assizes during the last month or so, it was certainly the case that the fewness and mildness of offenses, as compared with other occasions within his memory, gave every reason for congratu

lation.

NOTES OF CASES.

IN

N Homer v. Harvey, Supreme Court of New Mexico, 19 Rep. 247, it was held that a railway conductor who rents a room in a hotel at the terminus of his route, at a specified rate per month, which he uses for sleeping and other purposes when there, is not a guest of the hotel. The court said: "The liability of innkeepers is strict, and justly so; but it is a liability limited to their relation to travellers or wayfaring men. The law of civilized countries benignantly protects men away from home, and from those resources with which the denizen or citizen can guard himself from wrong, and protect his property from loss or injury. When the traveller comes to an inn and is accepted, he instantly becomes a guest. The innkeeper, when he accepts him and his goods, becomes his insurer, and the innkeeper must answer in damages for the loss or injury of all goods, money and baggage of his guest brought within his inn and delivered into his charge and custody, according to the usage of travellers and innkeepers; but he must be a guest, and before he can be a guest he must be a traveller. When he ceases to be a traveller, or a transient or wayfaring man,

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