Halleck, June 28, 1862. W. R. how, in the West as well as in the East, President CHAP. XIX. Lincoln treated his military commanders, not with ignorant interference, as has been so often alleged, but with the most fatherly indulgence. Future chapters will describe the complete failure in the East of the campaign undertaken by McClellan against Richmond, and which, on the 30th of June, brought to Halleck an order from the Secretary of War, dated the 28th, immediately to detach and send 25,000 men to assist that imperiled enterprise. The necessity was declared " imperative." "But in detaching your force," explained the order, "the President directs that it be done in such way as Stanton to to enable you to hold your ground and not interfere with the movement against Chattanooga and vol. XVII., East Tennessee." Halleck took instant measures to obey the order, but said in reply that it would jeopardize the ground gained in Tennessee and involve the necessity of abandoning Buell's East Tennessee expedition. This result the President had in advance declared inadmissible. He now telegraphed emphatically on June 30: "Would be very glad of 25,000 infantry-no artillery or cavalry; but please do not send a man if it endangers any place you deem important to hold, or if it forces you to give up or weaken or delay the expe- Lincoln to dition against Chattanooga. To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, Vol. XVII., I think fully as important as the taking and holding of Richmond." This request, but accompanied by the same caution and condition, was repeated by the President on July 2; and again, under the prompting of extreme need, Lincoln on July 4 sent a diminished VOL. V.-23 Part II., p. 42. Halleck, June 30, 1862. W. R. Part II., p. 53. CHAP. XIX. request; still, however, insisting that no risk be incurred in the West: "You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even ten thousand infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army." Lincoln to July 4, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVII., Part. II., p. 70. In Halleck's response on the following day it is important to notice the difference in the opinions entertained by the two men upon this point. Lincoln wished to gain East Tennessee, Halleck desired to hold West Tennessee. The distinction is essential, for we shall see that while Halleck's policy prevailed, it tended largely, if not principally, to thwart the realization of Lincoln's earnest wish. Halleck telegraphed: "For the last week there has been great uneasiness among Union men in Tennessee on account of the secret organizations of insurgents to coöperate in any attack of the enemy on our lines. Every commanding officer from Nashville to Memphis has asked for reënforcements. Under these circumstances I submitted the question of sending troops to Richmond to the principal officers of my command. They are unanimous in opinion that if this army is seriously diminished the Chattanooga expedition must be revoked or the hope of holding Southwest Tennessee abandoned. I must earnestly protest against surrendering what to Lincoln, has cost us so much blood and treasure, and which in a military point of view is worth three Richmonds." He had already, in a previous telegram (July 1), acknowledged and exercised the discretion Halleck July 5, 1862. which Lincoln gave him, replying, "Your telegram, CHAP. XIX. just received, saves Western Tennessee." It was found by the Washington authorities that the early reports of McClellan's reverses had been unduly exaggerated, and that by straining resources in the East the Western armies might be left undiminished. But with this conviction President Lincoln also reached the decision that the failure of the Richmond campaign must be remedied by radical measures. To devise new plans, to elaborate and initiate new movements, he needed the help of the highest attainable professional skill. None seemed at the moment so available as that of Halleck. Under his administration order had come out of chaos in Missouri, and under his guiding control, however feeble in the particular cases that we have pointed out, the Western armies had won the victories of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, Shiloh, Island No. 10, and Corinth. It was a record of steady success, which justified the belief that a general had been found who might be intrusted with the direction of the war in its larger combinations. The weakness of his present plans had not yet been developed. Accordingly on the 11th of July this order was made by the President: "That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital as soon as he can with safety to vol. XVII, the positions and operations within the department under his charge." It seemed at the moment the best that could be done. In his short Corinth campaign Halleck had substantially demonstrated his unfitness for the Lincoln, Order, July 11, 1862. W. R. Part II., p. 90. CHAP. XIX. leadership of an army in the field. He had made a grievous mistake in coming away from his department headquarters at St. Louis. He was a thinker and not a worker; his proper place was in the military study and not in the camp. No other soldier in active service equaled him in the technical and theoretical acquirements of his profession. The act of the President in bringing him to Washington restored him to his more natural duty. In following the further career of Halleck, one of the incidents attending this transfer needs to be borne in mind. The first intimation of the change came in the President's dispatch of the 2d of July which asked: "Please tell me could you make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the service in your department?" A few days later one of the President's friends went from Washington to Corinth bearing a letter of introduction to Halleck, explaining among other things: "I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exJuly 6, 1862. ceedingly glad of this if in your judgment it could Vol. XVI., be without endangering positions and operations Part II., in the Southwest." To this Halleck replied on July 10: "Governor Sprague is here. If I I· were to go to Washington I could advise but one to Lincoln, thing-to place all the forces in North Carolina, Lincoln to W. R. p. 100. Halleck July 10, 1862. W. R. Vol. XVI., Virginia, and Washington under one head, and hold that head responsible for the result." Part II., p. 117. It is doubtful if Halleck measured fully the import of his language; or whether he realized the danger and burden of the responsibility which, if |