McClellan to Buell, Jan. 13, 1862.

VII., p. 547.

Buell to
McClellan,

Jan. 13, 1862.

W. R. Vol.

VII., p. 548.

and may force Johnston to detach. Its political CHAP. IV.
effect will be very great." In his answer, written
the same day, Buell at length promised to carry w. R. Vol.
out the instruction. "As I told you in my dis-
patch, I shall now devote myself to it, contenting
myself, as far as Bowling Green is concerned, with
holding it in check and concealing my design as
long as possible." But though he, in the same
letter, acknowledged that the numerical strength of
his command had risen to ninety thousand men,
he could not bring himself to act even in fulfill-
ment of his own definite promise. Nearly three
weeks later, he wrote a letter alleging that "the
want of transportation and the condition of the
roads" had thwarted the programme. To a long
argument in support of this opinion, he added:
"For the reasons I have stated I have been forced
reluctantly to the conviction that an advance
into East Tennessee is impracticable at this time
on any scale which will be sufficient." The real
reason of his conviction appears in a few sentences
which follow, and which show a final decision to
carry out his long cherished design of a movement pp. 931, 932.
in force against Bowling Green.

If there be a question among military experts as to the momentary feasibility or local value of this East Tennessee movement, there can be none when considered in its influence and relation to the whole

great theater of war. A glance at the map, and a study of attendant circumstances, can leave no doubt that it was entirely possible to have seized and held the mountain region of Eastern Tennessee, and that such an occupation would have been a severance of the rebel Confederacy, almost as

Ibid.,
Feb. 1, 1862.

W. R.
Vol. VII.,

CHAP. IV. complete and damaging to its military strength as

1861.

Branner to
Benjamin,

Nov. 9, 1881.

W. R. Vol.

IV., p. 231.

the opening of the Mississippi. If, also, there had been any doubt about the earnestness of the Union sentiment of the people of Eastern Tennessee, events soon developed ample proofs of their patriotism and devotion to the Government. The reader will remember the transmittal of arms and ammunition by Nelson and Carter, and the formation of secret military organizations by the bolder Unionists. Rumors and promises of the coming of a Union army also reached them from time to time in such form as to excite their hope and measurably inspire their reliance. Had General Thomas been permitted to march his column to Cumberland Gap and Knoxville, as he desired, about the first of November, his presence would have been favored by extraordinary events.

Startling news reached the rebel Secretary of War on the 9th of November. "Two large bridges," telegraphed a railroad president, " on my road were burned last night about twelve o'clock; also one bridge on the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad at the same time, and an effort made to burn the largest bridge on my road. There is great excitement along the whole line of road and evidence that the Union party are organizing and preparing to destroy or take possession of the whole line from Bristol to Chattanooga." Two days later the commanding officer at Knoxville wrote further details. "My fears, expressed to you by letters and dispatches of the 4th and 5th instants, have been realized by the destruction of no less than five railroad bridges: two on the East Tennessee and Virginia road, one on the East Tennessee and

Wood to Cooper, Nov. 11,

1861. W. R.

Georgia road, and two on the Western and Atlan- CHAP. IV.
tic road. The indications were apparent to me, but
I was powerless to avert it. The whole country
is now in a state of rebellion; a thousand men are
within six miles of Strawberry Plains Bridge, and
an attack is contemplated to-morrow. . . An attack
was made on Watauga yesterday. Our men suc-
ceeded in beating them off, but they are gathering
in larger force and may renew it in a day or two.
They are not yet fully organized, and have no sub-
sistence to enable them to hold out long. I learn
from two gentlemen, just arrived, that another camp
is being formed about ten miles from here in Sevier
County, and already three hundred are in camp.
They are being reënforced from Blount, Roane,
Johnson, Green, Carter, and other counties. I
need not say that great alarm is felt by the few
Southern men." "Civil war has broken out at
length in East Tennessee,” said another letter; "in
the late election scarcely a so-called Union man
voted. .. They look confidently for the reës-
tablishment of the Federal authority in the South
with as much confidence as the Jews look for the
coming of the Messiah, and I feel quite sure when
I assert it that no event or circumstance can change
or modify their hopes. In this state of affairs
this part, and, indeed, all of East Tennessee, will
be subjected during the war to apprehensions of
internal revolt, more or less remote, as the tide of
war turns in this direction. The recent bridge-
burning in this section was occasioned by the hope
that the Federal troops would be here in a few days
from Kentucky to second their efforts. . . There
are now camped in and about Elizabethtown, in

Vol. IV.,

pp. 236, 237.

CHAP. IV. Carter County, some 1200 or 1500 men, armed with a motley assortment of guns, in open defiance of the Confederate States of America, and who are awaiting a movement of the Federal troops from Kentucky to march forward and take possession of the railroad. These men are gathered up from three or five counties in this region, and comprise the Jefferson hostile Union element of this section, and never will be appeased, conciliated, or quieted in a Southern IV., p. 239. Confederacy."

Graham to

Davis,

Nov. 12,

1861.

W. R. Vol.

To these appeals from persons of local prominence, Governor Harris of Tennessee added his earnest entreaty. "The burning of railroad bridges in East Tennessee shows a deep-seated spirit of rebellion in that section. Union men are organizing. 1861. W. R. This rebellion must be crushed out instantly, the

Harris to
Jefferson
Davis,
Nov. 12,

Vol. IV.,

p. 240.

Benjamin

leaders arrested and summarily punished." The Richmond authorities were not slow to respond. Two regiments from Memphis and another from Pensacola were ordered to East Tennessee in all haste, with such miscellaneous companies and fragments as could be gathered up nearer the scene of disturbance. "Troops are now moving to Branner, to East Tennessee to crush the traitors," tele1861. W. R. graphed the rebel Secretary of War; "you shall be amply protected." There is little need to relate the quick and unsparing movements by the Confederate troops against the Union combinations. The uprising seems to have been ill-advised and ill-concerted. Unsupported as it was by Federal forces, the hasty gatherings of the loyalists were quickly dispersed, and many of the participants captured.1

Nov. 13,

Vol. IV.,

p. 243.

1 The following extract from a "at the instance of a number of letter written by a Confederate, leading citizens, together with

The course of the Richmond Government towards CHAP. IV. the East Tennessee "traitors," however, deserves to be remembered. In the eyes of Jefferson Davis "treason" to the Union was a holy duty, while "treason" to their usurpation was deserving of exemplary punishment, which in this instance was ordered with apparent relish. "I am very glad," telegraphed the Confederate Secretary of War, "to hear of the action of the military authorities, and hope to hear they have hung every bridge-burner at the end of the burned bridge."

many officers of the army," to induce the Confederate Government to relax the extreme rigor of its East Tennessee policy, may probably be accepted as fair evidence of the transaction it describes :

"Colonels Leadbetter and Vance moved their commands into that portion of the State bordering on the Virginia and Kentucky line, while General Carroll and Colonel Wood moved from the west in the direction of Chattanooga and Knoxville. Scouting parties were sent out in every direction, who arrested hundreds suspected of disloyalty, and incarcerated them in prison, until almost every jail in the eastern end of the State was filled with poor, ignorant, and, for the most part, harmless men, who had been guilty of no crime, save that of lending a too-credulous ear to the corrupt demagogues whose counsels have led them astray. Among those thus captured were a number of bridgeburners. These latter were tried and promptly executed. The rigorous measures adopted by the military commanders here struck still greater terror into those who

had before been Union men, and
to avoid arrest and, as they
thought, subsequent punishment,
concealed themselves, thus giv-
ing the semblance of guilt to
actions innocent in fact and en-
tirely natural under the circum-
stances which surrounded them.
About 400 of the poor victims of
designing leaders have been sent
to Tuscaloosa as prisoners of
war, leaving in many instances
their families in a helpless and
destitute condition. The great-
est distress prevails throughout
the entire country in conse-
quence of the various arrests that
have been made, together with
the facts that the horses and the
other property of the parties that
have been arrested have been
seized by the soldiers, and in
many cases appropriated to per-
sonal uses or wantonly destroyed.
Old political animosities and pri-
vate grudges have been revived,
and bad men among our friends
are availing themselves of the op-
portunity afforded them by bring-
ing Southern men to hunt down
with the ferocity of bloodhounds
all those against whom they en-
tertain any feeling of dislike.”

to Ramsay,
1861, W. R.
pp. 700, 701.

Benjamin
Nov. 25,

Vol. VII.,

Young to Currin, Dec. 19, 1861. W. R. Vol. VII., pp. 777, 778.