CH. XXIII. to herd and drive down the Peninsula a magnificent army, superior in numbers to his own, and not inferior in any other respect-if we except the respective generals-commanding, who were at least equally distinguished engineers. In this enterprise he deserved and courted defeat by leaving the bulk of McClellan's army between himself and Richmond. When he laid his plan before Jefferson Davis, the latter saw at once this serious defect in it. He says:

Davis,

"Rise and

Fall of the
Confed-

erate Gov

ernment." Vol. II., p. 132.

I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched line between that left flank [of the enemy] and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance, and if McClellan was the man I took him for, as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old esprit de corps manifested itself in General Lee's first response that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes, but immediately passing to the main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchments, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy's heels before he gets there."

But everything shows he anticipated no such action on the part of McClellan. All his orders, all his dispositions, indicate clearly that he thought of nothing but driving him down the Chickahominy towards Yorktown, and capturing or dispersing his army. The measure of success he met with will always be, in the general judgment, a justifica

tion of his plan; but the opinion of the best mili- CH. XXIII. tary critics on both sides is that it never could have succeeded had it not been for McClellan's hallucination as to the numbers opposed to him. From the hour that Lee crossed his troops over the Chickahominy, leaving that river and McClellan's army between him and Richmond, he risked the fate of the Confederacy upon his belief that the Union general would make no forward movement. His confidence grew with every step of McClellan's retreat from Beaver Dam Creek to Malvern Hill, and was dearly paid for in the blood of his soldiers.

The first meeting between the two armies re sulted in a terrible defeat for the Confederates. About three o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, June, 1862. the rebel forces, commanded by Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and A. P. Hill, attacked the Union troops in position on the east side of Beaver Dam Creek, commanded by General McCall, whose division had been added to Fitz-John Porter's corps. McCall's brigade commanders were Truman Seymour, Meade, and John F. Reynolds. Of the last two, the one gained an undying fame and the other a glorious death at Gettysburg. The Confederates were in greatly superior force, but the Union troops had the advantage of position; and though both sides fought with equal valor, before night fell the rebels were repulsed with great slaughter. General McClellan visited Fitz-John Porter's headquarters at night, after the battle. He found an exultant and victorious army, almost unscathed by the fierce conflict of the day. Porter reports his loss at 250 out of the 5000 engaged, and says the enemy Civil War." lost nearly 2000 of their 10,000 attacking. If Por

"Battles

and

Leaders of the

Vol. II.,

p. 331.

CH. XXIII. ter, instead of McClellan, had been in command of

the army, Richmond might have been under the Union flag the next day. His soldierly spirit, flushed with the day's success, comprehended the full advantage of the situation. He urged McClellan to seize his opportunity; he proposed "to hold his own at the Beaver Dam line, slightly reënforced, while General McClellan moved the main body of the army upon Richmond." The general commanding had not resolution enough to accept or reject this proposition of his gallant subordinate. He returned to his own headquarters to make up his mind, and about "three or four o'clock in the morning" sent his final order to Porter to retire to a position some four miles east, behind Boatswain Swamp, and there await the further attack of the

enemy.

General Porter's personal devotion to McClellan, which was afterwards to bring him into lifelong trouble, has never allowed him to criticize this decision of his chief which overruled his own bold and intelligent plan. Let us see how the ablest and most efficient Confederate general engaged in this campaign regarded it. General Longstreet says:

In my judgment the evacuation of Beaver Dam Creek was very unwise on the part of the Federal commanders. We had attacked at Beaver Dam, and had failed to make an impression at that point, losing several thousand men and officers. This demonstrated that the position was safe. If the Federal commanders knew of Jackson's approach on the 26th, they had ample time to reënforce Porter's right before Friday morning (27th), with men 1 We are here quoting the language of General Webb, whose testimony is beyond question.-Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 130.

"Battles

and Leaders

and field defenses, to such extent as to make the re- CH. XXIII. mainder of the line to the right secure against assault. So that the Federals in withdrawing not only abandoned a strong position, but gave up the morale of their success, and transferred it to our somewhat disheartened Civil War," forces; for, next to Malvern Hill, the sacrifice at Beaver Dam was unequaled in demoralization during the entire

summer.

It is hard to understand what General McClellan means when he says in his report that the 26th was "the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance." If he thought it safe to attack Richmond with Lee and his army in front of him, how much more advantageous would such an attack have been with Lee and two-thirds of his army engaged in a desperate battle north of the Chickahominy. There is no indication in his orders or dispatches of these days—if we except one order to Porter, hereafter to be mentioned-that he had any more definite purpose than to await the action of the enemy, and retreat to the James if necessary. His mind was filled with the idea of an army of 200,000 under Lee. In his report, written a year afterwards, he reiterates and dwells upon this already disproved fiction, basing his persistent belief on the reports of his detective service. This is the only explanation possible of his action during this momentous week, while he was flying from myriads which existed only in his own brain, and his brave army was turning and checking Lee's pursuing forces at every halt it made.

of the

Vol. II.,

p. 398.

W. R. Vol. XI.,

Part I.,

p. 51.

Ibid.

On the morning of the 27th Porter withdrew to June, 1862. his new position, famous ever thereafter as the battlefield of Gaines's Mill, or of the Chickahominy, as it is called by Southern writers. His ground,

CH. XXIII. like that of the day before, was admirably chosen for defense. He had less than one-third the number of the host which was marching by every road on the west and north to destroy him.1 He knew his force was too small to defend so long a line against such numbers, but his appeals to McClellan for reenforcements brought no response until late in the day, when Slocum's division was sent him. With the troops he had he made a magnificent fight, which makes us speculate on what might have happened if he had commanded the entire Army of the Potomac on that day.

With the exception of the nine brigades left on the south side of the river under Magruder and Huger to hold McClellan, the whole army of General Lee, numbering over sixty thousand men, was advancing upon Porter's single corps. It was led by the best generals of the South-Longstreet, the two Hills, Whiting, Hood, Ewell, and the redoubtable Jackson, whose corps, though marching with less than their usual celerity, had turned Beaver Dam Creek the night before, and had now arrived at the post assigned them opposite Porter's right. General Lee commanded on the field in person, and Jefferson Davis contributed whatever his presence was worth.

The battle began at noon, and as evening fell upon the desperately fought field, the entire Confederate army, by a simultaneous advance, forced back the Union troops, overcome by numbers and

1 Porter's force consisted of Morell's, McCall's, and Sykes's divisions; "in all, 17,330 infantry for duty. There were present with him 2534 artillery, of which,

from the nature of the ground, but a very small portion could be used"; and 671 of the regular cavalry guarded the bridges.Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 129.