House, on the Pamunkey, as the base of supplies, was one CHAP. XXI. of McClellan's own choice, uninfluenced by McDowell's movements. Webb, "The Peninsula," p. 87. It required ten days after the fight at Williamsburg for McClellan's headquarters to reach Cumberland Landing, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, and on the next day he established his permanent depot at White House, near by. On the 21st the May, 1862. army was brought together and established in line on the Chickahominy, the right wing being about seven and the left about twelve miles from Richmond, from which they were separated by two formidable barriers -the rebel army, and the river with its environment of woods and swamps, its fever-breathing airs and its sudden floods. The Chickahominy was first attacked. General McClellan began at once with great energy the building of several bridges over the stream, a work of special difficulty on account of the boggy banks, which made long approaches necessary. In this work, and in a voluminous correspondence with the President in regard to reënforcements, which we shall notice when we come to treat of those movements of Jackson in the Valley that caused the division of McDowell's force, he passed ten days; he pushed the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman across the river, and retained those of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter on the north side. The monotony of camp life was broken on the 27th of May by a creditable feat of arms performed by Fitz-John Porter and his corps near Hanover Court House, where he attacked and defeated a rebel force under General Branch. The chief value of this engagement was its demonstration of the VOL. V.-25 CHAP. XXI. splendid marching and fighting qualities of the 1862. W. R. Part I., p. 33. troops engaged. General McClellan was greatly annoyed that the President did not seem to attach sufficient importance to this action; but General Johnston in his "Narrative," while not diminishing the gallantry of Porter and his troops, or denying the complete defeat of Branch, treats it merely as an incident of Branch's march under orders to join General Joseph R. Anderson, which was accomplished the same day at the point designated for this junction. There was no sequel to the fight. Porter and his victorious troops marched back to camp. On the 26th of May General McClellan informed the President that he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle," and Vol. XI., that he would be "free to strike" on the return of Porter. But several days elapsed without the blow being struck, until the enemy, as usual, accelerated matters by himself striking. It had been for some time the intention of General Johnston to attack the Union army before McDowell should join it; and learning, on the day of the battle of Hanover Court House, that McDowell was leaving Fredericksburg, he resolved at once to strike McClellan's force on both sides of the river. When we consider that the consolidated returns of the Army of the Potomac for the 31st of May showed an agVol. XI, gregate of 127,166 officers and men, of whom there were 98,008 present for duty, with 280 pieces of field artillery, and that General Johnston's force amounted to upwards of 62,000 effectives, we cannot but think it was a fortunate circumstance for him that he did not attempt to carry this heroic plan into effect. At night, when he had called his W. R. Part III., p. 204. general officers together for their instructions, CHAP. XXI. Johnston was informed that McDowell's force, which had been marching southward, had returned to Fredericksburg. He then abandoned his idea of attacking McClellan on both sides of the river, and reverted to his former plan of assailing with the greater part of his force the two corps on the south bank as soon as they had sufficiently increased the distance between themselves and the three corps on the north. In this plan, as in the other one,- and we shall see, farther on, that the same was the case with General Lee,- General Johnston does not seem to have been greatly troubled about a possible initiative of General McClellan. McClellan evidently had no suspicion of Johnston's intentions. At the moment that the latter was calling his generals together to give orders for the assault, McClellan was telegraphing to Washington: "Richmond papers urge Johnston to attack, now he has us away from gunboats. I think he is too able for that." W. R. Vol. XI., Part III., p. 193. Johnston's purpose was finally adopted and put in action with great decision and promptitude. On the 30th, D. H. Hill informed him that the Federals May, 1862. were in force at Seven Pines, and that the indications were that all of Keyes's corps was south of the river; to which Johnston immediately responded by telling him he would attack the next morning. Orders were given to throw twentythree of the twenty-seven brigades of which the Confederate army consisted, against the two corps of Heintzelman and Keyes. The rest were 1 In "Battles and Leaders," Vol. II., p. 211, General Johnston changes this statement to "twenty-two out of twenty-eight brigades." |