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CHAP. IV. that the reënforcements sent were not being placed with reference to East Tennessee. "What is the

McClellan

Nov. 27, 1861. W. R. Vol.

to Buell, reason," he inquired by telegraph, "for concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at VIL., p. 450. once on Eastern Tennessee unless it is impossible." Here Buell ought to have sent a straightforward reply, either that it was impossible, or that he would obey; instead of this he answered evasively, suggesting several alternative plans, but giving no indications of a willingness to act; his chief solicitude was reënforcement, drill, organization. These were certainly useful, perhaps necessary. But when they interfered with the prosecution of an enterprise specifically directed by his superior, he should not have left his intentions unexplained. Ten days more ran on, and Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard, who were in Washington attendMaynard ing Congress, sent Buell an anxious dispatch: Johnson to "Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest; the Government must come to their relief." His reply kept the word of promise to the ear: "I assure you I recognize no more imperative Maynard duty, and crave no higher honor, than that of rescuing our loyal friends in Tennessee, whose sufferings and heroism I think I can appreciate." But his letter to McClellan of the same day, if they could have seen it, would have sadly chilled their hope: "I do not mean to be diverted more than is absolutely necessary from what I regard as of the first importance- the organization of my forces, now little better than a mob." In his letter of two days later, by way of making amends, he said he had organized a division at Lebanon with special reference to East Tennessee, but hinted that he

and

Buell,

Dec. 7, 1861.

W. R. Vol.

VII., p. 480.

Buell to

and

Johnson,

Dec. 8, 1861.

W. R. Vol.

VII., p. 483.

Buell to McClellan,

Dec. 8, 1861.

W. R. Vol.

VII., p. 483.

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would convince McClellan it could be used to better CHAP. IV. advantage elsewhere.

Buell to
McClellan,
Dec. 10,
1861.
W. R. Vol.

Thomas to
Buell,
Dec. 20,
1861.

W. R. Vol.

Buell to
Thomas,
Dec. 21,

Vol. VII.,

p. 509.

Ibid.,
Dec. 23,

1861 W. R.

Vol. VII.,

pp. 511, 512.

To leave him no excuse the War Department telegraphed him, December 20: "Do you need VII., p. 487. more regiments than are now under your orders; if so, how many?" His reply indicated that he realized he was trying the patience of the Govern- VII., p. 509. ment: "I am not willing to say that I need more regiments. I can use more with decided advan- 1861. w. R. tage, if they can be sent." His more formal answer acknowledged that he had an aggregate "of some 70,000 men, about 57,000 for duty," and his letter at length discloses the idea upon which he had been acting: "The plan which I propose for the troops here is one of defense on the east and of invasion on the south." Finally, the approach of the New Year, together with other circumstances, again brought the question, so long evaded and neglected, sharply to his attention. "Johnson, Maynard, etc., are again becoming frantic," McClellan telegraphed him on December 29th, "and have President Lincoln's sympathy excited. Political considerations would make it advisable to get the arms and troops into Eastern Tennessee at a very early day; you are, however, the best judge. Can you tell me about when and in what force you 1861, W. R. will be in Eastern Tennessee?" Whether he intended it or not, he once more sent an evasive and misleading response: "It startles me to think," he wrote on December 29, "how much time has elapsed since my arrival, and to find myself still in Louisville... I have this moment received your dispatch. I intend a column of 12,000 men, with three batteries, for East Tennessee; but, as I have

McClellan
to Buell,

Dec. 29,

Vol. VII.,

p. 926.

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CHAP. IV. telegraphed you, it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so much depends on the circumstances which may arise in the mean time. . . In any event I must tell you, what I have been unwilling McClellan, to do all along, that you will require more troops 1861, W. R. in Kentucky. Don't acknowledge this, however, pp. 520, 521. but act on it."

Buell to

Dec. 29,

Vol. VII.,

Lincoln to
Buell,

Jan. 4, 1862.

W. R. Vol.

VII., p. 530.

This last qualified promise did not long serve to postpone the decisive avowal that Buell had been hitherto allowing the Administration to entertain delusive hopes. Prompted by causes which are related elsewhere, President Lincoln, on the 4th of January, telegraphed him the definite question: "Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer." In his reply, Buell for the first time, after nearly two months of evasion, fully let out the secret that his plans lay in another quarter. "While my preparations have had this movement constantly in view, I will confess to your Excellency that I have been bound to it more by my sympathy for the people of East Tennessee and the anxiety with which you and the General-in-Chief have desired it than by my opinion of its wisdom as an unconditional measure. As earnestly as I wish to accomplish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be concentrated at any point of that line pp. 590, 531. which is attacked singly." President Lincoln's comment on this extraordinary avowal is in that

Buell to
Lincoln,

Jan. 5, 1862.
W. R.
Vol. VII.,

generous and forbearing tone which forms one of CHAP. IV. his characteristic traits; but it does not conceal his sadness that the cause is to lose an advantage which a resolute commander might have grasped:

Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticize your views, and therefore what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor, rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement towards Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My dispatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer, which I cannot safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign to go and Lincoln to save their families somehow, or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my pp. 927, 928. anxiety.

McClellan did not let Buell off so easily. A sensitive officer would have little relished to be told that he had not only caused himself to be misunderstood, but had deranged the plans of his superior. "I was extremely sorry," wrote McClellan the same day, "to learn from your telegram to the President that you had from the beginning attached

Buell, Jan. 6, 1862. W. R. Vol. VII.,

CHAP. IV. little or no importance to a movement in East Tennessee. I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own, which I deeply regret. My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance at the present moment. My own advance cannot, according to my present views, be made until your troops are solidly established in the Eastern portion of Tennessee. If that is not possible a complete and prejudicial change in my own plans at once becomes necessary. Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance in comparison with the immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, South CaroMcClellan lina, North Georgia, and Alabama; results that I Jan. 6, 1862. feel assured would ere long flow from the moveVII., p. 531. ment I allude to."

to Buell,

W. R. Vol.

This candid lecture was within a week supplemented by another letter from the General-in-Chief to Buell containing a suggestion so strong as almost to amount to a positive order. "You have no idea of the pressure brought to bear here upon the Government for a forward movement. It is so strong that it seems absolutely necessary to make the advance on Eastern Tennessee at once. I incline to this, as a first step, for many reasons. Your possession of the railroad there will surely prevent the main army in my front from being reënforced

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