of the act, and the extent to which it came in conflict with the opinions of the people, as well as the extraordinary influences under which it was enacted, are indicated by the fact that its operation was limited to the term of two years. For a time it answered the demands of other governments. But in 1797 the statute was amended by further restrictions upon commerce and the people. Neither the interests of France nor public sentiment prompted this change in the existing law. It could have been suggested only by the power that prompted the original enactment. The law of 1794 operated only upon citizens of the United States within the jurisdiction of the United States. The law of 1797 operated against citizens of the United States beyond its limits and jurisdiction. The law of 1794 prohibited, under heavy penalties, the fitting out vessels of war for certain specified purposes; that of 1797 made this provision applicable not only to vessels of war, but to "private ships," and increased the penalties for its violation. It increased the fine from three to ten thousand dollars, and the imprisonment threatened from three years to ten years. It also prohibited the exportation of arms, equipments, vessels, &c., until the end of the session of 1798. The law of 1794 was limited to two years. That of 1797, except as to the exportation of arms, &c., was made permanent. These provisions indicate clearly under what influence they were enacted, and what interests they were intended to subserve. But it is to be specially noted, with reference to the history of the time, and also with regard to subsequent legislation upon the subject of our neutral relations, that in the terrible conflict between England and France, in which each nation contended not only for supremacy in Europe, but also for its existence, the statutes of 1794 and 1797, the first for a period of three years, and the second for twenty years, during which the whole of Europe was involved in war, were sufficiently stringent in their prohibitions upon American commerce and the American people to satisfy and silence the claims of the nation most ambitious for supremacy upon the land and sea. We were then in condition to have done more and gone further in this direction if it had been deemed necessary or just. But no further claim for protection was made, and the neutrality statutes of 1794 and 1797 remained unchanged for more than twenty years.

Early in the present century the Spanish provinces in America revolted against the oppressive government of Spain, and asserted their independence. The success of this revolution gave to the world eight sovereign and independent nations. The independence of the Spanish republics was hailed by the people of this country as the most auspicious event of the age. No government in Europe except that of Spain had resisted the freedom of the Spanish provinces by force. But all the nations of Europe in alliance with Spain maintained her right to the government of the colonies. Great Britain had been invited by Spain, in conjunction with the European alliance, to mediate between her and the colonies, upon the basis of their continued submission to her authority, with certain ameliorations as to commerce and the appointment of officers. The United States, whose co-operation was solicited by Great Britain, declined to enter into any plan of pacification, except upon the basis of their independence. The recognition of their independence was deferred for several years in deference to the authority of the Holy Alliance. Spain declared that such recognition would be regarded by her as an act of hostility. Their independence was recognized in 1822, after a contest of twelve years. The sympathy of the American people for the Spanish patriots was sincere and universal, and their hostility to the government and institutions of Spain was equally strong. The proximity of the Spanish provinces to our own country, and their inability, on account of their want of vessels of war, to cope with Spain upon the sea, rendered it difficult to prevent our citizens from giving them aid in their struggle for liberty. It was still more difficult to allay the suspicions of the European governments of our complication with the revolutionists. The statutes of 1794 and 1797, which had been sufficiently strong to satisfy the demands of England during her struggle with France, did not satisfy those who supported the authority of Spain over the colonies. To quiet these apprehensions, and more completely to fulfil all possible obligations of a neutral State, the statute of 1817 was enacted. The purpose of this act was stated in its title. It was an act to "preserve neutral relations." This statute embraced two principles not contained in the acts of 1794 or 1797. It required the government to take bonds from owners of armed vessels that no person within or without the jurisdiction of the United States should use them in contravention of its neutrality laws, and it authorized and directed collectors of customs, upon mere suspicion of such intent, to seize and detain them until an order of release should be obtained from the President. It was not denied that an armed vessel might be lawfully sold by an American citizen to a foreign subject, other than a subject of Spain, but it was thought necessary to make the American citizen responsible for the action of the foreign subject whereever he might be, and thus indirectly to prohibit the sale of American vessels. It was an act not to punish, but to prevent crime on the part of American citizens, by depriving them of the power of its commission. It was the assertion of the right of a belligerent not only to punish the violation of laws, but to demand the surrender of power to disregard them. It was not legislation to punish crime against the law of nations, but to prevent offences against Spain; and that at a moment when she was drawing her supplies from the United States to carry on the war against her colonies through the port of Havana, which was open to us only for that purpose. The manifestation of public feeling against the act of 1817 was so strong and general as to suggest a revision of the several neutrality acts, and the consolidation of such provisions as were deemed necessary to maintain the peace of this country with

other nations in a single statute. This was done in 1818. The act of that year constitutes the law of neutrality now in operation in this country; and it is the repeal of this act to which the attention of the committee has been called by order of the House. This act was the result of a strong public feeling against the law of 1817, and the earnest and united representations of foreign governments against the interference of American citizens in the struggle of the South American states for independence against Spain. Owing to the persistent power of foreign representatives' the new act, notwithstanding their manifest unpopularity, embodied all the objectionable provisions of preceding legislation. Its merit was that it embraced in one statute all legislation upon this subject, giving to its provisions the vigor of a new act, to which the attention of the executive officers of the country would be called. Its ablest opponent was Henry Clay, then Speaker of the House. He characterized it as an act for the benefit of Spain against the republics of America. It was enacted upon the pressing claims of Spain and Portugal, backed by the representative of Great Britain. No other country had adopted such provisions of law for the maintenance of its neutral obligations. It forbade citizens of the United States to accept commissions in the service of any government at war with other nations and at peace with us; it prohibited enlistments in the United States; the fitting out or increasing the force of vessels of war within or beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to enter such service, under a penalty of the confiscation of property and punishment by fine not exceeding $10,000 and imprisonment not to exceed ten years. Owners or part owners of vessels were required to give bonds in double the value of vessel, cargo, and armament, that they should not be used in contravention of law; and collectors of customs were authorized and directed to seize and detain, until the will of the President could be ascertained, vessels upon mere suspicion they were to be so used. Previous statutes had been temporary in whole or in part. This act was made permanent. It is impossible to suppose that provisions so repressive upon American commerce, so hostile to the cause of liberty in the colonies, and so strongly in favor of a government whose principles were so repugnant to the people as those of Spain, were voluntarily adopted. They had their origin in the interests of European governments hostile to the cause of the colonies. But it was not this consideration alone that led to their permanent enactment. The established policy of the government was that of peace with all nations. To maintain this policy it waived, both at home and abroad, interests to which, under other circumstances, it would have resolutely adhered. The declarations of Washington upon this subject are too familiar to require repetition. They were accepted by all his successors, and perhaps in no instance more forcibly and justly expressed than by Mr. Adams in 1826, in setting forth the objects of the Panama mission: "The great rule of conduct given us by the father of his country in his farewell address, in regard to foreign nations," he said, "is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little connexion as possible." "The counsels of Washington," said Mr. Adams, "in that instance, as in all the counsels of wisdom, were founded upon the circumstances in which our country and the world around us were situated at the time when it was given; that the reasons assigned by him for his advice were that Europe had a set of primary interests which to us had no or a very remote relation; that hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which were essentially foreign to our concerns; that our detached and distant situation invited and enabled us to pursue a different course; that by our union and rapid growth with an efficient government the period was not far distant when we might defy material injury from external annoyance; when we might take such an attitude as would cause our own neutrality to be respected, and with reference to belligerent nations might choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, should counsel." The same principle was stated by John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of State, when replying to the application for active aid to the cause of Greek emancipation and liberty in 1823.

"The policy of the United States with reference to foreign nations has always been founded upon moral principles and natural law-peace with all mankind. From whatever cause war between other nations, whether foreign or domestic, has arisen, the unvarying law of the United States has been peace with both belligerents. From the first war of the French revo lution to the recent invasion of Spain there has been a succession of wars, national and civil, in almost every one of which one of the parties was contending for liberty or independence. To the first revolutionary war a strong impulse of feeling urged the people of the United States to take sides with the party which at its commencement was contending, apparently at least, for both. Had the policy of the United States not been essentially pacific, a stronger case to claim their interference could scarcely have been presented. They nevertheless declared themselves neutral, and the principle then deliberately settled has been invariably adhered to ever since." It was upon this principle that the government acceded to the united demands of European nations in its legislation upon the subject of neutrality in 1818. It was not, as asserted, because every affection of our government was wrapped up in Great Britain, nor that we were legislating in favor of Spain, as Mr. Clay declared. This legislation was in harmony with the established policy of the government, the purpose of which was to disconnect ourselves from other nations in all matters of war.

Another consideration gave force to this view of public duty. It had been the established policy of the government, in submission to the views of the dominant political party of that day, to dispense with armies, navies, and fortifications, leaving our commerce and even our

⚫ territory to the protection of a just, moderate, and pacific public policy. President Monroe was the first to depart from this theory. He urged as strenuously as the federalists had done the fortification of our coast and frontier, the organization of an army competent to garrison and defend the frontier, and to meet the first invasion of a foreign foe. He advocated a navy, sufficient to maintain with dignity the neutrality of the United States, and secure our property on the seas from spoliation, and become a powerful engine of annoyance to public enemies. It was at this period that official declaration of the doctrine was made which now bears the name of President Monroe, and has become the recognized policy of the American government. It appears, therefore, that the early policy of the government was the result of the situation of the country, and that the deficiency in armies, navies, fortifications, and the implements of war, had as much to do with the formation of its policy as the opinions of its legislators, executive officers, or the people. It is also apparent that in urging the creation of armies, navies, fortifications, the implements, and the study of the science of war, especial consideration was given to the purpose of establishing a principle of neutrality, consistent with the dignity of the country, and protecting the continent against the encroachments of European powers and monarchical or imperial institutions of government.

It was, nevertheless, a wise and just policy, adapted to the condition of things at that time, and deliberately chosen, but with a view to the time not far distant when by union and rapid growth we might choose peace or war with belligerent nations, as our interests guided by justice should counsel."

It was a policy of isolation and estrangement from foreign nations, rather than of mere neutrality, which, when interpreted by the law of nations, means nothing more nor less than strict impartiality between those at war with each other.

It was this principle which enabled the administration of Washington and the people to harmonize upon a measure operating in favor of nations hostile to us, against patriots who were not only friends but sedulously following our example. The government accepted it, not because it was just, but necessary, and the people, because they shrank from presenting to the world the spectacle of a government at peace, and a people at war with other nations. It is of such dust that men capable of freedom are made. We do not hesitate to declare that there is now no desire to change this policy of peace with all nations, but it must be admitted that the time is approaching, if it has not come, when the statutes affecting our neutral relations may be put upon a footing of equality with those of other governments. It is scarcely necessary or just that the people of the United States should, by their own act, be put under obligations, and subjected to prohibitions such as rest upon no other nation, or that their personal rights and commercial privileges should by themselves be declared inferior to those enjoyed by people of other parts of the world.

The English statute of 1819 does not permanently prevent or punish crime. It depends upon the will of the Crown. The sovereign may suspend its operations at pleasure. It is, indeed, effective by its own terms only when the acts it prohibits are not licensed. Its restrictions upon British subjects are nominal compared with those of the American statute. This is the more noticeable because its enactment was in some measure a result of the adoption of the American statute of 1818. Lord John Russell says, in his correspondence with Mr. Adams upon the subject of the depredations of the British pirate Shenandoah upon our commerce, that "the American statute of 1818 was, in fact, so far as it was considered applicable to the circumstances and institutions of the country, (England,) the model of our foreign enlistment act of 1819." (Correspondence respecting the Shenandoah, page 301.) How far its imperfect provisions were enforced during the rebellion, and what advantage we derived from the halting imitators of our example by England, the American commerce swept from the seas or compelled to take shelter under the British flag can answer.

The law of France provides that if any citizen shall, by acts of hostility against foreign governments not approved by the government, expose the state to reprisals or a declaration of war, he shall be punished by banishment; and if war follows such an act, then by deportation, with loss of all rights of citizenship. If any citizen of France, without authority of the Emperor, enters the armed service of foreign governments, or joins any foreign military organization, he forfeits his citizenship, which he cannot regain except upon the conditions prescribed for the naturalization of foreigners. Deportation is a form of punishment preserved from the earliest ages of antiquity. It consists in perpetual banishment at some place designated by the government beyond the limits of the empire; or if no place has been designated, then in prison. It is equivalent to civil death.

The American statute is not demanded by international or natural law. According to these systems neutrality is impartiality. A state in virtue of its sovereignty has an inherent and indefeasibile right to remain neutral as between other states at war. This neutrality implies, on one part, impartiality; on the other, inviolability. The state cannot inflict, and is not bound to suffer injury. It is a temporary condition, incident to the situation, and not necessarily permanent. An attempt to impose upon a people permanent neutrality, especially if that word is interpreted to mean, as in our legislation it does, an estrangement, abscission, and isolation of the state from other nations, is opposed to the true principles of public morality and law. To make such a system permanent is impracticable. It can be justified only by a regard to the temporary condition of states by which it is enacted. The highest interests of civilization demand that the liberties and rights of neutrals should be

extended, and the privileges and powers of states at war diminished. Upon the recognition of this principle depend the progress of nations, the independence of states, the liberties of the people. To restrict the rights of neutrals, and enlarge the power of belligerents, is to reject the teachings of Christianity and the improvements of civilization, and to return to the doctrines of uncivilized nations and the practices of barbaric peoples.

In reviewing the statute of 1818 we cannot escape the conclusion that it is founded upon an opposite and unsound philosophy; that it disregards the inalienable rights of the people of all nations; that it was imposed upon the country by considerations affecting exclusively the political interests of other nations; that it criminally restrains the rights of nations at peace for the benefit of those at war; that it was intended to perpetuate the supremacy of favored nations on the sea. It properly belongs to another age, and is not of us nor for us. It was in deference to the conditions then imposed that American legislators thought it expedient to divest this country of rights enjoyed by others, indispensable to the development of the strength of republican institutions and the American States, and to inflict upon their people the irreparable injury of depriving them of privileges necessary to their private prosperity and the preservation of the liberties of their race. It is incredible that it should have been thought necessary permanently to suppress, as crimes on the part of our citizens, transactions which are not punished as crimes elsewhere, for the benefit of nations inimical if not hostile to us, and against states struggling for independence and liberty in emulation of our own example.

No; these concessions to the peace of the world were made for the time when they were enacted. It was an opportune and patriotic policy. The preservation of the republic was the first duty of our fathers, as it is now ours. It is destined, if sustained, to be the grand disturber of the right divine of kings, the model of struggling nations, the last hope of the independence of states and of rational liberty.

To the example and precept of our fathers we still adhere. But if the time has come for which they waited and worked, or whenever it shall come, in which the rights of the country can be asserted, its interests protected without departure from the established policy of our government, which we indorse without hesitation, and to which we adhere without reservation, it is our opinion that the opportunity should not be lost. And we therefore recommend, as incident to this duty and this day, a thorough revision of the statutes affecting our neutral relations with other governments, and the enactment of such laws as will limit its prohibitions and restrictions to those imposed by the laws of nations, the stipulations of treaties, the reciprocal legislation of other governments, the freedom of commerce, the independence of states, the interests of civilization, and that will curb the power of nations at war, and strengthen and extend the rights of those at peace.

The committee has had under consideration the bill referred by order of the House on the 20th June, providing that the statute of 1818 shall not be so construed as to prohibit citizens of the United States from selling vessels, ships, or steamers built within the limits, or of materials and munitions of war the growth or products thereof, to inhabitants of this country or to governments not at war with the United States.

The statute of 1818 enacts that 64 any person who shall fit out or arm, or attempt to fit out or arm, or be concerned in fitting out or arming, any ship or vessel, with intent that such ship or vessel shall be engaged in the service of any foreign prince or state, or any colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any prince, or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace, shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and fined not more than $10,000, and imprisoned not more than three years; and every such ship or vessel, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, together with all materials, arms, ammunition, and stores procured for the building and equipment thereof, shall be forfeited."

It requires that owners or consignees of every armed ship or vessel sailing out of the ports of the United States, belonging wholly or in part to citizens thereof, shall enter into bonds, with sufficient sureties, in double the amount of the value of ship, cargo, and armament, that she shall not be employed by such owners to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United States are at peace.

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It requires collectors of the customs to detain any vessel manifestly built for war purposes and about to depart the United States, of which the cargo, crew, or other circumstances" shall render it probable that such vessel is intended to be employed by the owner to cruise or commit hostilities upon the citizens or property of any foreign state, or of any district, colony, or people with whom the United States shall be at peace, until the decision of the President be had thereon, or until the owner shall have given bonds and security required by the tenth section of the act. It also makes citizens within the United States responsible for the acts of foreign subjects who are beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. These stringent provisions are not now necessary for the reason given for the passage of the law, to prevent the exportation of arms by force, in such a manner as to complicate the government with nations at war with each other but at peace with the United States; neither is it demanded by any just interpretation of our duty to other nations under the law of nations, treaty stipulations, or reciprocal municipal regulations. The repeal or modification of these

provisions will be, in the judgment of your committee, for the interest of public peace. Their effect now is to perpetuate the subjugation of States without naval force to the will of dominant maritime nations. It may reasonably be assumed that the late bombardment of the South American cities on the Atlantic coast by Spain, which has been universally condemned, would not have occurred but for the stringent execution of the provisions of this law by our government. Had the South American governments been supplied with materials for defence, from the abundant resources of the United States, this invasion of the American waters by the Spanish navy would not have been contemplated. Ships are articles of commerce; they are in no liberal or just sense contraband of war, nor are the materials of which they are made. The recent improvements in naval architecture are such as to diminish the distinctions between merchant vessels and ships of war, and to facilitate the adaptation of one to the purposes of the other. A strong-built, swift-sailing merchant vessel or steamer could be made with a single gun an effective war vessel. To prohibit our citizens from building such vessels or selling materials for their construction at a time when all nations except our own are at war, because they may be employed for hostile purposes by foreign subjects, or to demand bonds in double the amount of vessel, cargo, and armament, and to require officers of the customs to seize and detain them whenever cargo, crew, or "other circumstances" shall render probable a suspicion that they are to be so used, and where American citizens are part owners only, is substantially to deprive them of their rights to engage in the construction of vessels or to furnish materials therefor. Considering the limitless capacity of the country in this respect, it is a privilege that ought not to be surrendered except upon grounds of absolute necessity and justice.

The laws of war upon land have been materially and happily modified in the progress of civilization. Nations are no longer compelled to become parties to war. The rights of neutrals have been steadily enlarged; and the rights of non-combatants, both of person and of property, respected. War is now waged against governments, and not, as formerly, against persons. The most enlightened maritime nations have endeavored to modify and reform the laws of war upon the sea as upon the land. Great Britain is the only power that resists the. recognition of the rights of neutrals upon the sea as upon the land. In this, however, the principles she asserts are not enforced in her practice. To this extent she conforms to the spirit of the age. Russia, in 1780, asserted the doctrine of armed neutrality, and threatened war against any power that violated the principles asserted by her in behalf of neutral nations. These declarations were chiefly: that the flag covers the cargo, (contraband excepted;) that neutrals are not subject to the right of search; that articles contraband of war must be limited to objects used exclusively for purposes of war. They asserted the right of armed convoy for merchant vessels, and that blockade to be recognized must be effective. At a later period the northern maritime nations joined Russia in proclaiming the rights of neutrality as set forth in the declaration of the armed neutrality, which had been earlier asserted by France. The United States made war upon Great Britain in support of the same principles in 1812, and, as Napoleon the First said in the most memorable of his addresses to the French Chambers, vindicated and preserved the freedom of the seas when it had been abandoned by the rest of the world.

Notwithstanding the sacrifices made by the most enlightened maritime nations to mitigate the laws of war upon the sea, the necessary reform is not yet fully established. Great Britain, in theory at least, maintains the ancient and unjust pretensions of belligerents upon the sea, denying that the flag protects the merchandise, condemning as contraband of war materials used in the construction of vessels, coal, wood, hemp, and tar, as well as arms, guns, powder, &c., declaring that they ceased to be merchandise, and were contraband of war; denying the convoy of merchant vessels, and asserting the right of search and the theory of paper blockades. It is by the assertion of principles which she does not undertake to enforce that she seeks to maintain her supremacy on the seas. To these pretensions all the maritime nations are opposed. It is only by monopolizing the naval and commercial forces of the world that she can maintain these unjust pretensions. Whatever increases the maritime force of other nations opens the seas of the world to commerce, which is the handmaid of peace, It is due to the independence of nations, as well as to the freedom of the seas, that the United States should assist in this great work, and the repeal of these provisions cannot but contribute in an important degree to this object of universal interest.

It may be said that the modification of our statutes of neutrality will absolve Great Britain from claims made upon her for the destruction of our merchant vessels during the late civil war. There is no ground for this apprehension. The modification proposed affects the future and not the past relations of the United States with other nations. No change in our statute laws can release Great Britain from responsibility to this government, incurred under previously existing relations.

Our claim is for American ships destroyed by British vessels in violation of her own statute of neutrality-the foreign enlistment act of 1819, enacted, we are told, upon the model of our statute of 1818. Our complaint is based upon the fact that before one drop of blood was shed in any encounter upon land, or in any engagement except the affair at Fort Sumter; when not an effective insurgent vessel floated upon the ocean, she recognized the rebels as belligerents on the sea, and allowed pirate ships to escape from her ports to prey upon and destroy our commerce, and appropriated to herself the advantages of this unjust pro