wearied with seven hours of constant fighting.1 CH. XXIIL There was no confusion except at the point on the right where Morell's line had been pierced by Hood's brigade, where two regiments were made prisoner. Everywhere else the Union soldiers retired fighting, turning from time to time to beat back the enemy, until night put an end to the con flict. Porter had lost four thousand in killed and wounded-one-sixth of his men; Lee something more, about one-twelfth of his. The loss in missing was much larger on the Union side than on the Confederate. Lee had absolutely failed in his object to dislodge the Union army from its position and "drive it down the Chickahominy." Of the heroic valor of this sanguinary day's work there can be no question. There is much question of the wisdom of it. If McClellan had made up his mind to retreat to the James, he might have withdrawn Porter to the south side of the Chickahominy during the night of the 26th, after his signal victory at Beaver Dam. 1 Porter says: "The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries (several not engaged); in all, about 30,000 fighting men [including the reënforcements received during the day]. Confederate, 129 regiments, 19 batteries; in all, about 65,000." 2 "At last a moment came when action was imperative. The enemy assumed the initiative, and we had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank, while two corps at least of But, as we have seen, he the enemy's force were on the left "Battles and Leaders." Vol. II., p. 337. CH. XXIII. gave no definite orders until three o'clock the next morning, when he directed Porter to retire to Gaines's Mill. During all the terrible conflict of the 27th, he left his gallant subordinate to fight his force, with no intimation of his ultimate purpose. Porter had a right to think that the price of his tremendous sacrifice was to be the capture of Richmond. McClellan's orders to him on the 23d included these words: W. R. Vol. XI., Part III., p. 247. The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond. In addition to this we have the most unimpeachable authority for saying that Porter on the battlefield was left with the same impression. General Webb, who was present with General Porter during the fight, ordered to that duty from McClellan's headquarters, says he "carried with him to General Porter the distinct impression then prevailing at the headquarters of the army, that he was to hold this large force of the enemy on the left bank of the Chickahominy in order that General McClel"The Pen- lan, with the main army, might break through and take Richmond." Webb, insula," p. 187. have been), we could have fought the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communications, and then returned and taken Richmond."- Report of General Barnard, Chief of Engineers, Army of the Potomac. W. R. Vol. XI., Part I., p. 131. It was this inspiring thought which moved Porter CH. XXIII. and his men to such a prodigious feat of arms. General Webb says: The sacrifice at Gaines's Mill. . . was warranted, if we were to gain Richmond by making it, and the troops engaged in carrying out this plan, conceiving it to be the wish of the general commanding, were successful in holding the rebels on the left bank. But the general commanding was incapable of the effort of will necessary to carry out his share of the plan. He gives us to understand, in his report and in subsequent articles, that he resolved upon his retreat to the James on the 25th of June. General Webb adopts this theory, and adds that McClellan thought that the capture of Richmond, with Lee beyond the Chickahominy, was not a proper military movement. It is not in the competence of any one to judge what were General McClellan's thoughts and intentions from the 23d to the 27th of June. So late as eight o'clock on the night of the 27th a dispatch from him to the War Department indicates that he thought the attack of Magruder on the right bank was more serious than that upon Porter on the left. "I may be forced," he says, "to give up my position during the night, but will not if it is possible to avoid it"; and as a matter of course the usual refrain follows: "Had I twenty thousand fresh and good troops, we would be sure of a splendid victory to-morrow." Magruder, who had been left to guard Richmond with only twenty-five thousand troops, had been all day repeating the devices which were so successful at Yorktown. He had rattled about McClellan's entire front with so much noise and smoke as to create the Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 187. 1862. W. R. Vol. XI., Part III., p. 266. CH. XXIII. impression of overwhelming numbers. Even the seasoned corps commanders were not unaffected by it. Franklin thought it not prudent to send any reënforcements from his line to Porter. Sumner offered to send two brigades, but thought it would be hazardous. The real state of the case can best be seen from Magruder's own report. He says: W. R. Vol. XI., Part I., p. 59. Ibid., Part II., p. 662. "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," From Friday night until Sunday morning I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. The bridges had been all destroyed, but one was rebuilt (the New Bridge), which was commanded fully by the enemy's guns from Golding's, and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond. . . Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Austerlitz, under similar circumstances, by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently the city, might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander fully understood the character of his opponent. D. H. Hill says the same thing: During Lee's absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan. . . The fortifications around Richmond at that time were very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the disadvantages of a precipitated movement.1 1 The following shows the opinion of two of the most prominent Confederate officers upon this matter. It is an extract from a letter of General J. E. Johnston to General Beauregard, dated Amelia Springs, August 4, 1862, shortly after the Seven Days' Battles: "But for my confidence in McClellan's want of enterprise, I should on Thursday night, after |